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LIBRA.RY 

OP   THE 

Theological   Seminary, 

PRINCETON,    N.J. 

BX    7117     .W6    1849    v. 2 

Woods,    Leonard,    177A-1854. 

The   works    of    Leonard   Woods    . 

h.-^  /'i 


THE 


WORKS 


J 

LEONARD    WOODS,  D.  D., 


LATELY  PROFESSOR  OF  CHRISTIAN  THEOLOGY  IN  THE 
THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY,  ANDOVER. 


IN   FIVE    VOLUMES. 


YOJ..  n. 


ANDOVER: 
PRINTED     BY    JOHN    D.     FLAGG. 

1850. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1849,  by 

LEONARD   WOODS,  D.  D., 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Massachusetts. 


ansoteb: 
JOHN   D.    FLAGG, 

BTEREOTTPEE    AND    PRINTER. 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE   XLn. 

PAQI 

Divine  Providence.  Statement  and  proof  of  the  doc- 
trine. Providence  particular  and  universal,  —  re- 
lates to  the  natural  and  moral  world.  The  attri- 
butes OF  Providence,       ......  1 — 13 


The  doctrine  is  that  all  things  are  directed  and  controlled  by  Grod, 

proved  from  his  attributes, 

from  experience,      ..... 

Providence  particular  and  universal,  . 

An  objection  forestalled,   ..... 

A  general  Providence  implies  a  particular  Providence; 

important  to  intelligent  beings, 

-— ^  asserted  in  the  Scriptures, 

Divine  Providence  benevolent, .... 

just,  wise,  and  powerful,    .... 

manifestation  of  holiness, .... 


1 

1 

2 

4 

5 

8 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 


LECTURE   XLm. 

A  philosophical  theory  examined,    . 

The  theory  stated  by  Godwin,  Knapp,  Price,  Cowper,  etc. 
Argument  against  this  theory,    ..... 
Appeal  to  Christians,         ...... 


14—24 

15 
17 
22 


LECTURE   XLIV. 

The  particular  theory  continued,   ....  25 — 85 

Appeal  to  Scripture,  ........  25 

Oriental  idiom  considered,  .......  27 

Miracles,  ..........  28 

Argument  from  the  duty  of  prayer,   ......  29 


IV 


CONTENTS, 


LECTURE   XLV. 


The  theory  fukther  examined,  ....  36 — 55 

1.  Did  its  advocates  derive  it  from  the  Scriptures  ?      ...  37 

2.  How  do  they  know  the  truth  of  the  theory  ?  .  .  .  .  37 

3.  Do  they  infer  it  from  anything  which  takes  place  ?  .  .  .  38 

4.  Has  it  any  advantages  ?.......  38 

Argument  from  the  mechanism  of  a  clock,  remarked  upon  by  Dr. 

Clarke, 40 

Divine  Providence  includes  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature,  .  .  42 

The  powers  and  laws  of  nature  dependent  on  God,  ...  44 
Two  agencies,  that  of  creatures  and  that  of  God  —  their  relation 

to  each  other,        .........  46 

Views  of  Dr.  Day,   .........  48 

Practical  reflections  : 

1.  Easy  to  avoid  mistakes,     .......  50 

2.  Difierence  between  rational  piety  and  enthusiasm,        .         .  50 


LECTURE   XL VI. 


Moral  agency.     Proper  mode   of  inquiry, 
standard  of  truth, 

Man's  moral  agency  assumed,     . 

Meaning  of  moral  agency, 

Ultimate  standard  of  moral  distinctions, 

founded  in  the  constitution  of  man. 

Appeal  to  this  standard  by  inspired  men. 
Expressions  of  Dr.  Brown  referred  to. 


Ultimate 


56—66 

58 
59 
59 
62 
64 
65 


LECTURE   XLVn. 


Different  states  of  conscience  in  relation  to  moral 


AGENCY.     Ambiguity  of  words. 

BODILY  action,  .... 

Dormancy  of  conscience,  .  .  . 

1.  Conscience  not  wholly  inactive, 

2.  Will  finally  awake,  . 
Ambiguity  of  words. 

The  standard  applied  to  bodily  actions, 


The  test  applied  to 


67—76 

C7 
68 
68 
70 
73 


LECTURE   XLVm. 
The  test  applied  to  our  sensations  and  perceptions  ; 

TO  ACTS  merely  INTELLECTUAL  •,    AND  TO  VOLITIONS, 


The  test  applied  to  sensations, 
to  intellectual  acts,   . 


77—88 

77 

78 


CONTENTS. 


The  test  applied  to  volition, 

different  senses  of  the  word, 

explained  by  Locke, 

Is  volition  in  the  restricted  sense  a  moral  act  ? 
Mental  acts,  good  or  evil  in  themselves, 


80 

80 

81 

83 

,86 


LECTURE   XLIX. 

The  affections  in  themselves  morally  good  ok  evil. 
Laws  of  the  affections.  Their  connection  with  the 
intellect,  and  with  the  will,         ....         89 — 102 

The  standard  applied  to  the  affections,        .....  89 

Appeal  to  moral  sense,      ........  90 

Scripture  view,         .........  91 

Laws  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  the  affections,       .         .          .         .  92 

their  connection  with  the  intellect,      .....  93 

with  volition,    .........  93 

Language  of  Paul,  Rom.  7:  15 — 23,  Charnock's  views,         .         .  94 

The  affections  govern  the  will,  .......  95 

Quotation  from  Mackintosh,       .          .          .          .          .          .          .  97 

Practical  considerations  as  to  the  influence  of  the  will,           .         .  98 

Quotation  from  Whately,  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .  99 

Our  voluntary  agency  important  in  the  culture  of  moral  affec- 
tions,    100 


LECTURE   L. 

Connection  of  present  affections  with  preceding  af-> 
fections.     Practical  importance  of  the  views  which 

HAVE  been  advanced  RESPECTING  THE  CONNECTION  OF 
THE  AFFECTIONS  WITH  INTELLECT,  WITH  VOLITIONS,  AND 
WITH  PRECEDING  AFFECTIONS,       .....  103 — 113 


Connection  of  present  affection  with  the  preceding. 
Aptitude  of  the  mind  to  particular  affections. 
Natural  tendency  of  affection  to  increase  this  aptitude. 
This  tendency  sometimes  modified,     .... 

A  mistake  corrected,  ...... 

Practical  use  of  the  connection  of  the  affections  with  intellect, 

with  the  will,    ....... 

with  previous  affections,     .         .         . .    >     . 


103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
109 
110 
111 


LECTURE  LL 


On  what  peinciple  we  predict  future  affections,         114 — 125 


71  CONTENTS. 

LECTURE  LH. 

Moral  necessity,  what  it  implies.     Considerations  in 

its  favor,        . 126 — 137 


Moral  necessity  explained,  ..... 
The  doctrine  rests  upon  facts, ..... 
To  be  governed  by  motives  essential  to  rational  beings, 

acknowledged  in  our  practice, .... 

the  divine  conduct,  ..... 

Influence  of  motives  uniform,  ..... 


126 
129 
130 
180 
131 
131 


LECTURE  Lin. 

The  influence  op  motives,  objective  and  subjective,    138 — 145 

Influence  of  objective  motives  depends  on  the  subjective,    ,         .  138 

Our  own  experience,       ........  139 

Our  influence  over  the  affections,     .         .         .          .         .          .  142 

LECTURE  LIV. 

Do  motives  influence  men  necessarily  ?  Scriptural 
representation.  Nature  of  the  necessity.  Objection 
from  a  case  of  indifference  considered,       .         .       146 — 155 

Necessity  explained,        .          .         .         .         .         .          .         .  146 

Supposed  case  of  indifference  answered,  .....  148 

Objection  that  moral  necessity  is  inconsistent  with  moral  agency 

answered,  ..........  152 

Complete  influence  of  motives  considered          ....  163 

LECTURE   LV. 

Difficulty  as  to  moral  inability  considered.  Also  as 
TO  the  divine  purposes,  our  dependence  on  God,  and 

THE  WORK  OF  HIS  SPIRIT  IN  SANCTIFICATION,         .  .  156 — 163 

1.  Inability, 156 

2.  Divine  purposes,         ........  158 

3.  Our  dependence,        ........  161 

4.  Divine  influence  in  sanctification,          .          .          .          .          .  162 

LECTURE   LVL 

Moral  agency  continues  through  all  changes  of  char- 
acter. The  narrative  gen.  hi.  a  satisfactory  ac- 
count OF  the  first  human  sin,       ....  164 — 172 

Moral  agency  unimpaired  and  uninterrupted,    .         .         .         .  164 

Narrative  on  Gen.  iii.  satisfactory,     ......  169 


CONTENTS, 


VU 


LECTURE   LVn. 


OF     SINNERS     TO      OBEY     THE     DIVINE 


The    inability 

HANDS, 

Testimony  of  Scripture,  ...... 

applied  to  Christians,       ..... 

We  should  follow  the  Scriptures,      .... 
Does  the  present  time  require  new  modes  of  instruction  ? 


COM- 
173- 


-181 

174 
176 
178 
180 


LECTURE  LVm. 

The  sinner's  inability  explained,     . 

Not  every  kind  of  inability,     .... 

Scripture  requires  the  sinner  to  obey, 

Nature  of  the  inability  indicated  by  the  texts  referred 

Simplicity  of  the  sacred  writers, 

Quotation  from  Smalley,  .... 

Similar  language  used  in  other  cases. 


to, 


182—191 

182 
188 
184 
187 
188 
190 


LECTURE  LIX. 
Recapitulation.     Practical  bearings  of  the  subject,  192 — 200 


A  practical  difficulty,       .... 
Quotation  from  Dr.  Emmons,  . 
May  natural  ability  overcome  moral  inability  ? 
not  adapted  to  this  purpose, 


198 
195 
197 
199 


LECTURE   LX. 

Man's  depravity.     Preliminary  remarks,         .         .        201 — 209 

No  presumption  against  the  doctrine  from  the  divine  character,  .  201 

nor  from  the  fact  that  Grod  created  man  in  his  own  image,  .  204 

Spiritual   blindness   hinders   men  from  understanding  the   doc- 
trine,             205 

Men  in  their  natural  state  have  amiable  and  useful  qualities,        .  206 

No  philosophical  theory  free  from  difficulty,        ....  208 


LECTURE   LXI. 

Evidence  of  depravity  from  human  conduct. 
FROM  Scripture  of  its  universality,    . 

Evidence  from  human  conduct,         .  .  .  . 

This  evidence  various  and  constant. 


Evidence 

210—229 

210 
211 


VIU 


CONTENTS. 


Quotation  from  Dr.  Beecher,  . 

from  Chalmers,        .... 

from  Dr.  George  Payne,  .  • 

Proofs  from  Scripture  of  universal  sinfulness, 
Passages  expressly  asserting  it, 

setting  forth  the  sinfulness  of  individuals  and  nations, 

Scripture  representations  that  imply  universal  depravity. 


213 
213 
214 
216 
217 
218 
226 


LECTURE   LXn. 
Depravity  of  man  total,  ..... 

Total  depravity  explained,        ..... 

not  disproved  by  man's  amiable  and  useful  qualities, 

Proved  from  Scripture,   ...... 

from  Christian  experience,        .... 


230—235 

230 
231 
233 
234 


LECTURE   LXm. 
Depravity  native.     Explanation  of  terms.     Marks  op 

OTHER    things  WHICH  ARE    NATIVE.       ThESE  MARKS  PROVE 
NATIVE  DEPRAVITY,    .......  236 — 249 


Held  universally,   .... 

Explanation  of  native,     . 

Universality  one  mark  of  what  is  native, 

developing  itself  in  early  life,  . 

not  owing  to  any  change  subsequent  to  birth, 

operating  spontaneously, 

hard  to  be  overcome, 

we  can  predict  that  it  will  act  itself  out, 

applied  to  depravity. 

Objection  from  the  case  of  Adam  answered. 


236 
237 
238 
239 
239 
239 
239 
240 
241 
247 


LECTURE   LXIV. 

The  DOCTRINE  OF  NATIVE  DEPRAVITY  CONTINUED.  SCRIP- 
TURE EVIDENCE.  Consequences  of  denying  the  doc- 
trine,         250—270 

Appeal  to  Scripture,       .          .......  251 

Rom.  5:   12—19, 251 

Do  the  consequences  of  Adam's  offence  come  upon  any  who  are 

entirely  sinless  ?           ........  252 

John  3:6, 255 

Eph.  2  :  3,  and  Gal.  2:15, 258 

Psalm  51  :  3, 269 

Suppose  we  had  the  same  evidence  of  the  opposite  fact,       .         .  262 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


Consequences  of  denying  the  doctrine,     . 
Case  of  infant  children,  .... 


263 
267 


LECTURE   LXV. 
Common  objections  to  native  depravity  inadmissible,  271 — 288 


Common  objections  inadmissible, 
Marks  of  native  depravity  examined, 
Important  practical  principle  involved, 


271 
274 
281 


LECTURE   LXVI. 

Objections  to   native   depravity  particularly   exam- 
ined,          284—303 

From  the  moral  perfections  of  God,  .....  285 

Inconsistent  with  our  being  accountable  agents,  .         .         ■         294 


LECTURE    LXVn. 
Exercises  of  depraved  affection  commence  early, 

Assembly's  Shorter  Catechism,  ..... 

Levi  paid  tithes  in  Abraham,  ...... 


304—318 

316 
817 


LECTURE   LXVm. 

Innate  disposition  or  propensity  to  sin,  . 

Quotations  from  Hopkins,  Dwight,  and  others,  .  .         .         . 

Question  between  Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Edwards, 
Disposition  to  sin  taken  away  by  regeneration,  ... 
Quotation  from  Locke,    ........ 

What  will  become  of  human  beings  who  died  before  the  com- 
mencement of  moral  action  ?...... 

Two  views  harmonize,     ........ 


319 — 344 

324 
826 
337 
339 


340 
342 


LECTURE   LXIX. 

Remarks  on  the  words  innate,  transmitted,  hereditary, 
constitutional,  and  imputed,         ....         345- 

Innate, 
Hereditary,    . 
Imputation,    . 
Propagated,  . 
Constitutional, 


-364 

346 
346 
351 
352 
353 


CONTENTS, 


LECTURE  LXX. 

Every  other  theory  as  much  enctjmbered  with  diffi- 
culties AS  the  orthodox, 355 — 369 

Theory  of  a  mixed  character  in  man,        .....  356 

of  Dr.  John  Taylor, 357 

Another  theory,     .........  358 

Charge  of  physical  depravity,           .          .          .          .          .          .  361 

Another  theory,      .........  363 

Theory  of  a  preexistent  state  of  the  soul,  from  Prof  Miiller,        .  363 
Practical  tendency  of  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  exem- 
plified,         367 


LECTURE   LXXI. 

Remarks  ok  Coleridge's  views  of  original  sin,       .        370 — 387 
Proper  mode  of  teaching  the  doctrine  of  depravity,   .         .         382 — 387 


LECTURE  LXXn. 

The  atonement  a  subject  of  pure  revelation. 


388—397 


Human  reason  could  not  discover  that  God  would  in  any  way 
provide  salvation,         ...... 

— ^^  could  not  discover  in  what  way  he  would  do  this, 

could  not  determine  what  would  be  the  results. 

Human  reason  not  set  aside,  ..... 
How  reason  should  be  employed,  .... 
Hints  to  direct  our  inquiries  and  prevent  mistakes. 


389 
390 
391 
393 
894 
396 


LECTURE   LXXm. 

Texts  which  teach  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  first 

and  second  classes,         ......         398 — 406 

Pirst  class  teaching  that  Christ  is  the  Redeemer,         .          .          .  399 
Second  class  teaching  that  forgiveness  comes  through  the  death 

of  Christ, 399 

Objection  considered,      ........  400 


LECTURE   LXXIV. 

Third,  fourth,  fifth,  sixth,  seventh,  classes  of  texts,  407 — 419 

Circumstance  that  the  suffering  Saviour  was  perfectly  holy,         .         408 
How  to  account  for  his  sufferings,     ......  409 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


Third  class  of  texts  —  Christ  died  for  our  sins,  . 

Meaning  of  these  texts,  ....... 

Fourth  class  —  Christ  died  for  sinners,      .... 

These  texts  explained,    ....... 

The  idea  of  substitution  not  derived  from  a  particular  word, 
Fifth  class  —  Christ  a  ransom,  ..... 

Sixth  class  —  Gal.  3  :   13,  Christ  made  a  curse,  . 

Seventh  class  —  Christ  bore  our  sins,        .... 


411 
411 
414 
415 
416 
418 
418 
419 


LECTURE  LXXV. 

Eighth,  ninth,  tenth,  and  eleventh  classes.     A  diffi- 
culty AS  TO  THE    DIFFERENT  ENDS  OF  ChRIST'S  DEATH,     420 431 

Eighth  class  —  Christ  taking  away  sin,       .....  420 

Ninth  class — Christ  a  sin  offering,  ......  421 

Tenth  class — Christ  a  propitiation, .          .....  423 

Eleventh  class  —  Christ  reconciles  us  to  God,    ....  428 

Objection,  that  Scripture  mentions  other  ends  of  Christ's  death,  .  425 

Answered,     .         .         .         •         •         •         •         •         •         •  428 


LECTURE   LXXVL 

Different  views  op  the  ends  of  Christ's  death  harmo- 
nious. Metaphorical  language  used  by  the  ortho- 
dox, AND  BY  THE  SACRED  "WRITERS,  RESPECTING  GOD  A3  A 
JUST    MORAL    GOVERNOR. 


Objections  against  it  consi- 


How  far  Scripture  language  is  metaphorical. 
Metaphorical  language  used  for  impression, 
Why  does  God  inflict  punishment  ?  . 
Objection  of  Unitarians  considered, 


432—448 

434 
438 
438 
440 


LECTURE   LXXVn. 
Necessity  of  atonement  argued  from  various  consider- 


ations,    . 

1.  Atonement  actually  made,   ..... 

2.  Scriptures  assert  the  necessity,     .... 

3.  Consideration  of  divine  character  and  government. 


444—455 

444 
447 
449 


LECTURE   LXXVm. 

Substitution  or  vicarious  sufferings  particulablt  con- 
sidered, .         .' 456—464 

Atonement  defined,         ....•..•         461 


SI 


CONTENTS, 


LECTURE  LXXIX. 

Propitiation.  Satisfaction  op  justice.  Did  Christ 
answer  the  demands  of  the  law  and  endure  its  pe- 
NALTY ?     Did   he  pay  the  debt  op  sinners  ?     Did  he 

CANCEL  THE  CLAIMS  OF  THE  LAW  ?      .  .  .  .  465 — 477 

1.  Propitiation  explained,         .......  465 

2.  Satisfaction  to  divine  justice,        ......  467 

8.  Did  Christ  endure  the  penalty  of  the  law?    ....  471 

4.  Did  Christ  pay  the  debt  of  sinners?     .  .  .  .  .  474 

5.  Did  Christ  cancel  the  claims  of  the  law  ?      .         .  .         .  476 


LECTURE  LXXX. 

Was  THE  DEATH  OF  ChRIST  A    FULL  EQUIVALENT  AND  LEGAL 
SUBSTITUTE     FOR     THE     PUNISHMENT     OF     SINNERS  ?        WaS 

Christ  our  representative?     Were  our  sins  imputed 

TO  him  ?     Was  his  active  obedience  an  essential  part 

OF  the  atonement  ? 

6.  Full  equivalent  and  legal  substitute, 

The  law  place  of  sinners. 


8.  Christ  our  representative, . 

9.  Were  our  sins  imputed  to  Christ  ? 
10.   Active  obedience  part  of  the  atonement, 


478—489 

478 
479 
479 
480 
482 


LECTURE  LXXXI. 
Ib  the  atonement  general  or  particular  ? 


490—504 


LECTURE   LXXXn. 
Kemarks  on  the  controversy,  . 


505—521 


LECTURE  LXXXHL 

BeMARKS  on  the  views  of  COLERIDGE, 


522—535 


LECTURE   LXXXIV. 

Kegeneration.     Its  nature, 


636—549 


LECTURE   LXXXV. 

Kegeneration.  Its  cause  or  author.  The  work  mani- 
fests great  power  ;  is  sovereign  ;  and  is  special  and 
supernatural,         .......  550 — 563 


LECTURE   LXXXVL 
Regeneration  not  owing  to  anything  in  fallen  man,    564 — 575 


LECTURE     XLII 


DIVINE  PROVIDENCE.  STATEMENT  AND  PROOF  OF  THE  DOCTRINE. 
PROVIDENCE  PARTICULAR  AND  UNIVERSAL, — RELATES  TO  THE 
NATURAL  AND  MORAL  WORLD.  THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  PROVI- 
DENCE. 

The  doctrine  of  divine  providence  is,  that  all  things  are  sus- 
tained, directed  and  controlled  hy  Q-od.  "  Through  him  are  all 
things."  Correspondent  with  this  is  the  teaching  of  the  Assembly's 
Catechism.  "  The  works  of  God's  providence  are  his  most  holj, 
wise  and  powerful  preserving  and  governing  all  his  creatures  and 
all  their  actions." 

The  reality  of  God's  providence  has  been  considered  not  only 
by  Christian  divines,  but  by  heathen  philosophers,  as  resulting 
from  his  attributes.  If  God  is  infinitely  intelligent  and  powerful 
and  good,  he  certainly  will  take  care  of  the  works  of  his  hand. 
The  same  benevolence  which  prompted  him  to  create  the  world, 
must  prompt  him  to  preserve  and  govern  it.  The  same  wisdom 
which  contrived  so  wonderful  and  glorious  a  system,  can  and  wiU 
direct  and  control  it.  And  the  same  power  which  first  brought 
all  things  into  being,  can  with  perfect  ease  and  unfailing  efiiciency 
sustain  and  overrule  them.  To  suppose  that  God  would  create 
such  a  world  and  such  a  universe,  and  then  sufier  it  to  fall  into  non- 
existence, or  neglect  to  take  care  of  it,  would  be  to  suppose  God 
destitute  of  immutable  perfection.  If  we  should  be  told,  that 
God  win  tomorrow  withdraw  his  attention  and  care  from  the  crea- 
tures he  has  made,  and  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  them,  leav- 
ing them  and  all  their  concerns  to  take  their  own  course,  either  to 
cease  to  exist,  or  to  exist,  if  they  can,  independently  of  him ; 

VOL.  n.  1 


'J  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

should  "we  not  cry  out  in  distress,  —  can  it  be  that  our  glorious 
Creator  will  do  this  ?  Can  he  who  is  infinitely  benovolent,  cease 
to  exercise  his  benevolence  ?  Can  the  only  wise  God  cease  to 
show  his  wisdom  ?  Can  omnipotence  cease  to  act  ?  Why  should 
God  have  given  being  to  such  a  world,  unless  he  meant  to  pre- 
serve and  govern  it  ?  Would  it  be  an  act  of  goodness  to  create 
the  universe  and  then  leave  it  in  such  a  forlorn  condition  ? — The 
thought  that  God  will  neglect  to  preserve  and  govern  the  world 
which  he  has  made,  would  fill  us  with  inexpressible  terror  and  dis- 
may. We  could  find  no  resting  place.  All  would  be  desolation. 
And  those  who  have  the  highest  degree  of  reason  and  benevolence, 
would  be  the  most  wretched.  We  come  then  quickly  to  this  re- 
sult, that  if  God  does  indeed  possess,  as  we  know  he  does,  those 
perfections  which  we  are  wont  to  ascribe  to  him,  he  surely  will  pre- 
serve and  govern  all  his  creatures  and  all  their  actions. 

But  the  providence  of  God,  which  thus  follows  from  his  attri- 
butes, is  also  taught  by  experience.  Even  the  short  acquaintance 
which  we  have  had  with  the  natural  and  moral  world,  furnishes 
abundant  proof  of  the  sustaining  and  controlling  agency  of  God. 
In  the  heavens  above  and  in  the  earth  beneath,  in  land  and  water 
and  air,  in  the  light  of  day,  and  in  the  darkness  of  night,  in  the 
revolving  seasons,  in  vegetables,  animals  and  jninerals,  we  see  con- 
stant displays  of  boundless  wisdom,  power  and  goodness.  The 
objects  of  nature  around  us  and  above  us  address  themselves  di- 
rectly to  our  understandings  and  hearts,  declaring  in  language 
which  cannot  be  mistaken,  that  God  upholds  and  guides  the  uni- 
verse. Who  can  behold  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  creation, 
the  marks  of  contrivance  every  where  apparent,  the  adaptedness 
of  means  to  ends,  and  the  subserviency  of  all  things  to  the  im- 
provement and  well-being  of  man,  without  recognizing  the  con- 
stant operation  of  a  presiding  intelhgence  and  a  diffusive  benevo- 
lence ?  And  who  can  behold  the  mighty  operations  which  are 
going  on  in  the  visible  creation,  without  recognizing  the  hand  of 
omnipotence  ?  The  manner  in  which  we  are  continued  in  life, 
the  delicate  structure  of  our  frame,  the  dangers  to  which  we  find 
ourselves  constantly  exposed,  the  deep  consciousness  we  have  of 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  3" 

our  own  weakness,  and  our  utter  insufficiency  for  our  own  safety 
and  happiness,  must  indelibly  impress  the  sentiment  upon  us,  that 
in  God  we  hve  and  move  and  have  our  being.  The  doctrine  is 
brought  out  to  view  by  the  common  course  of  human  affairs  in 
societies,  and  in  the  life  of  indi\^duals.  Read  the  histoiy  of 
Joseph,  of  Moses,  of  David,  of  Esther,  and  of  other  persons  as 
set  forth  in  the  Scriptures.  Do  you  not  see  that  the  circumstances 
and  events  of  their  lives  were  all  shaped  by  the  hand  of  God  ? 
Do  you  not  observe,  every  where,  the  marks  of  his  all-directing 
agency  ?  The  histories  of  these  individuals  is  only  a  specimen  of 
the  history  of  human  life.  Your  life  and  mine  exhibit  as  real 
evidence  of  God's  providence,  as  the  life  of  Joseph,  Moses  or 
David.  We  must  have  been  very  inattentive  observers  of  the 
events  which  have  come  before  us,  if  we  have  overlooked  the  di- 
vme  hand  —  if  we  have  not  clearly  seen  that  the  daily  current  of 
our  affairs  depends  on  a  wisdom  and  power  above  our  own.  The 
plans  which  our  wisdom  contrives,  are  often  baffled.  The  objects 
which  we  design  and  expect  to  accomplish,  fail.  Events  occur 
which  were  not  expected  or  thought  of  by  us.  Blessings  come  to 
us  unsought.  Evils  befall  us  which  we  did  not  fear.  And  those 
evils,  against  which  we  most  earnestly  endeavor  to  guard  our- 
selves, we  find  it  impossible  to  avoid.  It  stands  before  us  in  evi- 
dence as  clear  as  noon-day  brightness,  that  it  is  not  in  man  to  di- 
rect his  own  steps.  We  have  no  poAver  to  stop  or  turn  aside  the 
wheels  of  providence.  Before  the  power  which  governs  human 
affairs,  our  power  fades  away.  And  in  comparison  with  the  wis- 
dom which  presides  over  us,  our  wisdom  is  folly.  In  proportion 
as  we  obtain  just  views  of  ourselves  and  of  our  condition,  we 
become  distrustful  of  our  own  plans,  and  feel  that  we  are  insuffi- 
cient to  guide  our  own  pursuits,  or  protect  our  o^vn  interests. 
This  is  a  lesson  which  we  are  learning  continually.  Common  ex- 
perience brings  us  into  contact  with  a  power  and  wisdom  above* 
us,  the  influence  of  which  we  should  always  desire  as  a  blessing 
of  infinite  value. 

The  evidence  of  a  divine  providence  over  societies  and  nations 
is  equally  remarkable.     We  may  sometimes  be  ready  to  think 


4  DIVINE     PKOVIDENCE. 

that  the  care  which  God  exercised  over  the  posterity  of  Jacob  and 
of  Esau  is  an  exception  to  the  general  course  of  things  ;  that  in 
those  cases,  God  had  a  special  object  in  view,  and  accordingly  in- 
terfered in  a  manner  entirely  dififerent  from  what  is  common  ;  that 
in  ordinary  cases,  he  lets  men  alone,  leaving  them,  for  the  most 
part  at  least,  to  take  care  of  themselves,  independently  of  any 
higher  agency.  But  if  the  history  of  our  own  country  and  of 
other  countries  should  be  written  truly  and  fully,  the  hand  of  God 
would  be  every  where  apparent.  You  could  not  avoid  the  belief, 
that  the  events  which  have  taken  place,  though  involving  human 
agency,  have  been  under  a  divine  direction,  and  have  all  been 
made  subser\dent  to  the  objects  of  divine  wisdom?  In  the  course 
of  our  Revolutionary  struggles,  there  were  many  instances,  in 
which  our  pviblic  affairs,  beyond  all  expectation,  and  independently 
of  human  contrivance,  took  such  a  favorable  turn,  that  the  whole 
community  were  constrained  to  acknowledge  the  hand  of  God. 
And  if  we  had  a  discei-nment  sufficiently  clear,  we  should  see 
that,  in  the  strictest  sense,  God  judgeth  among  the  nations,  and 
reigns  in  righteousness  and  in  mercy  over  all  the  earth. 

But  to  exhibit  the  argument  from  experience  and  from  fact  in 
all  its  force,  would  be  to  give  a  particular  and  complete  history 
of  all  the  events  that  have  taken  place  since  the  creation  of  the 
world,  relative  to  individuals,  famihes,  societies  and  nations.  All 
that  I  now  aim  to  do  is,  to  turn  your  thoughts  to  the  subject,  and 
to  induce  you  to  ponder  well  the  evidence  of  a  superintending 
providence,  arising  from  your  own  experience  and  observation,  and 
also  from  the  history  of  events  written  by  inspired  and  uninspired 
men. 

The  doctrine  which  I  maintain  and  which  is  the  doctrine  com- 
monly received  by  Christians  is,  that  the  providence  of  God  is  not 
only  general,  but  particular  and  universal ;  that  it  reaches  to  all 
his  creatures  and  all  their  actions.  This  doctrine  is  manifestly  of 
deep  interest.  It  teaches  that  the  king  eternal,  immortal  and  in- 
visible, the  only  wise  God,  is  constantly  near  to  us,  and  present 
with  us,  and  present  with  the  whole  creation,  every  where  and  at 
all  times  exercising  and  manifesting  his  glorious  perfections.     Let 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  5 

US  seriously  ponder  the  evidence  which  shows,  that  this  doctrine, 
so  interesting  and  desirable,  is  founded  in  truth. 

I  shall  here  forestall  an  objection  which  is  apt  to  arise  in  the 
minds  of  contemplative  men,  against  the  doctrine  of  a  particular 
and  universal  providence.  It  is  alleged,  that  for  God  to  concern 
himself  with  all  the  little  things  which  exist,  with  all  the  httle 
events  which  take  place,  and  all  the  trifling,  insignificant  actions 
of  rational  and  irrational  creatures,  would  be  derogatory  to  his  dig- 
nified and  exalted  character.  This  objection  is  specious  ;  and  it 
may  be  no  easy  matter  to  rid  our  minds  entirely  of  its  influence. 
The  chief  difiiculty  will  be  found  to  arise  from  supposing  an  anal- 
ogy which  does  not  exist,  between  the  agency  of  God  and  the 
agency  of  man.  As  it  would  be  burdensome  to  us,  and  would  be* 
incompatible  with  our  wisdom,  and  would  hinder  us  from  accom- 
plishmg  higher  objects,  to  concern  ourselves  continually  with  what 
we  call  small  and  trifling  afiairs  ;  it  is  supposed  that  any  thing 
like  this  would  be  burdensome  to  the  Supreme  Being,  and  would 
hinder  him  from  giving  proper  attention  to  objects  of  higher  mo- 
ment. But  in  all  this  we  forget,  that  God's  ways  are  not  our 
ways,  nor  his  thoughts  our  thoughts.  It  results  from  our  Hmited 
faculties,  that  we  can  attend  to  but  a  few  thmgs  at  once,  and  con- 
sequently are  obliged  to  make  a  selection  of  those  things  which 
seem  to  us  the  most  important,  and  to  pass  by  the  rest.  There 
are  various  little  things  with  which  we  cannot  consistently  concern 
ourselves,  because  they  do  not  fall  within  our  province,  and  ought 
not  to  occupy  the  time  which  is  due  to  other  matters.  But  you 
will  observe  that,  when  any  of  those  little  things  become  really 
important  to  us,  then,  however  little  they  may  be,  and  however 
insignificant  they  may  have  appeared  to  us  before,  we  find  it  to  be 
proper  to  concern  ourselves  with  them.  If  you  are  exposed  to  an 
insect,  however  small,  that  you  know  to  be  venomous,  you  take 
care  to  avoid  it.  If  you  have  inhaled  any  small  substance  into 
your  lungs,  you  take  pains  to  free  yourself  from  it.  Nor  do  you 
ever  feel  it  to  be  degrading  to  your  dignity,  or  in  any  way  incon- 
sistent with  your  duty,  to  concern  yourself  immediately  with 
such  a  small  matter.     If  the  most  exalted  personage  on  earth, 


6  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

even  while  engaged  in  business  of  the  greatest  moment,  should  in 
such  circumstances  stop  to  concern  himself  with  so  small  a  matter ; 
would  it  be  derogatory  to  his  character  ?  We  attend  every  day 
to  many  small  affairs,  which  would  be  quite  below  our  notice, 
were  they  not  important  to  our  well-being,  but  which,  being  thus 
important,  have  a  just  claim  upon  our  regard.  You  see  then  that 
the  objection  has  little  force  even  in  regard  to  us  ;  for  the  moment 
any  thing  however  small  in  itself  becomes  of  importance  to  us, 
that  moment  it  ceases  to  be  below  our  notice,  and  it  would  be  a 
dishonor  and  a  sin  to  neglect  it.  Now  if  we  saw  that  other  httle 
things  and  that  all  Httle  things  were  in  any  way  important  to  us, 
or  to  our  fellow  creatures,  it  would  certamly  be  right  for  us  to 
give  attention  to  them  to  the  extent  of  our  power.  To  do  so 
would  be  an  honor  to  us,  so  far  as  it  would  not  require  us  to  over- 
look things  more  important.  Of  what  weight  then  is  the  objection 
which  is  founded  on  the  supposition,  that  God  is  limited  in  his  un- 
derstanding and  power,  as  we  are  ?  Remove  this  misconception 
of  the  divine  character,  and  the  objection  loses  all  its  force.  We 
cannot  measure  God's  attributes  by  our  own.  Because  we  cannot 
know  all  things,  and  be  in  all  places  at  the  same  time,  it  does 
not  follow  that  God  cannot.  Because  our  attention  is  necessarily 
limited  to  a  few  things,  it  does  not  follow  that  God's  attention  is 
thus  limited.  All  tliuigs  are  present  to  his  view.  He  sees  at 
once  the  great  and  the  small,  the  distant  and  the  near.  He  knows 
the  whole  imiverse  more  perfectly  than  we  know  the  smallest  part 
of  it.  He  observes  all  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  all  intelligent 
beings  in  heaven  and  earth  far  more  perfectly,  than  we  observe  any 
•one  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  our  own  minds.  His  attention 
■to  the  greatest  objects  in  the  imiverse  does  not  interfere  at  all  with 
his  attention  to  the  least.  And  his  attention  to  the  least  does  not 
interfere  with  his  attention  to  the  greatest.  To  each  single  thing 
in  the  creation  he  attends  as  perfectly,  as  though  nothing  else  ex- 
isted, and  as  though  that  one  thing  were  the  only  object  of  his 
thoughts.  And  this  perfect  view  which  God  constantly  takes  of 
all  creatures  and  all  events  through  the  whole  extent  of  the  uni- 
verse, instead  of  being  wearisome,  or  requiring  anything  like  what 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  J, 

we  call  effort,  is  rest  and  blessedness  to  his  infinite  understand- 
ing. 

The  same  is  true  of  his  power.  His  agency  in  upholding  and 
governing  all  things  costs  him  nothing  like  labor  in  us.  It  is  per- 
fectly easy  for  God  to  exercise  his  omnipotence.  He  can  put  forth 
as  perfect  an  agency  in  the  greatest  things,  as  though  he  did  not 
act  at  all  in  the  smallest.  And  he  can  act  as  perfectly  in  the 
smallest,  as  though  he  did  not  act  at  all  in  the  greatest.  Hence 
I  cannot  admit,  that  the  objection  we  are  considermg  has  any 
weight.  The  exercise  of  a  particular  and  universal  providence 
is.  every  way  suited  to  the  perfections  of  God.  If  he  sees  that 
the  smallest  things  in  existence  are  of  any  consequence,  as  parts 
of  the  system  of  the  universe,  they  are  not  beneath  his  notice  ; 
and  it  is  not  a  dishonor  but  an  honor  to  him  to  extend  his  care 
over  them.  And  if  any  one  affirms  that  those  things  which  are 
small  in  themselves  are  of  no  use  as  parts  of  a  great  system,  he 
is  chargeable  with  the  impiety  and  presumption  of  setting  up  his 
own  judgment  in  opposition  to  the  judgment  of  God.  As  to  the 
allegation  that  httle  things  are  below  the  notice  of  God  —  who 
are  they  that  make  this  allegation  ?  Are  not  all  the  men  on 
earth  little  creatures,  exceedingly  little,  in  comparison  with  the 
beings  above  them  ?  With  all  our  proud  and  lofty  feelings,  we  ^ 
are  far  more  inferior  to  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  than  the  least  of  all 
insects  are  to  us.  If  then  we  insist  upon  the  objection  above 
stated,  let  us  carry  it  through  and  say,  that  God  is  so  great  and 
exalted,  and  we  are  so  small  and  insignificant,  that  it  must  be  de- 
gradmg  to  his  dignity  to  stoop  down  so  low  as  to  notice  us  and  to 
take  care  of  our  little  affairs.  Indeed,  if  we  consider  the  glori- 
ous character  of  God,  and  his  great  and  marvellous  works  in  the 
unnumbered  worlds  above  us,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  our  vision, 
we  may  well  be  filled  with  admiration,  and  exclaim  with  the 
Psahnist ;  "  What  is  man  that  thou  art  mindful  of  him,  or  the  son 
of  man  that  thou  visitest  him  ?"  God  does  really  humble  himself 
to  regard  the  greatest  created  beings  on  earth  or  in  heaven.  But 
this  is  no  objection,  for  infinite  condescension  is  one  of  the  per- 
fections of  God. 


8  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

But  the  objection  under  consideration  lies  with  as  much  force 
against  God's  work  in  creation,  as  in  providence.  Were  not  all 
the  Uttle  things  which  exist  created  hj  God  ?  Did  he  not  make 
the  worms  of  the  dust,  and  the  smallest  insects,  and  all  the 
minute  particles  of  sand,  air  and  water  ?  And  who  will  say,  that 
the  creation  of  these  was  beneath  the  exalted  character  of  God  ? 
How  then  is  it  unworthy  of  his  character  to  extend  his  care  over 
them  ?  To  say  that  anything  in  existence  is  of  no  use  whatever, 
and  is  unworthy  of  God's  notice,  would  be  to  impeach  his  wisdom 
as  Creator.  For  surely  God  knew  w^hat  was  worthy  of  him  be- 
fore he  created  the  world,  and  when  he  created  it.  And  if  he 
had  seen  that  any  of  the  httle  things  now  existing  were  absolutely 
useless,  and  in  no  way  deserving  of  his  notice,  would  he  have  ex- 
erted his  power  to  bring  them  into  existence  ?  But  if  God  mani- 
fested his  perfections  in  giving  them  existence  at  first,  he  mani- 
fests his  perfections  equally  in  continuing  their  existence. 

But  to  obviate  still  further  the  objection  against  the  doctrine 
of  a,  particular  axid  universal  TpTovidence,  it  is  important  to  show 
that  a  general  providence,  which  is  so  readily  admitted,  necessa- 
rily implies  a  particular  providence.  A  general  providence  is  a 
providence  over  the  world  as  a  whole.  But  is  not  the  world,  as 
a  whole,  made  up  of  parts  ?  And  is  it  possible  to  take  care  of 
the  whole  without  taking  care  of  the  parts  which  constitute  it  ? 
You  admit  that  divine  providence  extends  generally  over  water, 
earth  and  air.  But  these  consist  of  parts  larger  and  smaller. 
And  if  God  does  not  concern  himself  with  the  smaller  parts,  how 
can  he  concern  himself  with  the  larger  objects  which  they  consti- 
tute ?  It  is  manifestly  impossible  for  him  to  do  the  one  without 
doing  the  other.  The  same  is  true  respecting  the  animal  and 
vegetable  kingdoms.  If  God  takes  care  of  these  as  a  whole,  he 
must  take  care  of  all  the  species  of  animals  and  vegetables  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  and  of  particular  animals  and  vegetables, 
and  of  all  their  constituent  parts. 

This  view  of  divine  providence  is  indescribably  important  in 
respect  to  intelligent  and  moral  beings.  You  admit  that  God  has 
an  agency  in  regard  to  the  great  and  general  concerns  of  man- 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  y 

kind  ;  that  he  rules  among  the  nations,  superintends  their  weighty 
pubhc  measures,  and  takes  care  of  their  more  important  interests. 
But  how  can  there  be  such  a  general  providence,  without  a  par- 
ticular providence  ?  How  can  God  exercise  his  righteous  domin- 
ion over  a  nation,  without  exercising  it  over  the  individuals  who 
compose  the  nation  ?  And  how  can  he  superintend  the  weighty 
public  interests  of  the  nation,  without  superintending  whatever 
goes  to  constitute  those  mterests  ?  It  is  impossible.  A  particu- 
lar providence,  in  the  most  perfect  sense,  is  involved  in  a  general 
providence.  And  if  we  do  not  hold  to  a  particular  providence,  we 
cannot  consistently  hold  to  a  divine  providence  in  any  sense.  And 
as  a  particular  providence  is  necessarily  involved  in  a  general 
providence,  all  the  arguments  which  prove  a  general  providence, 
do,  at  the  same  time,  prove  a  particular  providence. 

The  doctrme  of  a  particular  providence  is  largely  asserted  and 
exemplified  in  the  Scriptures.  This  is  the  argument  on  which  we 
are  chiefly  to  rely.  The  Bible  teaches  that  God  doeth  his  pleas- 
ure in  the  armies  of  heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants  of  the 
earth ;  that  he  worketh  all  things  after  the  counsel  of  his  own 
will ;  that  his  mercies  are  over  all  his  works ;  that  he  is  every 
where  present ;  that  in  him  we  hve  and  move  and  have  our  being ; 
and  that  of  him,  and  through  him,  and  to  him  are  all  things. 
God's  providence  is  represented  as  extending  to  all  our  actions 
and  all  our  personal  concerns.  "  Man's  heart  deviseth  his  way, 
but  the  Lord  directeth  his  steps."  "  The  lot  is  cast  into  the  lap, 
but  the  whole  disposing  thereof  is  of  the  Lord."  God  fixes  the 
bounds  of  our  Hfe  and  the  place  of  our  abode.  He  gives  us  our 
daily  bread,  our  health,  our  domestic  and  social  comforts,  our  re- 
ligious privileges,  and  all  that  constitutes  our  goodly  heritage. 
Jesus  has  plainly  taught  us  what  concern  God  has  in  sustaining 
and  governing  the  world,  and  how  particular  and  constant  his 
agency  is.  He  says,  God  feeds  the  ravens  and  young  lions  — 
takes  care  of  sparrows,  clothes  the  lilies  and  numbers  the  hairs 
of  our  heads.  The  Scriptures  from  the  beginning  to  the  end 
teach  that  God  superintends  and  directs  the  aflkirs  of  families 
and  individuals ;  that  the  minutest  circumstances  are  ordered  by 


10  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

his  providence,  so  as  to  render  them  subservient  to  liis  designs ; 
that  when  favors  come  to  individual  persons,  or  families,  or  larger 
societies,  they  come  from  God,  and  are  expressions  of  his  good- 
ness ;  and  that,  when  greater  or  smaller  calamities  come,  they 
are  sent  hj  God  as  righteous  judgments.  The  whole  compass  of 
human  thoughts,  designs,  pursuits,  characters,  interests,  enjoy- 
ments and  sufferings  are  represented  as  being  under  the  eye  of 
God,  and  as  controlled  by  his  wisdom  and  power.  There  is  no 
exception  to  this.  According  to  the  Bible,  there  is  no  limitation 
of  the  providence  of  God.  It  i-eaches  all  things  great  and  small, 
both  in  the  natural  and  in  the  spiritual  world.  There  is  no  con- 
ceivable way  in  which  the  sacred  writers  could  have  more  strongly 
asserted  or  more  clearly  illustrated  the  particular  and  universal 
providence  of  God,  than  they  have  done.  And  if  the  doctrine 
is  not  true,  prophets  and  apostles,  and  Christ  himself  were  greatly 
mistaken. 

Such  briefly  are  the  arguments  in  proof  of  a  general  and 
particular  divine  providence.  Consider  now  the  attributes  which 
belong  to  it. 

1.  Divine  providence  is  benevolent.  In  other  words ;  God  in 
his  providence  exercises  his  benevolence.  He  over-rules  all  things 
for  the  welfare  of  his  moral  empire.  In  many  instances  his  provi- 
dence accomplishes  good  directly.  In  other  cases,  the  good 
aimed  at  is  accompHshed  by  means  of  that,  which  is  not  in  itself 
a  good.  This  is  the  case  of  all  the  afflictions  of  God's  people. 
In  themselves  they  are  not  joyous  but  grievous.  But  they  work 
the  peaceable  fruits  of  righteousness.  And  all  good  men  have 
reason  to  say,  it  is  good  for  us  that  we  have  been  afflicted.  The 
punishment  inflicted  on  the  wicked  will  certainly  answer  imjwrtant 
ends  in  exhibiting  the  holy  character  of  God,  in  supporting  the 
honor  of  his  law,  and  in  discountenancing  sin.  Even  sin  itself,  so 
far  as  God  suffers  it  to  take  place,  will  be  over-ruled  for  good. 
His  providential  agency  respecting  it  is  perfectly  benevolent.  It 
is  true  of  all  the  moral  evil  which  exists,  that  God  means  it  for 
good.  All  his  dispensations,  however  dark  and  inscrutable  for  a 
time,  are  but  the  actings  of  infinite  goodness. 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  11 

2.  Providence  i»ju8t.  The  plan  of  it  is  such,  that  sin  -will  be 
stigmatized  and  sinners  punished,  while  holiness  will  be  honored, 
and  those  who  are  holy  rewarded.  The  work  of  retribution  is 
commenced  here,  though  not  completed.  The  events  of  provi- 
dence make  it  perfectly  manifest  that  there  is  a  God  who  judgeth 
in  the  earth. 

3.  The  providence  of  God  displays  his  wisdom.  The  more  we 
attend  to  the  divine  operations  in  the  natural  world,  the  more  are 
we  struck  with  the  consummate  wisdom  which  is  every  where  mani- 
fested in  adapting  means  to  the  accomphshment  of  good  ends. 
But  this  adaptation  is  still  more  admirable  in  the  moral  world.  In 
unnumbered  instances,  the  end  accomplished  is  directly  and  mani- 
festly connected  with  the  means.  And  a  further  observation  will 
show,  that  the  end  thus  accomphshed,  becomes  a  means  to  another 
end,  and  this  last  to  another,  and  so  on  continually.  This  chain 
of  events,  this  concatenation  of  means  and  ends  may  be  less  visible 
in  the  moral  world  than  in  the  natural.  But  when  discovered,  it 
is  far  more  wonderful ;  and  it  often  leads  us  to  exclaim,  "  Oh !  the 
depth  of  the  riches  both  of  the  wisdom  and  knowledge  of  God !" 
This  is  most  of  all  the  case  when  the  ends  to  be  answered  are  distant 
in  time,  and  when  the  arrangements  of  providence  seem  at  present 
to  look  another  way.  This  was  remarkably  the  case  in  the  family 
of  Jacob.  For  a  long  time,  the  events  which  took  place  were 
calamitous  and  distressing.  But  when  you  follow  the  history,  you 
see  not  only  the  end  accomphshed,  but  the  striking  adaptation  of 
the  arrangements  of  providence  to  that  very  end.  This  subservi- 
ency of  events,  which  are  in  themselves  dark  and  deplorable,  to 
important  and  often  very  distant  results,  this  bringing  of  good  out 
of  evil  contrary  to  all  human  intentions  and  human  expecta- 
tions, shows  the  far-reaching  and  unsearchable    wisdom  of  God. 

4.  In  divine  providence  there  is  a  constant  manifestation  of 
power.  To  j^^'^scrve  is  as  much  the  work  of  omnipotence,  as  to 
create,  —  to  continue  existence  as  to  give  it  at  first.  But  it  is  not 
merely  by  upholding  things  in  existence  that  God  continually 
shows  his  power.  He  does  it  also  in  so  directing  and  governing 
all  his  creatures  and  all  their  actions,  as  to  compass  his  own  right- 


12  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

eous  and  benevolent  ends.  How  vast  is  the  work  of  giving  mo 
tion  and  direction  to  the  immense  bodies  which  belong  to  the  solar 
system !  But  the  solar  system  is  only  a  very  small  part  of  the 
creation.  Who  can  think  without  amazement  of  the  power  exer- 
cised in  eflSciently  superintending  the  millions  of  worlds  in  the 
starry  heavens ! 

One  of  the  ways  in  which  God  displays  his  power  is,  in  over- 
coming resistance.  No  language  can  set  forth  the  strength  and 
the  countless  forms  of  opposition,  constantly  made  by  wicked  be- 
ings against  the  righteous  and  benevolent  providence  of  God. 
But  what  is  all  this  opposition  before  his  infinite  power  ?  In  a 
moment,  and  with  perfect  ease,  he  can  frustrate  all  the  efforts  of 
his  enemies.  The  lifting  vip  of  his  hand  confounds  them.  His 
frown  fills  them  with  dismay,  and  prostrates  them  in  the  dust.  In 
many  instances,  it  pleases  God  in  his  providence  to  suffer  his  ene- 
mies for  a  time  to  prosper,  and  even  to  exult  and  triumph,  as 
though  they  were  conquerors.  And  then  when  they  stand  forth 
in  all  their  might,  with  the  skill  acquired  by  long  experience,  and 
flushed  with  the  hope  of  victory  ;  the  Almighty  utters  his  voice, 
and  they  are  scattered  and  put  to  shame.  So  a  mighty  prince, 
who  knows  his  own  resources,  and  his  superiority  over  his  en- 
emies, sometimes  suffers  them  to  come  into  the  very  midst  of 
his  kingdom,  and  within  sight  of  his  army,  so  that  he  can 
show  the  world  with  what  ease  he  can  conquer,  and  how  un- 
reasonable and  hazardous  it  is  for  his  enemies  to  rise  up  against 
him. 

Finally,  in  the  providence  of  God,  there  is  a  constant  manifes- 
tation of  holiness.  I  shall  here  present  only  one  particular  view 
of  the  subject.  This  world  is  full  of  moral  evil.  Except  the  ht- 
tle  holiness  which  the  grace  of  God  has  produced  in  the  hearts 
of  liis  people,  all  is  defiled  with  sin.  Now  it  is  such  a  world  as 
this,  that  is  the  theatre  of  God's  providence.  He  upholds  and 
governs  a  world  of  sinners.  Even  the  impure  and  unholy  Uve  and 
move  and  have  their  being  in  God.  But  God  is  perfectly  pure. 
Those  who  are  polluted  are  always  near  to  him,  and  he  is  near  to 
them.     His  eye  beholds  them.     His  hand  feeds  them.     But  no 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  13 

pollution  touches  his  holy  nature.  Among  us  moral  diseases  are 
contagious.  We  contract  defilements  from  the  company  of  those 
who  are  defiled.  A  good  man's  virtue  must  have  acquired  an 
imcommon  degree  of  firmness,  if  he  can  be  conversant  with  men 
of  the  world,  and  the  affairs  of  the  world,  without  contracting  a 
stain.  See  here  the  immaculate  purity  of  God.  He  has  a  contin- 
ual agency  in  the  midst  of  sinful  men,  but  his  agency  is  perfectly 
holy.  He  acts  in  a  world  of  polluted  beings.  But  no  pollution 
adheres  to  him.  Though  he  is  so  near  to  the  wicked,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  his  knowledge  and  power  is  constantly  present  with 
them,  still  his  character  is  unchangeably  holy.  He  has  no  fellow- 
ship with  sinful  beings,  and  as  to  feeling,  character  and  design, 
and  the  mode  of  exercising  his  attributes,  he  is  infinitely  distant 
from  them.  A  wall  of  adamant  could  not  so  efiectually  separate 
us  from  the  wicked,  or  shield  us  from  being  polluted  with  their  wick- 
edness, as  God  is  separated  and  shielded  by  his  own  holy  nature.  To 
him  there  is  no  need  of  such  a  separating  wall.  There  is  no  need 
of  his  fleeing  away  to  a  distant  world,  or  of  shutting  out  this  scene 
of  moral  impurity  from  his  sight.  His  own  perfection,  his  own 
immutable  holiness,  secures  him  forever  against  any  contagion 
from  the  moral  diseases  which  prevail  among  his  creatures.  And 
while  he  will  forever  be  where  wicked  beings  are,  he  will  be  there 
as  a  sin-hating  God ;  he  will  be  among  sinners  and  near  them,  to 
take  terrible  vengeance  upon  them  for  their  wickedness,  and  to 
show  that  he  is  the  Holy  one  of  Israel. 
VOL.  n.  2 


LE  CTURE    XLIII 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.        A     PARTICULAR     PHILOSOPHICAL     THEORY 
STATED    AND    EXAMINED. 

The  doctrine  of  divine  providence  has  ever  been  the  subject  of 
intense  thought  and  discussion  among  intelligent  men.  And  in  all 
ages,  objections  have  been  urged  against  it.  But  those  objections 
which  have  at  first  appeared  formidable  have,  on  a  more  mature 
consideration  generally  lost  their  force.  It  is  on  this  as  on  every 
other  subject ;  the  truth  has  nothing  to  fear  from  free  and  impar- 
tial inquiry.  If  men  examine  any  subject  in  a  right  manner,  and 
■with  prayer  to  God  for  divine  guidance,  they  will  be  gradually 
freed  from  what  is  erroneous  in  their  apprehensions,  and  the  light 
of  truth  will  shine  in  their  minds  more  and  more  clearly. 

The  doctrine  of  divine  providence  opens  a  large  field  before  ua, 
which  we  can  survey  only  in  parts.  And  if,  as  we  proceed,  doubts 
and  difficulties  arise  in  your  minds  respecting  what  I  advance,  my 
only  request  is,  that  you  would  suspend  your  judgment,  till  you 
have  gone  along  with  me  through  a  careful  investigation.  And 
here  let  me  advertise  you,  that  in  the  treatment  of  this  subject, 
which  holds  so  prominent  a  place  in  the  system  of  Theology,  I 
have  no  novelties  to  introduce.  My  views,  as  you  will  find,  are 
in  accordance  not  only  with  our  Seminary  creed,  but  with  the 
creeds  of  the  great  body  of  evangelical  divines  and  churches  in 
Europe  and  America,  and  what  is  far  more  important,  with  the 
teachings  of  the  holy  Scriptures. 

My  present  object  is,  to  examine  with  special  care,  a  particular 
theory  which  has  sometimes  been  maintained  by  speculative  phi- 


DIVINE     PKOVIDENCE.  15 

losophers,  and  which  is  apt  at  times  to  suggest  itself  to  the  minds 
of  all  thinking  men,  in  contradiction  to  the  doctrine  of  providence 
as  commonly  held.  The  theory  to  which  I  refer  is  stated  by  Dr. 
Godwin  in  his  able  work  against  Atheism.  After  careful  reflec- 
tion he  comes  to  this  conclusion,  which  is  the  one  commonly  adopt- 
ed, namely ;  "  that  all  things  in  heaven  or  earth,  however  great 
or  minute,  —  that  all  creatures  and  all  events  are  under  the  su- 
perintendence and  control  of  God."  He  then  mentions  two  dif- 
ferent views  which  have  been  taken  of  this  superintendence.  One 
of  these  views  is  the  common  one,  and  the  one  adopted  by  God- 
win himself,  namely,  that  there  is  an  immediate  and  constant  sw- 
perintendence  exercised  over  the  ivhole  creation,  and  that  ivhat  we 
term  the  laivs  of  nature  are  hut  the  ojierations  of  divine  power  in  a 
regular  and  uniform  manner.  And  this  is  the  exact  idea  of  the 
laws  of  nature  which  has  been  held  by  the  best  writers  from  Sir 
Isaac  Newton  to  the  present  time.  The  other  vicAv  he  mentions 
is  the  one  now  to  be  examined.  "  It  is  conceived  by  some,"  he 
says,  "  that  the  Creator,  having  brought  all  things  into  being, 
gave  to  universal  nature  laws,  by  which,  as  a  machine  once  set  in 
motion,  it  goes  on  without  any  subsequent  act  of  power  or  inter- 
ference of  its  Maker."  Dr.  Knapp,  m  his  theology,  explains  the 
theory  much  in  the  same  manner.  "  Some,"  he  says, "  have  main- 
tained, that  the  creatures  of  God  act  immediately  in  and  through 
themselves,  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers  with  which  they  have 
been  once  endowed  by  the  Creator,  and  independently  of  him. 
They  have  compared  the  movements  and  alterations  which  appear 
in  the  creation  to  those  of  a  machine  (e.  g.  a  clock)  which  being 
once  made  and  wound  up,  goes  for  a  time  of  itself,  without  the 
farther  assistance  of  the  artist,  and  when  he  is  no  longer  present." 
And  again  he  says,  "  the  theory  represents  God  as  an  artist,  who 
leaves  his  work  when  he  has  completed  it,  or  idly  beholds  its  ope- 
rations." In  this  respect  the  theory  resembles  the  abstruse  dogma 
which  prevails  among  some  of  the  pagan  nations  of  the  East,  and 
which  teaches  that  God,  after  he  made  the  world,  resigned  the  care 
of  it  to  subordinate  powers,  and  retired  himself  into  a  state  of  in- 
activity, and  became  absolutely  quiescent.     Calvin  in  his  Insti- 


16  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

tutes  notices  and  discards  the  theory.  Dr.  Price  particularly  un- 
dertakes to  confute  it  in  his  Dissertations,  and  says,  it  would  lead 
to  a  blind  and  frightful  fatalism.  Dr.  Diok  also  touches  upon  it 
in  his  theology.  And  it  is  clearly  and  strikingly  exhibited  by 
Cowper  in  his  Task,  in  the  following  lines  : 

"  Some  say  that  in  the  origin  of  things, 
When  all  creation  started  into  birth, 
The  infant  elements  received  a  law, 
From  which  thej'  swer-\  e  not  since  ;  —  that  under  force 
Of  that  controlling  ordinance  they  move, 
And  need  not  his  immediate  hand,  who  first 
Prescribed  their  course,  to  regulate  it  now. 
Thus  dream  they,  and  contrive  to  save  a  God 
Th'  incumbrance  of  his  own  concerns,  and  spare 
The  great  artificer  of  all  that  moves. 
The  stress  of  a  continual  act,  the  pain 
Of  unremitted  vigilance  and  care, 
As  too  laborious  and  severe  a  task. 
So  man,  the  moth,  is  not  afraid,  it  seems. 
To  spare  omnipotence,  and  measure  might 
That  knows  no  measure,  bj*  the  scanty  rule 
And  standard  of  his  own." 

The  theory  under  consideration,  stated  more  specifically  and 
fully,  is  this  ;  that  God  at  first  imparted  certain  powers  to  the  ma- 
terial and  spiritual  creation,  and  established  certain  permanent 
laws  according  to  which  those  powers  should  operate,  and  that,  as 
he  originally  established  this  perfect  order,  this  system  of  powers 
and  laws,  and  set  things  in  operation  upon  this  plan,  there  is  no 
need  of  his  continued  and  present  agency ;  that  the  created  sys- 
tem, thus  contrived  and  established,  will  go  on  of  itself  without 
being  constantly  propelled,  as  they  express  it,  by  the  hand  of  the 
Creator ;  that  the  powers  or  active  principles  with  which  he  has 
invested  the  system  of  things,  and  to  which  he  has  given  per- 
petuity, continue  to  operate  and  produce  their  proper  effects,  with- 
out any  further  act  of  divine  power.  According  to  this  hypothe- 
sis, the  doctrine  of  divine  providence  is,  that  God  at  the  begin- 
ning produced  and  established  a  sj^stem  which  from  its  own  inhe- 
rent energies  and  according  to  laws  once  for  all  impressed  upon  it, 
is  to  move  round  and  move  on,  and  bring  out  all  the  phenomena 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  17 

and  accomplish  all  the  ends  designed  ;  and  that  the  system  is 
made  so  perfect,  that  it  can  be  safely  trusted,  and  will  certainly 
go  right,  without  any  additional  assistance  or  care  of  its  divine 
Author ;  and  that,  m  reality,  all  he  has  now  to  do,  is  to  look  on 
with  infinite  complacency,  and  see  how  wise  and  good  the  sys- 
tem is,  and  how  perfectly  it  works,  ivithout  his  present  agency  or 
care. 

I  have  thus  endeavored  to  state  the  theory,  as  fairly  and  ex- 
actly as  possible,  and  to  present  before  you  its  most  plausible  as- 
pects. The  question  before  us  is,  not  whether  God  has  given 
powers  and  laws  to  the  creation  ;  for,  in  this,  all  are  agreed ;  but 
whether,  in  the  affairs  of  providence,  God  has  a  present  agency ; 
or  whether  the  events  which  take  place  result  entirely  from  the 
powers  and  laws  of  nature,  independently  of  any  present  agency 
of  God ;  —  whether  the  effects,  now  produced,  result  from  the 
present  operation  of  the  divine  power,  as  their  real  and  ultimate 
cause  ;  or  whether  they  result  entirely  from  the  active  principles 
and  powers  which  God  at  first  imparted  to  the  creation,  called 
second  causes,  without  any  present  exercise  of  his  power. 

You  will  carefully  notice  the  reason,  why  the  advocates  of  this 
scheme  deny  any  present  agency  of  God  in  the  affairs  of  provi- 
dence, namely,  that  he  did  at  first  impart  the  necessary  powers  to 
the  various  parts  of  creation,  and  impress  laws  upon  them  to  reg- 
ulate their  motions,  and  at  the  outset  appointed  that  these'  laws 
and  powers  should  have  a  permanent  efficacy,  and  that  in  conse- 
quence of  this,  all  the  ends  of  providence  are  answered  by  the 
unfailing  efficacy  of  these  laws  and  powers  of  nature,  without  any 
farther  agency  on  the  part  of  God.  This  is  the  ground  on  which 
the  advocates  of  the  scheme  deny,  that  the  events  of  providence 
depend  on  any  present  agency  of  God.  Keeping  this  in  mind, 
you  will  understand  what  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  scheme 
is,  taken  as  a  consistent  whole.  For  it  is  manifest  that  this  very 
reason  on  which  the  scheme  rests,  exists  in  regard  to  one  part  of 
the  creation  as  well  as  another  —  in  regard  to  all  parts,  as  much 
as  to  any.  For  God  at  first  did  certainly  impart  the  proper  pow- 
ers both  to  the  material  world  and  the  spiritual  world,  and  did 

2* 


18  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

establish  regular  laws  respecting  them.     There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  these  powers  a,nd  laws  belong  to  human  and  angehc  minds, 
as  really  as  to  material  substances.     In  all  minds  and  all  bodies, 
these  powers  and  laws  are  equally  real,  permanent  and  efficacious. 
It  is  evident  then  what  the  scheme  really  is,  if  consistently  and 
fuBy  carried  out,  namely ;  that  the  creation  universally  goes  on 
and  accomplishes  all  the  ends  designed,  by  the  force  of  its  own 
inherent  powers,  and  in  accordance  with  its  own  appropriate   and 
permanent  laws,  without  any  present  agency  of  Grod.     For  the 
same  reason  which  would  prove  that  a  present  divine  agency  in 
the  highest  sense  is  unnecessary,  w'ould  prove  that  a  present  di- 
vine agency  is  unnecessary  in  any  sense.     In  other  words,  the 
same  reason  which  would  prove   that  the  creation  is  not  immedi- 
ately and  entirely  dependent  on  the  present  Avill  and  agency  of 
God,  would  prove  that  it  is  not  dependent  at  all.     The  creation,  it 
is  said,  is  furnished  with  the  requisite  powers  and  laws  of  action. 
So  be  it.     And  is  it  not  completely  furnished  —  is  it  not  furnished 
with  all  the  requisite  powers  and  laws,  and  all  in  the  requisite 
degree  ?     And  if  so,  then,  according  to  this  scheme,  the  creation 
in  all  its  parts  is  quahfied  to  go  on  of  itself,  without  any  help  from 
above.     If  it  needs  help  in  any  way  or  in  any  degree,  how  can 
it  be  said  to  be  completely  and  permanently  furnished  with  all  the 
requisite  powers  and  laws  of  action.     No  doubt  the  creation  is, 
in  the  proper  sense,  completely  furnished.     And  if  its  being  thus 
furnished  .is  any  reason  why  a  present  divine  agency  is  not  neces- 
sary, it  is  a   full   reason.     If  it  supersedes  the  necessity  of  a 
present  divine   agency  in  one   part   of  the  creation,  it   does  in 
all   parts.     If  it   supersedes  the   necessity   of  it  in  its   higher 
degrees,   it    supersedes   it    in   every  degree.      Take   the    case 
which  is  so  often  chosen  to  illustrate  the  scheme  we  are  consid- 
ering.    A  skilful  artist  makes  a  clock,  which  will  of   itself  go 
exactly  a  week  or  a  month.     It  is  a  perfect  piece  of  mechanism, 
and  during  the  week  or  the  month,  needs  no  help  from  the  maker 
or  owner.     There  is  no  occasion  that  he  should  touch  it,  or  look 
at  it,  or  think  of  it.     It  goes  thus  far  completely  of  itself,  i.  e. 
by  the  operation  of  its  own  inherent  powers,  without  any  assist- 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  ]t9 

ance  or  any  attention  of  the  maker.     It  may  be  said,  the  clock, 
however  skilfully  constructed,  does  still,  at  stated   times,  need 
winding  up,  and  must  occasionally  be  repaired.     True,  and  what 
does  this  prove  ?     It  proves  an  imperfection  in  the  time-piece  — 
an  imperfection  which  cannot  be  avoided  by  human  skill,  because 
human  skill  cannot  get  at  the  principle  of  perpetual  motion,  and 
cannot  prevent  the  wasting  effect  of  friction.     But  can  it  be  sup- 
posed that  any  imperfection  of  this  kind  appertains  to  the  operations 
of  God  ?     Can  those  who  maintain  the  scheme  under  consideration, 
mean  only,  that  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature  are  such  as  to  keep 
up  orderly  motion  in  the  creation  only  for  a  time,  say  for  a  year  or 
a  century,  and  that  this  great  machine  then  needs  to  be  wound 
up  or  repaired  by  its  Author,  and  that  without  this  occasional  at- 
tention, it  would  exhaust  its  energies  and  stop  ?     To  any  who 
should  hold  such  a  notion  as  this,  I  would  propose  two  questions. 
The  first  is,  why  has  God  left  the  system  of  his  works  so  imperfect 
—  so  imperfect  according  to  their  own  views  ?     Wliy  has  he  not 
imparted  powers  and  laws  to  the  creation,  which  will  carry  it  on 
and  accomplish  all  his  purposes  perpetually,  without  any  interven- 
tion of  his  own  agency  ?     This  certainly  would,  on  their  scheme, 
be  a  far  greater  perfection,  than  to  leave  the  matter  so  as  to  re- 
quire any  such  occasional  attention  and  agency  from  God.     Why 
then  has  he  left  things  m  so  imperfect  a  state  ?     Could  not  he 
impart  powers  and  laws  which  would  secure  perpetual  motion  and 
perpetual  order  to  all  parts  of  the  creation  ?     Is  the  establishment 
of  perpetual  motion  beyond  the  power  of  the  all-wise  and  Almighty 
God,  as  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  ignorant,  feeble  man  ?     If  he  can 
give  the  power  to  act  independently  of  his  continued  agency  for 
a  time,  why  not  forever  ?     My  second  question  is,  whether  in  the 
regular  course  of  things  in  the  material  or  spiritual  world,  there  is 
any  evidence  of  such  a  periodical  or  occasional  di^dne  agency. 
I  mean,  whether  there  is  any  more  evidence  of  an  occasional  di- 
vine  agency,  than  there  is  of  a  continual  divine   agency.     Look 
at  the  motion  and  order  of  the  heavenly  bodies.     Look  at  all  the 
regular  processes  of  nature  in  our  world.     Can  you  perceive  any 
appearances  indicating  that  the  machine  of  the  creation  is  in  dan- 


20  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

ger  of  running  down,  that  the  power  which  gives  it  motion  is  in 
danger  of  being  spent,  and  needs  to  be  reheved  or  recruited  by 
foreign  help  ?  Some  distinguished  philosophers  have  supposed 
something  like  this.  But  is  there  any  reason  for  such  a  supposi- 
tion ?  In  the  settled  course  of  things  among  the  heavenly 
bodies,  or  on  the  earth,  is  there  any  more  evidence  of  an  occasion- 
al divine  agency,  than  there  is  of  a  constant  divine  agency  ? 
According  to  the  scheme  we  are  examining,  we  cannot  con- 
sistently suppose  any  actual  divine  superintendence  over  the  crea- 
tion. For  if  the  settled  powers  and  laws  of  nature  are  such,  as 
to  render  any  present  divine  agency  unnecessary,  wher^  is  the 
necessity  of  any  divine  superintendence  ?  Cannot  the  powers  and 
laws  of  nature,  to  which  so  much  is  ascribed,  operate  a  single  day 
or  moment,  without  the  actual  oversight  and  care  of  the  Creator  ? 
Do  those  who  maintain  this  scheme  think  that  the  great  machine 
is  after  all  so  imperfectly  made,  that  it  needs  looking  to,  every 
moment  to  keep  it  in  order  ?  And  then  on  their  scheme,  what 
does  God  actually  do  in  the  exercise  of  this  superintendence  ? 
Does  he  do  anything  ?  Does  he  put  forth  any  agency  ?  If  he 
does,  then  their  scheme  falls  at  once.  If  he  does,  then  the  powers 
and  laws  of  nature  are  not  such  as  to  supersede  his  present  agen- 
cy. And  this  is  the  same  as  to  say,  that  a  present  divine  agency 
is  consistent  with  the  operation  of  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature, 
and  not  only  consistent  with  it,  but  necessary  to  it.  And  then  I 
say,  as  before,  if  any  present  divine  agency  is  consistent  and 
necessary,  so  is  a  complete  divine  agency. 

Possibly  some  may  think  that  the  divine  superintendence  only 
implies,  that  God  constantly  keeps  his  eye  upon  the  creation,  and 
puts  forth  his  hand  to  guide  and  regulate  it,  whenever  he  sees  it 
to  be  necessary.  But  then,  according  to  the  scheme  we  are  ex- 
amining, how  can  such  a  necessity  be  supposed  ever  to  occur, 
without  implying  an  imperfection  in  God's  workmanship  ?  For 
if  his  imparting  such  laws  and  powers  to  the  creation  as  he  has 
imparted,  is  sufficient  to  enable  it  to  go  on  of  itself,  without  a 
constant  exercise  of  divine  power ;  then  if  anything  occurs  to 
make  a  particular  act  of  divine  power,  at  any  time  necessary,  it 


DIVINE     PEOVIDENCE.  21 

would  show,  according  to  this  way  of  thinking,  that  after  all  he 
had  not  imparted  the  requisite  powers  and  laws,  and  so  that  Ms 
work  was  left  imperfect. 

It  may  be  allowed  by  some  who  lean  toward  this  scheme,  that 
God  constantly  upholds  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature  which  he 
has  appointed,  this  being  all  which  is  necessary.  This  view  of 
the  subject  may  perhaps  be  right.  But  I  should  feel  it  important 
to  inquire,  what  it  is  to  uphold  these  powers  and  laws  ?  The  idea 
seems  to  be  this ;  that  when  God  created  the  material  and  spirit- 
ual world,  he  invested  it  with  all  such  powers  as  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  carry  it  on  and  accomplish  his  piu-pose,  and  impressed 
laws  upon  it  to  regulate  the  operation  of  its  powers,  and  that 
what  God  now  does  is  to  sustain  these  powers  and  laws,  i.  e.  to 
preserve  them  and  continue  their  efficacy.  Now  this  agency  of 
God  in  upholding  these  powers  and  laws  and  continuing  to  them 
the  requisite  efficacy,  is  by  the  very  supposition  a  constant  agenr 
cy,  an  agency  of  God,  on  which  these  powers  and  laws  continu- 
ally depend.  Thus  imderstood,  the  scheme  would  come  to  be 
substantially  the  same  as  the  one  commonly  adopted.  This  is  the 
principle  which  is  defended  by  Dr.  Price,  namely,  that  the  cause 
from  which  the  general  laws  that  govern  the  world  are  derived,  is 
the  immediate  power  of  Deity  exerted  everywhere.  But  it  is  evi- 
dent that  this  view  cannot  be  taken  consistently  with  the  supposi- 
tion, that  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature  are  sufficient  of  them- 
selves, and  so  supersede  the  present  and  constant  agency  of  God. 
For  here  it  is  maintained,  that  there  is  a  constant  divine  agency 
in  those  very  powers  and  laios  of  nature.  And  this  seems  to  be 
the  same  truth  philosophically  expressed,  as  is  so  clearly  taught 
in  the  current  language  of  the  Bible.  But  the  scheme  which  I 
wish  to  examine,  and  against  which  there  are,  in  my  view,  unan- 
swerable objections,  is  not  only  that  the  creation  is  invested  with 
all  the  requisite  powers  and  put  under  the  requisite  laws  ;  but  that 
these  powers  and  laws  are  so  estabUshed  by  the  Creator,  that 
they  go  on  of  themselves,  and  execute  all  his  designs,  without  his 
present  or  continued  agency ;  and  that  the  supposition  of  any 
immediate  or  constant  acting  of  his  power  in  order  to  account  for 


22  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

the  events  of  providence  or  in  order  to  accomplish  his  purposes,  is 
altogether  unphilosophical,  and  would  imply  imperfection  in 
those  powers  and  laws  of  nature  which  God  ordained  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  world.  Against  this  hypothesis,  I  urge  three  ar- 
guments. 

My  first  argument  is  a  direct  appeal  to  the  hearts  of  intelli- 
gent Christians.  Moral  feeling,  when  rectified  by  divine  grace, 
harmonizes  with  the  truth.  And  it  not  only  harmonizes  with  the 
truth  when  discovered,  but  is  an  important  help  in  the  discovery. 
A  sanctified  mind  has  an  eye  to  see  the  truth,  and  to  see  the  dif- 
ference between  truth  and  error.  In  most  questions  relating  to 
the  character  and  agency  of  God,  it  is  safer  to  rely  upon  the  un- 
biased dictate  of  an  honest  and  pious  heart,  than  upon  the  ope- 
ration of  a  speculative  intellect,  however  powerful  it  may  be.  I 
appeal  then  directly  to  you.  What  is  your  feehng  in  regard  to 
the  subject  before  us  ?  What  would  you  choose  in  regard  to  the 
affairs  of  divine  providence  ?  You  have  doubtless  been  accus- 
tomed to  think,  that  the  God  you  worship  is  always  and  every- 
where present,  and  is  always  exercising  his  wisdom,  power  and 
goodness.  You  have  considered  God  as  putting  forth  an  agency 
unceasingly  in  all  parts  of  the  creation.  You  have  considered 
him  as  on  your  right  hand  and  on  your  left ;  as  always  taking 
care  of  you,  sustaining  your  life,  giving  you  food  and  raiment 
and  every  blessing,  and  by  his  Spirit  sanctifying  and  comforting 
you.  Now  how  would  it  agree  with  your  pious  feelings  to  be  told, 
that  God  has  really  done  nothing  since  the  creation ;  that  he 
then  fonned  the  world  of  matter  and  the  world  of  mind,  and  gave 
it  the  requisite  powers  and  laws,  and  that  these  powers  act  of 
themselves,  that  these  laws  execute  themselves,  and  that  the 
great  system  of  things  thus  goes  on  untliout  any  pTesent  agency  of 
Crod;  that  all  the  wisdom,  power  and  goodness,  which  he  has  ever 
exercised,  were  exercised  at  once  when  he  made  the  world,  and 
that  since  that  time  he  has  retired  to  a  state  of  inaction,  having 
nothing  to  do,  unless  indeed  he  is  engaged  in  creating  other  sys- 
tems, and  in  investing  them  with  powers  and  laws  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  leaving  them  also  as  soon  as  they  are  created,  to  go 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  23 

on  without  any  farther  concern  of  his.  I  ask  how  all  this  would 
agree  with  your  feelings  ?  How  would  you  like  to  be  under  the 
government  of  a  God  who  has  nothing  at  present  to  do  and  will 
have  nothing  hereafter  to  do  with  the  world  which  he  has  made  ? 
How  would  you  like  to  be  in  such  a  forsaken,  sohtary  world,  un- 
der the  influence  of  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature,  which  are  not 
God,  but  which  according  to  this  scheme,  stand  in  the  place  of 
God  ?  Which  would  you  prefer,  —  to  be  under  the  government 
of  a  being  who  is  infinitely  intelligent  and  powerful  and  good,  and 
who  shows  himself  to  be  so  by  his  continual  agency,  or  to  be  un- 
der the  government  of  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature,  which  have 
neither  intelligence,  nor  design,  nor  feeling  ?  Or  to  take  another 
view,  which  would  you  prefer,  —  to  be  under  the  government  of 
a  God  whose  very  nature  is  to  be  active,  and  who  by  his  constant 
agency  in  aU  places  and  in  all  things,  or  in  the  words  of  the 
Apostle,  by  working  all  in  all,  exhibits  himself  continually  before 
you  as  a  wise,  powerful,  benevolent  and  glorious  God  ;  —  or  to  be 
under  the  government  of  a  God  whose  own  agency  in  the  aflFairs 
of  the  world  ended  with  the  act  of  creation,  and  who  committed 
the  whole  direction  of  things  to  the  world  itself,  after  enduing  it 
with  the  proper  powers  and  laws  ?  —  a  God  to  whom  it  is  a  matter 
of  choice  to  do  by  one  great  efibrt  all  that  he  has  to  do,  and  then 
to  avoid  the  trouble  of  constant  action,  —  "to  save  himself  the 
pain  of  unremitted  diUgence  and  care,"  or  for  some  other  reason, 
to  go  into  a  quiescent  state  ?  When  you  are  in  trouble,  and  when 
you  feel  yourself  to  be  depraved  and  guilty,  and  in  need  of  par- 
don and  sanctification ;  when  you  are  sick,  and  when  you  come  to 
the  hour  of  dying,  —  which  would  you  prefer  —  the  God  of 
Christians,  or  the  God  of  Epicurus  and  the  Hindoos  ? 

To  this  appeal,  if  I  mistake  not,  your  hearts  have  given  a 
ready  response.  If  the  subject  is  to  be  disposed  of  in  this  man- 
ner, you  say  all  is  plain.  You  start  back  from  the  idea  of  a  God, 
who  after  putting  forth  one  act  of  power  at  the  creation,  forever 
ceased  to  act,  entrusting  the  world  to  the  sole  direction  and  care 
of  the  laws  of  nature.  It  would  make  the  world  a  solitary  place, 
and  you  would  go  mourning  all  your  days  after  an  absent  God, 


24  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

and  jour  souls  could  never  be  satisfied  with  that  system  of  unin- 
telligent powers  and  laws,  which  is  thrust  upon  you  in  the  place  of 
the  constant  presence,  the  constant  care,  and  the  holy  and  mer- 
ciful agency  of  your  heavenly  Father.  You  say,  give  me  that 
doctrine  which  brings  my  God  near. 

On  this  point,  I  have  only  one  more  remark.  If  that  doc- 
trine of  divine  providence,  which  has  commonly  been  received 
and  acted  upon  by  devout  Christians,  and  defended  by  so  many 
learned  divines,  is  most  consonant  to  the  feehngs  of  every  good  man, 
and  which  every  good  man  would  wish  to  be  true ;  then  how 
strange  must  it  appear,  that  any  ma,n  should  go  about  by  hard 
philosophizing  and  profound  sophistry,  to  invent  another  scheme 
of  providence,  which  would  be  infinitely  less  pleasing  and  com- 
forting to  the  pious  heart ;  and,  in  order  to  maintain  a  scheme  so 
miwelcome,  so  abstruse,  and  so  chiUing  to  the  souls  of  Christians, 
that  he  should  labor  to  put  the  most  unnatural  and  forced  sense 
upon  the  word  of  God,  which  from  beginning  to  end,  most  plainly 
teaches  the  common  doctrine  of  providence.  This  I  expect 
soon  to  show.  How  sincerely  is  it  to  be  deplored,  that  any  man 
on  earth  should  oppose  and  decry  this  most  delightful,  most 
precious  doctrine  of  divine  providence,  and  attempt  to  thrust  in 
another  as  cold  as  Greenlanji ;  and  then  to  labor  to  support  it 
—  how  ?  Why,  by  doing  violence  to  the  unadulterated  senti- 
ments of  Christian  piety,  and  I  may  say  of  heathen  piety  too, 
and  by  trying  to  compel  the  Bible  to  utter  or  to  countenance  a 
sentiment,  which  stands  in  opposition  to  the  whole  current  of  its 
teachings.  Let  an  undertaking  like  this  fall  into  the  hands  of 
those  who,  not  Hking  to  retain  God  in  their  knowledge  are  doing 
all  that  the  most  creative  imagination  and  the  most  subtle  and 
imposing  sopliistry  can  do,  to  banish  God  from  the  creation,  or  else 
to  make  the  creation  God.  But,  "  0  my  soul,  come  not  thou  into 
their  secret;  unto  their  assembly,  mine  honor,  be  not  thou 
united !" 


LECTURE    XLIV. 


DIVINE  PROVIDENCE.      CONSIDERATION   OF   THE   PARTICULAR  THE- 
ORY  CONTINUED, 

In  the  second  place,  I  appeal  to  the  word  of  Crod.  Here  the 
great  difficulty  is  to  make  the  most  suitable  selection  from  a 
great  multitude  of  texts  found  in  different  parts  of  the  Bible. 
Some  of  the  more  general  representations  are  these  :  "  The  Lord 
reigneth  ;"  —  reigneth  now.  "  His  kingdom  ruleth  over  all." 
It  is  a  present  and  universal  dominion.  "  Both  riches  and  honor 
come  of  thee,  and  thou  reignest  over  all,  and  in  thj  hand  is  pow- 
er and  might ;  and  in  thy  hand  it  is  to  make  great,  and  to  give 
strength  unto  all."  Here  David  has  his  eye  upon  what  God  had 
done  in  his  own  case,  and  is  led  by  this  to  notice  what  he  does  in 
all  other  cases.  The  Apostle  said  to  the  people  at  Lystra,  that 
although  God  in  times  past  suffered  all  nations  to  walk  in  their 
own  ways,  he  nevertheless  "  left  not  himself  without  witness,  in  that 
he  did  good  and  gave  rain  from  heaven  and  fruitful  seasons."  And 
in  reference  to  the  same  subject,  Christ  says,  that  our  "  Father  in 
heaven  causeth  his  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good,  and  send- 
eth  rain  on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust."  It  is  the  evidence  which 
God  now  gives  of  his  diffusive  and  ever  active  goodness.  Scrip- 
ture also  teaches  that  God  causes  the  grass  to  grow,  clothes  the 
lilies,  hears  the  cry  of  the  young  hons,  feeds  the  ravens,  takes 
care  of  the  sparrows,  and  numbers  the  hairs  of  our  head  ;  that  he 
gives  us  life  and  health  and  all  things.  It  teaches  also  that  God 
exercises  a  universal  agency  over  the  minds  of  men,  and  over  the 
concerns  of  the  moral  world ;  that  the  heart  is  in  his  hand,  and 

VOL.  n.  3 


26  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

that  he  turneth  it  whithersd"evei'  he  will ;  that  he  directeth  our 
steps,  and  often  contrary  to  our  own  devising ;  that  he  sanctifieth 
whom  he  will,  and  that  he  worketh  all  in  all.  These  are  only  a 
small  part  of  the  general  representations  made  in  the  Scriptures 
of  the  agency  of  God,  both  in  the  natural  and  moral  world.  The 
language  is  perfectly  plain,  and  shows  beyond  doubt,  what  was  in 
the  minds  of  the  inspired  writers.  There  are  in  fact  no  forms  of 
speech,  by  which  they  could  more  unequivocally  teach  the  com- 
mon doctrine  of  divine  providence,  the  doctrine  that  God  has  a 
present  concern  and  a  present  agency  and  control  in  all  the  affairs 
of  the  creation. 

The  history  of  the  world,  as  recorded  in  the  Scriptures,  teaches 
the  same  doctrine.  When  you  look  into  the  Bible,  you  find  first 
that  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth.  The  work  of  crea- 
tion was  accomplished  by  God  himself.  And  when  you  proceed 
with  this  inspired  book,  you  find  that,  the  events  of  providence 
are  in  the  same  manner  expressly  ascribed  to  the  same  divine 
agency.  God  gave  commands  to  our  first  parents.  And  when 
they  sinned,  he  made  known  his  displeasure  and  doomed  them  to 
suffering.  He  raised  up  one  generation  of  men  after  another,  and 
bestowed  favors  or  inflicted  punishments.  When  the  people  built 
Babel,  the  Lord  scattered  them  abroad.  The  Lord  called  Abra- 
ham and  gave  him  a  numerous  posterity.  He  sent  Joseph  into 
Egypt,  and  there  gave  him  power.  He  brought  Jacob  and  his 
family  into  Egypt,  and  multiphed  them  and  made  them  a  great 
people.  When  they  were  oppressed,  the  Lord  deUvered  them, 
gave  them  the  land  of  Canaan,  and  drove  out  the  inhabitants  be- 
fore them,  and  there  made  them  a  mighty  nation.  And  after- 
wards it  was  God  who  visited  them  with  desolating  judgments  for 
their  idolatry  and  wickedness.  It  was  God  who  sent  them  into 
captivity.  It  was  God  who  raised  up  Cyrus,  and  put  it  into  his  heart 
to  favor  their  return,  and  to  promote  the  rebuilding  of  Jerusalem. 
It  was  God  who  sent  his  Son  into  the  world,  who  laid  the  burden 
of  our  iniquities  upon  him ;  who  raised  him  from  the  dead  and 
highly  exalted  him.  It  was  God  who  spread  the  gospel,  and 
called  Jews  and  Gentiles  out  of  darkness  into  marvellous  light. 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  ^ 

The  Scriptures  teach,  that  God  has  a  real,  present  agency  in  the 
affairs  of  individuals,  in  their  birth,  their  character,  their  actions, 
their  life,  their  health,  their  sickness,  and  the  time  and  circum- 
stances of  their  death. 

The  sacred  writers,  who  were  men  of  good  sense  and  honesty, 
and  who  spake  as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  have 
taught  the  doctrine  of  the  present  agency  of  God  in  the  affairs  of 
the  world,  as  plainly  as  human  language  can  teach  it.  On  sup- 
position that  they  actually  believed  this  doctrine,  and  made  it 
their  object  to  declare  it  unequivocally,  how  could  they  have  done 
more  than  they  have  done  ? 

Unitarians  and  others  who  mean  to  show  a  respect  for  the 
Bible,  and  yet  wish  to  be  rid  of  the  idea  of  a  constant  divine 
providence  and  agency,  say,  that  to  attribute  events  constantly 
to  the  hand  of  God  as  the  sacred  writers  do,  is  the  Hebrew  or 
Oriental  idiom.  I  know  very  well  it  is  the  Hebrew  idiom.  And 
I  know  too  it  is  the  idiom  chosen  by  prophets  and  apostles,  by 
Christ,  and  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  —  the  idiom  in  which  God  has 
seen  fit  to  speak  to  us,  not  to  deceive  us,  but  to  instruct  us.  In 
this  divine  idiom  God  teaches  divine  truth,  and  teaches  it  in  such 
a  manner,  as  to  make  it  intelligible  to  every  man  who  reads  with 
a  candid  and  pious  disposition.  And  if  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  an  actual,  present  agency  of  God  in  the  actions  of  men  and 
the  affairs  of  the  world,  the  language  of  the  Scriptures  is  adapted 
to  mislead.  It  has  actually  misled  Christians  of  the  highest  at- 
tainments in  knowledge  and  holiness.  It  is  a  general  fact,  that 
when  good  men  exercise  the  spirit  of  piety,  and  live  near  to 
God,  they  understand  the  Scriptures  in  relation  to  this  subject 
in  their  plain,  obvious  sense,  and  accordingly  ascribe  to  God  a 
present  and  constant  agency  in  all  the  concerns  of  the  world. 
This  view  of  God's  providence  is  dear  to  them,  and  they  hold 
it  fast,  finding  that  whatever  events  take  place,  it  quiets  their 
minds  and  gives  them  peace.  It  is  a  powerful  motive  to  watch- 
fulness, to  dihgence  in  doing  good,  and  to  fortitude  in  suffering. 
But  if  the  doctrine  is  not  true,  we  are  met  with  the  unaccountable 
fact,  that  the  most  intelligent,  devout  and  spiritual  Christians,  to 


28  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

whom  God  has  promised  the  special  teachings  of  his  spirit,  are 
the  most  likely  to  misunderstand  the  Scriptures,  and  to  form  er- 
roneous ideas  of  the  providence  of  God.  Yes,  the  most  intelli- 
gent, devout  and  spiritual  Christians,  who  really  enjoy  the  teach- 
ings of  the  divine  Spirit,  are  the  furthest  from  the  truth  and  the 
most  in  love  with  error.  For  they  certainly  believe  that  God 
has  a  present  and  most  benevolent  agency  in  their  life  and 
health,  in  their  daily  bread,  and  in  all  their  concerns.  They 
beheve  and  acknowledge  this,  and  act  upon  it.  And  it  diffuses 
joy  through  their  whole  life,  and  sheds  a  cheering  light  upon 
them,  when  they  pass  through  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death. 
Now  if  tliis  doctrine  is  an  error,  —  then  I  say  it  is  an  error 
which  is  inseparable  from  eminent  piety.  It  is  an  error  which 
naturally  and  necessarily  goes  in  company  with  truth,  and  has 
all  the  influence  of  truth,  and  which  those  will  be  the  least  likely 
to  give  up,  who  derive  their  opinions  most  scrupulously  and 
reverently  from  the  fountain  of  truth,  —  the  word  of  God. 

Under  the  head  of  Scripture  evidence,  I  have  one  thing  more 
to  suggest.  All  who  believe  in  miracles,  consider  them  as  the 
effects  of  the  direct  and  present  agency  of  God.  But  if  you 
examine  the  Scriptures,  you  will  find  that  miraculous  events  and 
common  events  are  equally  ascribed  to  God.  The  manner  in 
which  they  are  spoken  of  by  the  inspired  writers  is  the  same. 
The  deluge  has  generally  been  regarded  as  a  miracle.  And  how 
is  it  described  ?  It  is  said,  "  God  caused  it  to  rain  forty  days 
and  forty  nights."  Common  rain  is  not  a  miracle.  And  how  do 
the  inspired  writers  speak  of  this  ?  They  say  that  God  prepar- 
eth  rain  for  the  earth,  that  he  causeth  the  rain  to  descend.  Thus 
common  rain  and  miraculous  rain  are  both  ascribed  to  God. 
They  are  different  in  other  and  very  important  respects,  but  in 
this  they  are  alike,  that  they  both  result  from  the  present  agency 
of  God.  So  with  respect  to  the  cure  of  sickness.  Whether  the 
cure  is  in  the  common  way,  or  in  a  miraculous  way,  it  is  ascribed 
to  God,  and  is  ascribed  in  language  equally  unambiguous  and 
strong.  It  is  God,  who  healeth  all  our  diseases.  Common  and 
miraculous  cures  are  effected  by  the  same  divine  agency.     The 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  29 

dividing  of  the  Red  Sea  was  a  miracle,  and  the  sacred  writers 
say,  God  divided  the  waters,  that  the  children  of  Israel  might 
go  over  on  dry  grovind.  But  they  say  with  equal  plainness  and 
force,  that  God  commandeth  the  winds  and  they  arise,  and  that 
he  ruleth  the  waves  of  the  sea.  The  same  is  true  as  to  the  en- 
dowments and  actions  of  men.  Those  which  are  common  and 
those  which  are  miraculous  are  represented  as  flowing  equally 
from  the  present  agency  and  direction  of  God.  If  the  Bible 
teaches  that  God  gives  miraculous  endowments  to  prophets  and 
apostles,  and  enables  them  to  perform  miraculous  works,  it  also 
teaches,  that  he  imparts  to  men  their  common  endowments,  and 
directs  their  common  actions.  That  God  has  a  present  agency~l 
in  miraculous  events  we  learn  from  the  express  declarations  of  his 
word.  But  the  same  word  expressly  teaches  us  that  he  has  a 
present  agency  in  common  events.  If  we  deny  one,  we  must 
deny  the  other.  I  only  add,  if  we  deny  God's  present  agency  in 
common  actions,  to  be  consistent  we  must  deny  his  agency  in  holy 
actions.  As  to  the  reahty  of  the  divine  agency,  the  Scriptures 
maintain  it  equally  in  respect  to  the  common  affections  and  acts  of  I 
the  mind  and  in  respect  to  those  which  are  holy.  As  to  the  reality 
of  a  divine  agency,  there  is  no  difference.  But  in  other  respects 
there  is  a  difference,  a  difference  of  great  moment.  And  there  is 
evidently  good  reason  to  mark  this  difference  in  the  usual  way, 
that  is  with  reference  to  the  common  affections  and  acts  of  men, 
to  speak  of  God's  common  agency,  and  with  reference  to  the 
sanctification  of  the  heart,  to  speak  of  God's  special  and  super- 
natural agency ;  and  again  with  reference  to  miracles,  to  speak 
of  God's  miraculous  agency.  In  all  these  cases  there  is  a  real, 
present,  divine  agency.  But  the  circumstances,  the  mode  and 
the  results  of  the  divine  agency  in  these  three  cases  are  different. 
The  reahty  we  learn  from  Scripture.  The  difference  we  learn 
from  obvious  facts  and  circumstances. 

Having  thus  exhibited  the  direct  Scripture  argument  in  sup- 
port of  the  doctrine  of  a  real  and  present  agency  of  God  in  his 
providence,  I  shall  now,  in  the  third  place  argue  the  point  from 
the  important  duty  of  prayer. 


30  DIVINE     PKOVIDENCE. 

What  then  is  it  to  pray  ?  It  is  to  ask  God  to  do  some  act  of 
kindness,  to  bestow  some  favor.  "  Give  us  this  day  our  daily 
bread,"  We  ask  God  to  do  this  act  of  kindness  to-day.  In  this 
prayer,  it  is  implied  that  we  need  and  desire  food  ;  that  for  this 
blessing  we  depend  upon  God,  and  that  we  look  upon  him  as  able 
and  willing  to  do  this  kindness,  and  to  do  it  to-day.  And  it  is 
implied  that  if  we  have  our  daily  bread,  it  is  given  us  by  God, 
really  given,  though  by  an  invisible  hand ;  and  that  at  the  close 
of  the  day  it  is  proper  for  us  to  acknowledge  the  favor  he  has 
conferred  upon  us  during  the  day. 

Now  this  is  one  of  the  common  bounties  of  divine  providence. 
There  is  no  miracle  in  it.  It  comes  according  to  the  laws  of  nsr 
ture.  In  this  case,  God  exercises  his  goodness  at  the  present 
time,  or  he  does  not.  If  he  does  —  if  he  performs  an  act  of 
kindness  towards  us  at  the  present  time  —  if  he  wills  to  supply 
our  wants,  and  actually  does  what  he  wills,  then  prayer  has  a 
meaning,  and  they  who  pray  have  a  meaning,  and  they  mean  what 
they  say.  God  yives  them  their  daily  bread.  And  then  their 
gratitude  has  a  meaning,  and  is  conformed  to  truth.  And  on 
this  principle,  it  is  suitable  for  them  to  continue  every  day  to  of- 
fer up  the  prayer,  "  Give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread."  In 
this  they  act  as  properly,  as  a  child  who  asks  his  father  or 
his  mother  to  give  him  bread.  And  if  the  Scriptures  are 
true,  he  who  asks  a  favor  of  God,  has  at  least  as  much  reason 
to  expect  that  God  will  actually  do  what  he  prays  for,  as  any 
child  has  reason  to  expect  the  favor  he  asks  of  a  kind  parent. 
This  difiference  however  is  manifest,  that  the  parent  bestows  the 
favor  by  a  hand  that  is  seen,  and  God,  by  a  hand  that  is  not 
seen. 

But  if  the  contrary  supposition  is  true,  that  is,  if  God  does  not 
actually  exercise  his  power  and  goodness  to-day  in  giving  us  our 
daily  bread  —  if  his  agency  began  and  ended  six  thousand  years 
ago  in  creating  the  world,  and  estabUshing  the  laws  of  nature, 
and  no  new  act  of  his  power  is  to  be  expected  at  the  present  time ; 
then  what  is  the  meaning  of  prayer  ? 

The  siniilitude  of  the  clock  is  so  apt,  that  we  shall  recur  to  it 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  81 

again.  A  well  made  clock  goes  for  a  time  without  any  present 
care  of  any  one.  Of  course  there  would  be  no  propriety  in 
going  continually  to  the  clock  maker,  and  asking  him  to  keep 
his  eye  upon  his  clock  and  constantly  to  watch  it  and  take  care 
of  it  from  morning  to  night,  and  from  night  to  morning.  There 
would  be  no  propriety  of  our  asking  this  of  him  ;  for  the  clock 
will  go  just  as  well  if  he  is  absent  or  asleep  or  dead,  as  if  he  is 
alive  and  awake  and  present.  Now  I  say  if  we  are  no  otherwise 
dependent,  and  no  more  dependent  on  God,  than  a  clock  is  on 
the  man  who  made  it ;  we  have  no  more  occasion  to  ask  that  the 
eye  of  God  may  be  upon  us  for  good,  and  that  he  would  take 
care  of  us  day  and  night,  than  we  have  to  ask  a  clock  maker  to 
attend  continually  to  the  finished  time-piece  he  has  made,  to  stand 
by  it  every  moment,  and  to  take  care  to  keep  it  in  regular  mo- 
tion. When  we  pray,  we  ask  God  to  do  something,  and  to  do  it 
at  the  present  time,  or  at  some  future  time.  But  if  the  scheme 
before  us  is  true,  we  know  that  God  will  not  do  what  we  ask ; 
that  he  has  no  present  agency  in  the  affairs  of  the  creation  ;  that 
the  great  machine  is  so  constituted,  as  to  go  on  without  him. 
Accordingly  if  we  pray  at  all,  we  should  pray  to  that  which  can 
put  forth  the  necessary  agency,  we  should  pray  to  that  which 
is  really  to  accomplish  the  good  we  desire.  That  is,  we  should 
pray  to  the  great  machine  of  the  world.  We  should  pray  to  the 
laws  of  nature,  —  the  kind,  the  omniscient,  the  eflBcacious  laws 
of  nature  !  —  But  in  truth,  these  laws  of  nature  have  no  under- 
standing, and  they  cannot  know  what  we  need.  They  have  no 
heart,  and  they  cannot  feel  for  us,  and  their  ear  is  heavy  that 
they  cannot  hear. 

Or,  if  the  fact  is  really  as  the  scheme  under  consideration  sup- 
poses, and  yet  we  do  not  know  it,  and  if  under  this  mistake,  we 
offer  up  prayer  to  God,  and  ask  him  to  do  us  an  act  of  kindness 
to  day ;  then  I  say  our  prayer  is  an  illusion.  The  thoughts  of 
our  minds  when  we  pray,  are  mistaken  thoughts,  and  the  mistake 
is  the  ground  of  our  prayer.  God  knows  that  we  are  mistaken 
in  thinking  that  he  will  now  actually  exert  his  power  in  the  way 
desired.     And  those  who  have  got  into  tliis  profound  philosophy, 


32  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

know  that  we  are  mistaken,  and  that  our  prayer  does  not  cor- 
respond with  nature  and  truth.  And  they  labor  to  instruct  us, 
so  that  we  may  no  longer  imagine  such  a  thing  as  that  God  does 
at  present  really  act  in  the  concerns  of  the  world.  And  if  they 
succeed  in  convincing  us  of  this,  then  we  will  leave  off  the  prac- 
tice of  asking  God  to  give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread,  or  to  do 
anything  which  implies  his  present  agency,  being  convinced  that 
there  is  no  such  agency. 

The  Apostle  Paul  was  desirous  of  visiting  the  Christians  at 
Thessalonica,  and  in  his  first  Epistle  to  them  he  said ;  "  Now 
God  even  our  Father  and  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  direct  our  way 
unto  you."  What  was  in  the  Apostle's  mind  when  he  offered  up 
this  devout  desire  ?  He  certainly  thought  it  proper  to  ask  God 
to  direct  his  way  to  the  Thessalonians.  And  he  certainly  thought 
that  God  would  actually  direct  his  way  to  them,  if  he  saw  fit  to 
answer  his  prayer.  But  for  God  to  direct  his  way  to  the  Thes- 
salonians was  to  do  something,  it  was  an  act  of  God  —  an  act  to 
be  performed  at  that  time.  And  if  it  was  not  according  to  truth 
to  suppose  that  God  would  have  such  an  agency  at  that  time, 
then  the  apprehension  of  the  Apostle's  mind,  which  was  the 
foundation  of  his  prayer,  was  a  mistake,  and  if  he  had  been 
free  from  the  mistake,  he  would  not  have  prayed  as  he 
did. 

I  put  the  case  to  you.  When  you  offer  up  your  evening  prayer, 
you  ask  God  to  preserve  you  through  the  night,  to  give  you  quiet 
sleep,  and  to  guard  you  from  all  evil.  When  you  pray  thus,  is  it 
not  your  meaning  to  ask  God  to  do  a  real  act  of  kindness  ?  And 
how  would  you  feel  if  any  one  should  say  to  you,  —  your  sup- 
posing that  God  will  have  any  agency  in  preserving  you  this 
night  and  giving  you  repose  is  a  mistake ;  he  has  committed  this 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  the  laws  of  nature  are  to  be  relied  upon 
as  sufficient  for  all  the  purposes  of  our  existence  both  by  day  and 
by  night,  without  any  further  agency  or  concern  on  God's  part. 
He  did  all  that  was  necessary  for  him  to  do  when  he  established 
the  laws  of  nature.     What  would  you  say  to  such  a  declaration  ? 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  33 

And  if  you  believed  it,  could  you  pray  ?     Or  if  you  should  pray, 
to  Avhat  would  you  pray  ? 

These  remarks  apply  equally  to  the  divine  agency  in  regard  to 
the  mind.  The  prayers  which  prophets  and  apostles  offered  to 
God,  that  he  would  enlighten  their  understanding,  subdue  their 
sins,  sanctify  their  hearts,  strengthen  them  for  duty,  and  give 
them  the  comforts  of  his  Spirit,  clearly  imply  a  desire  and  ex- 
pectation that  God  would  do  what  they  requested  —  that  he  would 
actually  do  it  —  and  do  it  at  the  time  when  it  was  needed.  And 
when  we  pray  for  the  same  spiritual  blessings,  we  do  certainly 
think,  that  we  are  asking  God  to  do  something.  And  this  is  the 
same  as  saying,  we  believe  God  has  a  present  agency  in  enlight- 
ening, sanctifying  and  comforting  his  people.  But  there  is  the 
same  reason  to  deny  God's  agency  in  the  minds  of  men,  as  to 
deny  his  agency  in  the  natural  world.  For  surely  God  has  in- 
vested the  mind  with  suitable  powers,  and  has  given  it  suitable 
laws.  And  these  powers  are  as  operative,  and  these  laws  as 
unifoi-m,  as  the  powers  and  laws  of  the  material  creation.  And 
as  the  mind  is  incorruptible,  and  has  an  inherent  activity  far 
above  any  activity  found  in  the  natural  world,  we  should  suppose 
that  if  a  divine  agency  could  be  dispensed  with  anywhere,  it 
would  be  here.  The  machinery  of  the  intellectual  and  spiritual 
world  is  manifestly  more  excellent  in  its  structure,  and  makes  a 
higher  display  of  the  perfection  of  its  Author,  than  the  machine- 
ry of  the  natural  world.  No  one  therefore  can  reasonably 
think,  that  the  laws  of  the  natural  world  are  such,  and  were 
originally  designed  to  be  such,  as  to  supersede  the  constant  agen- 
cy of  God,  without  thinking  also,  that  the  laws  of  the  mind  are 
such,  and  were  designed  to  be  such,  as  to  supersede  his  agency 
in  the  mind.  The  scheme  we  are  considering,  to  be  consistent, 
must  relate  equally  to  matter  and  mind,  and  for  the  same  reason. 
I  say  then  that  this  scheme,  if  true,  would  make  all  prayer  for  a 
divine  influence  in  our  souls  a  mistake.  For  when  we  pray  for 
such  an  influence,  we  do  certainly  apprehend  that  there  is  such 
a  thing ;  we  apprehend  that  God  does  really  give  his  Spirit,  and 


34  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

give  it  at  the  present  day  to  enlighten,  sanctify  and  comfort  the 
souls  of  his  children.     If  this  influence  of  the   Spirit,  which  we 
regard  as  so  precious,  and  so  necessary  that  we  shall  perish  with- 
out it  —  if  such  an  influence  does  not  exist,  and  if  all  real,  actu- 
al agency  on  God's  part  was  put  forth  at  the  creation  in  impart- 
ing powers  and  laws  to  the  spiritual  world  —  then  all  prayer  for  a 
present  divine  influence  is  founded  in  delusion  ;  and  if  David  and 
the  other  prophets  and  the  apostles  had  understood  the  matter 
right,  the  prayers  they  offered  up  for  God's  influence  in  their 
hearts  would  have  been  suppressed.     If  they  had  only  had  the 
true  philosophy,  they  would  not  have  prayed  !     As  to  ourselves 
—  we  are  accustomed  to  pray  that  God  himself  would  work  in 
us  both  to  will  and  to  do,  that  he  would  guide  us  into  the  truth, 
and  make  us  holy.     And  we  have  verily  thought,  and  it  has  been 
a  part  of  our  faith,  that  God  does  exert  such  a  desirable  influence 
in  the  soul,  and  that  we  may  humbly  hope  to  obtain  it  by  fervent 
prayer ;  and  feeling  our  great  need  of  it,  we  have  applied  our- 
selves to  God  day  by  day  with  the  request,  that  he  would  vouch- 
safe to  us  the  precious  gift  of  his  Spirit  —  a  Spirit  divinely  pow- 
erful to  illuminate  and  purify  and  comfort  the  soul,  and  to  do  it 
when  we  need  it,  at  the  -present  time.     But  if  the  scheme  we 
have   been   considering    is   true,   the    laws   of  mind   are   such, 
that    no    present   agency   of  God   in    the    mind  is   to   be   ex- 
pected ;  and  if  all  his  agency  was  put  forth   at  the  beginning, 
when    he    gave    laws  ,  to    the   spiritual  world ;    and    if  we   are 
brought  to  believe  all  this,  then  our  prayers  are  ended  forev- 
er.     We   shall    no  longer   ask  an    act  of  kindness   from    God, 
when  we  beheve   he   does  no  such   act.     We   shall  no   longer 
ask    him    to    work    in  us    to   will   and   to    do,   when   we    are 
convinced   there  is  no   such  work   of   God   in  the   soul.     How 
much    soever  we   may   feel  our   need   of   such   influence    from 
God,  we  shall  feel  that  we  cannot   consistently   ask  it  because 
God  cannot  consistently  give   it.     And  thus   though   poor   and 
needy,   and    sinful  and  weak    and    desolate,   and    conscious   of 
our  utter  insufiiciency  for  our  own  sanctification  and  happiness, 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  35 

we  shall  be  cut  off  from  the  privilege  of  coming  to  the  throne 
of  grace,  which  has  been  our  last  and  only  hope,  and  shall  be 
forced  to  cast  ourselves  upon  the  powers  of  our  own  mind  and 
to  seek  relief  where  only  it  can  be  found,  that  is,  from  the  Icms 
of  nature.  And  thus  we  shall  be  of  all  men  the  most  mis- 
erable. 


^.^ 


LECTURE     XLV. 


DIVINE  PROVIDENCE.  THE  EXCEPTIONABLE  THEORY  FURTHER 
CONSIDERED.  REMARKS  AS  TO  THE  LAWS  AND  POWERS  OF 
NATURE  AND  THEIR  DEPENDENCE  ON  GOD.  TWO  PRACTICAL 
REFLECTIONS. 

I  SHOULD  not  think  it  expedient  to  extend  this  discussion  so  far, 
were  it  not  that  the  scheme  under  consideration  is  very  subtle 
and  very  plausible,  and  when  it  once  gets  possession  of  the  mind, 
is  hard  to  be  dislodged.  It  has  an  element  of  truth  which  recom- 
mends it  to  speculative  reason.  In  one  point  of  view,  it  is  all 
that  reason  demands.  But  in  another  view,  or  by  looking  at  it 
on  the  other  side,  its  falsity  is  easily  discovered.  The  scheme  is 
of  such  a  nature,  that  it  cannot  be  well  understood  without  being 
subjected  to  a  thorough  scrutiny.  While  seen  at  a  distance  un- 
der the  garb  which  it  assumes,  it  may  appear  like  an  angel  of 
light.  But  when  brought  near  and  embraced,  it  is  a  malignant 
demon.  The  plain  fact  is,  that  although  it  may  admit  the  idea 
of  God,  as  the  Creator  or  the  original  cause  of  all  things,  it  does 
not  admit  the  idea  of  God  as  the  Preserver  and  Governor.  It 
excludes  him  in  that  sense,  in  which  we  are  most  of  all  concerned 
with  him.  As  related  to  the  duty  and  privilege  of  prayer,  and 
to  all  the  interests  of  practical  religion,  it  is  Atheism.  It  puts 
nature  in  the  place  of  God.  And  if  we  adopt  the  scheme,  our 
relation  to  God  must  be  transferred  to  nature  ;  and  a  speculative 
contemplation  of  nature  must  come  in  the  place  of  our  devout 
intercourse  with  a  present  God.  And  as  the  cordial  belief  of  a 
present,  ever  active,  and  benevolent  God  is  the  life  of  reUgion, 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  SI 

religion  is  dead  as  soon  as  that  belief  is  abandoned.  The  worship 
of  nature,  whether  in  one  form  or  another,  was  the  idolatry  which 
revelation  was  intended  to  abolish.  The  scheme  under  review 
would  set  aside  revelation,  and  ^e  spiritual  worship  of  Jehovah 
which  revelation  aimed  to  establish,  and  would  carry  us  back 
to  the  idol  worship  of  our  pagan  ancestors.  And  if  our 
minds  should  not  be  narrow  enough  to  exercise  a  religious  rever- 
ence towards  particular  parts  of  nature,  it  would  lead  us  to  seek 
satisfaction  by  looking  at  nature  as  a  whole,  invested  with  its  va- 
rious powers  and  laws.  And  I  leave  it  to  those  who  embrace  the 
scheme  to  answer  the  question,  whether  the  circumstance  above 
mentioned  is  not  in  reality  what  makes  it  so  welcome  to  their 
feehngs,  relieving  them  from  the  duty  of  prayer,  and  from  all  the 
terrors  which  the  unsubdued,  unsanctified  heart  would  feel  in 
being  under  the  actual  and  constant  government  of  a  righteous 
and  Almighty  God ;  whether  that  in  the  scheme  which  is  most 
appalling  to  Christians,  is  not  most  attractive  to  them. 

And  here  it  would  afford  me  special  gratification  to  know, 
what  answers  the  strenuous  advocates  of  the  scheme  under  re- 
view would  be  able  to  give  to  such  questions  as  the  following. 

1.  Did  they  derive  the  scheme  from  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old 
and  New  Testament  ?  And  do  they  really  believe  that  the  views 
which  the  sacred  writers  entertained  and  meant  to  express  on  the 
subject  of  divine  providence  correspond  with  their  scheme  ?  My 
question  is,  whether  they  rest  the  scheme  on  Christian  principles, 
or  on  the  prmciples  of  a  skeptical  or  pantheistic  philosophy. 

2.  How  do  they  know  that  all  events  result  from  the  laws  of 
nature  tvithoiit  any  present  divine  agency  ?  They  may  indeed 
know  the  order  of  events,  and  the  laws  according  to  which  they 
take  place.  But  how  do  they  know  that  the  wisdom,  power  and 
benevolence,  manifested  in  that  order,  reside  in  nature  itself,  and 
not  in  the  Author  of  nature  ?  The  agency  of  God  in  preserving 
and  governing  the  world  is  an  invisible  agency.  But  how  can 
they  infer  from  its  being  invisible,  that  it  does  not  exist  ?  Admit 
the  visible  phenomena  of  nature  to  be  the  same  on  both  schemes ; 
what  reason  have  they  to  think,  that  the  present,  supreme,  efficient 

TOL.   II.  4 


38  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

cause  of  those  phenomena  hes  in  nature,  and  not  in  nature's  God  ? 
If  they  say  that  when  one  cause  is  sufficient,  it  is  unphilosophical  to 
look  for  another  ;  I  ask  how  they  come  to  know  that  the  one  suf- 
ficient cause  is  in  nature  ?  It  must  be  a  cause  of  astonishing 
power  and  skill  that  can  sustain  and  move  all  the  heavenly  bodies, 
and  bring  to  pass  all  the  events  that  take  place  in  this  and  other 
worlds.  How  do  they  satisfy  themselves  that  a  cause  possessed  of 
such  unbounded  power  and  skill  exists  anywhere  but  in  the  Being 
of  beings,  the  eternal  God  ? 

3.  Do  the  advocates  of  the  scheme  under  consideration  see 
anything  in  the  operations  which  are  going  on,  or  in  the  events 
which  are  taking  place  in  the  physical  or  moral  world,  which 
would  render  it  inconsistent  with  the  perfections  of  God,  that  his 
agency  should  be  concerned  in  them  —  anything  which  would 
make  it  unworthy  of  God  that  he  should  continually  act  in  up- 
holding, directing  and  governing  such  a  world  ?  If  there  is,  then 
let  them  show  how  it  is  consistent  that  God  should  at  first  estab- 
hsh  laws  which  would  invariably  produce  these  events  ?  Let  them 
show  that  it  is  more  worthy  of  God  to  make  such  arrangements  and 
establish  such  principles,  as  would  certainly  cause  all  the  opera- 
tions which  have  appeared  in  the  creation,  than  to  exert  his  pres- 
ent agency  in  sustaining  and  governing  the  world,  and  causing 
the  same  operations  ?  If  they  think  what  we  call  the  plan  of 
providence  or  the  order  of  events  cannot  be  consistently  ascribed 
to  the  present  agency  of  God ;  how  can  it  be  consistently  ascribed 
to  his  past  agency  ? 

4.  Can  my  opponents  show  any  advantage  which  their  scheme 
has  over  the  common  scheme  ?  Do  they  think  it  has  the  ad- 
vantage of  ascribing  the  phenomena  of  nature  to  a  cause  which 
is  any  more  visible  or  manifest  than  the  divine  cause  ?  But  is  the 
energy  of  God  any  more  invisible  than  second  causes  or  the  in- 
herent powers  and  energies  of  nature  ? 

Can  they  plead  that  their  scheme  makes  the  order  of  events 
more  firm  and  stable,  and  more  to  be  relied  upon  ?  But  what 
can  be  more  firm  and  stable  and  more  to  be  relied  upon,  than  the 
constant   care   and   agency   of   the    unchangeable    God  ?  —  the 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  39 

constant  exercise  of  infinite  and  unchangeable  wisdom,  power  and 
benevolence  ? 

Can  they  plead  that  nature  with  its  powers  and  laws  is  near, 
and  that  their  scheme  brings  them  into  a  closer  connection  with 
the  grand  efficient,  governing  cause  of  all  that  takes  place  ?  But 
what  can  be  nearer  than  the  omnipresent  Spirit  ?  With  what 
can  we  have  a  more  close  and  intimate  connection,  than  with 
that  God,  in  whom  we  Uve  and  move  and  have  our  being  ? 

Do  they  allege  that  their  scheme  secures  the  mind  against 
those  agitations  and  forebodings  which  arise  from  the  constant  ap- 
prehension of  such  a  Being  as  God  is  described  to  be  —  a  God 
of  awful  holiness  and  justice,  requiring  so  strict  a  service  and 
forbidding  transgression  on  so  dreadful  a  penalty  ?  But  what  can 
be  more  composing  to  those  who  are  penitent  and  contrite,  than 
the  Scriptural  representation  of  a  God  whose  mercy  is  higher  than 
the  heavens  ;  whose  grace  abounds  where  sin  hath  abounded  ;  who 
has  assured  all  who  repent,  how  great  soever  the  amount  of  their 
guilt,  that  they  shall  have  eternal  life  ?  And  if  the  minds  of 
any  are  agitated  with  forebodings  of  divine  wrath  without  any 
hope  of  mercy,  must  it  not  be  o>ying  to  their  hard,  impenitent, 
unbeheving  hearts  ?  And  in  fact,  is  the  Scripture  account  of 
God's  justice  in  the  treatment  of  transgi-essors  more  terrific,  than 
is  necessary  to  support  the  honor  of  the  divine  laws,  to  prevent 
future  offences,  or  to  remedy  the  evils  of  those  which  ai-e  past  ? 

Will  any  advocates  of  the  scheme  before  us  pretend  that  it 
would  be  burdensome  to  the  Supreme  Being  to  be  forever  exerting 
himself  in  upholding  and  governing  all  his  creatures  and  all  their 
actions,  and  that  it  would  be  more  reasonable  to  think  that  after 
the  mighty  effort  of  his  power  in  bringing  the  universe  into  being, 
he  would  choose  not  only  to  rest  from  the  work  of  creation,  but  from 
all  farther  exertion  of  his  power  ?  If  so,  I  would  only  ask  them, 
whether  they  have  well  considered  what  a  Being  God  is,  and 
whether  they  have  any  reason  to  doubt  that  the  constant  exercise 
of  power  imphed  in  the  common  doctrine  of  providence  must  be 
perfectly  easy  and  infinitely  pleasing  to  such  a  Being,  as  the 
Scriptures  represent  God  to  be  ? 


40  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

I  would  ask  them  finally  whether  they  are  not  aware,  that  it  is 
and  always  has  been  the  sentiment  of  the  devout  heart  that  God 
puts  forth  a  present  agency  in  all  the  events  which  take  place  both 
in  the  natural  and  in  the  moral  world  ? 

The  most  plausible  illustration  of  the  scheme  under  considera- 
tion has,  as  I  have  before  suggested,  been  taken  from  the  mech- 
anism of  a  clock.  A  clock  skilfully  made  will  for  a  time  go  of 
itself,  without  any  further  attention  from  the  maker.  And  such 
a  time-piece  is  more  honorable  to  the  skill  of  the  man  who 
contrived  it,  than  if  it  should  be  necessary  for  him  to  stand  by 
and  move  it  continually  with  his  own  hand.  In  like  manner,  it 
is  said,  God  is  more  honored  by  framing  the  world  in  such  a 
manner,  that  it  will  go  on  of  itself  and  accomplish  all  the  ends 
designed,  without  any  further  attention  from  him,  than  by  leaving 
it  in  such  a  state  as  to  need  his  constant  agency  to  sustain  it,  and 
to  direct  all  its  affairs. 

This  matter  is  well  explained  by  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  in  his  cor- 
respondence with  Leibnitz. 

"  The  reason  why  among  men  an  artificer  is  justly  esteemed  so 
much  the  more  skilful,  as  the  machine  of  his  composing  will  con- 
tinue longer  to  move  regularly  without  any  farther  interposition 
of  the  workman,  is  because  the  skill  of  all  human  artificers  con- 
sists only  in  composing,  adjusting  or  putting  together  certain  move- 
ments, the  principles  of  whose  motion  are  altogether  independent 
of  the  artificer,  such  as  are  weights  and  springs  and  the  like ; 
whose  forces  are  not  made  but  only  adjusted  by  the  workman. 
But  with  regard  to  God  the  case  is  quite  different ;  because  he 
not  only  composes  or  puts  things  together,  but  is  himself  the  Au- 
thor and  continual  Preserver  of  their  original  forces  or  moving 
powers  ;  and  consequently  it  is  not  a  diminution  but  the  true  glory 
of  his  workmanship,  that  nothing  is  done  without  his  continual 
government  and  inspection.  The  notion  of  the  world's  being  a 
great  machine  going  on  without  the  interposition  of  God,  as  a 
clock  continues  to  go  without  the  assistance  of  a  clock-maker,  is 
the  notion  of  materialism  and  fate,  and,  under  pretence  of  ma- 
king God  a  supra-mundane  intelligence,  tends  to  exclude  provi- 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  41 

dence  and  God's  government  in  reality  out  of  the  world.  And 
by  the  same  reason  that  a  philosopher  can  represent  all  things 
going  on  from  the  beginning  of  the  creation  without  any  govern- 
ment or  interposition  of  Providence,  a  skeptic  will  easily  argue 
still  farther  backwards,  and  suppose  that  things  have  from 
eternity  gone  on,  as  they  now  do,  without  any  true  creation  or 
original  Author  at  all,  but  only  what  such  arguers  call  all  wise 
and  eternal  nature.  If  a  king  had  a  kingdom,  wherein  all  things 
would  continually  go  on  without  his  government  or  interposition, 
or  without  his  attending  to  and  ordering  what  is  done  therein  ;  it 
would  be  to  him  merely  a  nominal  kingdom  ;  nor  would  he  in  reality 
deserve  at  all  the  title  of  king  or  governor.  And  as  those  men, 
who  pretend  that  in  an  earthly  government  things  may  go  on 
perfectly  well  without  the  king  himself  ordering  or  disposing  of 
anything,  may  reasonably  be  suspected  that  they  would  like  very 
well  to  set  the  king  aside  ;  so  whosoever  contends  that  the  course 
of  the  world  can  go  on,  without  the  continual  direction  of  God, 
the  Supreme  Governor ;  his  doctrine  does  in  effect  tend  to  ex- 
clude God  out  of  the  world." 

As  to  the  constant  dependence  of  all  things  on  God,  Clarke 
and  Leibnitz  agree,  and  Clarke  says :  "  There  are  no  powers  of 
nature  at  all  that  can  do  anything  of  themselves,  (as  weights  and 
springs  work  of  themselves  with  regard  to  man.)  But  the  wisdom 
and  foresight  of  God  consist  in  contriving  at  once,  what  his 
power  and  government  is  continually  putting  in  actual  execution." 
He  holds  that  "  God's  conserving  all  things  means  his  actual 
operation  and  government  in  preserving  and  continuing  the 
being,  powers,  dispositions,  and  motions  of  all  things."  "  But," 
he  says,  "  if  his  conserving  all  things  means  no  more  than  a 
king's  creating  such  subjects,  as  shall  be  able  to  act  well  enough 
without  his  intermedling  or  ordering  anything  among  them  ever 
after  ;  this  is  makmg  him  indeed  a  real  creator,  but  only  a  nominal 
governor."  And  he  quotes  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  who  holds  the  same 
principles,  and  says ;  "  A  God  without  dominion,  without  provi- 
dence and  final  causes,  is  nothing  but  fate  and  nature." 

Leibnitz  says  "  To  infer  from  that  passage  of  holy  Scripture, 

4* 


42  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

wherein  God  is  said  to  have  rested  from  his  -works,  that  there  is 
no  longer  a  continual  production  of  them,  would  be  to  make  a 
very  ill  use  of  that  text ;"  though  he  says  "  there  is  no  produc- 
tion of  new  simple  substances." 

Here  let  me  call  your  attention  to  two  particular  remarks, 
which  I  hope  will  clear  away  any  remaining  obscurities,  and  show 
that  the  common  doctrine  of  Divine  Providence  is  open  to  no  valid 
objections. 

First.  The  doctrine  of  Divine  Providence,  as  commonly  held, 
not  only  admits,  but  includes  what  are  called  the  powers  and 
laws  of  nature.  The  scheme  I  have  opposed  is  not  objected  to 
because  it  holds  to  these.  But  the  fact  that  it  does  hold  to  them, 
is  the  circumstance  which  gives  it  an  aspect  of  truth,  and  which 
is  made  so  plausible  an  argument  in  its  favor.  Now  let  it  be 
remembered  that  we  do  not  object  to  that  scheme  because  it  con- 
tains this  truth,  but  because  it  rejects  another  truth  and  one  of 
the  highest  moment.  In  other  words,  the  scheme  is  not  faulty 
because  it  holds  to  general  laws  and  powers  of  nature,  but  be- 
cause it  disconnects  them  from  the  constant  agency  of  God,  thus 
giving  them  a  present  independence.  To  do  justice  to  the  sub- 
ject of  Divine  Providence,  I  have  deemed  it  important  to  say 
expressly,  so  that  it  may  not  fail  to  be  understood  and  remem- 
bered, that  the  common  scheme  recognizes  and  maintains  in  all  their 
extent  what  are  denominated  the  laws  of  nature  both  m  the 
physical  and  the  moral  world. 

Scripture  speaks  and  philosophy  speaks  of  things  material  and 
spiritual,  as  endued  with  various  powers,  which  operate  according 
to  fixed  principles  and  laws.  These  powers  and  laws  are  not  fic- 
tions, but  realities.  They  as  really  exist  as  matter  or  mind.  In- 
deed neither  matter  nor  mind  could  exist,  and  be  what  it  is, 
without  them.  And  the  powers  which  belong  to  the  material  and 
spiritual  creation  not  only  are  realities,  but  are  possessed  of  a 
real  activity.  All  language,  and  the  thoughts  of  all  minds  ascribe 
to  spiritual  beings  and  to  material  things  an  energy  which 
produces  effects.  Who  can  help  ascribing  a  real  and  a  mighty 
efficiency  to  the  electric  power,  to  heat  and  to  steam,  and  es- 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  43> 

peciallj  to  the  powers  of  the  mind  ?  That  these  powers  actually 
produce  various  and  important  effects  is  a  matter  of  constant 
experience.  It  is  implied  in  whatever  we  say  or  think  or  do. 
And  those  who  hold  the  doctrine  of  divine  agency  in  the  high 
sense  in  which  it  is  set  forth  in  the  Scriptures,  still  ascribe  active 
powers  and  laws  to  matter  and  mind  —  they  do  this  deliberately 
and  sincerely.  And  if  they  should  make  the  attempt  to  lay  aside 
the  language  which  implies  this,  and  to  introduce  new  modes  of 
speech  which  would  not  contain  a  recognition  of  the  powers  and 
laws  of  nature,  the  attempt  would  evince  their  folly  and  absurdity. 
Common  sense  and  common  experience  tell  the  truth.  But  a 
man  who  denies  the  existence  and  constant  operation  of  the 
laws  of  nature  is  in  a  dream  or  is  insane.  He  adheres  to  shadows 
and  illusions,  instead  of  truth  and  reality. 

Read  the  Scriptures,  and  see  how  freely  the  writers,  who  teach 
that  God  himself  worketh  all  in  all,  speak  the  language  of  com- 
mon sense,  referring  constantly  to  the  things  that  are  made,  just 
as  they  are.  And  they  often  do  this  without  any  apparent  refer- 
ence to  a  power  above  the  powers  of  nature.  You  may  ask, 
how  they  could  properly  do  this,  if  they  believed  that  there  is  a 
power  above  them.  I  answer,  they  do  it  on  the  principle,  that 
all  parts  of  the  truth  do  not  lie  on  the  same  side  of  a  subject, 
and  are  not  to  be  touched  upon  at  one  and  the  same  time.  That 
there  is  body  and  spirit,  and  that  these  are  endued  with  various 
powers,  operating  according  to  fixed  laws,  is  as  real  a  truth,  as 
that  there  is  a  God.  To  say  that  a  God  exists,  is  not  to  assert 
all  the  truth  ;  because  other  beings  exist  as  really  as  God.  On 
the  other  hand,  to  say  that  those  other  beings  exist,  is  not  to  say 
all  the  truth ;  because  those  other  beings  are  not  God,  and  no 
pai-t  of  God.  Again ;  that  God  has  a  universal  agency  is  a 
truth,  but  not  all  the  truth.  For  other  beings  have  an  agency. 
Upon  these  principles  we  see  it  to  have  been  perfectly  proper  for 
the  sacred  writers  to  speak  frequently  of  the  powers  and  actions 
of  created  beings,  without  expressly  referring  at  the  time  to  any 
higher  power  or  agency.  In  doing  this  they  brought  into  view 
one  plain,  ob\ious  truth,  and  stopped  there,  because  the  occasion 


44  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

did  not  require  more.  At  other  times,  they  spoke  of  the  power 
or  agency  of  God  without  any  express  reference  to  the  power  or 
agency  of  created  beings.  In  doing  this,  they  brought  into  view 
the  great,  primary  truth,  and  stopped  there,  because  the  occa- 
sion  did  not  require  them  at  the  time  to  speak  of  other  truths 
subordinate  to  this. 

Having  thus  shown  that  the  common  theory  of  Providence  fully 
recognizes  the  powers  and  the  agency  of  created  things,  I  proceed 
to  my  second  remark,  which  is,  that  the  powers  and  laws  of  na- 
ture and  the  agency  of  created  things,  though  really  existent, 
and  though  really  distinct  from  the  power  and  agency  of  God, 
are  not  in  any  respect  independent  of  God. 

That  things  may  really  exist  which  are  dependent,  is  involved 
in  the  very  idea  of  creation.  God  was  the  cause,  created  things 
the  effects,  the  effects  being  as  real  as  the  cause.  And  as  things 
may  exist,  so  all  their  powers  may  exist,  in  a  state  of  depen- 
dence. And  as  the  existence  of  created  beings  and  of  all 
their  powers  depended  at  first  on  the  efficacious  will  of  God ;  so 
does  the  continuance  of  their  existence.  They  can  no  more  con- 
tinue to  exist  than  they  could  begin  to  exist,  independently  of 
God.  Here  we  have  the  doctrine  of  divine  preservation,  in 
which  the  will  and  agency  of  God  are  as  really  concerned,  as  in 
creating  them  at  first.  All  things  are  through  him,  as  really 
as  of  him. 
F  While  then  the  powers  and  laws  of  nature  and  the  agency  of 
created  beings  have  a  real  existence,  distinct  from  the  power  and 
agency  of  God,  it  is  evident  that  they  are  in  all  respects  de- 
pendent on  God ;  that  they  exist  because  God  wills  their  ex- 
istence, and  that  they  continue  to  exist,  because  God  preserves 
them  or  causes  them  to  continue.  So  the  Apostle  teaches.  It 
is  God  that  worketh  all  in  all. 

The  work  of  God  in  creating,  preserving  and  governing  intelli- 
gent beings  is  evidently  the  most  important  of  all  his  works.  And 
though  the  word  of  God  and  the  whole  course  of  his  providence 
cast  a  very  clear  light  on  this  great  work,  yet  it  is  in  relation  to 
this  that  the  human  mind  is  most  liable  to  misapprehension.     We 


DIVINE     PROVIDENCE.  4$ 

may  have  no  difficulty  in  acknowledging,  that  the  bodies  which 
compose  the  solar  system,  and  all  things  in  the  vegetable  and 
animal  world,  are  dependent  on  God  ;  that  as  he  made  them,  he 
now  upholds  them  and  directs  and  governs  all  their  operations. 
But  that  rational  and  moral  beings  are  dependent  on  God,  and 
that  he  works  in  them  and  controls  all  their  actions,  is  a  doctrine 
at  which  we  are  apt  to  stumble.  And  yet  the  sacred  writers  as- 
sert this  doctrine  very  frequently,  and  with  great  clearness.  And 
they  do  it  without  seeming  to  apprehend,  that  any  objection  or 
difficulty  can  be  urged  against  it.  And  if  we  should  look  at  the 
subject  in  the  light  of  unprejudiced  reason,  we  should  conclude, 
that  God's  agency  must  be  conspicuous,  in  proportion  to  the  dig 
nity  and  importance  of  the  beings  that  he  creates  and  preserves ; 
that  if  his  power  and  other  perfections  are  displayed  in  the  world 
at  large,  they  are  displayed  especially  in  the  rational  and  moral 
part ;  and  we  should  be  the  furthest  possible  from  imagining,  that 
creatures  who  possess  a  nature  of  singular  excellence,  are  in  any 
respect  independent  of  him  who  is  the  source  of  all  excellence. 
For  surely  the  greater  and  more  excellent  the  gift,  the  more 
clearly  is  the  giver  brought  into  view.  And  if  he  not  only  be- 
stows the  excellent  gift  once,  but  continues  it,  we  should  grate- 
fully acknowledge  his  continual  goodness.  Now  it  is  what  we 
should  hardly  have  expected,  that  any  man  should  question  the 
agency  of  God  in  those  things,  in  which  it  has  its  brightest  dis- 
play. It  would  be  comparatively  a  small  offence  against  reason 
and  truth,  to  doubt  the  constant  agency  of  God  in  sustaining 
lifeless  matter.  But  rational,  moral,  accountable  beings  receive 
from  God  far  more  exalted  gifts,  and  hold  a  far  higher  rank. 
In  them  the  operation  of  his  wisdom,  power  and  goodness  appears 
in  its  highest  glory.  And  thei/  are  the  beings  and  the  only  be- 
ings, capable  of  perceiving  this  display  of  the  divine  perfections. 
And  thei/  are  the  beings,  who  ought  devoutly  to  acknowledge  it, 
and  in  view  of  it,  to  glorify  God,  from  whom  cometh  every  good 
and  perfect  gift  —  and  if  every  good  and  perfect  gift,  certainly 
that  which  is  most  excellent  and  perfect.  Now  that  we,  ra- 
tional, immortal  beings,  who  receive  such  exalted  gifts  from  Gx)d, 


46  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

and  in  whom  he  displays  an  agency  proportioned  to  the  impor- 
tance of  our  noble  faculties,  and  our  intelligent  and  moral  actions  — 
that  we  should  ever  hesitate  and  be  reluctant  to  admit  this  divine 
agency  —  that  we  should  ever  be  afraid  of  ascribing  too  much  to 
God,  as  though  ascribing  all  good  to  him  could  be  too  much,  — 
that  we,  who  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  in  God,  should 
proudly  arrogate  to  ourselves  a  portion  of  independence,  and 
should  arrogate  it  even  in  that,  in  which  our  dependence  pre-emi- 
nently appears,  —  is  not  this  exceedingly  strange  ? 

These  are  the  two  remarks  I  had  to  make.  The  powers  and 
laws  of  nature  are  realities,  and  are  to  be  admitted  and  main- 
tained in  all  their  extent.  The  powers  and  laws  of  nature,  though 
distinct  from  the  power  and  agency  of  God,  are  not  in  any  re- 
spect nor  in  any  degree  independent  of  God.  He  worketh  all 
in  all,  especially  in  intelligent,  free  moral  beings.  There  are  two 
distinct  powers,  —  the  power  of  created  things,  and  the  power 
of  God,  the  Creator  and  Preserver.  There  are  two  agencies,  the 
agency  of  creatures,  and  the  agency  of  God.  These  powers  and 
agencies,  though  closely  related  to  each  other,  are  in  their  na- 
ture totally  distinct.  Of  course  the  power  and  agency  of  the  one 
can  never  be  ascribed  to  the  other,  as  properly  his.  The  agency 
of  the  one  may  be  very  nearly  connected  with  the  agency  of  the 
other,  but  it  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  other  as  his  agency. 

We  inquire  then,  what  relation  these  two  distinct  agencies  sustain 
to  each  other  ?  Are  they  concurrent  or  concomitant  agencies  ?  That 
is,  are  the  agency  of  God  and  the  agency  of  the  creature  joined 
together  as  agencies  of  the  same  kind,  and  as  having  the  same  re- 
lation to  a  common  end  ;  and  do  they  contribute  to  that  end  in  the 
same  manner?  Are  they  collateral  or  parallel  agencies?  All  these 
phrases  fail  of  expressing  the  particular  and  chief  relation  be- 
tween divine  agency  and  human  agency.  The  power  and  agency 
of  God  and  the  power  and  agency  of  creatures,  are  not  originally 
and  properly  co-existent,  or  concurrent.  The  power  of  creatures 
is  a  consequence,  an  effect  flowing  from  the  divine  power.  As 
Jesus  said  to  Pilate  ;  "  Thou  couldest  have  no  power  against  me, 
except  it  were  given  thee  from  above."     The  relation  then  of 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  4t 

divine  power  to  the  power  of  created  beings  is  the  relation  of 
cause  to  effect.  But  according  to  Dr.  Johnson,  those  things 
which  are  concurrent  or  concomitant  are  not  causative  or  conse- 
quential. This  is  true  as  to  the  agency  of  God  and  that  of  cre- 
ated things.  They  are  not  concurrent,  concomitant,  or  parallel 
agencies.  The  one  is  causative,  the  other  consequential.  The 
agency  of  material  things  is  manifestly  related  to  the  divine  agen- 
cy, as  an  effect  to  a  supreme  cause.  And  if  we  ascribe  an  agency 
of  a  lower  kind  to  a  divine  cause,  shall  we  not  ascribe  to  the 
same  divine  cause  an  agency  of  a  more  exalted  kind,  that  is,  the 
agency  of  intelligent  beings  ?  Do  we  honor  God  by  representing 
all  the  operations  in  the  natural  world  as  resulting  from  hi3 
sovereign  appointment  and  agency  ?  And  shall  we  not  honor 
him  more  by  representing  the  higher  and  more  wonderful  opera- 
tions of  the  mind  as  resulting  from  the  same  divine  appointment 
and  agency  ? 

But  is  this  dependence  on  divine  agency  consistent  with  the 
nature  of  free  moral  actions  ?  Why  not  ?  We  do  not  perform  a 
single  action  which  is  not  manifestly  the  effect  of  some  one  thing, 
or  many  things,  which  evidently  operate  upon  us  or  within  us  as 
causes.  Now  if  the  operation  of  inferior  and  even  unintelligent 
causes  is  consistent  with  the  nature  of  moral  actions ;  is  not  the 
operation  of  a  divine  cause,  to  say  the  least,  equally  consistent  ? 
Does  not  God  know  better  than  any  inferior  cause,  how  to  ope- 
rate upon  the  mind  which  he  himself  has  made,  and  influence  its 
actions,  without  violating  its  faculties  or  preventing  its  actions 
from  being  free,  moral,  and  accountable  ?  What  a  groundless 
conceit !  The  fact  is  that  God,  in  the  exercise  of  his  agency, 
not  only  lets  us  be  free,  moral  agents,  but  makes  us  so.  He  not 
only  leaves  us,  as  some  express  it,  to  exercise  the  faculties  of 
moral  agents  without  hinderance,  but  causes  us  thus  to  exercise 
them.  And  as  our  agency  is  dependent  upon  God ;  so  are  all 
its  properties  and  circumstances.  Thus  in  the  most  perfect  sense, 
our  free,  moral  agency,  taken  just  as  it  is,  has  to  divine  agency 
the  relation  of  an  effect  to  a  cause.  The  effect  here  is  of  a 
far  more    excellent  kind,  than  any  in   the  material  world,  and 


f^  DIVINE    PROVIDENCE. 

of  course   ought   to    be   more    devoutly   ascribed    to    a   divine 
cause. 

In  what  I  have  advanced  on  this  subject,  my  object  has  not 
been  to  support  any  human  theory.  I  have  aimed  at  nothing,  but 
to  bring  out  distinctly  the  very  positions  contained  in  the  word 
of  God.  There  are,  you  know,  two  classes  of  texts,  one  of  which 
asserts  the  agency  of  God,  the  other  the  agency  of  creatures. 
This  is  the  case  in  regard  to  the  natural  world.  God  causes  the 
motions  or  actions  which  take  place  in  material  things,  and  those 
things  really  move  or  act.  For  example,  he  causes  the  planets 
to  move,  and  they  do  move  —  the  sun  to  shine,  and  it  shines. 
These  two  agencies  are  real,  but  not  collateral  or  concomitant. 
But  the  inspired  writers  teach  this  specially  in  regard  to  man. 
God  causes  us  to  walk  in  his  statutes.  He  inclines  our  hearts 
to  obey  —  he  turns  us,  and  he  works  in  us  to  will  and  to  do.  He 
gives  repentance  and  faith,  and  he  sheds  abroad  his  love  in  our 
hearts.  Here  you  have  one  part  of  divine  truth,  a  part  never  to 
be  overlooked.  But  there  is  another  class  of  texts,  which,  with 
equal  clearness,  bring  into  view  the  rational,  moral  agency  of  man. 
While  God  causes  his  people  to  walk  in  his  statutes,  they  them- 
selves are  required  to  walk  and  do  walk  in  his  statues.  While 
he  inclines  their  hearts  to  obey,  their  own  hearts  inchne  to  obey. 
If  he  turns  them  from  their  evil  ways,  they  themselves  turn.  If 
he  gives  them  a  new  heart  and  a  new  spirit,  they  make  them- 
selves a  new  heart.  If  he  creates  in  them  a  clean  heart,  they 
cleanse  their  own  hearts.  He  gives  them  faith,  and  they  beheve  ; 
repentance,  and  they  repent.  He  causes  them  to  love,  and  they 
love.  He  works  in  them  to  will  and  to  do,  and  they  will  and  do. 
He  produces  love,  joy,  meekness  and  all  other  graces  in  them,  and 
they  exercise  these  graces.  He  keeps  them  from  sin,  and  they 
keep  themselves  from  sin.  "  Now  in  what  way"  says  a  very 
judicious  writer*  "  are  we  to  determine  the  meaning  of  these  two 
classes  of  texts  ?  Are  we  to  consider  them  as  contradictory  ? 
Are  we  at  liberty  to  adopt  the  one  class  as  true,  and  to  reject  the 

*  Jeremiah  Day,  D.  D.,    LL.  D. 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  4& 

other  as  false,  or  so  to  explain  them  away  as  to  leave  them  no 
determinate  signification  ?  If  men  incline  their  own  hearts  to 
obedience,  must  we  conclude  that  God  does  not  incline  them  ? 
If  they  are  required  to  make  themselves  a  new  heart,  does  it 
follow  that  God  does  not  give  them  a  new  heart  ?  If  they  turn 
from  sin  to  righteousness,  is  it  certain  that  God  does  not  cause 
them  to  turn, —  and  is  it  certain  that  their  obedience  is  independent 
of  his  agency  ?  Are  we  not  bound  on  the  contrary  to  put  such 
a  construction  upon  the  two  classes  of  texts,  that  both  may  be 
admitted  as  true  ?  And  how  is  this  to  be  done  ?  Evidently  by 
considering  the  agency  of  men  as  the  consequence  of  the  agency 
of  God.  If  he  causes  them  to  walk  in  his  commands,  they  do 
actually  thus  walk.  If  he  makes  them  obedient,  they  really  obey. 
If  he  turns  their  hearts,  they  themselves  turn.  If  he  gives  them 
a  new  heart  and  a  new  spirit,  they  exercise  the  affections  of  a 
new  heart.  Not  that  the  agency  of  God  is  identified  with  the 
agency  of  men ;  but  the  one  is  the  consequence  of  the  other,  is 
dependent  on  the  other.  His  act  in  turning  them  is  not  their 
act  in  turning.  Their  obedience  is  not  his  obedience.  His  ma- 
king them  a  new  heart,  is  not  the  same  as  their  making  them- 
selves a  new  heart ;  but  it  is  causing  them  to  make  themselves 
a  new  heart." 

This  author  proceeds  on  the  same  general  principle  to  explain 
and  reconcile  the  different  classes  of  texts,  which  relate  to  men 
as  sinners,  and  shows  that  in  this  point  of  view  also  they  are  de- 
pendent on  God,  and  that  he,  in  his  wise  and  righteous  provi- 
dence, exercises  a  sovereign,  controlling  influence  over  their 
thoughts  and  actions. 

I  might  show  that  the  representation  here  made  of  the  agency 
of  creatures  as  dependent  upon  the  agency  of  God,  and  the 
views  here  given  of  Divine  Providence,  agree  with  the  opinions 
of  all  the  distinguished  evangelical  writers  both  in  Europe  and 
America.  But  it  is  enough  for  us,  if  what  we  believe  is  accord- 
ing to  the  word  of  God. 

The  doctrine  of  Divine  Providence  suggests  some  important 
practical  reflections,  two  of  which  I  shall  lay  before  you. 

VOL.  II.  5 


50  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

First.  The  doctrine  of  Divine  Providence  is  presented  to  our 
view  in  so  clear  a  light  that  it  is  easy  to  avoid  mistakes.  The 
doctrine  comes  to  us  in  the  light  which  God  himself  has  cast  upon 
it  in  his  word  and  in  his  works.  The  works  and  the  word  of  God 
agree ;  thej  are  in  fact  but  two  methods  of  revelation,  though 
one  of  them  is  vastly  superior  to  the  other.  "  God  has  magnified 
his  word  above  all  his  name."  And  yet  this  superior  method  of 
revelation  presupposes  the  other,  and  cannot  be  rightly  appre- 
hended without  attention  to  the  other.  The  light  of  both  com- 
mingled makes  known  the  doctrine  of  providence  so  clearly,  that 
no  diligent  inquirer  after  the  truth  can  fail  to  understand  it. 
But  what  does  the  clearest  light  avail  to  those,  who  love  dark- 
ness rather  than  light  ?  INIost  of  the  erroi-s  which  prevail  on  this 
subject,  arise  from  within.  Only  let  men  be  brought  to  a  right 
state  of  mind,  and  their  errors  will  be  corrected,  and  the  obscu- 
rity which  has  appeared  to  them  to  be  spread  over  the  divine 
government  Avill  quickly  pass  away. 

Secondly.  We  see  here  the  precise  difference  between  rational, 
Scriptural  piety ,  and  enthusiasm. 

A  man  under  the  influence  of  true  Scriptural  piety,  judges 
right  as  to  the  nature  and  the  methods  of  divine  providence. 
Accordingly  he  not  only  seeks  of  God  the  blessings  which  he 
needs,  but  seeks  them  in  the  appointed  way.  He  prays  for  re- 
lief and  comfort,  and  hopes  that  God  will  answer  his  prayers  not 
miraculously,  but  according  to  the  usual  methods  of  his  provi- 
dence ;  and  these  methods  he  learns  from  Scripture  and  observa- 
tion. He  has  found  that  God  ordinarily  puts  forth  his  agency  in 
the  natural  and  in  the  spiritual  world  in  a  settled  method  and 
order ;  and  he  sees  that  this  uniform  method,  called  the  order  or 
laws  of  nature,  is  fitted  most  clearly  to  display  the  divine  perfec- 
tions, and  to  secure  our  welfare.  All  his  own  efforts  therefore, 
and  all  his  ideas  of  what  God  will  do,  are  conformed  to  the  truth. 
He  expects  God  to  act,  and  to  succeed  his  actions,  in  the  ap- 
pointed way,  and  in  no  other.  He  prays  that  God  would  give 
him  a  harvest,  and  hopes  that  God  will  grant  this  blessing.  But 
how  ?     Why,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature ;  and  what  these 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  51 

laws  are  every  one  understands.  He  looks  to  God  to  feed  him 
and  clothe  him,  to  heal  his  sicknesses  and  to  lengthen  out  his  life  ; 
and  all  in  the  -ways  of  God's  appointment.  He  asks  God  to  pre- 
serve him  from  hurtful  mistakes,  to  guide  him  into  the  truth,  and 
to  supply  all  his  need ;  and  he  expects  these  blessings  to  be  grant- 
ed in  the  way  marked  out  by  the  word  and  providence  of  God, 
and  in  no  other  way.  In  short  he  regulates  his  thoughts  and  de- 
sires, his  prayers,  actions  and  expectations,  according  to  the  es- 
tablished principles  of  the  divine  government.  And  thus  he 
thinks  and  prays  and  acts  in  conformity  with  the  truth.  He  falls 
in  with  the  divine  plan.  He  moves  in  harmony  with  the  movements 
of  providence.  He  desires  nothing,  he  prays  for  nothing,  except 
in  God's  established  method  and  order. 

Take  now  the  enthusiast.  He  prays  to  God,  and  expects  God 
to  answer  prayer.  In  this  he  may  be  right.  But  he  mistakes  as  to 
the  manner  of  praying,  and  the  manner  in  which  God  will  answer 
prayer.  He  offers  prayer  and  looks  for  an  answer,  in  a  way 
■which  God  has  not  appointed,  and  which  is  suggested  by  his 
own  misguided  imagination.  For  example,  he  is  desirous  of  know- 
ing what  the  will  of  God  is  respecting  a  particular  journey,  or 
other  pursuit ;  and  he  prays  that  God  Avould  make  known  his 
will.  But  how  does  he  expect  that  God  will  make  known  his  avUI  ? 
Not  through  his  own  rational  faculties,  exercised  in  the  way  of 
serious  deliberation  and  honest  inquiry.  He  does  not  deliberate  ; 
he  does  not  pursue  a  diligent,  rational  inquiry,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain what  the  will  of  God  is.  He  does  not  attend  to  the  events 
of  providence  or  the  instruction  of  Scripture,  to  see  what  they 
indicate.  Nor  does  he  think  it  necessary  or  proper  to  ask  advice 
of  others.  He  looks  for  an  answer  in  a  shorter  way.  The  ordi- 
nary method  of  availing  ourselves  of  patient,  serious  considera- 
tion, the  counsel  of  judicious  men,  the  manifest  leadings  of  provi- 
dence, and  the  teachings  of  Scripture,  in  connection  with 
prayer,  seems  to  him  very  dull,  and  far  below  the  aspirings  of  a 
warm  and  lofty  piety.  He  sometimes  thinks  that  God  will  answer 
prayer  and  make  known  his  will  in  a  dream  ;  and  then,  if  he 
dreams  so  and  so,  he  concludes  that  such  is  the  will  of  God.     Or 


52  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

he  expects  God  to  make  known  his  will  by  a  direct  and  extraor- 
dinary suggestion  to  his  mind,  aside  from  the  use  of  his  rational 
faculties.  And  then  if  something  is  suggested  to  his  mind,  not  in 
the  way  of  rational  consideration,  or  in  the  way  of  advice  from 
those  who  are  entitled  to  his  confidence,  but  directly,  and  sud- 
denly, and  in  an  unaccountable  manner,  through  the  capricious  act- 
ings of  an  excited  fancy  ;  he  thinks  it  from  God,  and  regulates 
his  conduct  accordingly. 

A  young  man  mider  the  mfluence  of  enthusiasm,  has  his 
thoughts  turned  towards  the  ministry,  and  he  prays  God  to  teach 
him  what  he  would  have  him  to  do.  But  he  forgets  that  God  has 
given  him  rational  faculties,  to  be  employed  on  this  subject  as 
well  as  on  any  other.  He  forgets  that  God  has  given  him  his 
word  to  instruct  him,  and  so  he  does  not  dihgently  and  patiently 
search  it.  Or  if  he  goes  to  the  inspired  volume,  he  goes  in  an 
unauthorized  way.  He  says  perhaps,  I  will  open  the  Bible,  and 
the  first  passage  which  my  eye  falls  upon  shall  decide.  With  this 
view,  he  opens  the  Bible,  and  it  may  be  his  eye  at  once  falls  upon 
such  a  passage  as  this  ;  "  son  of  man,  I  send  thee  to  the  house 
of  Israel;" — or,  "  Go  preach  the  gospel  to  every  creature." 
This  he  takes  to  be  a  clear  indication  of  the  will  of  God  respect- 
ing the  case  in  hand.  He  overlooks  the  proper  method  of  search- 
ing the  Scriptures,  that  is,  in  the  right  use  of  his  rational  facul- 
ties, and  all  the  helps  in  his  power.  He  forgets  that  there  are 
other  passages  in  the  Bible  which  relate  to  the  question  before 
him,  as  well  as  the  first  he  fixed  his  eye  upon.  He  forgets  that 
the  passage  he  may  read  the  next  minute,  or  the  next  day,  is  the 
word  of  God  as  well  as  the  one  he  first  read,  and  may  be  of  a 
very  different  and  opposite  import.  He  takes  no  suitable  pains 
to  leai'n  what  is  the  nature  of  the  work  which  he  contemplates, 
and  what  are  the  necessary  qualifications  for  it.  He  takes  no 
pains  to  settle  the  important  question,  whether  he  now  has  or 
is  ever  hkely  to  have  the  requisite  qualifications.  He  does  not 
go  modestly  to  a  minister  of  Christ  or  to  an  intelligent  Christian  for 
counsel.  But  he  concludes  at  once,  that  God  has  made  known 
his  will  by  directing  him,  as  he  did,  to  that  particular  text.     How 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  68 

can  it  be  supposed,  he  says,  that  God  would  order  it  so,  that 
such  a  text  should  first  of  all  be  placed  right  before  me,  unless 
he  meant  to  teach  me  that  he  does  really  call  me  to  be  a  minister 
or  a  missionary.  Now  you  cannot  reason  with  such  a  man  ;  for 
he  mistakes  entirely  as  to  the  principles  of  reasoning,  and  the 
methods  of  the  divine  providence.  You  cannot  reason  with 
him,  for  he  is  an  enthusiast,  and  an  enthusiast  cannot  be  reasoned 
with. 

A  person  under  the  influence  of  enthusiasm  errs  in  the  same 
way  in  judging  of  his  own  conversion.  In  ascertaining  whether 
he  is  a  pardoned  sinner,  and  has  a  title  to  lieaven,  he  does  not 
attend  carefully  to  his  own  heart  and  life,  comparing  them  with 
the  standard  of  God's  word.  How  then  does  he  proceed  ?  Why 
perhaps  he  reads  the  words  of  Christ ;  "  rejoice  that  your  names 
are  written  in  heaven ;"  and  he  concludes  at  once  that  he  is  in 
that  happy  state ;  and  he  is  filled  with  joy  at  the  thought  of 
endless  happiness,  —  not  considering  at  all  what  the  Bible  teaches 
as  to  the  conditions  of  eternal  life.  Perhaps  he  dreams  that  he 
sees  Christ  on  the  cross,  and  hears  him  say ;  I  die  for  thee,  or, 
thy  sins  are  forgiven  thee ;  and  he  takes  his  dream  to  be  an  evi- 
dence of  his  forgiveness,  though  he  neither  repents  nor  believes  in 
Christ.  I  introduce  these  cases  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  en- 
thusiasm, of  which  there  is  still  a  great  abundance  in  the  world. 
If  a  man  resorts  to  any  such  mea,ns  as  are  not  divinely  appointed, 
to  ascertain  his  conversion  and  his  title  to  heaven  —  if  he  relies 
upon  any  workings  of  his  own  excited  fancy,  or  upon  any  supposed 
communication  from  God,  except  what  comes  in  confoi-mity  with 
the  Scriptures,  to  satisfy  him  that  his  sins  are  pardoned,  he  shows 
himself  to  be  an  enthusiast.  And  though  an  enthusiast  may 
judge  right  in  thinking  he  is  a  child  of  God,  he  is  quite  as  likely 
to  judge  wrong. 

You  see  that  enthusiasm  has  a  mixture  of  truth  and  error. 
The  enthusiast  is  right  in  praying  to  God.  There  is  no  error  in 
this,  if  he  prays  as  he  ought.  He  is  right  in  praying  often  and 
earnestly.  He  is  right  in  expecting  God  to  answer  prayer ;  be- 
cause God  has  promised  to  do  this.     He  is  right  in  placing  entire 

6* 


54  DIVINE     PROVIDENCE. 

confidence  in  God,  and  in  the  truth  of  his  promises ;  only  he 
ought  to  understand  the  promises  correctly.  He  is  right  in 
thinking  that  God  will  actually  grant  the  blessings  which  he 
seeks,  if  he  seeks  aright.  Nor  does  he  mistake  in  expecting  a 
present  and  merciful  agency  of  God  in  answering  sincere,  fervent 
prayer.  Thus  far  he  goes  with  the  Bible  and  has  truth  on  his 
side.  And  here  you  come  to  the  place  where  he  departs  from 
the  mfallible  guide,  and  where  his  mistake  begins.  The  Bible 
does  not  teach,  and  providence  does  not  teach,  that  God  will 
answer  prayer  or  make  known  his  will,  in  such  a  way  as  the  en- 
thusiast supposes.  It  is  the  teaching  of  the  Bible  and  of  provi- 
dence, that  we  are  to  learn  the  will  of  God  in  all  ordinary  cases, 
by  the  dihgent  use  of  our  faculties  ;  that  God  guides  us  as  ra- 
tional beings,  and  on  uniform  principles.  Here  is  the  mistake  of 
the  enthusiast.  He  thinks  God  will  interpose  in  his  providence  to 
answer  his  prayers  and  supply  his  wants,  in  an  extraordinary 
manner ;  not  according  to  the  uniform  laws  which  divine  wisdom 
has  settled  in  the  natural  and  moral  world,  but  in  a  miraculous 
way.  The  man  of  enlightened.  Scriptural  piety  believes  that 
miracles  were  formerly  of  infinite  importance  for  the  confirmation 
of  the  truths  of  our  religion  ;  but  that  they  are  not  necessary  and 
are  not  to  be  expected  now  ;  and  indeed  that  their  occurrence  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  human  life,  would  subvert  the  common 
principles  of  action,  and  create  endless  confusion  in  the  moral 
world.  The  enlightened,  sober  Christian  believes,  that  God  can 
finswer  prayer  without  miracles  as  well  as  with  them.  He  has 
thus  all  the  motives  and  encouragements  to  prayer  which  he  could 
have,  if  God  had  promised  a  miraculous  answer  to  prayer.  And 
he  confidently  relies  upon  God  to  exert  an  agency  in  his  behalf, 
as  real,  and  as  beneficial,  as  a  miraculous  agency  could  be.  His 
prayers  therefore,  and  his  expectations  of  good,  are  all  conformed 
to  the  infalUble  standard.  He  lives  and  moves  in  the  region  of 
truth  and  reauty.  His  reason  and  conscience  and  all  his  facul- 
ties are  not  only  active,  but  active  in  the  right  way.  The  light 
which  guides  him  is  a  clear  and  certain  light,  coming  from  the 
sun  of  righteousness.     But  the  enthusiast  lives  in  the  region  of 


DIVINE    PROVIDENCE.  55 

fancies  and  dreams ;  which  fancies  and  dreams  maj  be  very  seri- 
ous and  very  pleasing,  and  even  subUme  ;  but  still  thej  are  fan- 
cies and  dreams.  And  by  relying  upon  them  he  deprives  him- 
self of  the  benefit  of  realities.  He  subjects  himself  to  constant 
loss  by  seeking  good  in  ways  which  cannot  be  successful,  instead 
of  those  ways  of  divine  appointment  in  which  his  success  would 
be  sure.  The  enthusiast  may  love  God  ;  but  he  is  apt  to  mistake 
the  will  of  God.  and  the  methods  of  his  providence.  He  may 
act  conscientiously ;  but  he  is  likely  to  act  erroneously  and 
strangely.  He  may  be  travelling  in  the  way  to  heaven ;  but  he 
travels  without  the  advantage  of  a  clear  light  and  a  safe  guide. 
It  may  be  that  he  goes  on  with  a  sincere  and  pious  heart ;  but  it 
is  with  a  bewildered  imagination,  half  the  time  following  phantoms, 
and  never  seeing  things  as  they  are,  till  he  arrives  —  and  if  after 
all  he  truly  loves  God  he  will  arrive,  at  that  world  of  light,  where 
shadows  and  dreams  cannot  be  found. 


LECTURE     XLVl. 


MORAL    AGENCY.      PROPER    MODE    OF    INQUIRY.      ULTIMATE    TEST 
OR   STANDARD    OF   MORAL   GOOD   AND   EVIL. 

The  pliilosopliy  of  the  mind  is  a  subject  of  deep  interest  to 
theological  students.  And  the  particular  views  which  you  enter- 
tain respecting  it  will  be  likely  to  influence  your  habit  of  think- 
ing on  some  of  the  most  important  doctrines  of  revelation,  par- 
ticularly those  to  which  the  Arminian  and  Pelagian  controversies 
are  related. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  lay  before  you  anything  like  a  complete 
system  of  mental  philosophy.  This  would  be  incompatible  with 
the  plan  of  lecturing  which  I  have  contemplated,  and  with  the 
Constitution  of  the  Seminary  relative  to  my  department.  The 
most  I  can  promise  is,  to  treat  briefly  of  such  parts  of  the  gene- 
ral subject  as  will  help  us  to  elucidate  important  principles,  either 
theoretic  or  practical,  in  Christian  Theology.  The  topic  which  I 
shall  more  particularly  consider,  is  Moral  Agency.  It  is  very 
manifest  that  this  subject  has  a  near  and  important  connec- 
tion with  Christian  Theology,  inasmuch  as  all  the  duties  which 
Christianity  inculcates,  all  the  motives  it  presents,  and  all  the 
blessings  it  confers,  respect  man  as  a  moral,  accountable  agent. 

The  subject  being  thus  connected  with  Christian  Theology, 
those  who  are  preparing  for  the  sacred  office  should  take  pains 
to  acquire  a  right  understanding  of  it,  and  an  abihty  to  treat 
other  related  subjects  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  a  just  im- 
pression on  others,  even  on  those  who  have  never  been  accustomed 
to  philosophical  discussion. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  57 

That  we  may  investigate  this  subject  Avith  success,  it  is  of 
special  consequence  that  v/e  should  have  our  minds  settled  as  to 
the  proper  mode  of  prosecuting  our  inquiries.  It  is  evident  in 
this,  as  in  other  cases,  that  we  must  derive  our  knowledge  from 
known  facts,  and  that  no  hypothesis  and  no  argument,  not  founded 
on  facts,  can  be  admitted  in  the  science  of  mind  any  more  than 
in  the  science  of  physics.  Any  hypothesis  in  natural  science, 
which  is  not  supported  by  the  evidence  of  facts,  we  regai'd  as  a 
dream  of  the  imagination.  We  should  do  the  same  as  to  mental 
science.  For  example,  if  any  one  advances  the  position,  that  the 
mind  can  put  forth  volitions  or  choices  without  the  influence  of 
motives,  we  should  as  philosophers  reject  the  position,  unless  there 
are  well  known  facts  to  sustain  it.  But  I  am  well  aware  that  it 
is  one  thing  to  acknowledge  this  principle  in  words,  and  to  have 
a  general  conviction  of  its  truth,  and  a  very  diflerent  thing  to 
observe  it  and  govern  oui'selves  by  it  in  practice.  It  is  surprising 
to  find  how  frequently  educated  as  well  as  uneducated  men 
resort  in  their  reasoning  to  the  hypothetical  method,  though  per- 
haps they  profess  to  renounce  it ;  and  how  much  of  the  incon- 
clusiveness  of  their  arguments,  and  how  much  of  the  strength  of 
objections  urged  against  them,  is  owing  to  this  circumstance. 
Such  have  been  the  books  in  common  use,  and  such  the  modes 
of  thinking  which  have  prevailed  in  times  past,  and  which  have 
been  transmitted  from  other  generations  to  us,  that  it  is  no  easy 
task  to  rid  our  minds  of  all  that  is  perplexing  and  false,  and  to 
bring  ourselves  to  that  simple  method  which  has  been  so  well 
defended  of  late  by  the  ablest  writers  on  mental  philosophy,  and 
which  so  obviously  agrees  with  the  dictates  of  common  sense  and 
the  estabhshed  rules  of  investigation  on  all  other  subjects.  On 
this  point,  I  quote  one  passage  from  Dr.  Upham's  Treatise  on  the 
WiU.  In  regard  to  the  discussion  of  the  various  questions  res- 
pecting the  Will  he  says  ;  "  It  will  be  our  desire  to  rest  mainly 
upon  facts  and  the  obvious  deductions  from  them,  and  to  avoid 
mere  speculation.  The  indulgence  of  speculation,  the  giving 
loose  to  discursive  flights,  is  often  flattering  to  pride  of  intellect, 
but  unless  controlled  by  a  frequent  recurrence  to  facts,  it  is  not 


58  MORAL    AGENCY. 

favorable  to  the  ascertainment  of  truth.  The  inquiries  before 
us,  so  far  at  least  as  the  mode  of  conducting  them  is  concerned, 
ought  to  be  prosecuted  in  essentially  the  same  manner  as  our 
inquiries  into  the  physical  world.  What  we  wish  to  know  are 
the  simple  facts  that  exist,  and  the  general  laws  which  these 
facts  obviously  develop  and  clearly  prove,  in  distinction  from 
mere  conjectures.  We  apprehend  that  this  course,  if  we  promise 
ourselves  a  favorable  issue,  is  necessary  in  all  discussions  respect- 
ing the  mind." 

According  to  the  views  which  I  have  thus  briefly  suggested 
on  the  subject  before  us,  it  is  not  to  be  our  inquiry,  what  we 
should  think  would  be,  or  what  must  be,  the  attributes  and  cir- 
cumstances of  a  moral  agent,  or  the  manner  of  his  acting.  We 
should  no  more  make  this  our  inquiry,  than  we  should  inquire  in 
natural  history,  what  must  be  or  what  we  should  think  would  be 
the  properties  of  an  Elephant,  or  the  instincts  of  a  Bee  ;  or  in 
physical  science,  what  must  be  the  properties  of  a  magnet,  or 
what  we  should  think  would  be  the  operations  of  electricity  or 
the  phenomena  of  solar  Hght.  The  chief  object  of  investigation 
in  the  diflferent  branches  of  natural  science  is  to  observe  and 
arrange  the  phenomena  exhibited  before  us  ;  or  in  other  words, 
to  discover  and  classify  the  facts  which  are  presented  to  \dew  in 
diiferent  parts  of  the  natural  world.  And  we  are  to  do  the  same 
in  regard  to  a  moral  agent.  Instead  of  saying  such  and  such 
must  be  his  properties,  his  circumstances  or  his  mode  of  acting, 
and  instead  of  inquiring  what  we  should  suppose  them  to  be,  our 
great  business  is  to  ascertain  what  they  are.  Proper  attention 
to  this  one  point  would  have  prevented  some  of  the  most  violent 
controversies  which  have  employed  the  pens  and  agitated  the 
passions  of  men,  would  have  rendered  the  study  of  mental 
science  simple  and  comparatively  easy,  and  would  have  con- 
taibuted  much  to  the  progress  of  the  human  mind  in  this  branch 
of  knowledge. 

In  this  discussion  I  shall  assume  that  man  is  a  moral  agent. 
And  this  you  will  see  to  be  just  as  proper,  as  to  assume  that  man 
is  an  inteUigent  agent,  or  that  he  has  animal  life,  or  that  he  ex- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  69 

ists ;  or  in  optics,  to  assume  that  man  has  the  sense  of  seeing. 
We  know  that  moral  agency  belongs  to  us  just  as  we  know  that 
any  other  attribiite  belongs  to  us,  that  is,  by  consciousness,  and 
by  observation  of  one  another.  Our  moral  and  accountable 
agency  could  never  be  made  out  by  general  logical  arguments. 
Its  existence  and  all  the  elements  of  which  it  is  constituted  are 
known  directly  as  matters  of  consciousness.  And  every  attempt 
to  obtain  the  knowledge  of  them  in  any  other  way  will  open  the 
door  to  obscurity  and  error. 

The  meaning  of  the  proposition,  that  man  is  a  moral,  accountable 
agent,  may  be  given  in  different  ways.  You  may  say,  a  moral 
agent  is  one  who  acts  morally,  or  one  who  is  under  a  moral  law, 
or  is  subject,  to  a  moral  government,  or  who  exercises  affections 
and  performs  actions  of  a  moral  nature,  all  amounting  to  the  same 
thing.  But  it  may  be  asked,  what  is  a  moral  law  ?  And  if  I 
say,  it  is  that  which  requires  moral  affections  and  actions,  it  may 
still  be  asked,  what  are  moral  affections  and  actions?  This 
brings  us  to  what  may  be  called  the  ultimate  fact  in  moral  science, 
and,  to  us,  the  practical  test  or  standard  of  all  moral  distinctions. 
When  we  have  certain  affections  or  do  certain  actions,  a  feeling 
of  approbation  or  complacency  is  excited,  in  other  words  a  feeling 
that  the  affections  or  actions  are  right.  As  similar  feeling  is  ex- 
cited when  we  contemplate  similar  affections  or  actions  in  others. 
But  when  we  are  conscious  of  certain  other  affections  in  ourselves 
or  contemplate  them  in  others,  a  feeling  of  disapprobation  or  dis- 
pleasure is  excited,  that  is,  a  feeling  that  such  affections  or  ac- 
tions are  wrong.  This  feeling  takes  place  uniformly,  so  far  as 
our  minds  are  unperverted  and  act  according  to  their  nature. 
The  fact  that  men  in  certain  conditions,  and  under  the  influence 
of  certain  causes,  judge  differently  from  this,  is  no  evidence 
against  the  existence  of  a  uniform  constitution  in  man,  or  against 
the  reality  of  the  distinction  which  has  been  made  between 
moral  good  and  evil,  any  more  than  the  fact  that  men,  under 
the  influence  of  certain  mental  or  bodily  diseases,  do  not  per- 
cieve  the  difference  between  harmony  and  discord  in  music,  or 
between  different  colors,  or  different  tastes,  or  between  what  is 


60  MORAL    AGENCY. 

true  and  false  in  Geometry,  is  evidence  that  there  is  no  differ- 
ence in  reality,  or  that  there  is  no  fixed  principle  in  our  minds 
which  leads  us  to   make  the  distinction.     But  it  will  be  found 
on  inquiry,  that  there  is  in  fact  much  less  difference  of  feeling 
among  men,  as  to  the  grand  distinction  between  moral  good  and 
evil,   than  has    sometimes    been  pretended.      Let   a  man   from 
strong  emotions  of  kindness  expose  himself  to  peril  and  suffer- 
ing to   rescue  a  fellow  creature   from  distress,  and  that  fellow 
creature  be  one  that  had  often  injured  him ;  who  could  witness 
such  an  act  of  kindness  and  magnanimity  without  a  feeling  of 
respect  and  admiration  ?     Let  another  man  from  mere  envy  or 
avarice  go   at    midnight  to   his  sincerest  friend  and  benefactor, 
quietly  asleep  in  his  bed,  and  with  wanton  cruelty  murder  him 
and  his   beloved  family  around    him  ;    who    could  witness    such 
an  act  without  a  feeling  of  indignation    and  abhorrence  ?     The 
sentiment  of  approbation  or  disapprobation,  which  arises  in  the 
mind  in  relation  to  such  actions,  is  as  uniform  as  the  sensation 
of  different   colors    at   the  sight  of   a    rain-bow.     So    that    our 
making  this  sentiment  or  feeling  of  the  mind  the  ultimate  fact 
in  moral  science,  and  the  standard  by  which  we  are  to  measure 
moral  good  and  evil,  will  subject  us  to  no  more  doubt  and  uncer- 
tainty than  we   meet   with  in   the   other  sciences.      The  moral 
sentiment  which  arises    in  our  minds  in  view  of   the    different 
feelings  and  actions  of  men,  depends  as  obviously  on  the  constitu- 
tion of  our  nature,  as  any  bodily  sensation.     And  this  constitu- 
tion of  our  nature  respecting  moral  good  and  evil  is  as  uniform, 
as  that  which  respects  reason  or  memory  or  the  bodily  senses. 
We  know  that  these  faculties  and  senses,  when  disordered,  vary 
from  the  same  faculties  and  senses  in  a  healthy  state.     But  vari- 
ations, arising  from  such  a  cause,  never  weaken  our  confidence 
in  our  reason  or  memory  or  the  bodily  senses,  or  prevent  our  ap- 
peahng  to  them  as  a  rule  of  action.     In  like  manner,  although 
the  moral  sensations  of  some  men  are  disordered  and  false,  we 
still  make  our  appeal  to  our  moral  constitution,  or  to  the   senti- 
ment which  uniformly  arises  in  our  minds  in  relation  to  different 
actions,  as  the  ultimate  standard  of  morals,  or  the  measure  of 


MORAL     AGENCY.  61 

right  and  wrong.  We  are  not  indeed  always  to  refer  to  it  in  a 
formal  manner,  or  to  the  exclusion  of  other  rules  of  judgment. 
But  we  shall  find  that  every  other  intelligible  rule  of  judgment 
presupposes  or  implies  this.  Even  the  divine  law,  which  is  most 
commonly  and  most  justly  referred  to  as  the  standard  of  moral 
virtue,  ultimately  depends  upon  this  for  its  binding  force,  certainly 
it  does  fully  correspond  with  it.  The  divine  law,  requiring  us  to 
love  God  and  our  neighbor,  is  obligatory  upon  us,  because  we 
have  a  moral  nature,  that  is,  because  we  are  so  constituted  that 
we  are  capable  of  moral  affection,  and  approve  in  ourselves  and 
others  what  is  required,  and  disapprove  what  is  forbidden.  But 
the  same  divine  law  is  not  obligatory  on  brute  animals.  And 
why  ?  Because  they  are  not  moral  agents  ;  that  is,  they  are  not 
so  formed  as  to  be  capable  of  any  emotion  or  action  respecting 
moral  objects,  or  any  feeling  of  approval  or  disapproval  in  view 
of  such  emotion  or  action.  The  applicability  of  the  divine  law 
to  us  and  its  reasonableness  in  relation  to  us  depend  entirely  upon 
our  having  what  we  call  a  moral  nature.  Mere  intelligence,  if 
it  could  exist  without  moral  feeling,  could  not  make  us  proper 
subjects  of  God's  law.  If  we  had  the  faculty  of  knowing  the 
existence  and  some  of  the  attributes  of  God  without  any  affec- 
tion of  love,  or  any  faculty  or  capacity  to  love,  and  without  any 
feeling  that  we  ought  to  love  such  a  Being,  or  that  we  are 
blame-worthy  for  not  loving  ;  what  we  mean  by  moral  obliga- 
tion would  be  wanting.  Moral  obligation  so  entirely  depends 
upon  our  having  a  moral  nature,  and  the  feeling  of  approbation 
or  disapprobation  in  view  of  our  moral  affections,  that  if  such 
affections,  and  such  approbation  and  disapprobation,  and  all  car 
pacity  for  them,  should  cease  in  mankind,  nothing  like  moral  ob- 
ligation would  for  a  moment  remain.  That  the  Governor  of  the 
world  should  in  such  a  case  command  human  beings  to  love  and 
punish  them  for  not  loving,  would  be  no  more  consistent  with 
justice,  and  would  no  more  promote  the  ends  of  moral  govern- 
ment, than  for  him  to  command  a  brute  animal  to  love  and  to 
punish  it  for  not  loving.  To  us,  possessed  as  we  are  of  moral 
sentiment,  how  utterly  inconsistent  would  it  be  with  the  confi- 
VOL.  n.  6 


62  MORAL    AGENCY. 

dence  we  repose  in  God,  to  suppose  that  he  exacts  love  of  any 
of  his  creatures  and  punishes  them  for  the  want  of  love,  when 
in  fact  they  have  no  faculty  of  love,  and  no  consciousness  that 
the  requisition  of  love  is  just,  or  that  they  are  ill-deserving  for  not 
complying  with  it.  The  moral  government  of  God  is  a  concern 
between  him  and  creatures  endued  with  a  moral  nature.  The 
rectitude  of  his  government  implies  that  there  is  a  moral  sense 
in  his  subjects,  approving  his  law  and  disapproving  what  is  con- 
trary to  it.  So  that  to  suppose  that  the  Supreme  Being  adminis- 
ters a  moral  government,  involving  commands  and  penalties  to- 
wards those  who  have  no  faculty  of  moral  perception  agreeing 
with  that  government,  is  to  suppose  what  would  be  subversive  of 
all  our  notions  of  God's  attributes. 

This  then  is  the  sum  of  what  my  time  will  allow  me  to  say  on 
this  part  of  the  subject.  We  are  so  constituted,  that  we  neces- 
sarily make  a  distinction  among  our  diflferent  affections  and  ac- 
tions, approving  some  and  disapproving  others.  In  regard  to 
these  affections  and  actions,  we  feel  and  judge  as  we  do  from  the 
nature  which  God  has  given  us.  And  it  is  as  impossible  for  us, 
without  a  total  perversion  of  our  moral  faculties,  to  feel  and 
judge  differently  in  regard  to  the  primary  distinctions  in  moral 
subjects,  as  it  is  to  have  different  sensations  respecting  the  ob- 
jects of  our  senses.  It  is  you  well  know  impossible  for  us  to  be 
pleased  with  pain  or  displeased  with  pleasure,  and  with  such  a 
nature  as  we  possess  it  is  equally  impossible  for  us  to  approve  of 
malice,  or  to  disapprove  of  benevolence.  Give  a  man  honey  to 
taste,  and  you  excite  in  him  the  sensation  of  sweetness  ;  present 
a  prism  to  his  eye,  and  you  excite  the  sensation  of  different  col- 
ors ;  speak  to  him,  and  you  excite  the  sensation  of  sound.  In 
like  manner,  present  to  a  man's  mental  eye  the  feeling  of  benevo- 
lence and  the  actions  that  flow  from  it,  and  you  excite  in  him 
instant  approbation.  Present  the  contrary,  and  you  excite  disap- 
probation. If  he  attends  to  the  affections  in  his  ovra  mind,  he 
will  either  approve  or  condemn  himself.  If  he  observes  them  in 
others,  he  will  either  approve  or  condemn  them.  And  if  at  any 
time  the  impulse  of  his   own   passions  leads  him  to  justify  the 


MORAL  AGENCY.  63 

Avrong  affections  of  himself  or  of  others,  he  will  ultimately  con- 
demn himself  for  it  as  an  act  of  violence  done  to  his  moral 
nature. 

On  this  principle  let  the  sacred  preacher  faithfully  exhibit  be- 
fore the  minds  of  men  the  glorious  benevolence  or  goodness  of 
God,  displaying  itself  in  the  ten  thousand  forms  of  happiness 
which  it  produces.  I  say  not  that  they  will  certainly  love  such 
a  Being.  But  I  say,  that  they  must  inwardly  approve  of  his 
character  ;  and  that  they  must  either  love  him,  or  disapprove  of 
themselves  for  not  loving.  To  this  constitution  of  our  nature,  to 
this  moral  sentiment  uniformly  produced  in  our  minds  by  him  who 
created  us,  the  prophets  and  apostles  made  their  last  appeal  in 
their  addresses  both  to  the  good  and  the  bad  ;  and  we  must  do 
the  same.  We  must  indeed  speak  of  the  divine  law  as  our  stand- 
ard. It  is  in  truth  our  standard,  a  perfect  standard,  set  before 
us  by  him  who  knows  what  we  are,  and  who  has  a  right  to  com- 
mand. But  the  divine  law  as  written  in  the  Scriptures,  or  as 
announced  by  the  sacred  preacher,  is  just  and  good  m  relation  to 
those  only,  who  have  substantially  the  same  law  written  on  the 
heart; — it  is  just  and  good  only  in  relation  to  mot^al  beings,  ca- 
pable of  perceiving  its  justice  and  goodness  and  of  conforming  to 
its  demands.  Our  obhgation  to  obey  any  law  of  God  must  de- 
pend on  the  principle,  that  the  command  is  what  our  moral  na- 
ture declares  to  be  right,  that  it  recommends  itself  directly  to 
our  conscience,  or  that  it  is  such  a  law  as  Avill  meet  the  approba- 
tion of  our  conscience  as  soon  as  we  have  competent  knowledge. 
In  this  latter  case,  in  which  we  are  at  present  destitute  of  com- 
petent knowledge,  instead  of  forming  a  judgment  directly  on  the 
propriety  of  the  law,  we  fix  our  eye  upon  the  character  of  the 
Lawgiver  and  are  satisfied  that  a  law  coming  from  him  must  be 
worthy  of  obedience. 

But  I  need  not  pursue  this  discussion  farther,  as  the  subject  is 
one  on  which  every  man  is  competent  to  judge,  and  actually  does 
judge,  h(Jwever  unable  he  may  be  to  describe  philosophically  the 
grounds  of  his  judgment.  If  I  ask  you  what  moral  obligation  is, 
or  what  you  mean  by  the  phrase,  I  ought  to  do  such  a  thing,  or 


G-1  MORALAGENCY. 

it  is  my  duty  or  I  am  bound  to  do  it,  your  reply  must  rest  ulti- 
mately upon  the  moral  sentiment  in  your  own  minds.  You  may 
indeed  say  with  perfect  propriety,  that  you  ought  to  do  a  thing, 
because  God  commands  it.  But  your  saying  this  implies  that 
you  are  persuaded  of  the  truth  of  the  principle,  that  you  owe 
obedience  to  such  a  Being  as  God,  whatever  his  commands  may 
be.  Had  you  not  already  the  persuasion  that  you  ought  to  obey 
God,  you  certainly  would  not  assign  his  command  as  the  reason 
why  you  ought  to  perform  any  particular  action.  What  then  do 
you  mean  by  your  saying  that  you  ought  to  obey  God  ?  Do  you 
mean  anything  more  or  less  than  this,  that  you  are  so  constituted, 
or  have  such  a  nature,  that  you  do  and  must  regard  obedience  to 
God  as  right,  and  must  feel  a  satisfaction  in  your  own  mind 
when  you  render  obedience,  but  must  disapprove  a  refusal  to 
obey,  and  reproach  yourself  when  you  are  chargeable  with  it  ? 
You  thus  refer  ultimately  to  the  conviction  of  your  own  conscience 
or  to  the  moral  sentiment  of  your  own  mind  as  the  standard  or 
rule  of  your  obligation.  Had  you  not  such  a  conscience,  such  a 
moral  nature,  you  would  never  say,  I  ought  or  am  under  obligar- 
tion  to  do  this,  or  to  refrain  from  that.  We  may  not  always  ad- 
mit the  principle  above  stated  in  words,  but  we  shall  find  that  in 
all  our  arguments  to  prove  men's  obhgation  or  to  produce  in  their 
minds  a  feeling  of  it,  we  make  our  ultimate  appeal  to  their  moral 
sense,  or  to  the  constitution  of  their  moral  nature.  We  ask  them, 
is  it  not  right  to  love  that  Being,  who  is  infinitely  benevolent  and 
who  has  shown  unceasing  kindness  to  you  ?  Is  it  not  duty  to 
avoid  what  such  a  Being  has  forbidden,  and  what  will  mjure 
your  fellow  creatures  and  yourselves  ?  That  is,  do  you  not  per- 
ceive this  to  be  the  case,  or  have  you  not  such  a  nature  that  you 
feel  it  to  be  so  ? 

This  appeal  to  the  moral  sense  as  the  ultimate  test  or  measure 
of  right  and  wrong,  is  often  made  by  the  prophets  and  apostles, 
and  by  Jesus  of  Nazareth  more  than  by  any  other.  And  this 
conspired  with  other  things  to  make  him  the  best  of  all  teach- 
ers. 

But  I  wish  here  to  guard  you  against  supposing,  that  it  is  our 


MORAL    AGENCY.  65 

feeling  of  approbation  or  disapprobation  that  constitutes  or  makes 
things  right  or  wrong.  Some  expressions  in  Thomas  Brown's 
Lectures,  if  taken  bj  themselves,  would  seem  to  favor  this  sup- 
position ;  though  after  a  careful  attention  to  what  he  advances 
on  the  subject,  I  cannot  think  he  meant  more  than  this,  that  it 
is  our  rational  and  moral  nature,  or  the  feeling  of  approbation  or 
disapprobation  which  arises  in  our  minds  in  view  of  our  affections 
and  actions,  which  renders  those  affections  and  actions  right  or 
wrong  in  relation  to  us,  or  which  renders  us  accountable  for  the 
affections  and  actions  as  right  or  wrong  in  us,  we  being  possessed  of 
such  an  intellectual  and  moral  nature  —  the  same  things  not  be- 
ing right  or  wrong  to  beings  destitute  of  rational  and  moral  facul- 
ties. According  to  the  construction  then  which  candor  would 
put  upon  Dr.  Brown's  remarks,  it  is  this  moral  capacity  in  us  that 
makes  us  capable  of  discerning  the  rectitude  or  obliquity  of 
moral  actions.  The  fact  is,  that  the  very  sentiment  of  approba- 
tion implies  that  what  we  approve  is  right,  right  in  itself.  We 
look  at  it,  we  see  what  it  is,  and  say  it  is  right,  —  not  that  by 
pronouncing  it  right  we  make  it  right.  I  say,  that  what  we,  in 
the  proper  exercise  of  our  moral  faculties,  see  to  be  right,  is  right 
in  itself.  Its  rectitude  hes  in  its  own  nature.  If  any  moral 
being  in  the  created  universe  loves  God,  he  does  what  is  just  and 
right.  If  we  know  that  he  has  love  to  God,  we  approve  the  af- 
fection, and  pronounce  it  right.  If  we  are  ignorant  of  it,  it  is 
to  us,  as  though  it  did  not  exist.  But  other  moral  beings  who 
are  acquainted  with  it,  perceive  and  acknowledge  its  rectitude. 
And  if  that  one  moral  agent,  who  loves  God,  were  the  only  cre- 
ated being  endued  with  a  moral  nature  ;  he  would  be  conscious 
of  the  rectitude  of  his  own  affection,  and  God  would  regard  it 
with  approbation.  But  suppose  further,  that  no  moral  being  ex- 
isted besides  God ;  in  that  case  the  moral  sentiment  would  exist 
in  the  mind  of  God,  and  would  exist  there  in  perfection.  God 
would  be  conscious  of  the  complete  rectitude  of  his  own  affection, 
and  would  feel  a  perfect  complacency  in  himself.  Being  pos- 
sessed of  absolute  perfection,  he  would  necessarily  feel  perfect 
self-approbation.     It  is  then  in  God  himself,  that  all  moral  excel- 

6* 


66  MOEAL    AGENCY. 

lence  originally  exists.  In  him  it  is  found  in  its  underived,  unboun- 
ded fulness.  And  when  from  eternity  he  thought  of  other  moral 
beings,  that  is,  beings  to  be  created  by  him  with  a  moral  nature  bear- 
ing a  resemblance  to  his  own,  he  knew  that  it  would  be  right  for  such 
moral  beings  to  love  him  supremely,  and  to  be  benevolent  to  one 
another  ;  and  that  it  would  be  wrong  for  them,  instead  of  loving 
him  and  one  another,  to  be  selfish  and  malevolent.  This  discern- 
ment of  what  would  be  right  and  wrong  in  creatures,  existed  in  the 
mind  of  God  before  creation  began,  as  perfectly  as  it  does 
now.  To  God  therefore  we  are  to  look  for  the  original  spring, 
the  foundation  and  the  standard  of  all  moral  excellence.  There 
is  no  moral  excellence  independently  of  God,  none  but  what  is 
derived  from  him  and  conformed  to  his  image.  Here  is  the  only 
ultimate  basis  and  standard  of  moral  excellence.  You  may  say, 
that  the  basis  of  the  distinction  between  moral  good  and  evil  ex- 
isted eternally  in  the  nature  of  things.  But  you  must  not  forget 
that  previously  to  creation,  or  eternally,  there  was  in  fact  no  non 
ture  of  things,  imless  you  call  the  nature  of  Crod  the  nature  of 
things.  It  was  indeed  eternally  the  intention  of  the  divme  mind 
to  create  things,  that  is,  moral  beings,  in  whose  very  nature  the 
distinction  of  good  and  evil  would  be  founded.  And  speaking  with 
some  latitude,  we  might  say,  that  all  those  things  which  were  to 
be  created,  existed  eternally  in  the  mind  of  God.  But  the  plain 
truth  is,  not  that  created  things  eternally  existed,  but  that  God 
eternally  purposed  that  they  should  exist.  ^ 


LECTURE    XLVII. 


MORAL  AGENCY.  DIFFERENT  STATES  OF  CONSCIENCE  CONSID- 
ERED IN  RELATION  TO  MORAL  AGENCY.  AMBIGUITY  OF  WORDS. 
THE  MORAL   TEST   APPLIED   TO   BODILY  ACTION. 

It  is  an  important  fact  that  conscience,  or  the  moral  sense, 
which  was  considered  in  the  last  Lecture  as  an  ultimate  standard 
of  right  and  wrong,  has  in  different  men,  and  in  the  same  men  at 
different  times,  various  degrees  of  clearness  and  activity.  It 
may  be  so  cultivated  and  improved  that  it  will  do  its  office  prompt- 
ly and  correctly,  will  be  always  awake  and  always  in  earnest, 
and  will  give  its  decisions  with  a  power  which  will  fill  the  soul 
with  joy  or  with  anguish.  On  the  other  hand  it  may  be  so  neg- 
lected, depraved  and  stupified,  that  for  a  time  it  will  either  not 
act  at  all,  or  act  erroneously.  Men  bring  their  conscience  into 
this  diseased  and  torpid  state  by  acting  against  their  convic- 
tions. They  disregard  the  admonitions  of  the  inward  monitor, 
till  he  becomes  weary  and  ceases  to  admonish.  Through  the  in- 
fluence of  indulged  sin,  the  light  of  the  soul  is  in  a  great  degree 
extinguished.  Still  it  is  not  wholly  extuaguished.  The  moral 
faculty  is  not  destroyed.  It  is  rather  like  the  eye  which  sees 
not,  because  it  is  shut,  or  because  a  dark  body  is  interposed  and 
conceals  the  object.  The  organ  of  vision  remains,  and  actual 
sight  will  return,  as  soon  as  the  eye  is  opened  or  tlie  intervening 
body  removed.  In  those  wicked  men  who  are  for  the  present 
most  free  from  inward  reproofs,  conscience  will  at  length  awake 
to  fidehty,  and  will  execute  a  dreadful  retribution  for  all  that  has 
been  done  during  its  slumbers. 


68  MORAL     AGENCY. 

But  these  variations  of  conscience  involve  a  difficulty  respect- 
ing our  present  subject.  For  if  moral  agency  implies  that  we 
have  in  our  minds  a  feeling  of  approbation  in  view  of  what  is 
right  and  of  disapprobation  in  view  of  what  is  wrong,  then  where 
is  moral  agency  at  the  time  when  this  feeling  is  entirely  suppres- 
sed, or  what  is  Averse,  when  that  which  is  right  is  disapproved, 
or  that  which  is  wrong  is  approved  ;  when  men,  in  the  language 
of  Scripture,  put  light  for  darkness  and  darkness  for  light,  good 
for  evil  and  evil  for  good. 

To  assist  in  the  solution  of  this  difficulty,  I  offi^r  the  following 
remarks. 

First.  In  the  state  of  moral  dormancy  above  described,  con- 
science is  not  tvholly  inactive.  From  our  own  experience,  and 
from  the  acknowledgments  of  others,  we  conclude  that  in  a  state 
of  the  greatest  hardness  and  insensibihty,  when  men  seem  en- 
tirely to  overlook  the  evil  of  sin,  they  frequently  suflFer  such  self- 
reproach  and  remorse,  and  such  fears  of  the  wrath  to  come, 
that  they  choose  annihilation  rather  than  existence.  Conscience 
then,  even  in  the  most  abandoned,  does  speak  and  warn  and  re- 
prove ;  and  it  often  requires  all  the  efforts  which  wicked  men 
can  make,  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  a  cheerfulness  which  they 
do  not  feel. 

But  there  is  a  farther  solution  at  hand.  If,  during  the  state 
af  probation,  conscience  is  for  a  time  suppressed  and  buried  in 
sleep ;  in  a  state  of  retribution,  it  will  awake  to  perform  its  office. 
And  when  a  man's  conscience  is  thoroughly  awake,  he  will  re-" 
view  the  feelings  and  actions  which  took  place  during  the  time  of 
moral  slumber,  and  will  regard  them  with  a  strong  disapproba- 
tion of  himself.  The  properties  of  moi'al  agency,  which  before 
existed,  but  lay  concealed,  will  then  become  visible.  Possessing 
as  he  did  a  moral  nature  through  the  whole  period  of  his  existence, 
he  was  always  the  subject  of  feelings  morally  wrong,  though  he 
did  not  at  the  time  faithfully  consider  and  disapprove  them.  But 
in  the  future  state,  his  moral  faculty  being  disencumbered  and  in- 
vigorated, he  will  take  those  feelings  into  view,  and  pass  a  sen- 
tence of  condemnation  upon  himself  on  account  of  them. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  69 

We  are  not  then  to  consider  it  essential  to  the  existence  of  a 
man's  moral  agency  in  a  state  of  probation,  that  he  should  have  a 
conscience  which  will  in  all  cases,  at  the  very  time  when  the  ac- 
tions take  place,  actually  approve  what  is  right  and  disapprove 
what  is  wrong.  But  it  certainly  does  belong  to  a  moral  agent, 
that  when  his  conscience  is  free  from  disorder  and  properly  en- 
hghtened,  he  will  thus  approve  or  disapprove  his  own  moral  acts. 
It  follows  from  his  very  constitution,  that  this  will  ultimately  be 
the  case. 

The  foregoing  remarks  show  the  mistake  of  those,  who  think  it 
essential  to  moral  agency  and  accountabiUty,  that  there  should  be, 
at  all  times,  a  correct  present  discernment  of  the  rule  of  duty,  or 
actual  knowledge  of  law.  It  would  be  very  easy  to  show  that 
moral  affection  may  exist  in  one  who  has  at  the  time  no  distinct  ap- 
prehension of  its  nature,  and  no  present  feeling  of  approbation  or 
disapprobation.  Our  minds  may  be  so  occupied  with  other  sub- 
jects, or  so  perverted  by  sinful  indulgence,  as  to  be  for  a  time  pre- 
vented from  this.  But  it  would  be  very  unreasonable  to  suppose, 
that  an  affection  or  action  changes  its  nature,  because  at  the  time 
we  are  regardless  of  it.  It  is  a  fact  of  constant  occurrence  with 
children  and  with  men,  that  they  inconsiderately  and  without  any 
present  feeling  of  blame-worthiness  indulge  affections  and  perform 
actions,  which  afterwards  on  reflection  they  find  to  have  been  wrong. 
These  affections  and  actions  were  wrong  at  the  time  they  took 
place  ;  but  through  their  own  fault  the  wrong  was  then  overlooked. 
Now  it  is  perceived.  This  general  fact  is  implied  in  every  instance, 
in  which  we  labor  to  convince  men  of  those  past  offences  of  which 
they  have  been  insensible,  and  of  the  mistakes  they  have  hereto- 
fore made  respecting  their  own  conduct.  It  is  implied  in  the  case 
of  Saul  of  Tarsus,  the  persecutor,  who  afterwards,  in  a  better  state 
of  mind,  saw  that  what  he  once  thought  an  act  of  piety,  was  in 
reality  an  act  of  malice  and  cruelty.  It  is  implied  in  the  case  of 
a  converted  heathen.  The  convert  is  satisfied  that  some  things 
which  he  once  did  without  conscious  guilt,  were  great  e\als  in  the 
sight  of  God.  So  it  is  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  with  every  one 
who  is  enlightened  from  above.     Many  of  his  feeUngs  and  actions, 


70  MORAL     AGENCY. 

which  he  once  thought  harmless,  he  now  knows  to  have  been  mor- 
ally wrong.  I  say  then  it  is  not  essential  to  our  moral  agency,  or 
to  the  existence  of  moral  good  or  evil  in  us,  that  we  should  at  the 
time  have  a  distinct  consideration  or  conception  of  a  moral  law,  or  a 
sensible  approbation  or  disapprobation  of  our  feelings  and  actions. 
Moral  good  or  evil  does  in  fact  sometimes  exist  without  this.  This 
therefore  cannot  be  regarded  as  essential  to  the  existence  of  moral 
agency.  But  every  moral  agent  has  a  constitution  of  mind,  which 
will  lead  him,  first  or  last,  to  a  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  in  himself, 
and  to  a  feeling  of  self-approbation  or  disapprobation  on  account  of 
his  own  moral  actions.  Such  a  mental  constitution  must  therefore  be 
considered  as  an  essential  property  of  a  moral  agent.  And  this 
constitution  undoubtedly  belongs  to  every  human  being  from  his 
first  existence. 

I  have  here  one  observation  to  suggest  as  an  inference  from  the 
general  principle  above  laid  down.  The  observation  is  intended 
specially  for  gospel  ministers.  As  to  the  grand  distinction  among 
the  feelings  and  actions  of  men,  we  may  make  our  appeal  directly 
to  their  conscience.  Less  of  the  form  of  reasoning  is  necessary 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  The  primary  truths  of  religion  should 
be  held  up  directly  before  the  minds  of  men,  whether  learned  or 
unlearned.  The  more  you  have  to  do  with  conscience,  the  less 
advantage  do  you  give  to  the  subtlety  of  the  understanding  and 
the  corruption  of  the  heart.  Appeal  directly,  as  Jesus  did,  to 
man's  moral  sense. 

Before  applying  the  general  principle  I  have  endeavored  to  es- 
tablish to  the  particular  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind,  I 
shall  forewarn  you  of  the  perplexities  and  mistakes  to  which  you 
will  be  exposed  from  the  ambiguity  of  words.  Many  if  not  most 
of  the  words,  which  are  employed  on  the  subject  before  us,  are 
employed  in  a  variable  manner.  The  word  knowledge  is  sometimes 
used  to  denote  an  act  of  the  mind  and  understanding  to  denote  a 
faculty,  which  we  call  speculative,  implying  nothing  of  a  moral 
nature.  At  other  times,  the  words  denote  Avhat  is  most  spiritual. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  word  faith,  or  believe.  In  some  cases  it 
denotes  an  act  of  the  mind  which  is  merely  intellectual.     In  other 


MORAL    AGENCY.  71 

cases  it  includes  affection.  The  word  love  has  a  very  variable 
sense,  denoting  an  attachment  sometimes  of  an  inferior  nature, 
and  sometimes  superior,  and  this  too  in  relation  to  the  same  ob- 
ject. The  Avords  poiver  and  ability  have  different  significations  at 
different  times.  Other  instances  almost  without  number  might  be 
adduced.  In  consequence  of  this  variable  sense  of  words,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  attend  to  all  the  circumstances  which  can  ena- 
ble us  to  discover  in  what  sense  words  are  used  in  each  particular 
case.  And  when  we  ourselves  speak  or  write  on  a  subject  so  im- 
portant and  so  difficult  as  the  one  now  under  consideration,  we 
should  endeavor,  by  exact  definitions,  by  discriminating  epitheta, 
and  by  all  the  means  in  our  power,  to  make  the  signification  of 
our  words  perfectly  apparent. 

It  is  specially  necessary  for  us  to  remember  that  the  very  words, 
which  I  have  used  to  pomt  out  the  standard  of  moral  actions,  and 
the  distinction  between  good  and  evil,  are  liable  to  such  variations 
of  sense  as  may  occasion  no  little  confusion  in  our  reasoning.  We 
say  it  is  a  proof  that  any  feeling  or  action  is  morally  good  or  evil, 
that  it  excites  in  us  a  sentiment  of  approbation  or  disapprobation. 
But  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  very  different  things  in 
relation  to  different  objects  and  to  different  rules  of  judging.  We 
approve  of  a  mechanical  instrument,  if  it  is  suited  to  our  parpose, 
and  disapprove  it,  if  otherwise.  To  approve  in  this  sense  is  the 
same  thing  as  to  say,  it  is  good  for  our  use,  or  adapted  to  the  end 
designed ;  to  disapprove  is  the  opposite.  We  use  these  words  in 
respect  to  civil  relations  and  the  rule  of  civil  conduct.  If  a  man 
has  acted  agreeably  to  these  relations  or  to  this  rule  of  conduct, 
we  say  he  has  done  right,  whatever  may  be  true  of  him  in  respect 
to  a  higher  rule  of  action. 

Looking  upon  man  as  sustaining  the  social  and  domestic  relations, 
we  approve  the  affections  which  according  to  the  constitution  ot 
his  nature  belong  to  these  relations,  and  which  are  adapted  to  diffuse 
happiness  through  the  domestic  and  social  state.  In  regard  to  these 
relations,  we  pronounce  such  affections  to  be  right.  But  our  ap- 
probation of  these  affections,  regarded  in  this  light,  implies  no  ap- 
probation of  them  in  a  higher  view.     We  know  it  to  be  sometimes 


72  MORAL     AGENCY. 

the  case,  that  a  man  •who  possesses  great  tenderness  of  conjugal  or 
paternal  affection,  is  guiltj  of  grossly  violating  the  laws  of  civil 
society.  His  conduct  in  relation  to  domestic  Ufe  we  approve  ;  his 
conduct  in  relation  to  civil  law  we  at  the  same  time  disapprove. 

The  highest  of  all  the  relations  which  we  are  capable  of  sustain- 
ing, is  our  relation  to  God  ;  and  the  highest  law  is  the  dmne  law. 
This  law  prescribes  first  of  all  the  affections  we  owe  to  God.  Now 
when  we  find  our  affections  or  the  affections  of  others  correspond- 
ing with  this  divine  law,  we  have  the  feeling  of  approbation  in  the 
highest  sense.  When  we  find  such  affections  wantmg  and  the 
contrary  existing,  our  disapprobation  is  excited.  Tliis  is  the  ap- 
probation or  disapprobation  which  is  chiefly  intended  whenever  Ave 
speak  on  the  subject  of  rehgion.  Here  we  regard  man  as  a  moral 
or  religious  being,  —  as  related  to  God,  —  as  under  divine  law, 
and  to  be  approved  or  disapproved  before  the  divine  tribunal,  as 
he  is  obedient  or  disobedient  to  this  law.  Whatever  may  be  his 
feehngs  and  actions  in  regard  to  his  inferior  relations,  if  he  is 
faulty  here,  he  is  regarded  with  disapprobation. 

The  foregoing  remarks  show  with  sufficient  clearness  in  how  many 
senses  we  use  the  words  approbation  and  disapprobation.  Other 
words,  relative  to  this  subject,  as  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong, 
have  the  same  variety  of  senses.  And  this  variety  arises  from  the 
same  cause  as  that  above  mentioned,  namely,  the  reference  which 
the  words  have  to  different  relations,  and  to  different  standards  of 
judgment.  We  apply  the  word  good  to  a  house,  a  carriage,  a 
musical  instrument,  or  an  article  of  food,  as  famiUarly  as  to  a 
moral  agent.  But  we  refer  to  things  of  a  very  different  nature, 
and  to  different  standards  of  judgment.  A  house,  a  carriage,  a 
musical  instrument  or  any  article  of  food  is  good,  if  it  is  suited  to 
answer  the  purpose  intended.  A  virtuous  moral  agent  is  called 
good,  because  he  is  conformed  to  the  high  standard  of  God's  law. 
Now  it  is  true  that  we  have  occasion  to  speak  of  the  affections  and 
actions  of  men,  even  the  same  affections  and  actions,  as  standing 
in  different  relations,  and  to  be  judged  of  by  different  rules.  In 
reference  to  one  relation  and  one  rule  of  judgment,  we  call  an  af- 
fection or  action  good  or  right.     But  perhaps  that  affection  or  ac- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  73 

tion  has  no  relation  at  all  to  a  higher  standard ;  or  if  it  has,  it  may 
have  no  conformity  to  it,  and  so,  in  reference  to  that  higher  stand- 
ard, it  caimot  be  called  good. 

It  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  through  the  whole  of  this  discussion, 
and  wherever  moral  agency  in  the  higher  sense  is  concerned,  that 
the  words  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  approbation  and  dis- 
approbation, and  others  of  hke  kind,  are  used  in  the  higher 
sense,  that  is,  in  reference  to  moral  objects.  They  are  used  in 
reference  to  that  spiritual  law,  which  marks  out  our  duty  to  God 
and  to  our  fellow  men.  A  careful  remembrance  of  tliis  Mall  be  of 
great  use  in  preventing  obscurity  and  confusion  and  giving  clear- 
ness to  our  discussions. 

Having  made  these  preUminary  remarks,  I  proceed  to  apply 
the  standard  of  good  and  evil  to  particular  mental  and  bodUy  ac- 
tions. 

I  begin  with  external  or  bodilt/  actions.  In  what  light  are  these 
to  be  regarded  ?  Are  they  in  themselves  of  a  moral  nature  ?  that 
is,  objects  of  approbation  or  disapprobation  in  themselves  consider- 
ed ?  Or  are  they  so  only  in  reference  to  the  intention,  design  or 
affection  of  the  agent  ?  That  they  are  not  so,  in  themselves  con- 
sidered, is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  in  all  those  instances  in 
which  they  take  place  contrary  to  the  intention  of  the  agent,  or 
without  any  intention,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  consider  them  as 
either  praise-worthy  or  blame- worthy.  A  parent  entirely  bereft 
of  reason,  or  under  the  influence  of  a  spasmodic  convulsion,  inflicts 
a  mortal  wound  on  a  beloved  child.  Here  the  fatal  motion  of  the 
parent's  ann,  not  arising  from  any  malevolent  feeling  or  intention, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  any  more  blame-worthy,  than  the  falUng  of 
a  tree,  that  should  occasion  the  same  unhappy  event.  Again  ; 
a  parent  sees  his  Uttle  child  furiously  attacked  by  a  savage  beast. 
As  the  only  possible  means  of  saving  the  child  from  instant  death 
he  discharges  a  pistol  at  the  beast,  but  unhappily  his  own  child  is 
the  victim.  Look  now  upon  that  loving  parent,  pierced  with 
sorrows  which  neither  words  nor  tears  can  express.  Is  he  the 
object  of  your  disapprobation  ?  These  and  all  other  cases,  in 
which  it  is  apparent  that  bodily  action  or  the  effect  which  follows 

VOL.  u.  7 


74  MORAL    AGENCY. 

it  does  not  proceed  from  the  intention  of  the  agent,  show  clearly 
that  the  morality  of  bodily  action,  and  the  approbation  or  disap- 
probation which  it  excites  in  us,  respects  the  intention  or  feeling 
of  the  agent,  or  what  is  commonly  called  the  motive.  Nothing 
can  be  more  evident  than  this. 

But  as  an  external  action,  which  is  beneficial,  is  generally 
promjDted  by  a  benevolent  disposition,  and  an  external  action 
which  is  directly  hurtful  by  a  malevolent  disposition,  the  moat 
careful  discrimination  is  necessary  to  guard  against  mistake.  The 
impression  made  on  our  minds  is  that  of  a  uniform  connection  be- 
tween the  visible  action  and  the  inward  intention  or  motive.  As 
this  connection  appears  so  uniform,  and  as  bodily  actions  are  un- 
derstood to  be  visible  signs  of  inward  and  invisible  affections,  we 
are  accustomed  to  speak  of  bodily  actions,  as  though  they  were 
in  reality  good  or  evil.  In  this  way  we  often  attribute  to  ex- 
ternal actions  qualities  which  really  belong  only  to  the  disposi- 
tion or  intention  of  the  agent,  and  which  cannot  with  propriety 
be  attribvxted  to  any  external  actions,  except  in  relation  to  the 
mind.  There  is  no  proposition  more  certain  than  this,  that  out- 
ward actions  are  morally  good  or  evil,  not  in  themselves,  but 
relatively  to  the  state  of  the  mind  from  which  they  proceed. 
Our  moral  constitution  is  such  that  we  cannot  either  approve  or 
condemn  external  actions  in  ourselves  or  in  others,  except  as  we 
refer  to  the  intention  from  which  they  proceed.  It  is  the  state 
of  the  mind,  the  disposition,  intention  or  feeling,  which  we  really 
consider  to  be  good  or  bad,  while  we  regard  external  actions  only 
as  manifestations  of  what  the  state  of  the  mind  is. 

Here  you  see  in  what  sense  external  actions  are  commanded  or 
forbidden  by  the  divine  law.  This  law,  taken  in  the  strictest 
sense,  respects  bodily  actions,  not  in  themselves  considered,  but  in 
relation  to  the  inward  intention  or  feeling  of  the  agent.  If 
bodily  actions  should  not  stand  in  this  relation,  and  should  not 
indicate  the  disposition  or  intention  of  the  agent,  they  would 
cease  to  come  under  the  cognizance  of  the  divine  law.  What 
the  law  requires  and  prohibits  is  primarily  and  strictly  the  acting 
of  the  heart,  whether  this  is  internal  merely,  or  shows  itself  in 


MORAL   AGENCY.  75 

external  action.  Why  then,  it  is  asked,  does  the  law  in  any  in- 
stance literally  require  and  forbid  external  action,  and  that  only, 
making  no  mention  of  that  internal  affection,  which  is  here  de- 
clared to  be  the  essence  of  obedience  or  disobedience  ?  I  an- 
swer, because  the  law  is  addressed  to  those,  whose  judgment  of 
moral  good  and  evil  does  naturally  and  constantly  refer  to  the 
heart ;  to  those,  who  possess  such  a  constitution  of  mind,  that  they 
cannot  attribute  moral  good  or  evil  to  bodily  actions,  except  as 
they  unfold  the  intention  or  disposition  of  the  mind.  Whenever 
outward  actions  are  by  the  moral  law  required  or  forbidden,  they 
are  required  or  forbidden  as  expressions  of  what  is  inward.  Ac- 
cording to  this  well  known  principle,  to  require  the  outward  ac- 
tions is  to  require  the  dispositions  or  intentions  of  the  mind,  from 
which  they  ought  to  proceed.  For  example,  when  we  are  re- 
quired to  call  upon  God,  which  in  itself  is  an  outward  act,  —  we 
are  required  to  have  that  state  of  mind  which  prompts  to  prayer. 
Merely  to  use  the  words  of  prayer  without  inward  piety  is  not 
real  obedience  to  the  divine  command.  When  we  are  required  to 
^ve  to  the  poor,  we  are  really  required  to  possess  that  disposition 
which  prompts  to  deeds  of  charity.  Again,  when  the  law  says, 
"  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  it  forbids  the  act  of  killing  a  man,  as  pro- 
ceeding from  a  malicious  intention.  No  outward  act,  not  pro- 
ceeding from  such  an  intention,  could  be  considered  as  violating 
the  divine  law,  though  it  should  chance  to  occasion  the  death 
of  human  beings,  and  even  though  it  should  be  designed  to  oc- 
casion their  death  ;  as  when  a  civil  officer  executes  the  sentence 
of  the  law  upon  murderers. 

Let  me  add,  that  the  particular  state  of  mind,  required  or  for- 
bidden, must  be  understood  to  be  that  which  naturally  corresponds 
with  the  outward  action,  or  from  which  the  outward  action  natu- 
rally and  directly  proceeds.  It  occurs  frequently,  that,  although 
the  outward  act  required  does  in  fact  proceed  from  an  intention 
of  the  mind,  it  does  not  proceed  from  the  right  intention,  and  of 
course  is  not  obedience.  So,  on  the  other  hand,  when  the  out- 
ward act,  which  is  prohibited,  arises  not  from  the  wrong  state  of 
mind  which  naturally  corresponds  with  the  action  or  from  which 


76  MORAL     AGENCY. 

it  naturally  proceeds,  but  from  some  other  materially  different,  it 
is  not  to  be  regarded  as  disobedience.  One  of  the  great  objects 
of  moral  and  religious  instruction  is  to  detect  the  windings  and 
fallacies  of  the  heart  in  relation  to  this  subject,  and  to  show 
clearly  what  particular  dispositions  of  mind  ought  to  influence 
men  in  their  outward  actions,  and  to  prevent  them  from  supposing, 
that  they  can  render  true  obedience  to  God,  while  under  the  in- 
fluence of  unauthorized  motives. 


LECTURE    XLVIII. 


THE     TEST     APPLIED     TO     OUR     SENSATIONS  OR  PERCEPTIONS  ;     TO 
ACTS    MERELY   INTELLECTUAL  ;     AND    TO    VOLITIONS. 

Having  satisfied  ourselves  that  we  are  to  consider  external 
actions  to  be  good  or  evil,  only  as  they  relate  to  the  intention  or 
disposition  which  prompts  them,  or  in  other  words,  that  they  have 
no  moral  good  or  evil,  except  what  they  derive  from  that  state  of 
mind  from  which  they  result,  we  shall  proceed  to  examine  the 
different  affections  or  ads  of  the  mind  itself. 

Fu'st.  The  mind  acts  in  the  way  of  perceiving  external  ob- 
jects through  the  medium  of  the  senses.  We  have  the  sensations 
of  seeing,  hearing,  tasting,  smelling  and  feeling.  Are  these  of  a 
moral  nature  ?  Are  they  either  praise-worthy  or  blame-Avorthy  ? 
The  answer  is  obvious.  No  one  regards  himself  with  approbation 
or  disapprobation  for  having  the  sensations  of  color  or  sound  or 
taste.  These  sensations,  considered  simply  by  themselves,  can- 
not be  either  commanded  or  forbidden.  .  Their  existence  shows 
neither  obedience  nor  disobedience.  A  man  sees  the  Hght  of 
the  sun  and  hears  the  sound  of  thunder  and  tastes  the  sweetness 
of  honey,  equally,  whether  he  is  good  or  bad.  These  sensa- 
tions stand  in  no  relation  to  the  rule  of  duty,  any  more  than  a 
man's  having  two  hands. 

I  have  said  that  merely  having  the  sensations  above  mentioned 
shows  neither  obedience  nor  disobedience  to  the  moral  law,  and 
has  no  direct  relation  to  law.  And  yet  it  is  obvious  that  certain 
situations   of  body  or  states  of  mind  may  be   required,  which 

7* 


78  MORAL    AGENCY. 

may  be  the  means  of  exciting  these  sensations  ;  and  in  tliis  way, 
our  having  or  not  having  the  sensations  may  be  indirectly  or 
consequentially  a  matter  of  moral  obligation.  Should  we  be  com- 
manded to  go  out  of  a  dungeon  that  we  might  see  the  hght  of 
day,  or  to  pass  through  a  blooming  orchard  that  we  might  smell 
its  fragrance,  or  to  visit  a  stranger  that  we  might  hear  the  story 
of  his  sufferings  ;  we  should  be  under  obligation ;  but  the  obliga- 
tion would  evidently  respect  the  voluntary  situations  or  acts  which 
precede  the  sensations  intended. 

Let  us  next  inquire  into  those  operations  of  the  mind  which  are 
purely  intellectual,  as  the  knowledge  of  mathematical  truth,  and 
of  the  laws  which  regulate  the  natural  world,  indeed  the  knowl- 
edge of  any  truth,  so  far  as  it  is  perceived  by  the  intellect  mere- 
ly, without  any  affection.  Now  does  the  consciousness  of  these 
intellectual  acts,  or  the  perception  of  them  in  others,  excite  a 
feeling  of  approbation  or  disapprobation  ?  We  do  indeed  set  a 
high  price  upon  our  rational  powers,  and  upon  the  acquisitions 
we  make  in  knowledge,  as  we  do  also  upon  our  earthly  posses- 
sions. But  who  ever  regarded  any  of  these  as  in  themselves  the 
objects  of  moral  approbation  ? 

But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  the  acquisition  of  knowl- 
edge men  are  often  actuated  by  moral  affections,  and  that  under 
the  influence  of  these  affections  they  make  efforts  which  are  very 
commendable.  Knowledge,  standing. thus  connected  with  com- 
mendable motives  and  efforts,  comes  itself  to  be  considered  as 
very  commendable.  Still,  all  which  we  regard  as  commendable  or 
worthy  of  approbation  in  knowledge,  is  its  connection  with  praise- 
worthy motives,  those  motives  and  the  efforts  prompted  by  them, 
being  the  real  object  of  our  approbation.  The  position  I  would 
maintain  becomes  perfectly  obvious,  when  we  consider  the  case 
of  a  man,  who  has  been  prompted  to  acquire  knowledge  by  un- 
worthy motives.  There  being  nothing  praise-worthy  in  his  mo- 
tives, we  can  feel  no  approbation  of  him,  or  complacency  in  him, 
on  account  of  his  having  acquired  knowledge.  Nor  can  any  paan, 
whose  conscience  is  awake,  ever  approve  himself  for  the  mere 
acquisition  or  possession  of  knowledge,  separately  from  any  good 


MORAL    AGENCY.  79 

dispositions  which  may  have  prompted  him  to  the  acquisition  or 
use  of  it,  any  more  than  for  the  mere  possession  of  wealth  or  any 
external  advantage.  This  view  of  the  subject  is  strongly  sup- 
ported by  the  Scriptures,  which  teach  us  that  merely  knowing 
the  will  of  God  is  so  far  from  deserving  approbation,  that  it  en- 
hances the  guilt  of  disobedience. 

There  is  one  source  of  mistake  in  regard  to  this  subject,  against 
which  we  must  guard  with  particular  care,  and  that  is,  the  fre- 
quent use  of  the  words  knowledge,  understanding,  and  others  of 
similar  import,  in  a  high  and  spiritual  sense,  implying  cordial  at- 
tachment to  the  object.  This  source  of  misapprehension  has 
already  been  hinted  at.  The  Scriptures  often  speak  of  knowing 
God  and  Christ,  and  of  understanding  the  things  of  rehgion,  as 
implying  real  holiness.  An  Apostle  says,  "  He  that  loveth  God 
knoweth  God."  Now  those,  who  are  conversant  with  the  phrase- 
ology of  Scripture  and  of  common  religious  discourse,  are  very 
apt  to  have  in  their  thoughts  more  or  less  of  this  spiritual  sense 
of  the  words,  even  when  we  mean  to  use  them  to  denote  merely 
what  is  intellectual  or  speculative.  In  the  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject, it  therefore  becomes  highly  important  to  show  plainly,  that 
we  employ  the  words  to  denote  the  act  of  the  mind  in  merely 
apprehending  any  religious  truth,  exclusively  of  all  emotion. 
Now  if  we  bring  this  intellectual  act  distinctly  under  considerar- 
tion,  separately  from  all  those  motives  and  states  of  mind  which 
may  be  connected  with  it,  we  are  satisfied  at  once  that  it  is  not 
of  a  moral  nature,  and  can  never  be  regarded  either  with  appro- 
bation or  disapprobation. 

The  result  is,  that  acts  or  states  of  mind,  purely  intellectual, 
cannot  as  they  are  in  themselves  be  enjoined  as  duty.  When 
they  are  enjoined  in  Scripture,  they  are  to  be  understood  as  com- 
prising those  affections  or  motives  which  are  in  themselves  objects 
of  approbation  or  complacency. 

I  might  here  show  how  far  our  intellectual  faculties  and  acts  are 
under  the  influence  of  our  moral  state.  It  is  manifestly  on  ac- 
count of  this  influence,  that  our  intellectual  acts  are  so  often  made 
matters  of  divine  legislation,  and  are  treated  as  indications  of 


80  MORAL    AGENCY. 

character.  Their  relation  to  moral  government  is  real,  though 
indirect.  They  come  under  the  cognizance  of  law,  just  so  far  as 
they  are  influenced  by  those  affections,  which  are  in  themselves 
morally  good  or  evil,  and  wholly  on  account  of  such  influence. 
What  and  how  important  this  influence  is,  may  be  more  particu- 
larly considered  in  a  subsequent  Lecture. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  voUtmi,  or  the 
action  of  the  will.  That  our  investigation  may  be  in  any  measure 
satisfactory,  the  meaning  of  the  words  relating  to  the  subject 
must  be  definitely  settled. 

Formerly,  the  words  will,  volition,  voluntary,  and  others  of 
like  signification,  were  for  the  most  part  used  by  respectable 
writers,  in  a  very  extensive  sense,  and  denoted  every  thing  which 
could  be  considered  as  morally  right  or  wrong.  All  the  affections 
were  considered  as  affections  of  the  will,  and  they  were  consid- 
ered as  good  or  evil,  because  they  belonged  to  the  will.  Thus 
the  word  wUl  was  used  in  a  very  large  sense,  signifying  all  that 
we  mean  by  the  moral  faculty,  or  by  our  moral  nature.  But  the 
progress  of  metaphysical  and  moral  science,  and  indeed  the  con- 
venience of  common  discourse,  has  shown  the  expediency  of 
making  a  more  particular  classification  of  the  faculties  and  opera- 
tions of  the  mind,  and  of  using  the  words  which  designate  them 
in  a  more  limited  and  more  definite  sense.  Vohtion  or  willing 
is  now  used  by  accurate  writers  on  mental  philosophy,  and  gene- 
rally I  think  in  common  discourse,  to  signify  that  determination 
or  act  of  the  mind,  which  is  immediately  connected  as  a  cause 
with  some  particular  action  of  the  body,  or  some  particular  direc- 
tion of  the  thoughts  or  faculties  of  the  mind.  According  to  the 
constitution  of  our  nature,  the  hmbs  move  and  the  thoughts  are 
employed  in  a  particular  manner  in  consequence  of  a  certain  act 
or  determination  of  the  mind,  called  volition  or  willing.  Thus  I 
say,  I  will  to  move  my  hand,  or  I  choose  to  employ  the  faculties 
of  my  mind  in  such  a  study.  The  acts  of  the  mind,  as  well  as 
bodily  acts,  are  in  such  cases  influenced  by  a  previous  determi- 
nation or  choice.  Volition  relates  to  both  kinds  of  action, 
though  not  always  with  the  same  immediate  and  perfect  con- 
trol. 


MORAL  AGENCY. 


81 


The  word  will  is  used  by  Locke  in  exactly  the  same  sense,  as 
I  have  given  it.  He  says ;  "  We  find  in  ourselves  a  power  to 
begin  or  forbear,  continue  or  end  several  actions  of  our  minds 
and  motions  of  our  bodies  barely  by  a  thought  or  preference  of 
the  mind,  ordering  or  as  it  were  commanding  the  doing  or  not 
doing  such  or  such  a  particular  action.  This  power,  which  the 
mind  has  thus  to  order  the  consideration  of  any  idea  or  the  for- 
bearing to  consider  it,  or  to  prefer  the  motion  of  any  part  of  the 
body  to  its  rest  and  vice  versa  in  any  particular  instance,  is  that 
which  we  call  the  ivill.  The  actual  exercise  of  that  power  by  di- 
recting any  particular  action  or  its  forbearance  is  what  we  call 
volition  or  willing.  The  forbearance  of  that  action,  consequently 
to  such  order  or  command  of  the  mind,  is  called  voluntary, 
and  whatsoever  action  is  performed  without  such  a  thought  or 
order  of  the  mind,  is  called  involuntary y  Again  he  says ; 
"  Volition  it  is  plain  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  knowingly  exerting 
that  dominion  it  takes  itself  to  have  over  any  part  of  the  man, 
by  employing  it  in,  or  withholding  it  from  any  particular  action. 
And  what  is  the  will  but  a  faculty  to  do  this?  And  is  that 
faculty  anything  more  in  effect  than  a  power,  the  power  of  the 
mind,  to  determine  its  thought  to  the  producing,  continuing  or 
stopping  any  action,  as  far  as  it  depends  on  us  ?" 

A  late  respectable  writer  says,  "  The  word  will  is  taken  in  a 
greater  or  less  latitude.  It  signifies,  according  to  some,  every 
desire  and  inchnation,  every  preference  and  choice.  According 
to  others,  volitions  or  the  acts  of  the  will  are  properly  such  acts 
of  the  mind  as  result  in  some  change  in  the  body  or  mind.  The 
whole  active  or  voluntary  power  of  man  consists  in  an  ability, 
when  he  chooses  to  exercise  it,  to  alter  the  train  of  thoughts  by 
turning  the  mind  from  one  subject  of  contemplation  to  another, 
and  in  the  abihty  to  move  the  members  of  the  body  within  cer- 
tain limits.  Let  any  man  seriously  inquire  whether  he  possesses 
any  other  power  or  ability  than  this.  We  know  that  there  are 
many  things  which  he  has  no  ability  to  perform.  He  cannot  alter 
the  nature  of  the  perceptions  of  sense  ;  he  cannot  excite  in  him- 
self affections  to  any  object  at  will.     If  a  man  wish  to  enkindle 


82  MORAL     AGENCY. 

love  in  liis  breast  to  any  person,  he  cannot  possibly  do  more  than 
contemplate  all  the  traits  of  character  which  are  amiable  in  that 
person,  or  all  those  circumstances  which  have  a  tendency  to  create 
an  interest  in  the  person  ;  but  it  is  a  vain  effort  to  endeavor  to 
love  another  by  the  mere  eflfort  of  will.  If  we  take  the  word 
will  in  the  larger  sense,  all  clear  distinction  between  desire  and 
will  is  removed.  If  we  call  every  preference  an  act  of  volition, 
then  obviously  will  and  affection  are  confounded  ;  for  what  is  pref- 
erence but  a  superior  affection ;  and  choice,  if  it  result  in  no 
determination  to  act,  is  nothing  else  but  preference  or  the  cherish- 
ing of  a  stronger  affection  for  one  thing  than  another.  It  seems  to 
us  therefore  to  be  altogether  expedient  to  confine  the  words  will  and 
volition  to  those  distinctly  marked  actions  which  lead  to  some 
change  in  body  or  mind.  Those  determinations,  whicli  lead  di- 
rectly to  action  whether  of  body  or  mind,  are  properly  called  vo- 
litions ;  as  when  I  resolve  to  raise  my  head,  to  direct  my  eyes  to 
this  quarter  or  that,  to  turn  my  thoughts  from  one  subject  to  an- 
other. These  are  acts  which  are  clearly  defined  and  which  are 
easily  distinguishable  from  mere  desires  or  emotions.  A  late 
philosophical  writer  has  indeed  attempted  to  sweep  away  all  con- 
troversies respecting  the  determination  of  the  will  by  confounding 
will  a'  1  desire  together,  but  still  he  is  obliged  to  acknowledge, 
that  some  of  our  desires  are  followed  by  action,  or  by  a  change  in 
the  body  or  mind,  and  these  being  thus  clearly  distinguished  by 
their  effects,  and  being  also  the  most  important  of  all  our  acts, 
it  is  expedient  to  have  them  put  into  a  class  by  themselves  with 
an  appropriate  denomination." 

Admitting  the  use  of  the  word  will  or  volition  which  is  now  the 
prevailing  use,  we  shall  easily  ascertain  the  meaning  of  volun- 
tary. That  is  voluntary,  whether  bodily  or  mental,  which  de- 
pends on  the  will  or  which  takes  place  in  consequence  of  a  pre- 
vious volition  or  choice.  The  appetite  of  hunger  is  not  volun- 
tary ;  but  acting  to  satisfy  it  is  voluntary,  eating  being  the  con- 
sequence not  of  the  mere  appetite,  but  of  the  choice  to  eat. 
Seeing  the  light  when  the  eye  is  open  in  the  day  time  is  not  vol- 
untary, but  opening  the  eye  is  voluntary.     Many  outward  and 


MORAL    AGENCY.  88 

many  inward  acts  are  of  a  mixed  character,  partly  voluntary  and 
partly  involuntary.  To  see  the  moon  and  stars,  to  taste  worm- 
wood or  honey,  and  many  other  acts  of  the  senses,  are  of  this 
character.  The  position  or  act  of  the  body,  preparatory  to  the 
sensation,  is  voluntary.  The  sensation  itself,  after  the  prepara- 
tion is  made,  is  involuntary. 

Thus  much  by  way  of  definition.  I  will  only  add,  that  I 
sliall  use  the  words  under  consideration  in  the  sense  defined. 
And  I  apprehend  this  to  be  the  prevailing  sense  of  the  words 
in  common  discourse.  I  am  however  well  aware,  that  will, 
choice  and  other  like  words,  are  frequently  used  in  Scripture  in  a 
more  general  sense,  including  the  disposition  and  all  the  affections 
and  desires.  If  I  have  occasion  to  use  the  words  in  this  sense,  I 
will  give  due  notice  of  it. 

Let  us  now  inquire  whether  volition  or  willing,  in  the  restricted 
sense  above  mentioned,  is  a  moral  act ;  in  other  words,  when  taken 
by  itself,  is  it  praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy?  To  determine 
this,  we  must  apply  our  moral  test  to  particular  instances  of  vo- 
lition. And  we  shall  begin  with  one  as  simple  as  possible.  A 
man  wills  to  move  his  hand.  Now  we  are  totally  unable  to  de- 
termine whether  such  a  volition  is  good  or  bad  or  indifferent,  be- 
fore we  know  the  causes  which  prompt  the  volition,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  it  takes  place.  If  the  man  moves  his  hand 
to  do  an  act  of  benevolence  or  piety,  we  say  the  volition  or 
choice  is  good.  Why?  Because  the  volition  is  prompted  by  a 
good  motive.  If  he  wills  to  move  his  hand  to  commit  an  act 
of  revenge  and  cruelty,  we  say  the  volition  is  bad,  because  it  is 
prompted  by  a  bad  motive.  If  he  wills  to  move  his  hand  merely 
to  reheve  it  of  uneasiness,  we  say,  the  volition  is  neither  morally 
good  nor  evil,  for  the  plain  reason  that  it  is  prompted  by  a  mo- 
tive that  is  neither  morally  good  nor  bad. 

In  every  such  case,  our  judgment  respecting  the  volition  de- 
pends on  its  circumstances.  It  is  the  consideration  of  the  object 
of  the  volition,  or  the  motive  which  prompts  it,  or  in  other 
words,  of  the  affection  or  state  of  mind  from  which  it  proceeds, 
that  determines  our  opinion  of  its  character.     In  regard  there- 


84  MORAL    AGENCY. 

fore  to  this  instance,  and  other  like  instances,  our  conclusion  must 
be  that  the  volition  or  act  of  willing,  taken  by  itself  separate 
from  the  motive,  is  neither  morally  good  nor  bad  ;  that  when- 
ever we  give  it  a  moral  denomination,  or  form  a  moral  judgment 
respecting  it,  we  view  it  relatively ;  and  that  we  regard  it  as 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  according  to  the  affection  which  excites 
it,  or  the  object  at  which  it  aims. 

For  the  sake  of  a  farther  illustration  of  this  principle,  it  may 
be  useful  to  attend  to  examples  somewhat  different.  A  man  wills 
or  chooses  to  give  money  to  a  poor  family,  or  to  a  benevolent 
institution.  The  first  seems  to  be  an  act  of  compassion,  the  last 
of  piety ;  and  we  naturally  think  the  voUtion  or  choice  to  per- 
form it  is  praise-worthy.  We  think  it  so,  because  it  appears  to 
spring  from  a  praise-worthy  motive.  But  should  we  discover 
that  the  man  gave  his  money  without  piety  or  compassion,  that 
his  object  was  to  gain  advantage  to  himself  so  that  he  might  suc- 
cessfully execute  his  ambitious  or  covetous  designs ;  we  should 
instantly  change  our  judgment  as  to  the  moral  nature  of  the  ac- 
tion and  the  volition,  and  instead  of  calling  it  benevolent  or 
pious,  we  should  call  it  selfish  and  base.  If  in  any  such  case  we 
examine  our  own  moral  sense,  we  shall  find  that,  from  the  consti- 
tution of  our  minds,  we  do  and  must  judge  of  a  man's  volitions 
nearly  in  the  same  way  as  we  do  of  his  external  actions,  that  is, 
from  the  affection  or  state  of  mind  by  which  he  is  influenced,  or 
from  the  real  object  which  he  strives  to  attain.  Seneca  under- 
stood this.  "  The  praise  is  not,"  he  says,  "  in  the  deed  done," 
he  means  a  voluntary  deed,  "  but  in  the  manner  of  doing  it.  If 
a  man  visits  a  sick  friend  and  watches  at  his  pillow  for  charity's 
sake  and  because  of  his  old  affection,  we  approve  it ;  but  if  he 
does  it  in  hope  of  a  legacy,  he  is  a  vulture,  and  only  watches  for 
the  carcass.  The  same  things,"  the  same  voluntary  actions,  "  are 
honest,  and  dishonest.  The  manner  of  doing  them  and  the  end 
designed  makes  the  difference."  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  in 
cases  like  those  above '  mentioned,  and  in  all  common  cases,  we 
directly  predicate  moral  good  or  evil,  not  of  the  volition,  consid- 
ered by  itself,  but  of  the  affection  or  state  of  mind  from  which  it 


MORALAGEXCY.  GO 

arises  ;  or  to  speak  with  strict  propriety,  we  predicate  good  or  evil 
of  the  man,  not  Avith  reference  to  his  vohtion,  understood  in  the 
limited  sense  intended,  but  with  reference  to  his  disposition  or  af- 
fection. Whether  we  choose  to  perform  any  bodily  action  or  to 
exercise  the  mental  powers  on  any  particular  subject,  we  can 
form  no  opinion  of  the  moral  qualities  of  that  volition  or  choice, 
before  we  have  ascertained  the  source  from  which  it  springs,  or 
the  affection  which  prompts  it. 

It  is  not  then  simply  the  voluntariness  of  any  action  that  gives 
it  its  moral  character,  since  the  volition  itself,  which  is  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  action,  is  not  by  itself,  separate  from  the  mo- 
tive, either  praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy,  but  derives  its  moral 
quality  from  that  affection  of  the  heart  which  prompts  it.  Admit 
a  particular  action  to  be  voluntary,  still  it  is  not  this  which  makes 
it  morally  good  or  bad.  And  if  an  affection  or  state  of  mind  is 
not  the  result  of  any  preceding  volition,  it  cannot  be  inferred 
from  this,  that  it  has  not  a  moral  nature ;  for  it  is  ultimately  the 
affection,  the  disposition  or  the  state  of  the  heart,  which  has 
itself  a  moral  nature,  and  which  imparts  a  moral  quahty  to  the 
vohtion  which  follows  it. 

The  question  is  sometimes  agitated,  whether  everything  which 
is  morally  good  or  bad,  is  voluntary,  and  whether  it  is  the  volun- 
tariness of  an  action  which  makes  it  right  or  wrong.  Now  as  to 
external  or  bodily  actions,  it  is  clear  that  they  cannot  be  good  or 
bad  unless  they  are  voluntary.  If  they  are  involuntary,  that  is, 
if  they  do  not  take  place  in  consequence  of  a  previous  act  of 
the  will,  they  can  no  more  excite  in  us  a  sentiment  of  approba- 
tion or  disapprobation,  than  the  motions  of  a  tree  or  a  cloud. 
Whenever  the  mmd  acts  upon  the  members  of  the  body  and 
causes  them  to  move,  it  does  it  by  a  volition.  If  any  action  of 
the  body  is  involuntary,  that  is,  if  it  does  not  foUow  an  act  of  the 
■will,  for  example,  the  beating  of  the  heart,  or  the  motion  of  the 
blood,  it  is  no  part  of  moral  agency,  and  we  cannot  feel  that  we 
are  accountable  for  it.  But  because  bodily  action  for  which  we 
are  accountable  is  voluntary,  that  is,  takes  place  in  consequence 
of  an  act  of  the  will,  it  does  not  follow  that  this  must  be  the  case 
VOL.  n.  8 


86  MORAL     AGENCY. 

■with  all  the  actions  of  the  mind.  For  mental  actions  are  widely 
different  from  bodily  actions.  The  members  of  the  body  not  being 
possessed  of  an  intelligent  and  moral  nature,  their  motions  can  in 
no  sense  be  considered  as  intelligent  or  moral,  except  as  they  are 
related  to  the  mind.  But  the  mind  is  possessed  of  an  intelligent 
and  moral  nature,  and  its  acts  maybe  and  in  many  cases  must  be 
in  themselves  morally  good  or  evil.  I  say,  they  must  be  so,  or 
there  can  be  no  good  or  evil  in  the  universe.  The  laws  which 
govern  the  actions  of  the  body  are  materially  different  from  those 
which  govern  the  affections  of  the  mind.  Experience  and  con- 
sciousness teach  us,  that  our  affections  are  not  immediately  con- 
sequent upon  a  previous  determination  of  the  will,  as  our  bodily 
actions  are.  So  that  whatever  they  may  have,  which  is  either 
praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy,  cannot  arise  from  this  circumstance, 
that  is,  upon  their  being  dependent  upon  a  volition.  Men  are  apt 
to  think  that  they  cannot  be  accountable  for  their  mental  affections 
and  actions,  unless  they  result  from  a  determination  of  the  will,  be- 
cause this  is  the  case  with  their  bodily  actions.  They  are  inchned 
to  judge  respecting  the  feelings  and  operations  of  the  mind  in  the 
same  way  as  respecting  the  actions  of  the  body.  Whereas  a  fair 
examination  will  show  that  the  goodness  or  badness  of  those  men- 
tal acts,  called  affections,  does  by  no  means  depend  upon  the  cir- 
cumstance of  their  being  or  not  being  consequent  upon  a  previous 
volition ;  that  these  acts  of  the  mind  are  by  themselves  right  or 
wrong,  containing  the  essence  of  all  the  moral  good  and  evil  which 
can  exist  in  man. 

Edwards's  views  are  coincident  with  those  I  have  expressed. 
When  speaking  of  the  notion  that  the  nature  and  the  very  exis- 
tence of  holiness  depend  on  its  cause,  that  is,  on  the  previous 
choice  of  the  mind,  he  says,  "  I  suppose  the  way  that  men  came 
to  entertain  this  absurd  notion  with  respect  to  internal  inclinations 
and  volitions  themselves,  namely,  that  the  essence  of  their  moral 
good  or  evil  lies  not  in  their  nature  but  their  cause,  was  that  it  is 
indeed  a  very  plain  dictate  of  common  sense,  that  it  is  so  with  I'e- 
spect  to  all  outward  actions  and  sensible  motions  of  the  body,  that 
the  good  or  evil  of  them  does  not  lie  at  all  in  motions  themselves, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  8T 

which  taken  by  themselves  are  nothing  of  a  moral  nature,  and  the 
essence  of  all  the  moral  good  or  evil  that  concerns  them  lies  in  those 
internal  dispositions  and  volitions  which  are  the  cause  of  them. 
Now  being  always  used  to  determine  this  without  hesitation  con- 
cerning external  actions,  which  are  commonly  signified  by  such 
phrases  as  men's  actions  or  doings,  hence  when  they  come  to  speak 
of  volitions  or  internal  exercises  of  their  inclinations  under  the 
same  denomination  of  their  actions,  —  they  unwarily  determined 
the  case  must  be  the  same  with  these  as  with  external  actions ; 
not  considering  the  vast  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  case." 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Edwards  often  considers  vohtions 
or  acts  of  the  will  the  same  as  the  affections,  or  as  including  the 
affections.  And  he  shows  that  supposing  it  to  be  essential  to 
their  being  morally  good  or  evil,  that  they  should  follow  a 
volition  or  act  of  the  will,  is  manifestly  absurd.  And  their 
following  a  volition  or  act  of  the  will  is  what  I  mean  by  their  be- 
ing voluntary. 

If  after  all,  any  man  is  inclined  to  say,  that  our  moral  affec- 
tions are  all  voluntary  ;  then  I  ask  what  is  his  meaning  ?  When 
he  says  the  affection  of  love  to  God  which  fills  the  heart  of  the 
converted  sinner  is  voluntary,  does  he  mean  that  the  affection  is  a 
consequence  of  a  previous  vohtion  or  act  of  the  will,  and  is  pro- 
duced by  it  ?  In  other  words,  does  he  mean  that  the  affection  is 
preceded  by  an  act  of  the  will  or  a  volition  to  exercise  the  affec- 
tion ?  And  does  he  mean  this  respecting  every  holy  affection  in 
the  Christian's  mind,  and  respecting  every  sinful  affection  in  the 
sinner's  mind  ?  If  this  is  his  meaning,  then  I  make  it  a  question 
of  fact,  and  inquire  whether  our  consciousness  or  experience 
shows  it  to  be  so.  Does  a  good  affection  rise  in  the  Christian's 
mind,  or  a  bad  one  in  the  sinner's  mind,  as  the  effect  of  a  previ- 
ous volition,  or  because  he  previously  wills  it  ?  And  does  the 
experience  of  a  good  man  show  that  the  corrupt,  earthly  affec- 
tions, which  from  time  to  time  rise  in  his  heart,  are  produced  by 
a  previous  volition,  or  that  they  exist  because  he  previously,  or, 
if  you  please,  simultaneously,  chooses  they  should  exist  ?  Does 
he  feel  the  emotion  of  pride  or  envy  or  ill-will  in  consequence  of 


88  MORAL    AGENCY. 

his  choosing  to  feel  it  ?  Does  a  mother  love  her  infant  child  in 
consequence  of  willing  to  love  it  ?  But  if  any  one  means,  as  many 
do  mean,  that  affection  itself  is  an  act  of  the  will,  and  so  is  the  same 
thing  as  volition,  then  I  ask  what  sense  it  makes  to  say  that  an  af- 
fection, which  they  call  volition,  is  voluntary  ?  And  when  they  say 
that  volition  is  voluntary,  is  it  any  more  than  saying  that  volition 
is  volition  ?  In  metaphysical  discussion  any  use  of  the  word  vol- 
untary, except  to  denote  that  the  thing  which  is  said  to  be  volun- 
tary is  consequent  upon  a  previous  volition  or  choice,  seems  to  me 
calculated  to  produce  confusion. 

The  plain  fact  is,  that  man  himself,  as  an  intelligent,  moral 
being,  acts  in  a  variety  of  ways.  He  thinks,  remembers,  wills, 
determines,  chooses,  desires,  loves  and  hates.  And  his  being  or  not 
being  praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy  for  any  of  these  acts  de- 
pends not  upon  their  order,  that  is,  upon  the  question  whether 
they  come  before  or  after  others,  but  upon  their  intrinsic  nature* 
If  any  affection  or  act  of  the  mind  is  not  in  itself  morally  good  or 
bad,  how  can  it  be  made  so  by  following  another  act  ? 


LECTURE     XLIX. 


THE  AFFECTIONS  IN  THEMSELVES  MOKALLY  GOOD  OR  EVIL. 
LAWS  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS.  THEIR  CONNECTION  WITH  THE 
INTELLECT,   AND    -WITH    THE    WILL. 

We  shall  next  consider  the  affections.  The  word  affection  is 
often  used  to  denote  all  the  feehngs  or  exercises  of  the  heart. 
But  the  subject  I  have  undertaken  to  investigate  must  limit  my 
attention  to  that  particular  class  of  feelings  or  exercises,  which 
relates  to  things  of  a  moral  or  spiritual  nature.  Thare  are 
various  feelings  which  relate  to  other  things,  and  which  can- 
not be  supposed  to  have  any  concern  with  our  present  sub- 
ject. 

It  has  been  customary  with  many  writers  to  use  the  word  sen- 
sibiUties  or  susceptibilities  instead  of  affections  or  feelings  of  the 
heart.  But  in  my  view  the  words  are  not  so  exactly  suited  to  the 
subject.  And  I  think  moreover  that  the  use  frequently  made  of 
these  words  is  the  occasion  of  mistake  ;  for  sensibility  or  suscepti- 
bility commonly  denotes  the  mere  capacity  or  capabiUty  of  feeling 
or  exercise,  rather  than  actual  feeling  or  exercise,  and  no  one 
can  suppose  that  a  mere  capacity,  capabihty,  or  power,  aside  from 
mental  action,  is  worthy  of  praise  or  blame. 

In  the  present  investigation,  I  shall  use  the  word  affections  to 
denote  the  various  exercises  of  the  heart,  as  love  and  desire 
and  their  opposites,  towards  God  and  other  moral  and  spiritual 
objects.  And  our  inquiry  is,  whether  these  exercises  or  states  of 
mind  are  of  a  moral  natui-e. 

To  me  it  is  very  evident  that  all  our  notions  of  moral  good 

8* 


90  MORAL     AGENCY. 

and  evil,  and  all  our  feelings  of  approbation  or  disapprobation^ 
relate  ultimately  to  what  I  here  call  affections.  In  these  affec- 
tions of  the  heart,  and  these  actings  of  our  inward  spiritual  na- 
ture, we  find,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  elements  and  the  essence  of 
holiness  and  sin. 

But  here,  as  elsewhere,  our  appeal  is  to  our  moral  sense,  which 
we  have  seen  to  be  the  ultimate  test  of  good  and  evil.  Suppose 
then  we  are  conscious  of  having  in  our  hearts  true  love  to  God 
or  benevolence  to  men,  —  conscious  of  having  this  affection  and 
nothing  else,  conscious  of  the  emotion  or  exercise  of  love,  unat- 
tended with  any  external  action  whatever.  Do  we  not  instantly 
say  that  such  an  affection  is  right  ?  Does  not  the  consciousness 
of  having  it  excite  in  us  a  feeling  of  self-approbation  or  compla- 
cency ?  And  does  not  the  perception  of  this  affection  in  others 
excite  in  us  the  feeling  of  approbation  towards  them  ?  If  so, 
then  it  has  the  distinguishing  mark  of  virtue,  or  moral  good.  In 
this  feehng  of  approbation,  there  is  no  necessary  reference  to 
anything  else  either  antecedent  or  consequent,  as  the  ultimate 
object  of  our  approbation.  It  is  the  affection  itself,  that  we  re- 
gard as  constituting  moral  excellence  or  goodness.  This  will  ap- 
pear still  more  evident  when  we  advert  to  a  fact  which  has  been 
already  suggested,  namely,  that  whenever  we  feel  approbation  of 
any  outward  action,  or  any  volition,  such  approbation  refers  ulti- 
mately to  the  governing  affection.  And  if  any  volition  or  out- 
ward action,  which  first  appears  right,  and  so  excites  our  appro- 
bation, is  found  afterwards  to  spring  from  any  other  than  a  be- 
nevolent affection,  our  approbation  ceases  at  once.  If  on  the 
contrary  we  are  conscious  of  having  a  malevolent  affection  to- 
wards any  one,  though  that  affection  has  not  been  expressed  by 
any  injurious  action,  —  a  feehng  of  disapprobation  or  dissatisfac- 
tion with  ourselves  is  immediately  excited.  And  if  any  voluntary 
action  which  proves  injurious  to  ourselves  or  others,  and  which  at 
first  view  excites  disapprobation,  is  afterwards  discovered  to 
have  proceeded,  not  from  any  malevolent  affection,  but  from  real 
kindness,  our  disapprobation  ceases.  This  and  innumerable  other 
instances  make  it  certain  that  we  do  and  must  regard  malevolent 


MORAL    AGENCY.  91 

affection  as  being  in  itself  moral  evil,  the  very  essence  of  all  that 
is  blame-worthj  in  man. 

The  view  we  have  taken  of  this  subject  is  confirmed  by  the 
Holy  Scriptures.  Our  Saviour  informs  us  that  the  sum  of  the 
law  is  the  precept  which  requires  love.  Matt.  22 :  37,  "  Jesus 
said  unto  him,  thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy 
heart  and  Avith  all  thy  soul  and  with  all  thy  mind."  This  is  the 
same  as  saying,  that  the  affection  of  love  comprises  everything 
which  is  required  of  us  as  duty  or  moral  virtue.  And  the  Apostle 
Paul,  speaking  of  moral  virtue  or  duty  in  regard  to  our  fellow 
men,  teaches  that  all  branches  of  it  are  contained  in  love.  Rom. 
13  :  8 — 10,  "  Owe  no  man  anything  but  to  love  one  another ;  for 
he  that  loveth  another  hath  fulfilled  the  law.  For  this,  thou  shalt 
not  commit  adultery,  thou  shalt  not  kill,  thou  shalt  not  steal, 
thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness,  thou  shalt  not  covet ;  and  if 
there  be  any  other  commandment,  it  is  briefly  comprehended  in 
this  saying,  namely,  thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself. 
Love  worketh  no  ill  to  his  neighbor  ;  therefore  love  is  the  fulfil- 
ling of  the  law."  This  is  very  plain.  The  Scriptures  inform  us, 
that  God  looketh  on  the  heart ;  and  in  various  ways  they  pass  a 
sentence  of  condemnation  upon  everything  which  does  not  pro- 
ceed from  right  affection,  while  they  approve  and  honor  such  af- 
fection as  implying  all  that  is  excellent  and  praise- worthy.  In 
all  this,  the  Scriptures  perfectly  coincide  with  the  unperverted 
sentiment  of  our  minds ;  and  especially  with  the  practical  judg- 
ment of  Christians.  It  results  as  du-ectly  and  necessarily  from 
the  constitution  of  our  rational  and  moral  nature,  that  we  ap- 
prove benevolent  affections  and  disapprove  the  contrary,  as  it 
results  from  the  constitution  of  our  physical  nature,  that  we  have 
a  sensation  of  sweetness  from  the  taste  of  honey,  or  of  hardness 
from  the  feeling  of  a  stone,  or  of  pain  from  the  cutting  of  our  flesh. 
And  just  so  far  as  our  philosophy  differs  from  this,  it  differs  from 
the  teachings  of  Christ  and  the  apostles  as  to  the  nature  of  that 
which  the  moral  law  requires. 

Is  it  not  strange  that  any  one  should  mistake  or  doubt  on  a 
pomt  which  appears  so  exceedingly  plain  ?     We  are  accountable 


92  MORAL    AGENCY. 

beings.  And  for  what  are  we  accountable,  if  not  for  our  actions  ? 
As  to  outward,  bodilj  actions,  we  have  seen  that  we  are  ac- 
countable for  them,  only  as  they  result  from  the  operations  of 
the  mind.  It  is  in  these  inward  operations,  these  actings  of  our 
spiritual  nature,  that  we  find  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  what 
we  are  accountable  for,  that  is,  of  moral  good  and  evil.  But 
it  is  said,  and  said  truly,  that  moral  good  or  evil  cannot  be  predi- 
cated of  all  our  mental  acts.  It  must  however  be  predicated  of 
some  of  them.  My  question  is,  what  class  of  my  mental  acts 
shall  I  consider  to  be  virtuous  or  vicious  ?  For  which  class  am 
I  accountable  to  God  ?  This  I  would  determine  first  by  an  ap- 
peal to  the  moral  sense.  But  as  it  comes  to  pass  that  through 
some  disorder  of  our  moral  sense,  or  through  the  ambiguity  of 
words,  or  through  the  influence  of  science  falsely  so  called,  -v^e 
are  hable  to  doubt  or  mistake,  it  is  important  that  we  avail  our- 
selves of  the  help  of  Scripture,  particularly  of  the  divine  law. 
What  does  the  word  of  God  require  of  us  as  duty  ?  It  requires 
affection.  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God,  and  thou  shalt 
love  thy  neighbor.  It  also  requires  all  those  inward  and  outward 
acts,  which  proceed  from  the  affection  commanded.  And  it  of 
course  forbids  the  contrary  affection,  and  the  various  acts  which 
flow  from  it.  It  is  then  very  clear  that  the  affection  of  love  to 
God  and  man  constitutes  holiness,  and  the  contrary  to  this  or  the 
want  of  this  constitutes  sin.  In  this  conclusion,  unperverted  con- 
science and  the  word  of,  God  unite. 

What  has  been  said  I  deem  sufficient  to  estabhsh  the  point, 
that  those  affections  which  respect  moral  objects  are,  in  their  own 
nature,  morally  good  or  evil,  and  that  all  the  good  or  evil  predi- 
cated of  our  outward  actions  and  of  our  volitions,  is  thus  predicated 
in  relation  to  the  affections. 

We  are  now  to  enter  on  a  subject  of  great  practical  impor- 
tance, and  one  which  merits  more  attention  than  it  has  yet  re- 
ceived. The  subject  is,  the  laws  of  the  mind  in  regard  to 
the  affections,  particularly  as  to  the  connection  they  have 
with  the  intellect,  with  volition,  and  with  preceding  affec- 
tions. 


MORAL     AGENCY.  93 

Here  then  we  are  to  examine  in  what  manner  we  put  forth  our 
affections ;  in  other  words,  in  what  circumstances  and  according 
to  what  laws  our  affections  are  exercised.  We  have  nothing  to 
do  with  conjectures  or  unsupported  hypotheses.  Our  object  is  to 
ascertain  facts,  the  facts  of  experience  or  consciousness,  and  the 
laws  or  principles  which  these  facts  involve. 

We  inquire  then  first  ivhat  connection  the  affections  have  with 
the  intellect  ?  The  answer  is  obvious.  The  exercise  of  any  af- 
fection implies,  -that  an  object  is  apprehended.  And  this  appre- 
hension of  the  object  is  an  act  of  the  understanding  or  intellect. 
In  other  words  the  mind,  as  a  rational  or  intellectual  agent,  per- 
ceives the  object  which  it  loves  or  hates.  Loving  or  hating  neces- 
sarily implies  or  presupposes  that  an  object  of  love  or  hatred  ia 
in  the  mind's  view.  This  is  the  connection  which  understanding 
has  with  the  affections.  It  apprehends  the  objects  towards  which 
the  affections  are  exercised.  This  is  all  the  influence  it  ever  had 
or  can  have.  If  we  would  use  our  understanding  so  as  to  ex- 
cite love  to  God  in  our  hearts,  all  we  can  do  is  to  form  as  clear 
and  vivid  conceptions  as  possible  of  his  amiable  attributes,  and 
the  acts  of  his  goodness.  If  we  would  excite  love  to  God  in 
others,  we  must  do  what  we  can  to  assist  them  in  apprehending 
his  character  aright.  We  must  present  to  the  view  of  their  un- 
derstanding those  things  which  are  suited  to  excite  their  love. 
But  we  may  sum  up  all  in  few  words.  When  a  -man  loves  or 
hates,  he  does  it  as  an  intelligent  being  and  it  is  utterly  incon- 
ceivable that  he  should  exercise  any  affections  which  are  of  a 
moral  nature,  and  for  which  he  shall  be  accountable,  without  pre- 
viously using  the  faculty  of  understanding. 

Our  second  inquiry  is,  how  the  affections  are  connected  with 
volition,  or  what  influence  volition  has  over  them. 

Here  we  find  the  fact  to  be,  that  the  affections  are  not  the  im- 
mediate effects  of  volition,  that  they  are  not  directly  under  the 
influence  of  the  will  as  the  members  of  the  body  are.  If  any 
one  supposes  that  his  affections  are  in  this  sense  the  consequence 
of  volition,  or  that  they  are  controlled  by  an  act  of  the  will 
taken  in  the  restricted  sense,  let  him  make  the  experiment.     Let 


94  MORAL    AGENCY. 

him  will  to  love  some  person  or  thing  which  he  has  always  before 
hated  and  which  he  now  hates,  and  see  whether  his  heart  will 
obey  this  determination  of  his  will,  as  his  feet  obey  his  deter- 
mination to  walk  in  a  path  where  he  had  never  walked  before. 
Or  let  him  will  to  hate  a  favorite  child,  or  to  love  him  less,  and 
see  whether  his  heart  will  obey  in  this.  If  voHtion  were  in  truth 
the  proximate  cause  of  the  affections,  they  would  uniformly  follow 
volition.  When  we  will  to  have  any  affection  and  that  affec- 
tion does  not  follow,  we  have  evidence  that  the  affections  are 
not  under  the  control  of  the  will.  There  are  cases  innu- 
merable in  which  men  will  and  wish  and  choose  a  thousand 
times  over  to  have  a  particular  affection,  but  all  in  vain. 
How  quickly  would  real  Christians  love  God  with  a  perfect  and 
incessant  love,  if  their  merely  w^iUing  and  earnestly  willing  to  do 
so  would  bring  them  to  it.  But  the  affections  must  be  influenced 
by  other  causes. 

The  language  of  Paul,  Rom.  7:  15 — 23,  furnishes  a  strong 
illustration  of  the  principles  above  stated.  The  Apostle  says, 
"  What  I  would,  that  do  I  not.  To  will  is  present  with  me,  but 
how  to  perform  that  which  is  good  I  find  not.  For  the  good  that 
I  would  I  do  not,  but  the  evil  which  I  would  not,  that  I  do. 
I  find  then  a  law  that  when  I  would  do  good,  evil  is  present  with 
me."  The  fact  with  which  I  am  now  concerned  is  one  which  is 
here  made  very  prominent  in  the  experience  of  Paul.  There 
was  an  inward  law,  the  law  of  sin,  the  evil  bias,  the  corrupt 
propensity,  tiie  sin  that  dwelt  in  his  affections,  which  was  not 
subject  to  his  will.  The  determinations  of  his  will  did  not  control 
his  heart.  Charnock's  views  harmonize  with  those  of  the  Apostle. 
He  says  of  the  "  first  motions"  of  the  mind  or  what  he  calls 
"unpledged  thoughts,"  —  "These  are  sins,  though  we  consent 
not  to  them,  because  though  they  are  without  our  will,  they  are 
not  against  our  nature,  but  spring  from  an  inordinate  frame  of  a 
different  hue  from  what  God  implanted  in  us.  How  can  the  first 
sprouts  be  good,  if  the  root  be  evil  ?  Not  only  the  thought 
formed,  but  the  very  formation  or  the  first  imagination  is  evil. 
Voluntariness  is  not  necessary  to  the  essence  of  a  sin,  though  it 


MORAL    AGENCY.  ;96 

be  to  the  aggravation  of  it.  It  is  not  my  will  or  knowledge  which 
makes  an  act  sinful,  but  God's  prohibition."*  Dr.  George  Payne 
says,  "  that  admiring,  loving,  etc.  are  not  invariably,  even  indirect- 
ly, the  result  of  volition,  and  that  they  are  never  directly  so  ;  that 
in  many  cases  at  least,  we  might  perhaps  say  in  all  cases,  the 
mind  cannot  but  admire,  love,  etc."! 

In  many  instances,  our  affections  are  indeed  according  to  our 
volitions  ;  and  these  instances  may  be  thought  to  be  proofs  that  vo- 
lition has  a  direct  control  over  affection.  But  it  is  very  easy  to 
see  that  the  bare  agreement  of  our  affections  with  our  volitions 
cannot  prove,  that  they  result  from  our  volitions  as  their  proper 
and  immediate  cause ;  inasmuch  as  affections  may  be  conformed 
to  volitions,  though  produced  by  other  causes.  The  general  cause, 
[I  mean  now  the  external  cause,  and  assume  that  the  mind  exists 
and  is  in  a  state  suitable  to  the  exercise  of  the  affections  intended,] 
the  general  cause,  which  excites  the  affections,  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  presentation  of  a  suitable  object.  Would  you  fill  a  parent's 
heart  with  love  and  joy,  present  before  him  a  beloved  child  return- 
ed after  long  absence,  or  rescued  from  imminent  danger.  Would 
you  excite  a  man's  disgust  or  abhorrence,  present  a  disgusting  or 
hateful  object.  The  excitement  of  an  affection,  whether  of  one 
kind  or  another,  depends  not  on  an  act  of  the  will,  as  its  immedi- 
ate or  proximate  cause,  but  on  the  clear  view  of  a  fit  object.  Let 
such  an  object  come  before  a  man's  mind,  and  the  affection  will 
follow,  without  any  influence  from  a  present  volition.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  he  has  not  an  object  before  him  which  is  fitted  to  elicit 
the  affection,  or  if  his  mind  is  not  in  a  state  favorable  to  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  affection,  his  willing  to  have  the  affection  will  fail  to 
produce  it. 

I  have  said  that  the  act  of  the  will  does  not  directly  govern  the 
affections.  To  set  this  in  the  most  striking  point  of  '\aew,  I  now 
add  that  the  converse  is  true,  namely,  that  the  affections  govern 
the  will.  I  use  affections  in  the  large  sense  before  mentioned,  in- 
cluding the  emotions,  desires  and  all  the  feelings  of  the  heart.     It 

*  Sermon  on  •'  the  Sinfulness  and  cure  of  thou<j;hts." 

t  Elements  of  Mental  and  Moral  Science,  p.  75,  76,  London  Edit.  1828. 


96  MORAL    AGENCY. 

is  evidently  one  of  the  laws  of  the  mind,  that  the  will,  instead  of 
exerting  a  direct  control  over  the  affections,  does  itself  act  under 
their  influence.  This  is  to  me  a  fact  of  consciousness.  I  cannot 
recall  a  single  instance  in  my  past  life,  in  which  I  put  forth  a  vo- 
lition, choice,  or  act  of  the  will,  except  as  prompted  to  it  by  some 
inclination,  feehng  or  desire.  If  it  were  necessary  I  might  prove 
this  by  the  plainest  representations  of  Scripture.  I  have  already 
adverted  to  the  doctrine  repeatedly  taught  in  the  New  Testament, 
that  love  to  God  and  man  is  the  fulfilhng  of  the  law,  —  which  must 
imply  that  there  is  a  fixed  and  sure  connection  between  love  and 
obedience,  that  obedience  certainly  flows  from  love  ;  as  Jesus  said ; 
"  if  any  man  love  me,  he  will  keep  my  word." 

But  this  is  a  point,  on  which  mankind  from  their  own  experience 
come  generally  to  the  same  conclusion.  And  if  any  can  be  found 
who  adopt  a  speculation  at  variance  with  this,  their  practical  judg- 
ment contradicts  their  speculation.  But  I  shall  say  more  on  this 
point  in  another  place.  It  will  however  be  to  my  purpose  to  show 
that  the  most  respectable  writers,  how  different  soever  their  habits 
of  thinking  on  other  subjects,  agree  in  this.  Dr.  Upham  makes 
it  plain  that  the  intellect  operates  upon  the  will  only  by  means  of 
the  emotions,  feelings  and  desires.  He  gives  the  example  of  a  man, 
who  reasons  himself  into  the  belief  that  a  certain  amount  of  prop- 
erty would  be  beneficial  to  himself  and  family.  But  if  this  intel- 
lectual belief  is  not  attended  with  some  emotion  or  desire,  it  will 
fail  to  arouse  the  will  to  activity  or  to  secure  a  single  effort.  Locke, 
in  opposition  to  the  opinion  he  had  before  entertained,  says,  "  Upon 
a  stricter  inquiry  I  am  forced  to  conclude  that  good,  the  greater 
good,  though  apprehended  and  acknowledged  to  be  so,  does  not 
determine  the  will,  until  our  desire  makes  us  uneasy  in  the  want 
of  it.  Let  a  man  be  ever  so  well  persuaded  of  the  advantage  of 
virtue,  —  yet  till  he  hungers  and  thirsts  after  righteousness,  till  he 
feels  an  uneasiness  in  the  want  of  it,  his  will  —  will  not  be  deter- 
mined to  any  action  in  pursuit  of  it.  For  good,  though  appearing 
and  allowed  ever  so  great,  yet  till  it  has  raised  desires  in  our  minds, 
reaches  not  our  wills." 

The  following  remarks  are  from  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  a  distin- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  97 

guished  metaphysician  and  philosopher,  who  cannot  be  suspected 
of  any  fondness  for  theories  unsupported  by  plain  facts.  His  ob- 
ject is  to  show  that  what  I  have  called  affection,  and  that  only,  in- 
fluences volition.  He  says,  "  through  whatever  reasoning  the  mind 
may  pass  in  its  advances  towards  action,  there  is  placed  at  the  end 
some  principle  wholly  unlike  mere  reason,  some  emotion  or  senti- 
ment which  must  be  touched  before  the  springs  of  will  and  action 
can  be  set  in  motion."  Again,  when  he  is  speaking  of  a  being, 
who  may  be  supposed  merely  to  think  and  reason,  he  asks,  "  what 
could  induce  such  a  being  to  will  or  to  act  ?  —  Reason  as  reason, 
can  never  be  a  motive  to  action.  It  is  only  when  we  superadd  to 
such  a  being  sensibility  or  the  capacity  of  emotion  or  sentiment, 
—  of  desire  or  aversion,  that  we  introduce  him  into  the  world  of 
action.  We  then  clearly  discern  that  when  the  conclusion  of  a 
process  of  reasoning  presents  to  his  mind  an  object  of  desire,  or  the 
means  of  obtaining  it,  a  motive  of  action  begins  to  operate,  and 
reason  may  then,  and  not  till  then,  have  a  powerful  but  indirect 
influence  on  conduct.  Let  any  argument  to  dissuade  a  man  from 
immorahty  be  employed,  and  the  issue  of  it  will  always  appear  to 
be  an  appeal  to  feeling.  You  prove  that  drunkenness  will  proba- 
bly ruin  health.  But  your  hope  of  success  depends  on  the  drunk- 
ard's fear  of  ill  health  ;  and  he  may  always  silence  your  argument 
by  telling  you,  that  he  loves  wine  more  than  he  dreads  sickness. 
You  speak  in  vain  of  the  infamy  of  an  act  to  one  who  disregards  the 
opinion  of  others.  —  You  may  truly  but  vainly  tell  of  the  pleas- 
ures of  friendship  to  one  who  has  little  affection.  If  you  display 
the  delights  of  liberahty  to  a  miser,  he  may  always  shut  your 
mouth  by  answering,  the  spendthrift  may  prefer  such  pleasure  ;  I 
love  money  more."  It  is  thus  apparent,  this  writer  says,  that  the 
influence  of  reason  on  the  will  is  indirect,  and  arises  only  from 
its  being  one  of  the  channels  by  which  the  objects  of  desire  or 
aversion  are  brought  near  to  these  springs  of  voluntary  action. 

I  have  allowed  myself  to  extend  these  remarks  so  far  for  the 
purpose  of  strong  confirmation  to  the  principle  I  have  advanced. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  it  has  been  said- by  some  that  volition,  orl 
the  act  of  the  will,  always  controls  the  affections.     I  hold  it  to  be  ■• 

VOL  n.  9 


F8  MORAL    AGENCY. 

a  matter  of  consciousness  that  this  is  not  the  case,  but  that  the 
contrary  of  this  is  a  uniform  law  of  the  mind,  namely,  that  the 
will,  instead  of  having  any  direct  control  of  the  aflfections,  is  itself 
/controlled  hy  them. 

It  is  easy  to  see  the  wisdom  and  fitness  of  that  constitution  of 
our  nature  by  which  the  influence  of  the  will  is  thus  limited.  In 
Tthe  first  place  if  a  mere  act  of  the  will  governed  the  afiections, 
how  could  the  uniformity  of  the  affections  and  the  stabiUty  of  the 
character  be  secured,  unless  the  will  itself  should  be  preserved 
from  its  natural  capriciousness  and  be  kept  uniform  and  steady  by 
another  and  a  superior  power. 

Secondly.  If  our  affections  were  influenced  by  a  mere  act  of 
the  "will,  what  occasion  could  there  be  for  that  incessant  watchful- 
ness, and  that  earnest,  painful  and  persevering  labor,  which  the 
Scriptures  require  of  us,  in  order  that  we  may  subdue  what  is  evil, 
and  form  ourselYes  to  holy  love  and  obedience,  on  the  principle 
supposed,  if  we  should  merely  put  forth  a  volition  or  an  act  of  the 
will  that  our  affections  might  be  pure  and  heavenly,  the  work 
would  at  once  be  accomplished,  and  nothing  more  remain  for  us  to 
Ldo.  How  opposite  would  this  be  to  the  plan  of  divine  wis- 
dom, which  in  the  business  of  our  spiritual  culture,  assigns  to  us  an 
amount  of  effort  sufficient  to  occupy  all  our  active  powers  through 
the  whole  period  of  our  probation. 

Thirdly.  The  extent  of  voluntary  power  which  Grod  has  given 
us,  is  suited  to  encourage  and  stimulate  us  to  the  highest  endeav- 
ors to  form  right  habits  of  feehng  and  action,  and  is  fully  sufficient 
for  this  purpose  ;  while  the  appointed  limits  of  our  voluntary  pow- 
er are  adapted  to  teach  us  our  dependence  on  God,  and  our  con- 
stant need  of  his  Spirit  to  assist  us  in  our  duty,  and  to  work  in  us 
both  to  will  and  to  do. 

But  while  it  is  so  evident  from  consciousness  and  experience 
that  the  will  does  not  exert  a  direct  control  over  the  affections, 
there  is  still  a  sense,  and  a  very  obvious  and  important  sense,  in 
which  the  affections  are  really  influenced  by  the  will.  And  as  this 
is  a  point  of  great  consequence,  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  clearly 
what  is  the  nature  of  that  influence,  and  what  place  it  has  in  the 
business  of  moral  culture. 


MORAL  AGENCY.  99^ 

Now  as  the  aflfections  are  excited  by  the  presentation  of  fit 
objects ;  if  the  will  has  any  influence  to  excite  the  aflfections,  it 
must  be  by  means  of  such  objects.  Here  then  we  see  at  once 
what  and  how  extensive  an  influence  the  wUl  may  exert.  Just 
so  far  as  any  act  of  the  will  is  concerned  in  bringing  fit  objects 
before  the  mind,  it  has  a  power,  in  this  indirect  way,  that  is,  by 
means  of  these  objects,  to  call  forth  the  aflfections.  This  power, 
as  to  its  reality  and  importance,  may  be  illustrated  by  the  power 
we  have  by  means  of  our  voluntary  agency,  in  the  culture  of  a 
field  and  the  production  of  a  crop.  The  corn  does  not  grow  in 
direct  obedience  to  our  will :  but  it  grows  under  the  influence  of 
those  physical  laws  which  our  voluntary  agency  directs.  If  we 
wish  for  a  crop,  we  make  use  of  means,  which  according  to  the 
known  laws  of  nature  will  tend  to  produce  a  crop.  Over  the 
growth  of  the  corn,  our  wishes  and  voUtions  have  no  immediate 
power  ;  but  they  have  a  mediate  or  indirect  power,  that  is,  by  the 
applications  of  means  suited  to  the  end  in  view.  So  in  the 
moral  world.  The  voluntary  power  which  we  have  over  our  af- 
fections, is  through  the  medium  of  those  things,  which  are  the 
proper  excitements  of  aflfection,  and  which  we  can  voluntarily 
direct.  "  A  curious  and  important  fact,"  says  Dr.  Whately,  is 
forced  on  the  attention  of  every  one  who  reflects  on  the  operations 
of  his  own  mind,  viz.  that  the  feelings,  propensities  and  sentiments 
of  our  nature  are  not,  like  the  intellectual  faculties,  under  the 
direct  control  of  volition.  The  distinction  is  much  the  same  as 
between  the  voluntary  and  the  involuntary  actions  of  diSerent 
parts  of  the  body.  One  may,  by  a  deliberate  act  of  the  will, 
set  himself  to  calculate,  —  to  reason,  —  to  recall  historical  facts, 
etc.,  just  as  he  does  to  move  one  of  his  Umbs.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  volition  to  hope  or  fear,  to  love  or  to  hate,  to  feel  de- 
votion or  pity,  and  the  like,  is  as  ineflfectual,  as  to  will  that 
the  pulsations  of  the  heart  or  the  secretion  of  the  liver  should 
be  altered.  Some  indeed  are,  I  believe,  (strange  as  it  may 
seem)  not  aware  of  the  total  inefiicacy  of  their  own  eftbrts  of 
voUtion  in  such  cases,  that  is,  they  mistake  for  a  feeling  of  grati- 
tude, compassion,  etc.,  their  conviction  that  the  case  is  one  which 


100 


MOEAL  AGENCY, 


calls  for  gratitude  or  compassion.  A  very  moderate  degree  of 
attention  however  to  what  is  passing  in  the  mind  will  enable  any 
one  to  perceive  the  diiference.  How  is  this  difficulty  to  be  sur- 
mounted ?  Good  sense  suggests  in  each  case  an  analogous 
remedy.  It  is  in  vain  to  form  a  will  to  quicken  the  circulation 
of  the  blood,  but  we  may  by  a  voluntary  act  swallow  a  medicine, 
from  which  will  follow  that  effect.  And  so  also,  though  we  can- 
not by  a  direct  effort  of  volition  excite  or  allay  any  sentiment  or 
emotion,  we  may,  by  a  voluntary  act,  fill  the  understanding  with 
such  thoughts  as  shall  operate  on  the  feelings.  Thus  by  atten- 
tively studying  and  meditating  on  the  history  of  some  extraordi- 
nary personage,  by  contemplating  and  dwelhng  on  his  actions  and 
sufferings,  —  his  virtues  and  his  wisdom,  —  and  by  calling  on  the 
imagination  to  present  a  vivid  picture  of  all  that  is  related,  and 
referred  to,  in  this  manner  we  may  at  length  succeed  in  kindling 
such  feelings,  suppose  of  reverence,  admiration,  gratitude,  love, 
hope,  emulation,  etc. ,  as  we  were  already  prepared  to  acknowl- 
edge were  suitable  to  the  case.  So  again,  if  a  man  of  sense 
■wishes  to  allay  in  himself  any  emotion,  that  of  resentment  for 
instance,  though  it  is  not  under  the  direct  control  of  the  will,  he 
deliberately  sets  himself  to  reflect  on  the  softening  circumstances, 
such  as  the  provocations  the  other  party  may  suppose  himself  to 
have  received,  perhaps  his  ignorance  or  weakness,  or  disordered 
state  of  health  ;  —  he  endeavors  to  imagine  himself  in  the  jjlace 
of  the  offending  party,  and  above  all,  if  he  is  a  Christian,  he 
meditates  on  the  parable  of  the  debtor  who,  after  having  been 
himself  forgiven,  claimed  payment  with  rigid  severity  from  his 
fellow  servant,  and  on  other  similar  lessons  of  Scripture.  Such 
processes  as  this,  to  which  a  man  of  well  regulated  mind  con- 
tinually finds  occasion  to  resort,  is  exactly  analogous  to  that  of 
taking  a  medicine  which  is  to  operate  on  the  involuntary  bodily 
organs."* 

We  see  then  how  important  and  how  extensive  our  voluntary 
agency  is  in  regard  to  our  affections.     Experience  teaches  us 

*  Whately's  Rhetoric. 


MORAL     AGENCY.  101 

what  situation  is  most  favorable  to  the  exercise  of  holy  affec- 
tions, and  what  views  of  the  mind,  or  what  objects  brought  be- 
fore the  mind,  have  the  greatest  effect  in  exciting  such  affections. 
For  example,  experience  teaches  us  that  the  house  of  God,  the 
company  of  devout  Christians,  religious  retirement,  the  chamber 
of  sickness  and  the  house  of  mourning  are  promotive  of  good 
affections  and  desires.  If  then  we  would  cultivate  such  affec- 
tions, we  must  put  ourselves  in  these  favorable  situations,  which 
is  a  matter  of  voluntary  agency.  In  respect  to  these  favorable 
situations  we  have  a  voluntary  power  over  ourselves,  and  it  is 
just  as  necessary  we  should  use  this  power  to  bring  ourselves  into 
a  right  situation,  as  it  is  to  set  a  plant  in  a  place  where  the  sun 
will  shine  upon  it,  and  the  rain  and  dew  afford  it  moisture.  Ex- 
perience teaches  that,  if  the  mind  is  in  any  measure  in  a  right 
state,  reading  the  Scriptures,  hearing  the  gospel  preached,  con- 
versing with  intelligent  Christians,  and  other  ways  of  bringing 
the  truths  of  religion  before  the  mind,  tend  directly  to  excite 
good  affections.  In  order  to  excite  such  affections  in  ourselves, 
it  is  then  just  as  proper  and  necessary  that  we  should  make  use 
of  these  methods  of  bringing  the  truths  of  religion  clearly  before 
the  mind,  as  that  we  should  do  anything  to  cultivate  the  vege- 
tables in  our  garden.  Here  you  see  how  extensive  is  the  busi- 
ness to  which  we  are  to  apply  ourselves,  as  voluntary  agents. 
Our  minds  ought  always  to  be  filled  with  holy  affections.  And 
that  this  may  be  the  case,  we  should  always  keep  ourselves  in  a 
proper  situation,  and  should  labor  to  have  a  constant  succession 
of  di\ine  and  heavenly  objects  passing  before  our  minds,  in  the 
manner  most  suited  to  excite  and  strengthen  holy  affections. 
How  immense  appears  the  magnitude  of  this  work,  when  we  con- 
sider what  a  vast  variety  of  truths  must  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  mind,  and  how  many  and  how  diversified  the  forms  in  which 
they  must  be  exhibited,  to  produce  the  greatest  present  effect  on 
our  moral  affections,  and  to  raise  them  permanently  to  their  high- 
est perfection.  What  manifest  occasion  then  have  we  for  the 
gi'eatest  diligence  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  for  skill  in 
the  arrangement  of  the  various  truths   of  religion,  for  watchful 

9* 


102  MORAL     AGENCY. 

care  in  keeping  our  minds,  our  senses  and  our  external  affairs  in 
a  right  state,  in  short,  for  unceasing  exertion  to  bring  the  most 
salutary  and  most  elevating  influence  to  act  continually  on  our 
moral  character. 

But  our  voluntary  agency  in  the  business  of  moral  culture  goes 
farther.  Experience  teaches  that  while  some  objects  and  circum- 
stances are  suited  to  make  right  impressions  on  the  mind,  others 
are  suited  to  have  a  contrary  influence.  It  teaches  what  are  the 
objects  and  occasions  which  tend  to  excite  improper  feelings.  By 
a  right  use  of  our  voluntary  power,  we  can  avoid  such  objects 
and  occasions,  and  in  this  way  prevent  in  a  great  measure,  the 
excitement  of  improper  affections.  We  learn  from  experience, 
that  we  cannot  successfully  resist  the  influence  of  powerful  temp- 
tations to  which  we  voluntarily  expose  ourselves.  We  learn  that 
our  thus  exposing  ourselves  betrays  either  a  total  ignorance  of 
our  own  hearts,  or  a  willingness  to  give  indulgence  to  our  sinful 
passions.  For  those  who  are  desirous  of  guarding  against  cor- 
rupt affection,  and  improving  their  moral  character,  here  is  a 
great  work,  a  work  inculcated  as  of  the  highest  consequence  in 
the  word  of  God.  It  is  the  work  of  Christian  vigilance,  imply- 
ing an  unceasing  care  to  avoid  all  the  causes  of  irregular  pas- 
sion, and  to  keep  ourselves  at  a  distance  from  all  occasions  of  sin, 
—  an  unceasing  care  and  resolution  to  guard  against  those  com- 
panies and  places,  the  sight  or  contemplation  of  those  objects, 
and  the  indulgence  of  those  trains  of  thought,  which  are  apt  to 
kindle  unholy  affection,  and  so  to  pollute  the  mind.  It  appears 
then  that  although  we  cannot  prevent  or  subdue  sinful  affection, 
as  we  regulate  our  bodily  motions,  by  the  direct  influence  of 
the  will,  still  we  may  do  much  to  prevent  and  subdue  it 
by  the  influence  of  our  will  in  respect  to  the  causes  or  oc- 
casions of  such  affection.  According  to  the  view  we  have 
taken  of  the  subject,  the  proper  influence  of  the  will  or  the 
extent  of  our  voluntary  power  in  regulating  the  affections  is 
made  perfectly  obvious  and  definite,  so  that  we  know  ex- 
actly what  we  can  do,  and  what  we  have  to  do,  by  our 
voluntary  exertions,  in  promoting  our  own  moral  improve- 
ment. 


LECTURE    L. 


MORAL  AGENCY.  CONNECTION  OF  PRESENT  AFFECTIONS  WITH 
PRECEDING  AFFECTIONS.  PRACTICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE 
VIEWS  WHICH  HAVE  BEEN  ADVANCED  RESPECTING  THE  CON- 
NECTION OF  THE  AFFECTIONS  WITH  INTELLECT,  WITH  VOLI- 
TION,  AND    WITH   PRECEDING   AFFECTIONS. 

We  are  now  to  inquire  briefly  what  connection  our  present 
affections  have  with  any  'preceding  affection,  or  what  injluence 
preceding  affections  have  upon  the  j^resent. 

It  is  generally  the  case  that  a  previous  affection  is  not  par- 
ticularly recollected,  and  of  course  cannot  in  any  proper  sense 
be  called  a  motive  to  the  mind,  in  the  exercise  of  its  present  af- 
fections. But  if  an  affection  is  recollected,  and  is  thus  brought  as 
an  object  of  contemplation  before  the  mind,  it  must  be  considered 
as,  in  some  sense,  a  motive,  that  is,  it  must,  in  connection  with  oth- 
er things,  exert  an  influence  upon  the  feelings.  Like  every  other 
object  of  contemplation,  it  must  occasion  or  help  to  occasion  some 
present  emotion.  But  a  recollected  affection  is  generally  only 
one  of  a  great  variety  of  things  which  operate  as  causes  of  our 
present  affections.  Those  very  affections  therefore,  which  arise 
when  we  contemplate  a  past  affection,  must  result  more  or  less 
from  other  causes.  And  those  other  causes  may  modify  and  con- 
trol the  particular  influence  of  the  preceding  affection,  so  that 
the  feeling  which  the  recollected  affection  produces  may  be  ex- 
ceedingly different  from  what  it  would  be,  were  the  recollected 
affection  the  only  motive  or  cause  acting  on  the  mind.  Of 
course  we  cannot  generally  predict  that  the  affection,  excited  by 


104  MOKAL    AGENCY. 

the  recollection  of  a  past  affection,  will  be  of  the  same  nature 
with  the  past.  An  apostate  angel  may  distinctly  recollect  the 
holy  affection  of  which  he  was  once  the  happy  subject,  while  all 
his  present  affections  will  be  totally  unholy.  In  his  present  state 
of  mind,  the  very  remembrance  of  the  holy  affection  he  once 
had,  will  excite  an  affection  of  a  contrary  nature.  And  how 
often  does  a  Christian,  in  a  time  of  spiritual  declension,  recollect 
the  happy  feelings  of  days  that  are  past,  without  having  any 
similar  feelings  renewed  by  the  recollection.  And  how  often 
does  a  Christian,  in  a  right  state  of  mmd,  recollect  his  former 
corrupt  affections  with  emotions  of  godly  sorrow  and  holy  abhor- 
rence. Still  in  these  very  cases  the  recollection  operates  as  a 
motive,  and  actually  excites  or  helps  to  excite  present  affections. 
But  the  particular  nature  and  degree  of  these  affections  de- 
pend on  the  influence,  not  of  one  single  cause,  but  of  all  the 
causes  which  operate.  It  is  owing  to  this  combination  of  causes, 
that  the  recollection  of  a  past  affection  is  sometimes  followed  by 
an  affection  similar  and  sometimes  dissimilar  to  the  one  recol- 
lected. Our  recollection  of  a  good  affection  sometimes  excites 
a  feehng  of  approbation  and  dehght.  But  if  the  mind  is  in  a 
state  of  settled  impiety  and  rebellion,  it  will  excite  feelings  of 
guilt  and  remorse,  and  so  be  a  source  of  unhappiness.  And 
when  past  goodness  thus  recollected  is  associated  with  painful 
emotions,  it  will  produce  greater  and  greater  dishke  of  goodness  ; 
in  other  words,  it  will  increase  the  strength  of  sinful  affection. 
Such  an  effect  as  this,  you  will  remember,  does  not  result 
from  the  single  cause  of  recollected  goodness.  All  the  corrupt 
dispositions  now  belonging  to  the  mind,  and  various  external  ob- 
jects, have  an  influence  in  producing  the  unhappy  effect.  In- 
deed the  recollection  of  past  goodness  seems  merely  to  give  occar 
sion  to  the  activity  of  other  causes. 

What  has  now  been  said  is  sufficient  to  illustrate  one  way,  in 
which  past  recollected  affection  has  an  influence  upon  present 
affection.  But  there  is  another  way,  and  that  of  special  con- 
sequence, in  which  this  influence  appears.  There  is  what  may 
properly  be  called  an  aptitude  of  the  mind  to  the  exercise  of  par- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  105 

ticuJar  affections.  That  is,  the  mind  is  in  such  a  state,  that  it 
is  likely  to  have  or  is  apt  to  have  certain  affections  or  emotions, 
rather  than  others,  on  the  presentation  of  particular  objects.  I 
might  illustrate  this  by  many  examples.  Do  you  not  know  be- 
fore hand  how  a  covetous  man  and  how  a  benevolent  man  will 
be  likely  to  feel,  when  you  ask  them  to  give  money  to  promote 
a  benevolent  object  ?  And  do  you  not  know  how  an  enviou3 
man  will  feel,  when  he  thinks  of  the  superior  acquisitions  or  the 
superior  honors  of  one  of  his  companions  ?  And  do  you  not 
know  how  a  man  of  a  generous,  disinterested  heart  will  feel  in 
view  of  the  same  superior  acquisitions  or  honors  of  another? 
And  do  you  not  know  what  different  emotions  would  arise  in 
the  mind  of  a  devoted  Christian  and  in  the  mind  of  a  hard- 
ened sinner,  in  the  mind  of  Gabriel  and  in  the  mind  of  Satan, 
if  they  should  be  brought  into  the  presence  of  Jesus  Christ  ? 
This  aptitude  to  particular  affections  may  be  greater  or  less.  It 
is  greater,  when  the  particular  object  excites  the  affection  more 
readily  or  more  frequently,  or  when  the  excited  affection  is 
stronger.  This  tendency  to  particular  affections  is  indeed  vari* 
ously  influenced  by  previous  affections.  But  the  natural,  direct 
tendency  of  any  affection  taken  by  itself  is  to  increase  the 
mind's  aptitude  to  the  same  affection.  Thus  the  exercise  of  benev- 
olence increases  the  tendency  of  the  mind  to  benevolent  affectior^. 
In  consequence  of  loving  God  with  all  the  heart  now,  our  mind, 
supposing  it  exposed  to  no  influence  of  an  opposite  nature,  will 
be  more  apt  to  love  him  hereafter.  The  affection  will  be  hkely 
to  arise  more  readily  and  to  a  higher  degree.  In  this  way  we 
account  for  the  high  attainments  which  some  Christians  make  in 
piety.  The  frequent  exercise  of  love,  faith  and  submission, 
strengthens  the  aptitude  of  their  mind  to  the  same  exercise.  It 
prepares  the  way  for  the  same  affections  to  be  excited  again  more 
readily,  or  to  a  higher  degree.  Malevolent  affections  come  under 
the  same  law.  The  exercise  of  anger,  malice  or  revenge,  taken 
by  itself,  naturally  leads  to  a  still  more  violent  exercise  of  the 
same  passions.  It  is  well  known  that  men  grow  more  corrupt 
by  indulging  corrupt  affections,  —  more  wicked  by  wicked- 
practice. 


106  '  MORAL     AGENCY. 

But  this  natural  and  direct  tendency  of  the  affections  is  fre- 
quently modified  and  sometimes  changed  by  other  causes.  A 
particular  affection  may  be  attended  by  such  circumstances,  or 
connected  with  the  influence  of  such  other  causes,  that  it  will  be 
followed  bv  a  diminished  aptitude  to  that  affection.  Suppose  a 
man  has  his  compassion  often  and  strongly  excited  by  the  ai> 
pearance  of  distress  in  beggars,  and  by  the  touching  appeals 
thev  make  to  his  heart.  And  suppose  he  finds  that  this  appear- 
ance is  often  deceptive,  and  that  these  touching  appeals  are  often 
grounded  on  falsehood.  The  natural  consequence  is,  a  less  apt- 
ness to  have  his  compassion  excited  by  the  causes  which  excited 
it  before.  The  exercise  of  compassion,  if  left  to  produce  its  own 
proper  effect,  would  increase  the  mind's  tendency  to  compassion. 
But  in  the  case  now  supposed,  the  other  causes  Avhich  operate, 
that  is,  the  discovery  of  imposture  and  the  consequent  painful 
reflections,  go  far  to  prevent  the  excitement  of  compassion  when 
similar  cases  occur.  And  this  counter-influence  of  incidental 
causes  may  be  so  great,  as  in  a  measure  to  deaden  the  heart  to 
the  exercises  of  pity  in  all  other  cases.  On  this  principle  you 
may  easily  see  how  the  strong  excitements  of  feeling,  produced 
by  fictions  and  by  theatrical  exhibitions,  are  adapted  to  pro- 
duce a  pernicious  effect  upon  the  natural  sensibilities.  The  same 
remarks  may  be  made  respecting  friendship  and  confidence.  A 
man  may  in  so  many  instances  find  his  friendship  misplaced,  and 
his  confidence  betrayed,  that  in  the  end  no  excellence  of  charac- 
ter can  gain  his  heart.  The  feeling  of  friendship  and  confidence 
tends  by  itself,  to  increase  the  mind's  aptitude  to  the  same  feel- 
ings. But  through  the  influence  of  other  circumstances,  that 
tendency  may  be  diminished  and  ultimately  destroyed. 

Facts  might  be  adduced,  illustrative  of  the  same  principle  in 
regard  to  sinful  affections.  Strong  emotions  of  anger,  if  in- 
dulged and  if  separate  from  all  other  causes,  would  produce  an 
increasing  tendency  to  anger,  and  in  the  end  a  confirmed  habit 
of  indulging  it  in  all  its  violence.  But  a  man  in  certain  states 
of  mind  may  be  so  affected  by  the  operation  of  other  causes,  that 
the  violent  excitement  of  his  anger  may  in  its  results  prove  a 


MORAL    AGENCY.  107 

safeguard  against  such  excitement  in  time  to  come.  This  effect 
you  will  observe  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  direct  and  proper 
operation  of  anger,  but  to  other  causes  awakened  and  made  ef- 
fectual by  the  occurrence  of  anger.  The  same  is  sometimes  true 
of  other  criminal  affections.  The  dispositions,  which  David  in- 
dulged in  the  case  of  Uriah,  and  Peter  in  the  judgment  hall,  were 
undoubtedly  followed  by  a  state  of  mind  more  strongly  fortified 
than  ever  before  against  the  same  criminal  dispositions.  And 
through  the  grace  of  God,  it  is  so  with  Christians  generally. 
The  sinful  affections  which  often  rise  in  their  hearts,  and  the  sin- 
ful practices  into  which  they  are  sometimes  drawn,  occasion  the 
bitterness  of  sorrow,  and  that  sorrow  embitters  the  sin  which 
occasioned  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  new  evidence  which 
Christians  in  such  cases  obtain  of  the  immeasurable  forbearance 
and  goodness  of  God,  increases  the  strength  and  tenderness  of 
their  love,  and  renders  them  more  unwiUing  to  offend.  And 
even  in  the  history  of  sinners,  instances  are  not  wanting,  in 
which  the  commission  of  sin,  especially  of  some  flagrant  sin, 
instead  of  producing,  according  to  its  own  proper  tendency,  in- 
creasing sinfulness,  becomes  tlu-ough  divine  mercy  the  occasion 
of  such  reflections  and  emotions,  as  actually  lead  to  a  change  of 
character. 

Here  allow  me  to  notice  a  mistake,  sometimes  made  by  the  best 
of  men,  who  represent  it  as  a  fact,  that  sinners  while  unrenewed 
universally  grow  more  and  more  hardened  and  confirmed  in  sin, 
that  they  will  certainly  have  less  feeling  on  the  subject  of  reli- 
gion at  a  future  time  than  they  have  now,  and  especially  that 
those,  who  pass  through  a  revival  of  religion  without  being  con- 
verted to  God,  will  become  more  stupid  and  bold  in  sin  Aan  ever 
before.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  common  fact.  But  it  is  well 
known  that  some  sinners,  not  savingly  converted  in  a  time  of 
revival,  do  nevertheless  retain  an  increased  sensibility  to  divine 
truth,  a  deeper  feeling  of  the  worth  of  the  soul,  a  greater  dread 
of  sin,  and  a  more  awakened  regard  to  the  means  of  religion. 
They  do  not  relapse  mto  as  great  a  degree  of  thoughtlessness 
and  insensibility  as  they  formerly  had.     Similar  facts  are  found 


108  MORAL    AGENCY. 

to  occur  among  sinners  in  other  circumstances.  But  these  facts 
are  far  from  proving  that  there  is  not  in  every  period  of  an  im- 
penitent state  a  constant  augmentation  of  guilt,  as  there  must 
be,  if  impenitence  is  a  culpable  thing ;  —  nor  do  they  prove  that 
the  natural  tendency  of  living  in  impenitence  and  unbelief  is  not 
to  produce  a  growing  strength  of  sinful  affection  and  a  growing 
disregard  to  duty.  They  only  prove  that  another  and  a  higher 
cause  is  in  operation,  a  cause  which  opposes  and  in  some  degree 
overcomes  the  natural  and  direct  tendency  of  sinful  affections. 
It  is  evident  that  in  the  actual  state  of  their  minds  sinners  would 
at  all  times  be  growing  worse,  would  constantly  acquire  greater 
and  greater  hardness  of  heart,  as  truly  as  Pharaoh  did,  were 
they  given  over  to  the  sole  influence  of  their  impiety.  This  will 
undoubtedly  be  the  case  with  all  sinners  in  a  state  of  final  ret- 
ribution. In  that  state,  the  nature  and  tendency  of  sin  will  be 
fully  displayed.  But  in  the  present  life  the  tendency  of  sin  to 
increase  its  own  power  in  the  mind,  though  generally  and  to  an 
alarming  degree  manifest,  is  yet  in  a  variety  of  instances  subject 
to  many  powerful  checks.  Through  the  mercy  of  God  other 
causes  both  inward  and  outward  come  in  for  a  share  of  influence, 
and  in  a  multitude  of  cases  lead  on  to  a  moral  state  exceedingly 
different  from  that  which  would  have  resulted  from  the  operation 
of  sinful  affection  alone. 

From  this  examination  you  will  perceive  what  every  advance 
in  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  will  render  more  evident,  that  al- 
though we  may  discover  very  clearly  that  a  particular  law  exists 
in  our  intelligent  and  moral  nature,  and  produces  many  and  im- 
portant effects,  yet  such  a  law  does  not  stand  alone,  but  is  in  its 
influence  combined  with  various  other  principles  or  causes,  which 
sometimes  increase,  sometimes  diminish,  and  sometimes  entirely 
prevent  its  proper  effect.  It  is  this  combination  of  moral  and 
intellectual  causes  which  renders  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  so 
complex,  and  the  acquisition  of  clear  and  definite  ideas  of  it  so 
difiicult. 

But  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  attending  this  subject,  we 
may  to  a  great  extent  obtain  a  real  knowledge  of  the  laws  which 


MORAL    AGENCY.  109 

regulate  our  mental  operations  and  may  apply  that  knowledge  to 
the  most  important  purposes. 

The  conclusion,  to  which  this  brief  examination  has  conducted 
us  in  regard  to  the  connection  of  our  moral  affections  with  intel- 
lect, with  volition,  and  with  previous  affections,  is  obviously  of 
great  moment  in  the  cultivation  of  moral  virtue.  Knowing  the 
connection  which  intellect  has  with  the  affections,  namely,  that  it 
apprehends  the  objects  by  which  the  affections  are  excited,  we 
know  precisely  what  is  the  use  of  intellect  in  the  improvement 
of  the  affections.  Intellect  is  not  only  important  but  abso- 
lutely essential.  If  without  intellectual  light,  or  which  is  the 
same  thing  without  the  use  of  reason,  there  could  be  any  stir- 
ring of  affection  within  us,  it  would  be  blind  affection,  hardly  dis- 
tinguishable from  the  instincts  of  the  brutal  species.  But  we  are 
conscious  of  nothing  like  this.  Our  affections  fix  upon  certain 
objects.  That  is,  certain  objects,  apprehended  by  the  under- 
standing, move  the  affections.  If  then  we  would  promote  good 
affections,  we  must  apply  our  understanding  to  the  apprehension 
of  moral  objects.  And  we  must  apply  it  with  such  diligence,  that 
the  understanding  itself  may  be  continually  improved,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  this  may  apprehend  the  objects  of  moral  regard  with 
more  and  more  clearness  and  correctness,  and  with  a  larger  and 
larger  extent  of  views.  In  this  way  we  may  contribute  to  the 
excitement  of  stronger  and  more  enduring  affections.  For  if 
it  is  an  apprehension  of  particular  objects  which  excites  the  af- 
fections, then  the  clearer  and  stronger  that  apprehension  is, 
the  more  powerfully  will  the  affections  be  excited.  When  any 
object  is  seen  partially  or  obscurely,  the  affection  excited  must 
be  defective  or  weak.  When  we  have  mistaken  views  of  an 
object,  the  affection  excited  must  be  a  mistaken  affection.  Con- 
sidering therefore  the  nature  of  the  human  mind  and  of  the 
various  objects  which  it  is  called  to  contemplate,  and  all  the 
obscurity,  defectiveness  and  error,  to  which  our  apprehensions 
of  them  are  Uable,  we  cannot  but  be  impressed  with  the  vast  im- 
portance of  improving  our  intellectual  powers.  To  grow  in 
knowledge  is  the  means  of  growing  in  grace.     Perfectly  clear 

VOL.  II.  10 


110  MORAL    AGENCY. 

and  correct  views  of  God  and  divine  things  in  a  future  state  will 
result  in  the  perfection  of  holy  love.  We  shall  be  like  Christ,  be- 
cause we  shall  see  him  as  he  is. 

The  religion,  which  is  founded  on  this  principle  and  advanced 
by  this  means,  is  essentially  different  from  every  species  of  enthu- 
siasm. Enthusiasts  are  influenced  chiefly  by  imagination  or  feel- 
ing, in  contradistinction  to  enlightened  reason.  And  if  reason  is 
of  any  use  with  them,  it  influences  them  by  erroneous  apprehen- 
sions. The  means  then  of  preventing  and  curing  enthusiasm  is  to 
give  a  right  direction  to  the  intellectual  powers,  and  to  promote 
just  and  Scriptural  views  of  the  objects  of  religion.  Enthusiasm 
prevails  most  in  a  state  of  darkness,  but  is  apt  to  die  away  under 
the  influence  of  light. 

I  observe  in  the  next  place  that  our  ha\ang  a  clear  and  definite 
knowledge  of  the  connection  existing  between  the  ivill  and  the  af- 
fections will  enable  us  to  make  the  most  wise  and  successful  use  of 
our  voluntary  powers  in  the  cultivation  of  goodness.  The  Avill  we 
have  seen  has  an  influence  over  the  affections,  not  directly,  but 
through  the  medium  of  motives,  that  is,  through  the  medium  of 
those  objects  which  reason  apprehends.  Having  settled  this  point, 
we  shall  be  forever  saved  from  the  folly  of  attempting  to  influence, 
and  of  supposing  that  we  can  influence,  our  affections  directly  by 
the  power  of  the  will,  —  as  mere  a  dream  as  to  suppose  we  can 
obtain  the  knowledge  of  geometry  or  influence  the  growth  of  a 
tree  in  the  same  way  !  Instead  of  thus  wasting  our  time  and  labor 
in  the  misapplication  of  voluntary  power,  we  know  how  to  keep  it 
within  its  proper  province  and  direct  it  to  its  proper  use.  —  Again, 
we  shall  no  longer  indulge  the  groundless  opinion,  that  it  is  any 
part  of  moral  agency  or  in  any  way  necessary  to  moral  obligation, 
that  the  affections  should  be  directly  under  the  control  of  the  will. 
And  when  we  find  by  experience  that  our  volitions  have  not  a 
direct  power  over  the  affections,  that  our  previously  willing  to  have 
or  not  to  have  a  particular  affection  can  neither  insure  nor  prevent 
its  existence,  and  that  frequently  our  affections  are  contrary  to  what 
our  will  previously  fixed  upon,  —  when,  I  say,  we  find  that  our  will 
has  no  direct  power,  and  often  no  power  at  all  either  direct  or  indi- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  Ill 

rect  over  our  affections,  we  shall  regard  it  as  no  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  moral  agency,  and  shall  be  far  from  supposing  that  we  arc  on 
this  account  any  less  praise-worthy  for  right  affections,  or  less 
blame-worthy  for  wrong  affections.  Now  surely  it  must  be  no 
small  advantage  to  be  entirely  freed  from  the  perplexing,  embar- 
rassing notion,  that  a  power  which  really  has  no  existence  is  essen- 
tial to  moral  agency.  It  must  be  no  small  advantage  to  be  able 
to  rest  the  doctrine  of  moral  obhgation  on  its  one  simple  principle, 
and  to  separate  it  from  every  thing  foreign  to  its  nature. 

Possessing  just  views  of  the  connection  which  the  will  actually 
has  with  the  affections,  we  shall  in  all  our  voluntary  efforts  have  to 
do,  not  with  imaginations  and  falsities,  but  with  reahties.  We 
shall  give  the  will  the  place  which  the  Author  of  our  nature  has 
given  it,  and  apply  it  to  the  important  purposes  to  which  it  is 
truly  adapted.  We  shall  never  treat  the  affections,  as  though  they 
were  made  to  submit  blindly  and  slavishly  to  the  despotism  of  the 
will.  The  power,  which  we  shall  attempt  to  exercise  over  them, 
will  be  a  rational  power,  a  power  exercised  by  means  of  rational  mo- 
tives. In  other  words,  we  shall  attempt  to  excite  and  improve  the 
affections  by  bringing  before  the  mind  those  objects  or  consider- 
ations by  which  the  affections  are  and  must  be  excited.  This  is 
the  connection,  which  the  will  has  with  the  reason  or  intellect,  in 
eliciting  or  governing  the  affections.  The  will  points  reason  to  its 
proper  objects.  Of  those  objects,  reason  forms  apprehensions ; 
and  by  these  apprehensions,  the  affections  are  influenced.  In 
other  words,  we  ourselves  love,  desire,  hate,  etc.  in  view  of  the 
objects  which  are  placed  before  our  minds.  We  see  what  is  the 
proper  work  and  province  of  the  will  as  well  as  of  the  intellect. 
And  surely  this  work,  whether  of  the  one  or  the  other,  is  sufficient- 
ly extensive,  important  and  difficult,  without  our  attempting  to  add 
to  it  what  is  altogether  incongruous. 

I  observe,  finally,  that  a  correct  understanding  of  the  connection 
between  our  present  and  previous  affections,  besides  preserving  us 
from  useless  imaginations  and  mischievous  errors,  will  prove  a  power- 
ful motive  to  us  to  guard  against  all  corrupt  affection,  even  the  first 
and  smallest  movement  of  it  in  the  heart,  and  most  assiduously  to 


112  MORAL     AGENCY. 

cherish  every  feeling  that  is  pure  and  holy.  If  we  consider  that 
according  to  the  constitution  of  our  minds  a  good  affection  natural- 
ly leads  on  to  other  affections  of  the  same  nature,  that  a  continued 
train  of  good  affections  is  more  likely  to  arise  in  the  mind  and  to 
arise  too  in  a  higher  degree  in  consequence  of  every  good  affec- 
tion which  takes  place ;  we  shall  be  far  more  deeply  impressed 
with  the  value  of  such  affection,  than  if  we  considered  it  as  ex- 
isting singly  or  alone.  It  will  indeed  appear  of  great  value,  con- 
sidered by  itself,  but  of  vastly  greater  value,  considered  in  its 
relation  to  subsequent  affections.  It  must  be  regarded  as  a  mat- 
ter of  immense  weight,  that  a  pious  emotion  which  at  any  time 
rises  in  our  hearts,  has  a  natural  tendency  to  perpetuate  itself, 
a  tendency  to  exert  an  influence,  which  instead  of  passing  away 
with  the  moment,  will  extend  into  all  future  time,  contributing  to 
form  a  permanently  pious  character,  and  to  secure  a  state  of 
unceasing  enjoyment.  Seriously  entertaining  this  view  of  the 
happy  consequences,  likely  to  flow  from  right  affections,  we  should 
crave  them  as  the  choicest  of  blessings,  should  open  our  hearts 
wide  to  give  them  room,  and  continually  look  to  God,  the  foun- 
tain of  holiness,  that  he  would  cause  every  good  affection  to 
prevail  in  our  hearts. 

Equally  salutary  effects  would  result  from  our  considering  the 
constituted  connection  of  sinful  affection  with  the  subsequent 
state  of  the  mind.  With  what  anxious  care  should  we  avoid 
every  unholy  emotion,  if  we  seriously  considered  that  it  is  a  disease 
of  the  soul  hard  to  be  cured  ;  that  Avhen  it  once  takes  place,  it 
has  such  a  hold  of  our  moral  nature  as  will  be  likely  to  ensure 
its  continuance,  and  that  every  operation  of  this  hateful  distem- 
per increases  its  strength  and  renders  it  more  fatal.  If  we  were 
waked  up  to  just  apprehensions  of  this  subject,  we  should  be 
strongly  impressed  with  the  evil  of  sin,  not  merely  as  consisting 
in  a  wrong  state  of  mind  and  the  attendant  unhappiness  at  the 
particular  time  when  it  takes  place,  but  as  tending  according  to 
the  laws  of  the  mind  to  draw  after  it  endless  pollution  and 
misery.  Thus  we  should  look  upon  every  sinful  affection  that 
rises  in  the  heart,  as  an  evil  of  fearful  magnitude,  and  as  spread- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  113 

ing  an  ominous  and  pestilential  influence  over  the  whole  of 
our  existence.  We  should  feel  that  no  degree  of  vigilance  or 
resolution  against  sin  can  be  too  great ;  and  that  it  is  better  to 
forego  any  present  pleasure  and  to  endure  any  extremity  of 
present  suffering,  and  even  to  give  up  life  itself  as  a  sacrifice, 
than  to  take  this  deadly  poison  into  our  souls.  With  these 
views  we  should  look  with  amazement  as  well  as  grief  on  the 
multitude  of  rational  beings  around  us,  who  live  not  only  without 
concern,  but  with  apparent  satisfaction,  in  the  midst  of  the  most 
dreadful  plague  that  ever  seized  on  man,  and  who  are  so 
stricken  with  madness,  that  they  are  often  the  more  pleased,  as 
they  exhibit  more  certain  symptoms  of  eternal  death. 

Thus  we  should  find  that  the  true  system  of  mental  philosophy 
teaches  us  to  adopt  conclusions  which  are  perfectly  coincident 
with  the  holiest  dictates  of  revelation. 

10* 


LECTURE    LI. 


ON    WHAT     PRINCIPLE     WE     ORDINARILY    PREDICT   OUR     OWN    FU- 
TURE  AFFECTIONS  AND    THOSE    OP    OTHERS. 

Still  further  to  elucidate  and  establish  the  general  principles 
advanced  in  the  two  foregoing  Lectures,  I  shall  direct  your  at- 
tention to  the  well  known  fact,  that  we  can  in  many  cases  know 
what  affectmis  will  arise  in  our  own  minds  and  in  the  minds  of 
others  in  future  time.  For  example,  we  can  predict  that  an  af- 
fectionate father  will  love  his  children  to-morrow  and  next  year, 
and  that  a  sincere  Christian  will  continue  to  love  his  Saviour. 
Our  daily  transactions  imply  the  power  of  predicting  what  feel- 
ings our  fellow  creatures  will  hereafter  possess.  This  is  imphed 
in  every  instance,  in  which  we  repose  confidence  in  our  friends  ; 
for  it  is  really  a  confidence  in  them,  not  only  as  they  now  are, 
but  as  they  will  be.  And  every  instance,  in  which  we  pronounce 
others  dishonest  and  wicked,  or  in  which  we  suspect  them  of  being 
so,  implies  an  apprehension  that  they  will  feel  and  act  dishonestly 
and  wickedly  hereafter.  All  that  we  say  of  men's  dispositions  or 
characters  implies  that  we  know,  or  think  we  know,  what  will 
be  their  feelings  a;nd  actions  in  cases  which  may  occur  in  future. 
If  I  tell  you  that  such  a  man  has  a  benevolent  heart,  or  an  up- 
right and  pious  character,  I  mean  to  signify  that  he  will  undoubt- 
edly have  benevolent  feelings  or  will  act  uprightly  and  piously 
the  next  minute  and  the  next  hour,  unless  indeed  some  unex- 
pected cause  shall  intervene  to  change  the  state  of  his  mind. 
And  as  to  ourselves,  the  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  prin- 
ciples, dispositions  or  characters  implies  that  we  can  with  more  or 


MORAL    AGENCY.  115 

less  certainty  predict  what  will  be  our  feelings  and  actions  on 
future  occasions.  This  power  of  looking  into  the  future  and 
knowing  what  affections  will  be  excited,  being  so  essential  to  the 
direction  of  our  own  affairs  and  to  the  order  and  happiness  of 
society,  deserves  our  particular  attention.  Let  us  then  inquire 
in  what  way  we  acquire  this  knowledge  and  on  what  principles  it 
is  grounded. 

My  reasoning  on  this  subject  is  limited  to  cases,  where  the 
causes  concerned  are  known  to  us,  and  where  they  operate  uni- 
formly and  produce  their  effects  in  the  ordinary  way.  Cases  of 
miraculous  interposition  are  excepted. 

In  regard  to  those  cases  in  which  we  are  now  concerned,  it  is 
evident  that  the  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  future  affections 
and  the  future  affections  of  others,  is  obtained  in  the  same  way 
as  our  knowledge  of  any  other  future  events.  In  the  natu- 
ral woi'ld  we  know  what  will  take  place  by  knowing  what  has 
taken  place.  By  planting  corn  in  a  good  soil,  prepared  in  a 
proper  manner,  with  attentive  cultivation  and  the  usual  degree  of 
moisture  and  heat,  we  know  that  a  crop  will  be  produced,  be- 
cause w^  know  that  in  this  way  a  crop  has  been  produced.  The 
effect  of  food  or  medicine  we  can  foretell,  just  so  far  as  we  have 
known  its  effects  in  similar  cases  before.  If  the  same  effect 
should  not  be  produced  hereafter  as  has  taken  place  heretofore, 
we  should  ascribe  the  difference  to  the  operation  of  different 
causes.  We  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  laws  of  nature  are 
uniform,  so  that  the  same  causes  will  produce  the  same  effects. 
The  reason  why  we  so  often  anticipate  events  which  do  not  come 
to  pass,  is  that  we  have  only  a  partial  acquaintance  with  the 
combination  of  causes  concerned,  and  from  this  want  of  perfect 
knowledge  we  are  led  to  imagine  causes  to  be  the  same,  which 
are  the  same  only  in  part.  There  is  a  real  difference  in  the 
causes,  though  the  difference  may  be  concealed  from  us.  Did 
we  perceive  the  difference  in  the  causes,  we  should  anticipate  a 
corresponding  difference  in  the  effect.  In  a  particular  place,' 
there  is  a  noble  vine,  which  in  past  years  was  abundantly  fruit- 
ful.    But  the  present  season,  with  cultivation  and  weather  quite 


116  MORAL    AGENCY. 

as  favorable,  the  vine  withered  away  and  died.  To  a  superficial 
observer  this  difierence  of  effects  may  seem  unaccountable,  inas- 
much as  all  the  causes,  which  he  sees  to  have  been  in  operation, 
continue  to  be  the  same.  But  a  more  careful  examination  re- 
veals to  him  a  cause  of  decay  in  the  last  case  which  did  not  ex- 
ist before.  The  bark  was  violently  torn  from  the  vine,  or  the 
roots  were  devoured.  There  was  a  new  cause,  a  cause  which, 
had  it  existed  in  former  years,  would  have  produced  the  same 
effect.  In  other  cases,  the  difference  may  be  owing  to  the  ces- 
sation of  some  cause  which  previously  operated.  A  willow, 
which  once  flourished,  now  languishes.  And  yet  the  season  i3 
propitious,  and  trees  in  other  situations  are  as  flourishing  as  ever. 
We  wonder  at  the  fading  of  the  tree  and  know  not  how  to  ac- 
count for  it.  But  soon  we  find  that  a  secret  spring  of  water, 
which  formerly  afforded  perpetual  moisture  to  its  roots  and  caused 
its  exuberant  growth,  has  been  dried  up. 

Such  examples  show  that  a  perfect  acquaintance  with  past 
causes  and  effects  would  enable  us  to  judge  as  to  the  effects 
which  will  be  produced  in  future  time.  If  then  we  mistake,  as  we 
often  do,  in  attempting,  to  predict  future  events  from  the.  past,  the 
mistake  does  not  he  in  our  thinking  that  the  laws  of  matter  or  of 
mind  are  uniform,  or  that  the  same  causes  will  produce  the  same  ef- 
fects, but  in  our  supposing  that  the  causes  which  are  to  operate,  will 
be  the  same  as  have  operated  in  previous  cases,  when  in  fact  they 
are  different.  In  all  cases,  where  causes  apparently  the  same 
do  not  produce  the  same  effect,  it  must  be  owing  to  some  unper- 
ceived  difference  in  the  causes.  To  this  difference  we  must  at- 
tribute the  difference  in  the  effect. 

It  is  in  conse{][uence  of  our  not  knowing  or  overlooking  some 
of  the  causes  which  have  influenced  human  feelings  and  actions 
in  past  time,  or  the  causes  which  are  to  influence  them  in  future, 
that  we  entertain  so  many  mistaken  expectations  in  regard  to 
them.  We  are  confident  that  certain  motives  will  have  a  par- 
'  ticular  influence  upon  a  man's  feelings  and  actions.  Why  are 
we  thus  confident  ?  Because  we  have  observed  in  various  in- 
stances that  those  causes  have  produced  such  an  effect  in  other 


MORAL     AGENCY.  117 

men,  and  perhaps  in  him  too.  But  we  soon  find  ourselves  disap- 
pointed. How  can  we  account  for  the  disappointment  ?  Why 
did  not  the  motives  presented  excite  the  same  feehngs  or  lead  to 
the  same  actions  as  before  ?  The  answer  is,  that  although  the 
causes  to  a  certain  extent  were  the  same,  other  causes  very  dif- 
ferent were  joined  with  them.  Perhaps  when  motives  were  urged 
upon  him  m  the  last  case,  he  was  occupied  with  other  objects  and 
so  was  in  a  state  of  mind  unfavorable  to  our  wishes.  Or  per- 
haps from  the  influence  of  some  hidden  causes  he  was  disinclined 
to  give  any  attention  to  our  persuasions ;  or  some  opposing  incli- 
nation or  passion,  which  had  easily  yielded  before,  had  acquired 
such  strength  that  no  arguments  of  ours  could  overcome  it.  In 
a  word,  some  causes  which  did  not  exist  in  the  same  degree  of 
strength,  interfered,  and  prevented  the  effects  which  our  argu- 
ments had  before  produced. 

Take  another  case.  In  a  particular  instance  we  are  confident 
that  no  arguments  whatever  can  persuade  a  man  to  abandon  long 
continued  intemperance,  and  we  are  thus  confident  because  we 
know  that  all  possible  arguments  have  again  and  again  been  tried 
upon  him-  in  vain.  But  it  may  be  that  he  has  come  to  possess  a 
different  state  of  mind  from  what  he  had  before.  Some  example 
of  the  dreadful  effects  of  intemperance,  or  the  experience  of  those 
effects  in  himself,  may  have  alanned  him,  or  some  affecting  be- 
reavement may  have  softened  his  feelings,  or  some  divine  truth 
attended  with  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  may  have  awak- 
ened his  conscience.  By  some  such  cause,  he  may  be  prepared  to 
receive  a  strong  impression  from  those  very  considerations,  which 
have  been  so  often  urged  upon  him  without  effect.  Thus  our 
confidence  that  no  arguments  could  persuade  him  to  forsake  his 
intemperance,  though  the  general  principle  it  assumed  was  right, 
may  still  have  been  grounded  on  inadequate  knowledge  of  the 
various  things  which  conspire  to  produce  the  desired  effect. 
Though  our  observation  had  indeed  made  us  acquainted  with 
many  instances  in  which  the  best  arguments  could  not  induce 
him  to  give  up  intemperate  drinkmg ;  still  we  should  not  have- 
been  so  confident  that  he  never  would  be  induced  to  do  it,  had 


118  MOKAL     AGEXCY. 

we  been  fully  aware  of  the  different  state  of  preparation  into 
which  his  mind  might  be  brought,  or  of  the  whole  combination  of 
circumstances  which  might  operate  as  causes  and  might  tend  to 
persuade  him  to  reform. 

Here  we  see  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  longer  experience  and 
more  perfect  acquaintance  with  human  life  generally  check  our 
confidence  as  to  the  future,  and  render  us  more  cautious  in  pre- 
dicting what  events  will  take  place.  We  find  that  a  combination 
of  causes  quite  different  from  our  expectations,  and  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  foreknowledge,  is  from  time  to  time  brought  to  act 
upon  ourselves  and  upon  others.  This  we  conclude  will  continue 
to  be  the  case.  And  as  it  is  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  beyond 
our  power  to  foresee  exactly  the  causes,  which  will  come  into 
operation,  we  learn,  though  perhaps  reluctantly,  that  it  is  equally 
beyond  our  power  to  foresee  what  effects  will  be  produced. 
And  while  some  men,  possessing  great  ardor  and  little  knowledge 
of  human  affairs,  feel  themselves  able  to  affirm  with  certainty  how 
individuals  and  societies  will  act,  and  what  events  will  take  place, 
wisdom  of  greater  maturity  will  lead  us  in  most  cases  to  hesitate 
and  to  doubt,  and  to  wait  in  patience  till  divine  providence  shall 
give  us  further  information. 

We  see  then  that  our  knowledge  of  what  will  be,  arises  from 
our  knowledge  of  what  has  been,  and  that  the  power  to  foresee 
future  events  implies  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  or 
the  certainty  that  like  causes  will  produce  like  effects ;  and  also 
that  the  fact  of  our  having  so  imperfect  an  acquaintance  with 
future  events,  arises  from  our  imperfect  acquaintance  with  the 
variety  of  causes  which  will  come  into  operation  in  future 
time. 

But  in  the  present  discussion,  we  are  concerned  particularly 
with  the  affections  of  the  mind,  and  the  actions  flowing  from 
them.  My  position  is,  that  admitting  as  we  must,  the  uniformity 
of  the  laws  of  the  mind,  we  are  able  to  determine  beforehand 
what  affections  will  be  excited  in  our  own  minds,  just  so  far  as 
we  know  what  causes  will  operate  upon  us,  and  what  affections 
have  been  excited  by  the  same  causes  in  past  time.     There  are 


MORAL     AGENCY.  119 

indeed  many  difficulties  in  the  way  of  our  determining  exactly 
what  feelings  we  shall  have  at  any  future  time,  difficulties  arising 
from  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  causes  which  have  produced 
our  past  feelings,  and  those  which  will  act  upon  us  in  future. 
But  notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  we  have  such  a  knowledge 
of  our  future  affections,  as  proves  highly  beneficial  to  our  most 
important  interests.  And  every  degree  of  this  knowledge  de- 
pends on  past  experience.  We  can  no  more  determine  what  our 
feelings  and  actions  will  be  under  the  influence  of  any  future 
causes,  except  from  our  knowing  what  they  have  been  under  the 
influence  of  similar  caiises,  than  we  can  determine  what  will  be 
the  effect  of  any  kind  of  medicine,  or  of  any  chemical  cause, 
without  knowing  what  has  been  its  effect.  An  attempt  to  account 
for  our  foreknowledge  or  for  the  want  of  it  on  any  other  grounds, 
than  what  I  have  exhibited  before  you,  must  be  wholly  unsatis- 
factory. 

The  foregoing  remarks  relate  to  particular,  specific  affections. 
But  there  is  a  more  general  view  of  the  subject  which  deserves 
to  be  noticed  in  this  discussion,  being  of  special  consequence 
in  theoretic  and  practical  divinity.  We  divide  all  moral  affec- 
tions into  two  classes,  holy  and  sinful.  Each  of  these  classes  in- 
volves a  great  variety  of  particular  affections,  which  may  be  ar- 
ranged under  several  subordinate  heads.  Now  while  human 
nature  remains  in  its  present,  disordered,  unrenewed  state,  we  can 
predict  with  certainty  that  whatever  may  be  the  particular  spe- 
cies of  moral  afiections  arising  in  the  mind  of  man,  they  will  all 
belong  to  the  general  class  of  sinful  affections.  And  this  is  the 
same  as  saying,  that  all  the  causes,  except  the  regenerating  in- 
fluence of  the  Spirit,  which  can  be  supposed  to  act  upon  the 
mind  of  man  in  his  natural  state,  will  produce  sinful  affections  of 
one  kind  or  another. 

For  this  conclusion,  we  have  all  past  experience.  If  as 
Christians  you  review  the  history  of  your  own  minds  in  a  state 
of  unregeneracy,  you  will  be  convinced  of  the  humiliating  fact, 
that  whatever  causes  operated  on  you,  all  your  moral  affections 
were  wrong.     No  view  which  you   could  take  of  the  glorious 


120  MORAL    AGENCY. 

goodness  of  God  could  excite  your  love.  No  display  of  the  vile- 
ness  and  hatefulness  of  sin  could  produce  any  feelings  of  real 
abhorrence.  No  urgency  of  motives  could  persuade  you  to  for- 
sake sin  and  obey  the  Gospel  of  Christ.  This  was  the  only 
character  you  exhibited,  while  you  remained  without  the  renewing 
of  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  acknowledgment  of  enlightened  be- 
lievers in  every  age  respecting  themselves  confirms  the  same 
conclusion.  But  that  which  puts  this  point  beyond  any  possible 
doubt,  and  which  is  by  itself  evidence  sufficient  to  produce  the 
most  confident  faith,  is  the  testimony  of  God  himself  respecting 
the  character  of  unrenewed  man.  On  the  ground  of  this  three- 
fold evidence,  arising  from  the  most  faithful  review  of  our  own 
life,  and  from  the  full  acknowledgment  of  Christians  generally, 
and  above  all  from  the  testimony  of  God  respecting  man's  native 
character,  we  can  certainly  predict  that  sinners,  while  unre- 
newed, will  continue  to  sin ;  that  no  motives  can  be  presented 
before  them  which  will  excite  holy  affections  ;  that  whatever  par- 
ticular form  their  character  may  assume  and  whatever  variety  of 
changes  it  may  undergo,  it  will  not,  without  the  renewing  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  moral  evil.  Of  this  we  are 
confident,  because  such  has  been  the  universal  fact  respecting  un- 
regenerate  man.  This  has  been  the  case  with  unrenewed  man 
so  constantly,  that  we  know  his  character  in  regard  to  religion,  as 
well  as  we  know  his  character  in  regard  to  his  bodily  appetites  or 
his  natural  affections.  And  we  can  as  certainly  predict  that  man, 
so  long  as  he  continues  without  the  regenerating  influence  of  the 
Spirit,  will  continue  to  have  moral  affections  which  are  unholy, 
as  we  can  predict  the  operation  of  any  of  his  appetites  or  natural 
affections. 

It  must  I  think  be  regarded  as  among  the  most  obvious  and 
certain  principles  of  human  knowledge,  that  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  nature  the  same  causes  produce  the  same  effects,  and  of  course 
that  any  difference  in  the  effects  must  be  owing  to  a  corresponding 
difference,  though  frequently  unperceived,  in  the  causes.  Now  if 
a  difference  exists  in  the  phenomena  of  the  mind  where  the  causes 
are  apparently  the  same,  instead  of  foreclosing  all  inquiry  by  the 


MORAL    AGENCY.  121 

idea  of  something  mysterious  and  inscrutable,  we  should  make  it 
our  object,  bj  assiduous,  persevering  inquiry,  to  discover  as  far  as 
may  be,  those  hidden  causes  which  will  account  satisfactorily 
for  the  difference  in  the  phenomena. 

To  elucidate  this  suJDJect  still  more  fully,  I  present  the.foUowing 
case.  A  man  is  tempted  by  his  love  of  money  to  take  away  the 
life  of  a  rich  relative,  who  he  knows  has  recently  bequeathed  him 
a  large  estate.  But  he  instantly  repels  every  thought  that  would 
lead  him  to  perpetrate  so  atrocious  a  crime.  And  yet,  not  long 
after,  he  yields  to  the  temptation  and  actually  commits  the  deed 
of  wickedness,  which  he  before  regarded  with  so  much  horror. 
The  principal  motive  which  finally  prevailed,  was  the  same  as  he 
before  rejected,  that  is,  the  love  of  money  and  the  desire  of  coming 
into  the  immediate  possession  of  such  an  estate.  Now  it  might  be 
that  precisely  the  same  cause  operated  on  his  mind  in  the  last  case, 
as  in  the  first,  and  yet  produced  a  different  and  opposite  effect. 
The  business  of  philosophy  is  to  account  for  this  difference. 

This  difference  unquestionably  has  a  cause.  In  addition  to  the 
love  of  money  and  the  thought  of  coming  into  the  immediate  pos- 
session of  such  an  estate,  so  far  as  it  was  the  same  in  the  last  case 
as  before,  there  was  something  el^  of  the  nature  of  a  cause, 
which,  joining  its  influence  with  this,  constituted  a  complex  cause 
just  as  different  from  the  cause  which  operated  before,  as  its  effect 
was  different  from  the  previous  effect.  But  what  was  this  addition- 
al cause  ?  This  question  is  doubtless  capable  of  a  satisfactory 
solution.  In  the  first  place,  we  must  account  for  the  murder,  con- 
sidered as  a  voluntary  act,  by  the  state  of  mind  which  directly  led 
to  it,  and  so  was  its  proximate  cause.  Now  that  state  of  mind, 
considered  as  a  whole,  was  clearly  different  from  that  previous 
state  which  prevented  the  criminal  act.  The  whole  history  of  the 
mind,  if  we  were  acquainted  with  it,  would  doubtless  enable  us  to 
account  for  that  different  state  of  mind  as  satisfactorily,  as  we  can 
account  for  any  other  mental  phenomenon.  For  here,  as  in  other 
cases,  we  could  refer  the  effect  to  well  known  laws.  And  one  of 
these  laws  is  that  a  frequent  and  famihar  contemplation  of  an 
agi-eeable  object  often  tends  to  make  it  more  important  in  our  view, 

VOL.  II.  11 


122  MORAL    AGENCY. 

and  so  to  give  it  an  increased  influence  upon  ns.  An  agreeable 
object  frequently  returning  to  the  mind  sometimes  lias  an  influence 
like  the  increased  momentum  of  a  falling  stone.  Accordingly, 
as  the  man  above  mentioned,  contemplated  the  estate  bequeathed 
to  him,  he  was  more  and  more  impressed  with  the  desirableness 
of  speedily  possessing  it.  ^  Every  new  contemplation  gave  it  new 
power  over  his  feelings  ;  which  is  perfectly  like  what  we  ourselves 
have  often  experienced,  and  is  according  to  what  we  know  to  be 
the  laws  of  the  mind. 

It  also  results  from  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  that  the 
familiar  contemplation  of  the  unnatural  deed  would  diminish  the 
horror  with  which  it  was  once  regarded,  and  that  the  resistance  first 
made  against  the  corrupt  inclination  would  be  gradually  weakened. 
The  very  fact  that  the  man  suffered  such  a  subject  to  return  to 
his  thoughts  from  day  to  day  would  suppress  the  power  of  his  con- 
science and  all  the  generous  affections  of  his  nature.  By  thinking 
perpetually,  and  with  narrow,  selfish  emotions,  of  the  property  he 
was  to  receive,  he  would  become  more  and  more  insensible  to  the 
feelings  of  gratitude  and  friendship  towards  his  relative,  and  would 
finally  look  with  impatience  on  that  life  which  kept  him  from  en- 
joying the  object  so  dear  to  his  heart. 

We  must  consider  also,  that  a  man  in  such  a  case  is  liable  to 
a  strange  infatuation,  and  that  his  mind  is  often  so  occupied 
and  heated  with  the  object  of  his  passion,  that  he  will  overlook 
every  other  object,  and  even  forget  the  common  precautions 
which  are  necessary  to  his  personal  safety. 

Thus,  by  referring  to  the  well  known  laws  of  our  intelligent  and 
moral  nature,  we  rid  ourselves  of  whatever  is  ambiguous,  unin- 
telligible and  obscure,  and  place  the  whole  subject  on  the  common 
ground  of  philosophical  investigation.  We  refer  the  event  under 
consideration  to  well  known  and  uniform  laws.  And  when  we 
have  done  this,  what  more  has  philosophy  to  do  ? 

I  have  fixed  upon  a  particular  fact  for  the  purpose  of  profit- 
able discussion.  But  the  same  principles  hold  in  respect  to  all 
the  common  operations  and  states  of  mind.  We  are  to  look  first 
at  facts,  facts  intelligible  and  capable  of  distinct  consideration. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  123 

We  are  next  to  ascertain  the  laws  by  which  the  mind  is  governed 
in  respect  to  them,  and  to  refer  these  facts  to  those  laws.  Here 
we  come  to  the  end  of  reasoning.  Beyond  this  our  knowledge 
cannot  go. 

It  has  been  suggested,  and  it  must  be  kept  in  view  that 
the  causes  which  operate  in  ehciting  the  affections  of  the  mind, 
are  often  exceedingly  complex.  When  we  would  account  for  a 
particular  affection  or  act,  we  generally  find  it  necessary  to  refer 
to  a  variety  of  principles  combined.  In  many,  perhaps  in  most 
cases,  we  must  refer  to  a  long  series  of  preceding  causes  and 
effects.  For  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  present  state  of  mind 
is  affected  by  preceding  states  of  mind,  and  is  really  the  conse- 
quence of  them,  while  those  preceding  states  were  affected  by 
states  still  previous,  and  so  on  through  the  whole  series.  So  that 
in  order  to  find  the  true  and  complete  cause  of  the  present  affec- 
tion, or  mental  state,  it  would  be  necessary  to  look  at  the  whole 
train  of  antecedent  affections,  as  being  in  an  important  sense  the 
complex  cause.  This  you  will  perceive  is  a  circumstance  which 
must  occasion  great  difficulty  in  our  attempts  to  explain  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  mind.  For  it  may  be  that  the  present  state  of 
our  mind  is  to  be  traced  back  to  some  impression  or  excitement 
of  feeHng  in  our  early  childhood ;  that  impression  or  excitement 
having  contributed  to  the  following  state  of  mind,  and  that  to 
another,  and  mingling  from  step  to  step,  with  other  causes  and 
conspiring  with  them  to  produce  in  the  end  the  present  mental 
state.  Were  we  capable  of  reviewing  and  thoroughly  investigat- 
ing the  whole  history  of  our  past  exercises  and  of  knowing  perfect- 
ly all  the  laws  of  our  minds,  there  would  be  httle  or  nothing  in  our 
habits  of  feeling  and  action  which  could  not  be  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained. 

There  are  we  know  a  great  variety  of  affections,  passions  and 
appetites,  naturally  belonging  to  man.  These  are  very  different 
from  each  other,  and  in  many  cases  the  indulgence  of  one  of 
them  is  inconsistent  with  the  indulgence  of  others,  and  the  in- 
crease of  one  impUes  the  decrease  of  others.  Now  there  are 
many  causes  in  operation,  which  may  lead  to  the  indulgence  and 


124  MORAL    AGENCY. 

the  growth  of  one  affection,  and  to  the  denial  and  deci'ease  and 
apparently  to  the  extinction  of  others ;  and  this  increase  of  some 
affections  and  decrease  of  others,  or  this  different  combination 
of  affections  is  according  to  fixed  laws ;  and  these  laws  are  suf- 
ficient to  account  for  all  the  changes  of  character  and   conduct 
which  take  place  in  common  life.     For  example,  it   sometimes 
occurs  that  a  man,  once  devoted  to  idleness  or  sensuality,  becomes 
diligent  and  sober.     And  sometimes  a  man  of  industry  and  so- 
briety becomes  indolent  or  sensual.     Now  every  man  has  those 
affections,  passions  or  appetites  which,  under  the  influence  of  cer- 
tain external  circumstances,   may  produce  in  him  the    character 
of  industry  and  sobriety,  or  of  indolence  and  sensuality.     When 
he  exhibits  either  of  these  characters,  we  account  for  it  by  refer- 
ring to  the   appropriate   causes.      And   when  he   changes  from 
one  to  another  of  these  characters,  we  account  for  it  by  refer- 
ring to  a  change  of  circumstances,  in  other  words,  to  a  change 
of  the  causes  which  operate  upon  him.     It  is  indeed  sometimes 
the  case  that  a  particular  affection  or  habit  is  so  confirmed,  that 
none    of  the    causes,    wliich   commonly  operate,  will   produce    a 
change.     But  in  general  the  affections  or  habits  of  the  mind  are 
not  confirmed  to  such  a  degree,  and  the  door  is  open  for  changes.  - 
But   whatever  may  be   the   particular   character   of  a  man   in 
respect  to  the  concerns  of  the  present  fife,  whether  industry  or 
sobriety  or  ambition   or  avarice  or  sensuality  ;  it  may  be  resolved 
into   simple  principles  belonging  to  human  nature.      There   are 
original  appetites  of  body  and   affections   of  mind,  which  being 
combined  and  exercised  in  different  ways  are  sufficient  to  ac- 
count for  all  these  forms  of  character.     So  that  he,  who  has  one 
of  these  forms  of  character,  might,   if  other   principles    of  his 
nature  had  been  called  into  exercise,  have  assumed  a  different 
form.      He,   who   is  now   fond   of  a  retired,    agricultural   life, 
might  have  been  trained  to  delight  in  the  business  of  merchan- 
dise ;  and  the  merchant,  who  loves  the  business  and  bustle  of  a 
city,  might  have  been  trained  to  the  quiet  life  of  a  farmer.     The 
ingenious  mechanic  might  have  been  a  scholar,  and  the  scholar  a 
mechanic,  the  spendthrift  a  miser,  and  the  miser  a  spendthrift. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  125 

The  ordinary  causes  wliich  operate  upon  men,  and  give  them 
such  a  vast  variety  of  character,  have  no  power,  properly  speak- 
ing, to  create  any  new  principles.  Their  only  influence  is  to  de- 
velop the  principles  originally  belonging  to  human  nature,  and 
to  give  them  direction  and  form. 

You  will  remember  that  cases  of  miraculous  and  supernatural 
interposition  are  here  excepted. 

11* 


LECTURE    LII. 


MORAL    NECESSITY,   WHAT  IT   IMPLIES.        CONSIDERATIONS   IN  ITS 

FAVOR. 

The  subject  of  Moral  Necessity  furnislies  a  remarkable  in- 
stance of  the  difficulty  and  perplexity  occasioned  by  employing 
words  in  a  scientific  or  technical  sense,  or  in  a  sense  not  well  de- 
fined or  not  well  understood.  If  we  say  in  plain  language  that 
a  man  is  influenced  to  this  or  that  action  by  particular  motives, 
for  example,  if  we  say  a  Christian  is  influenced  by  love  to  Christ, 
or  by  the  hope  of  future  blessedness,  to  resist  temptation  and 
obey  the  divine  commands  ;  we  express  a  truth  which  all  under- 
stand, and  which  seems  to  be  attended  with  no  difficulty.  And 
if  we  go  farther  and  say,  that  every  man  who  has  love  to  Christ 
in  his  heart  will  certainly  be  influenced  by  it  to  resist  tempta- 
tion and  obey  the  divine  commands,  we  still  speak  a  language 
which  is  intelUgible  to  all.  So,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  say, 
that  every  man,  who  is  destitute  of  love  to  God  and  under  the 
influence  of  unholy,  selfish  afiections,  will  certainly  disobey  God 
and  live  to  himself;  we  still  use  language  which  conveys  an 
obvious  and  unexceptionable  meaning.  And  if  we  rise  to  still 
stronger  expressions,  and  say  that  there  is  nothmg  but  holy  love 
which  can  influence  any  man  sincerely  to  worship  and  obey  God, 
and  that  there  is  nothing  but  pride  or  love  of  sin  which  can 
influence  any  man  to  reject  Christ  and  disobey  his  gospel ;  our 
meaning  is  readily  perceived  and  no  one  finds  any  ground  of 
objection.  If  we  vary  our  expressions  still  further  and,  ap- 
proximating a  little  towards  scientific  and  philosophical  language, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  127 

saj,  such  is  our  nature  or  constitution,  that  love  to  God  will  and 
must  influence  us  to  worship  and  obey  him,  while  pride  or  love 
of  the  world  will  and  must  prevent  us  from  worshipping  and 
obeying ;  still  we  are  intelligible  and  none  can  hesitate  to  admit 
the  truth  of  our  declaration.  We  may  say  too,  that  love  to 
God  is  a  motive  so  powerful,  that  every  one  who  is  under  its  in- 
fluence, will  certainly  obey  the  divine  commands,  and  that  while 
love  to  God  has  full  possession  of  his  heart,  no  consideration 
can  prevent  this.  These  and  other  similar  forms  of  expression 
convey  the  truth  intended  in  a  manner  perfectly  plain  and  defi- 
nite, and  leave  no  room  for  misapprehension  or  mistake.  But 
the  moment  we  express  this  same  truth  in  scientific  or  philo- 
sophical language,  and  say,  that  in  all  these  cases  the  mind  is 
under  the  influence  of  moral  necessity,  or  that  a  man  acts  as  he 
does  necessarily,  or  that  his  actions  are  the  necessary  result  of 
the  causes  which  operate  upon  him  ;  those  who  are  not  accus- 
tomed to  such  language  or  do  not  exactly  apprehend  its  mean- 
ing, will  be  involved  in  difficulty.  But  it  will  be  found  on  care- 
ful inquiry,  that  such  difficulty  does  not  arise,  as  is  often  sup- 
posed, from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  but  from  applying  to  it 
language  which  is  commonly  applied  to  chfferent  subjects  and 
commonly  understood  in  a  different  sense,  or  from  bringing  in  false 
principles  of  reasoning,  or  finally  from  a  state  of  mind,  which 
admits  of  no  clear  conceptions  on  such  a  subject. 

The  doctrine  of  moral*  necessity  teaches  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
that  all  the  affections  and  voluntary  actions  of  men  result  from 
the  influence  of  causes  acting  in  or  upon  the  mind ;  that  there 
is  a  certaui,  invariable  connection  between  those  causes  and  their 
effects ;  that  the  laws  of  the  mind  are  fixed  and  uniform,  and 
that  in  the  mental  world  as  well  as  in  the  material,  the  same  causes 
always  produce  the  same  effects.  This  doctrine  may  be  ex- 
pressed differently  thus  :  There  is  in  fact  an  established,  uniform 


*  For  various  reasons  I  prefer  the  word  moral  to  i)hilosophical.  The  latter 
term  has  a  meaning  too  extensive,  relating  c(iually  to  all  subjects  whether  mate- 
rial or  spiritual. 


128  MORAL     AGENCY. 

connection  of  cause  and  effect  in  the  moral  world  as  well  as  in 
the  physical,  so  that  when  all  the  previous  circumstances  are  the 
same,  the  same  results  will  certainly  follow.  The  doctrine  im- 
plies, that  if  we  could  know  exactly  and  fully  what  moral  causes 
will  operate  at  any  future  time,  we  could  foretell  with  certainty 
what  the  effects  will  be. 

It  is  very  necessary  however,  as  has  been  already  suggested, 
to  guard  agaist  the  supposition,  that  moral  causes  are  entirely 
the  same  at  one  time  as  at  another,  because  they  appear  the 
same.  It  may  be  impossible  for  us  to  know  in  any  case  all  the 
moral  causes  Avhich  exist.  Some  of  them,  and  those  too  which 
have  the  greatest  efficiency,  may  in  their  nature  and  operation 
be  too  subtle  to  fall  directly  under  our  inspection.  Our  doctrine 
imphes  that  the  same  effects  will  uniformly  and  certainly  result, 
not  from  previous  circumstances  or  causes  which  are  partly  the 
same,  or  which  may  appear  to  us  to  be  the  same,  but  from  those 
which  are  the  same  really  and  entirely ;  and  that  this  is  as  true 
in  relation  to  the  mind  as  in  relation  to  the  physical  world.  But 
while  the  connection  of  causes  and  effects  in  the  mind  is  the  same 
in  respect  to  certainty  and  uniformity,  as  in  the  material  world, 
i  it  must  be  kept  constantly  in  view,  that  both  the  causes  and  the 
effects  are  in  their  nature  essentially  different.  In  the  one  case, 
physical  causes  are  connected  with  physical  effects  ;  in  the  other 
case  moral  causes  with  moral  effects.  This  is  the  reason  why  the 
doctrine  under  consideration  is  denominated  the  doctrine  of  moral 
necessity,  —  the  word  moral  being  however  used  in  a  large  sense. 
Here  the  effects  result  from  the  operation  of  a  moral  or  mental  cause, 
not  a  physical.  The  cause  is  correspondent  with  the  effects. 
These  effects  are  the  internal  and  external  actions  of  a  moral 
[agent.  Physical  causes  cannot  produce  them.  Although  the 
things  presented  to  our  view  in  the  material  world,  as  for  ex- 
ample, the  hght  of  the  sun  and  the  descent  of  rain  may,  as 
objects  of  contemplation,  produce  sensible  effects  in  the  mind, 
still  they  do  not  produce  them  as  they  produce  vegetation  by  a 
physical  influence.  They  do  it  by  becoming  the  objects  of  the 
mind's  apprehension,  and  so  operating  indirectly  as  moral  causes, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  129 

or  rather  putting  moral  causes  in  operation.  As  far  as  eflfects 
are  of  a  moral  nature,  thcj  always  flow  from  the  mind  of  a 
moral  a";ent  and  result  from  moral  causes  which  exist  and  act 
in  the  mind. 

In  maintaining  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity,  I  adduce  no 
abstract  or  conjectural  arguments.  The  doctrine  rests  upon 
facts,  —  facts  which  constantly  occur,  and  which  every  man  may 
observe  in  himself.  I  might  rather  say  the  doctrine  asserts  a 
general  fact.  The  question  at  issue  is  wholly  a  question  of  fact. 
Do  men  act  under  the  influence  of  moral  necessity  ?  Or,  in 
more  plain  and  definite  language,  are  the  actions  of  men  in- 
fluenced by  moral  causes,  and  do  those  causes  operate  regularly 
according  to  an  established,  uniform  law  ?  The  causes,  with 
which  we  are  now  concerned,  are  those  which  operate  in  or  upon 
the  mind  and  produce  intelligent  action,  and  are  commonly 
called  motives.  So  that  the  question  comes  to  this,  whether 
men  acting  as  moral  agents  are  always  influenced  by  motives,  or  | 
act  in  view  of  motives,  and  in  consequence  of  motives.  But  our 
reasoning  on  this  subject  will  be  constantly  hable  to  mistake,  un-  ] 
less  we  give  to  the  word  motives,  as  Edwards  does,  its  most  ex- 
tensive signification,  and  make  it  comprise  all  the  afiections, 
dispositions,  appetites  and  habits  of  the  mind,  everything  in  the 
mind  as  well  as  out  of  the  mind,  which  excites  or  tends  to  ex- 
cite inward  or  outward  action.  Objects  presented  to  us  from 
without  are  called  motives,  because  as  objects  of  contemplation 
they  excite  the  afiections.  But  when  we  speak  of  motives  in 
the  more  strict  and  appropriate  sense,  as  when  we  say  a  man's 
character  and  actions  must  be  judged  of  according  to  his 
motives,  we  always  refer  to  the  dispositions,  inclinations  and 
purposes  of  the  heart,  or  what  are  called  subjective  mo- 
tives. 

The  proof  of  this  doctrine  is  nothing  but  an  appeal  to  those 
facts  with  which  every  man  is  famihar.  This  proof  may  be  ex- 
hibited in  several  ways.  In  our  common  actions  we  are  conscious 
of  being  influenced  by  motives.  If  we  reflect  on  the  ordi- 
nary actions  of  our  life,  especially  those  which  present  them- 


130  MORAL     AGENCY. 

selves  to  our  consideration  most  clearly  and  distinctly,  we  shall 
certainly  find  this  to  be  the  case. 

To  assert  that  we  are  governed  by  motives  is  in  fact  no  more 
than  to  assert  that  we  are  rational  beings.  If  in  any  case  we 
are  not  governed  by  motives,  or  act  without  motives,  we  do  in  that 
case  cease  to  be  rational  or  moral  agents.  It  is  indeed  very 
common  for  us  to  act  without  this  or  that  particular  motive,  and 
even  to  act  against  the  influence  of  particular  motives ;  but  in  aU 
such  cases  we  are  influenced  to  act  as  we  do  by  other  motives 
of  greater  power.  To  say  we  are  not,  would  be  to  say  we  are 
not  rational. 

Take  another  view.  It  is  inconceivable  that  any  action  should 
be  performed  without  a  cause.  If  the  action  which  is  performed 
is  rational  and  moral,  it  is  inconceivable  that  it  should  take 
place  without  a  reason  or  moral  cause.  It  would  be  a  self-con- 
tradiction, a  palpable  absurdity,  to  say  that  a  rational  action  can 
take  place  without  the  accompanying  circumstance,  that  it  has  a 
cause,  that  is,  a  motive  or  reason  corresponding  with  its  nature. 
A  rational  action  performed  without  a  reason  would  be  a  rational 
action  that  is  not  rational.  And  a  rational  agent,  acting  with- 
out a  reason  or  motive,  would  be  the  same  as  a  rational  agent 
who  is  not  rational.  And  this  would  be  no  less  absurd,  than  to 
say  that  a  stone  is  not  hard  and  that  water  is  not  liquid.  For 
hardness  is  no  more  the  property  of  a  stone  or  liquidness  of 
water,  than  acting  from  some  motive  or  for  some  reason  is  the 
property  of  a  rational  being.  If  any  one  thinks  otherwise,  I 
would  let  him  alone  till  he  finds  out  his  mistake. 

You  implicitly  acknowledge  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  under 
review,  whenever  you  attempt  to  influence  your  fellow  men  to 
rational  action.  You  present  rational  inducements  or  motives  be- 
fore them,  and  you  do  this  for  the  sole  purpose  of  producing 
some  afiection  in  them  or  engaging  thto  to  perform  some  action. 
Knowing  as  you  do  the  natux-e  of  the  mind,  you  never  think  of 
influencing  men  to  act  without  the  use  of  motives.  This  is  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  all  our  efforts  to  induce  a  rational  be- 
ing to  act.     We  present  motives  to  a  rational  being  when  we 


MORAL    AGENCY.  131 

■wish  to  excite  him  to  action,  just  as  naturally  and  spontaneously 
as  we  apply  mechanical  force  in  order  to  produce  motion  in  a 
material  substance  ;  and  we  do  this  because  we  know  it  to  be  a 
law  of  the  mind  to  perform  rational  and  responsible  action  under 
the  influence  of  motives  and  in  no  other  way,  as  it  is  a  law  of 
matter  which  is  at  rest  to  remain  so  till  it  is  put  in  motion  by  a 
physical  force. 

My  last  argument  is,  that  God  himself  in  his  word  constantly  ] 
makes  use  of  motives  or  rational  considerations  to  induce  men 
to  right  actions.  This  constitutes  the  whole  system  of  influence, 
employed  by  the  inspired  writers  and  by  the  ministers  of  the 
gospel.  And  this  imphes  that  in  the  judgment  of  ministers  and 
of  God  himself,  man  is  so  formed  as  to  be  influenced  to  act  by 
motives,  and  in  no  other  way. 

The  varied  appeal  to  facts  constitutes  the  evidence  1  ofier  to 
estabUsh  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity,  and  to  prove  that  men 
are  governed  and  wholly  governed  by  motives. 

But  you  may  be  inclined  to  inquire  more  particularly,  whether 
the  influence  of  motives  is  uniform  ;  whether  our  constitution  is 
such  that  they  operate  upon  us  in  the  same  manner. 

In  regard  to  this,  it  is  clear  that  the  same  considerations  which 
prove  that  men  are  governed  by  motives,  prove  also  that  the 
operation  of  motives  is  uniform ;  in  other  words,  that  the  same 
moral  causes  will  always  produce  the  same  efiects.  This  position 
seems  to  me  self-evident.  And  I  know  not  how  any  man  can 
beUeve  it  possible  for  a  rational  being  not  to  act  in  the  same 
manner,  when  all  the  previous  circmnstances  and  motives  are  the 
same.  Let  experience  and  common  sense  decide.  Peter,  under 
the  influence  of  the  motives  which  acted  upon  him  the  night  be- 
fore the  crucifixion,  denied  his  Lord.  Now  suppose  he  had  been 
at  any  subsequent  time  precisely  and  in  all  respects  in  the  same 
circumstances,  and  under  the  influence  of  the  same  motives ; 
suppose  the  state  of  his  own  mind  to  have  been  the  same ;  sup- 
pose him  to  have  had  the  same  weakness  of  faith,  the  same  ti- 
midity and  the  same  reluctance  to  sufier,  and  in  all  other  respects 
the  same  dispositions  and  feelings,  and  suppose  his  external  cir- 


132  MORAL    AGENCY. 

cumstances  and  all  the  motives  which  acted  upon  him  to  have  been 
perfectly  the  same ;  would  he  not  have  willed  and  acted  in  the 
same  manner?  Do  you  say  he  might  have  willed  and  acted 
differently?  Well  then  suppose  he  had  acted  differently.  I 
inquire  for  the  cause  or  reason  of  that  difference.  You  must 
either  assign  some  cause,  and  this  would  be  the  same  as  saying 
he  had  a  different  motive,  or  was  influenced  by  a  different  cause, 
or  you  must  say  the  difference  of  conduct  had  no  cause,  which 
would  be  the  same  as  to  assert  that  an  effect  may  be  produced 
without  a  cause,  and  this  would  be  asserting  what  every  man 
knows  to  be  false. 

It  is  manifestly  the  belief  and  the  universal  belief  of  men  that 
the  influence  of  motives,  or  the  manner  in  which  men  are  in- 
duced to  act,  is  uniform.  As  evidence  of  this,  it  is  sufficient  to 
say  that  whenever  we  wash  to  excite  men  to  a  particular  action, 
we  always  urge  those  very  motives  which  have  excited  ourselves 
or  others  to  the  same  actions.  This  is  the  course  pursued  by 
every  one  who  would  induce  men  to  do  their  duty,  and  by  every 
one  who  sohcits  them  to  commit  sin.  It  is  indeed  true  that  only 
a  part  of  the  motives,  which  influence  men  to  act,  are  under  our 
direction  or  even  within  the  reach  of  our  knowledge,  and  that 
Avhile  the  external  considerations  which  lie  within  our  power  and 
which  we  carefully  urge  upon  them  are  in  substance  the  same 
as  have  been  successful  in  other  cases,  the  state  of  their  minds, 
constituting  the  great,  inward  motive,  may  be  widely  different. 
And  on  this  account,  it  would  betray  great  want  of  discernment 
for  us  confidently  to  expect  that  the  same  consideration  sug- 
gested to  the  minds  of  different  men,  or  of  the  same  men  at 
different  times,  will  produce  the  same  effect.  The  difference  in 
the  disposition  or  state  of  mind,  on  which  rational  considerations 
operate,  will  always  give  to  those  considerations  a  different  in- 
fluence. But  whenever  we  would  induce  men  to  act,  we  go  as 
far  as  we  can  to  bring  them  under  the  influence  of  the  same 
motives  as  have  induced  others  to  act  in  the  manner  desired ; 
and  this  plainly  implies  that  we  consider  the  mind  to  be  so 
constituted  as  to  invest  motives,  so  far  as  they  are  the  same, 
I 


MORAL    AGENCY.  133 

with  the  same  influence.  Were  it  not  for  this  pennancnt  con- 
stitution of  the  mind,  we  could  form  no  conception  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  our  fellow  men  will  be  affected  bj  the  circumstances 
attending  them,  or  the  motives  which  act  upon  them ;  and  of 
course  we  could  form  no  conception  of  their  future  conduct. 
Nor  should  we  be  able  to  form  a  definite  conception  in  any  in- 
stance whatever  of  our  own  future  conduct.  According  to  this 
strange  notion,  though  a  man  has  been  influenced  by  his  own 
governing  disposition  and  by  a  variety  of  external  motives  to  a 
life  of  unvarying  industry  and  uprightness  for  a  long  course  of 
years,  this  would  furnish  no  ground  of  expectation  that  he  will 
be  thus  influenced  by  the  same  motives  at  any  future  time. 
On  this  supposition,  there  would  be  no  prospect  of  our  gaining 
any  sure  influence  over  the  minds  of  men,  and  the  whole  busi- 
ness of  public  or  private  speaking  for  the  purpose  of  persuasion 
would  come  to  an  end.  The  exhibition  of  truth,  the  commu- 
nication of  thought,  even  language  itself,  would  be  of  no  value, 
and  the  bonds  of  domestic,  civil  and  religious  society  would  be 
dissovlvd.  For  the  effect  of  all  our  attempts  to  produce  convic- 
tion or  to  excite  affection  in  the  minds  of  others,  and  even  the 
obhgations  of  religion,  depend  on  the  permanence  of  the  constitu- 
tion which  God  has  given  to  the  human  mind,  and  the  uniformity 
of  the  laws  by  which  it  is  governed. 

You  will  ask  whether  we  have  not  power  to  act  differently  from 
what  we  do.  My  reply  is,  that  we  have  all  the  power  which  is 
necessary  to  constitute  us  rational  and  accountable  creatures, 
and  all  which  can  belong  to  us  as  such.  But  we  have  no 
power  to  act  contrary  to  the  laws  of  our  rational  existence.  In 
other  words,  we  have  no  power  to  cease  to  be  rational.  We 
have  power  to  act  according  to  the  laws  of  voluntary  agency ; 
but  we  have  no  power  to  act  against  those  laws.  That  is,  we 
have  no  power  to  cease  to  be  voluntary.  I  may  say  too  we  have 
power  to  act  according  to  the  laws  which  govern  us  as  depend- 
ent beings,  but  no  power  to  act  in  opposition  to  these  laws,  that 
is,  we  have  no  power  to  cease  to  be  dependent.     Now  the  fact 

VOL.   II.  12 


134  MORAL    AGENCY. 

that  we  have  no  power  to  act  contrary  to  the  laws  of  our  rational, 
voluntary  and  dependent  existence,  does  not  leave  us  destitute 
of  any  desirable  power,  of  any  power  which  any  man  ever  did 
possess,  or  which  any  man,  except  one  who  is  distracted,  or  is 
guilty  and  wretched  to  desperation,  can  ever  wish  to  possess.  The 
power  which  I  attribute  to  man  is  the  power  to  act  according  to 
the  laws  which  the  Author  of  our  being  has  estabHshed  ;  in  other 
words,  it  is  the  power  to  act  as  rational,  moral,  voluntary  and  de- 
pendent beings.  This,  I  hold,  is  the  only  power  we  have.  As- 
certain what  the  above  mentioned  laws  are,  and  you  ascertain  the 
limits  of  the  power  which  we  possess  or  can  desire. 

You  may  still  inquire,  whether  we  have  not  power  to  act  dif- 
ferently from  what  we  do.  It  is  not  my  present  intention  to 
enter  particularly  on  the  consideration  of  the  various  difficulties 
respecting  the  subject  of  man's  power  or  ability.  All  I  shall  do, 
will  be  to  offer  a  few  obvious  remarks  adapted  for  our  present 
purpose. 

To  illustrate  this  point  as  clearly  as  possible,  I  shall  take  the 
following  familiar  case.  For  sufficient  reasons  a  man  now  chooses 
to  sit  still.  You  say  he  has  power  to  walk.  This  I  admit.  He 
has  power  to  walk  according  to  the  laws  of  his  nature,  that  is, 
he  has  power  to  walk  when  he  wills  it,  or  in  obedience  to  his  will. 
But  has  he  power  to  walk  without  willing  it  ?  If  you  say  he  has, 
then  I  have  three  things  to  say  in  reply.  The  first  is,  that  no  man, 
acting  as  a  rational,  accountable  being,  ever  did  such  a  thing. 
So  that  the  power  supposed  is  one  which  never  showed  itself  in 
any  instance  of  rational,  voluntary,  accountable  agency.  There 
is  then  thus  far  no  evidence  from  fact  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
power.  Secondly.  If  you  are  not  satisfied  with  the  experience 
of  past  ages,  then  make  the  experiment  yourself,  and  see  whether 
you  have  the  power  of  walking  without  willing  it.  Try  as  often 
and  with  as  much  effort  as  you  please,  so  that  you  may  be  sure 
not  to  mistake.  The  result  will  be  this,  l^ou  will  find  that  you 
have  the  very  convenient,  useful  power  to  walk  when  you  will,  but 
that  you  have  no  power  to  walk  without  willing  it.  Third.  The  pow- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  135 

er  supposed  is  very  undesirable,  and  would  be  altogether  useless 
and  even  hurtful,  so  that  no  rational  man  would  wish  to  possess 
it. 

But  you  say  you  have  the  power  of  ivilling  to  walk,  and  so  the 
power  of  walking  by  wiUing  it.  This  is  also  what  I  maintain. 
You  have  the  power  of  willing  to  walk,  that  is,  you  have  the 
power  of  willing  this  in  accordance  with  the  constitution  of  the 
mind,  particularly  the  laws  which  govern  the  mind  in  regard  to 
volition.  You  can  will  to  walk  when  you  have  a  sufficient  motive 
or  reason  to  do  it,  such  motive  or  reason  always  being  the  antece- 
dent circumstance  or  cause  of  the  volition.  The  volition,  when- 
ever it  takes  place,  is  the  consequence  of  a  motive.  If  there- 
fore you  mean  that  you  have  the  power  of  wiUing  to  walk,  when 
you  have  a  motive  or  reason  operating  in  your  mind  sufficient  to 
induce  you  to  put  forth  such  a  voUtion,  this  I  acknowledge  is 
what  all  experience  shows  to  be  true.  We  find  that  we  always 
will  to  walk  when  we  have  a  sufficient  motive  or  reason  for  will- 
ing this  ;  which  is  the  same  as  to  say,  we  have  power  to  exercise 
this  volition  as  an  effijct  of  an  appropriate  and  adequate  cause. 
But  if  you  assert  that  you  can  will  to  walk  without  the  operation 
of  such  a  cause,  that  is,  without  a  sufficient  motive,  then  I  de- 
mand proof.  If  you  have  such  a  power,  you  can  exercise  it. 
To  say  you  possess  the  power  but  cannot  exercise  it,  is  to  say 
that  you  possess  the  power  and  yet  do  not  possess  it.  Did  you 
then  on  any  occasion  ever  exercise  such  a  power  ?  Did  you 
ever  in  any  instance  deliberately  will  to  walk  without  any  motive  ? 
You  can  recollect  various  instances  in  which  you  have  willed  to 
walk  under  the  influence  of  motives,  but  did  you  ever  wiU  to 
walk  without  any  motive  or  reason  whatever  ?  I  am  sure  you 
never  did,  because  I  am  sure  that  the  influence  of  motives  is  in- 
volved in  the  very  nature  of  volition ;  so  that  without  this  in- 
fluence, voUtion  would  not  be  volition,  any  more  than  love  would 
be  love  without  anything  to  love,  or  than  belief  would  be  belief 
without  anything  to  believe. 

But  if  you  are  not  satisfied  with  your  past  experience,  then 


136  MORAL     AGENCY. 

make  a  new  trial,  as  I  proposed  to  you  before  ;  and  see  whether 
you  can  find  the  real  existence  of  such  a  power  as  you  have  sup- 
posed. Before,  you  tried  to  walk  without  willing  to  walk.  Now 
try  to  will  it,  without  any  reason  for  willing  it. 

Or  make  trial  of  your  power  in  another  way.  I  suppose  it  is 
true  that  you  have  no  reason  to  go  or  to  will  to  go  to  Mexico. 
This  then  may  afford  you  a  good  opportunity  to  determine  whether 
you  have  in  fact  the  power  to  put  forth  a  volition  without  any 
motive.  And  as  an  important  question  in  mental  philosophy  is 
concerned,  it  is  worth  the  while  to  make  a  deliberate  and  very 
serious  experiment  upon  yourself,  and  for  once  at  least  to  act 
out  the  power  which  you  claim,  to  will  a  tJdng  toithout  any  motive. 
And  you  need  not  fear  that  your  willing  to  go  to  Mexico  with- 
out any  reason  will  involve  you  in  any  difficulty,  as  enlisting  for 
military  service  would.  For  when  you  come  to  reflect  that  you 
willed  without  any  reason,  except  merely  to  show  tJiat  you  had 
power  to  do  it,  why,  you  can  for  good  and  substantial  reasons 
will  to  stay  at  home  ;  and  the  thought  of  this  may  perhaps  in 
the  want  of  other  motives  help  you  to  will  to  go  ;  it  may  at  least 
help  you  to  put  forth  a  kind  of  evasive  will  or  double  will,  that 
is,  a  will  to  go  covering  up  a  will  not  to  go,  or  a  will  not  to  go 
being  somehow  enclosed  in  a  will  to  go.  Try  and  see  if  you 
cannot  prove  your  point,  and  without  any  reason  will  to  go  to 
Mexico,  and  yet  after  all  not  will  to  go.  If  you  are  not  satis- 
fied, take  any  other  case  you  choose,  and  make  the  strange, 
preposterous  effort  to  will  something  without  any  motive,  in- 
ward or  outward.  You  will,  if  I  mistake  not,  come  in  the 
end  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  very  important  power  which 
you  possess  to  put  forth  acts  of  will  no  more  implies  that 
you  can  will  without  the  influence  of  a  motive,  than  your 
having  power  to  see  the  moon  implies  that  you  can  see 
it  without  using  your  eyes,  or  that  you  can  see  it  without 
seeing  it. 

Evidently  the    power    of    willing  which  we    possess,   is    no 
other  than  the  power   of    exercising  a  volition  under  the  in- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  137 

fluence  of  proper  and  sufficient  motives,  or  the  power  of 
exercising  a  volition  for  which  we  have  sufficient  reasons. 
And  experience  shows  that  we  have  no  such  power  as  can 
free  the  will  from  the  control  of  motives,  or  can  excite 
it  to  any  vohtions,  otherwise  than  as  it  is  determined  by 
motives.  In  other  words,  all  experience  shows,  that  we 
have  no  power  to  deprive  ourselves  of  the  properties  of 
rational  beings. 

12* 


rtt>  f 


LECTURE    LIII. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  MOTIVES,  OBJECTIVE  AND  SUBJECTIVE. 

It  has  already  been  suggested  that  the  word  motives  is  used 
in  a  two-fold  sense,  denoting  both  the  objects  which  are  presented 
to  the  mind  from  without,  and  the  dispositions  and  desires  of 
the  mind  itself.  Accordingly  motives  are  called  objective  and 
subjective.  Both  of  these  classes  of  motives  exert  an  influence 
upon  us,  but  not  in  the  same  way.  Objective  motives,  or  things 
presented  to  the  mind  from  without,  have  an  influence  upon  us 
through  what  is  inward,  that  is,  by  means  of  the  dispositions  and 
desires  of  the  mind.  We  learn  from  our  own  consciousness  and 
from  observation,  that  external  objects  afiect  us  according  to 
our. internal  state.  Their  power  to  influence  our  conduct  depends 
altogether  upon  what  is  within  the  mind.  They  become  real 
motives  only  by  coming  into  contact  with  what  we  call  subjective 
motives.  Hence  it  may  be  said  in  reference  to  external  or  ob- 
jective motives,  that  we  ourselves  determine  their  influence,  that 
is  to  say,  we  determine  it  by  our  inward  state.  One  man,  by 
the  covetous  or  ambitious  disposition  which  he  has  cherished  and 
strengthened,  gives  to  wealth  and  power,  objects  external  to  the 
mind,  a  powerful  influence  over  him,  an  influence  which  controls 
his  vohtions  and  conduct.  While  another  man,  who  is  be- 
nevolent and  spiritually  minded,  guards  himself  against  the  im- 
proper influence  of  those  objects,  and  it  may  be  said  that,  by  his 
holy  frame  of  mind,  he  determines  or  makes  it  certain  that  wealth 
and  honor,  as  objects  of  covetousness  and  ambition,  shall  have 
no  power  over  his  will  or  his  life  ;  that  they  shall  have  no  in- 


MORAL    AGENCY.  139 

fluence,  except  in  subserviency  to  his  benevolence.  It  was  Judas's 
inward  state  which  gave  all  their  effect  to  the  low,  base  motives 
which  prompted  him  to  betray  Christ,  —  motives  which  could 
have  exerted  no  such  influence  upon  the  pure  mind  of  John. 
It  was  the  state  of  Christ's  mind,  which  prevented  any  tempta- 
tion from  obtaining  the  least  power  over  him.  It  is  a  fact  well 
known  to  all  care  fid  observers  of  the  human  mind,  that  our  inter- 
nal state,  our  affections,  our  dispositions,  our  mental  habits,  our 
appetites,  passions  and  desires,  determine  what  influence  exter- 
nal motives  shall  have  upon  us.  While  we  are  in  one  state  of 
mind,  those  motives  have  a  bad  influence  upon  our  voluntary 
conduct,  an  influence  to  lead  us  to  acts  of  disobedience.  If  we 
are  in  another  state  of  mind,  the  same  external  motives  have  a 
good  influence  upon  us,  or  no  influence  at  all.  This  is  the  way, 
and  the  only  way,  in  which  the  influence  of  this  class  of  motives 
is  determined.  Worldly  and  forbidden  objects  will  never  cease 
to  be  pleasing  and  attractive,  and  spiritual,  holy  objects  will 
never  cease  to  be  displeasing  and  repulsive  to  a  man,  while  he 
is  in  an  earthly,  unholy  state  of  mind.  But  the  reverse  of  all 
this  takes  place  in  one  who  is  spiritual  and  holy. 

The  truth  of  what  I  have  now  advanced,  as  to  the  influence 
of  external  or  objective  motives,  is  so  fully  impressed  upon  us  by 
our  own  experience,  that  we  always  proceed  on  the  belief  of  it  when 
we  present  motives  to  the  minds  of  others.  We  are  persuaded  be- 
forehand, that  if  the  objects  of  Christian  benevolence  are  presented 
to  a  man  whose  heart  is  contracted  and  selfish,  they  will  fail  of 
producing  the  effect  which  we  desire,  and  which  they  actually 
produce  in  those  whose  hearts  are  enlarged  with  benevolent  and 
pious  affections.  But  if  we  are  not  satisfied  with  what  general 
observation  teaches,  then  let  us  make  an  experiment  upon  our- 
selves, and  see  whether  the  influence  of  external  motives  is  de- 
termined in  any  other  way  than  by  means  of  some  predominant 
disposition  or  desire  in  our  own  mind.  And  I  am  confident 
that  a  fair  experiment  will  satisfy  us  that  the  influence  of  this 
class  of  motives  depends  wholly  on  our  internal  state  ;  that  a 
particular  motive,  for  example,  the  command  of  God,  will  in- 


140  MORAL    AGENCY. 

fluence  us  in  one  way  when  we  are  in  one  state  of  mind,  and  in 
a  different  way  when  we  are  in  a  different  state  ;  and  that  this  is 
the  only  way  in  which  any  external  motives  have  power  over 
us. 

This  principle,  which  is  of  great  consequence  in  the  philosophy 
of  the  mind,  has  been  frequently  illustrated  by  a  fact  of  common 
occurrence  in  relation  to  our  bodily  constitution.  Present  the 
most  delicious  food  to  a  man  who  is  sick.  Instead  of  exciting 
desire,  as  it  does  in  the  healthy,  it  excites  disgust.  While  he  is 
sick,  food  cannot  be  agreeable  to  his  palate.  In  order  that  whole- 
some food  may  have  the  desired  influence  upon  him,  he  must  be 
restored  to  health.  It  is  equally  true  that  wliile  a  man  is  under 
the  dominion  of  selfishness,  the  motives  of  religion  will  never  have 
the  influence  over  his  mind,  which  they  have  over  the  minds  of 
Christians.  Before  they  can  have  that  influence,  he  must  possess 
a  benevolent,  pious  disposition.  To  suppose  that  external  motives 
can  exert  an  influence  over  us,  contrary  to  the  affections  and  de- 
sires of  our  hearts,  is  absurd.  And  to  suppose  such  a  power  to 
be  actually  exercised,  —  to  suppose,  for  example,  that  the  holy 
character  of  God  can  actually  excite  enmity  in  the  hearts  of 
angels  while  continuing  holy,  or  love  in  the  heart  of  Satan,  or  in 
the  heart  of  any  man  remaining  unregenerate,  would  be  to  sup- 
pose what  would  subvert  the  foundation  of  moral  character  and 
the  principles  of  human  knowledge ;  indeed  it  would  be  to  sup- 
pose a  gross  absurdity.  But  it  may  be  said,  that  men  without 
any  real  change  in  their  moral  state  do  greatly  vary  the  influence 
of  those  objects,  which  are  presented  as  motives  to  action.  This 
is  admitted.  But  it  is  very  easy  to  show,  that  such  an  alteration 
in  a  man's  voluntary  conduct  is  the  consequence  of  a  change  of 
some  sort  in  the  state  of  his  mind.  There  are  oth^r  dispositions, 
besides  those  of  a  religious  character,  which  have  an  influence 
upon  the  conduct  of  men.  A  man  who  once  neglected  the  public 
worship  of  God  may,  so  far  as  religion  is  concerned,  continue  as 
he  was,  and  yet  to  promote  his  credit  or  interest  or  some  other 
object  to  which  he  is  attached,  he  may  become  a  stated  attendant 
on  public  worship.     B^t  this  is  only  saying,  that  a  man  may  give 


MORAL     AGENCY.  141 

to  a  particular  object,  such  as  public  worship,  a  new  influence 
over  his  mind  bj  viewing  it  in  a  new  light,  or  bringing  it  to  have 
a  new  bearing  upon  some  of  his  natural  inclinations.  As  a  means 
of  spiritual  good,  the  object  is  still  regarded  with  indifference. 
But  it  is  now  viewed  as  a  means  of  promoting  some  worldly  or 
selfish  interest,  and  thus  it  becomes  a  powerful  motive  to  action. 
Here,  as  in  all  other  cases,  the  object  derives  its  influence  over  a 
man's  conduct  from  some  prevailing  disposition  of  his  heart. 
For  were  he  not  attached  to  that  worldly  object  which  is  con- 
templated, it  would  have  no  power  over  his  will  or  his  conduct. 
A  consideration  of  all  the  variety  of  cases  which  occur,  would 
confirm  our  conclusion,  that  we  cannot  regulate  the  influence  of 
external  motives,  nor  do  anything  to  give  them  more  or  less 
power  over  us,  except  by  means  of  our  dispositions  or  the  states 
of  our  mind.  But  these  dispositions  and  states  are  so  various, 
and  relate  to  so  many  objects,  and  in  their  operations  are  ca- 
pable of  being  combined  in  so  many  ways,  that  there  is  no  end 
to  the  variety  of  results  which  may  flow  from  them.  All  the 
appetites  and  passions,  all  the  natural  affections,  all  the  dispo- 
sitions of  the  heart  in  relation  to  God  and  man,  and  to  the 
interests  of  time  and  eternity,  may  have  an  influence  in  deter- 
mining what  effect  any  external  motive  shall  have  over  our 
mind  and  our  conduct ;  or  to  express  it  otherwise,  in  determin- 
ing how  we  shall  feel  and  act  in  view  of  that  motive.  The  in- 
fluence of  the  outward  motive  must  in  many  cases  be  exceedingly 
complex,  flowing  as  it  does  from  such  a  variety  of  inward  dis- 
positions. Accordingly  the  power  which  we  have  in  determining 
the  influence  of  an  outward  motive  over  us,  is  often  so  complex 
that  it  cannot  without  difiiculty  be  analyzed. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  those  motives  which  are  called 
subjective,  consisting  in  those  very  affections,  dispositions  and 
desires  of  the  mind,  on  which  the  influence  of  outward  things 
depends. 

It  is  manifest  that  our  affections  and  desires  constitute  our 
character.  In  a  moral  point  of  view,  my  love  is  myself.  I  am 
praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy,  holy  or  sinful,  according  to  my 


142  MORAL     AGENCY. 

love.  If  I  love  God  supremely,  I  am  holy.  If  I  love  myself  or 
any  created  object  supremely,  I  am  sinful.  In  other  words,  if 
I  am  a  lover  of  what  is  good,  /am  good.  If  I  am  a  lover  of  what 
is  evil,  /am  evil.  My  life,  my  voluntary  conduct,  will  be  accord- 
ing to  my  love.  Hence  love  to  God  is  virtually  the  fulfilling  of 
the  law.  And  the  want  of  this,  and  the  contrary  love,  is  the  sum 
of  disobedience  ;  it  involves  all  evil.  It  is  therefore  with  obvious 
propriety,  that  we  consider  the  supreme  affection  of  the  heart  to 
be  the  great,  governing  motive  within  us.  But  when  we  speak  of 
tills  great,  subjective  motive,  as  comprehending  all  the  springs  of 
action,  we  mean  to  comprise  under  it  the  appetites,  inclinations, 
passions  and  desires,  in  short,  all  the  inward  principles  and  move- 
ments of  which  we  are  conscious,  and  which  constitute  the  inner 
man  and  make  us  what  we  are. 

Now  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  give  to  all  these  inclinations,  tliis 
love  and  its  opposite,  these  inward  desires  and  principles  of  action, 
the  general  name  of  affections,  or  the  predominant  state  of  the 
heart.  And  my  present  inquiry  is,  whether  we  may  and  do  in 
any  way  exert  an  influence  over  this  inward  motive,  so  as  to  make 
it  in  any  respect  different  from  what  it  was  before. 

And  here  it  is  perfectly  evident  that,  according  to  the  well 
known  laws  of  the  mind,  we  may  greatly  modify  all  our  affections. 
By  our  own  agency  we  may  increase  or  diminish  their  strength. 
We  may  give  superiority  to  a  particular  affection  whicli  has  been 
inferior.  We  may  bring  into  subjection  one  which  has  governed 
us.  And  we  may  bring  about  a  different  combination  of  these  in- 
ternal principles.  In  consequence  of  this  modifying  influence 
over  our  affections,  we  may  greatly  vary  their  power  as  motives 
of  action.  The  love  of  money  or  of  honor  may  come  to  possess 
more  or  less  control  over  us  than  formerly.  If  we  are  Christians, 
our  love  to  God  may  rise  higher  or  sink  lower.  And  every  affec- 
tion of  the  unrenewed  heart  may  grow  in  strength,  or  may  lose 
the  decrree  of  strength  which  it  once  had. 

But  the  influence  which  Ave  exert  over  our  affections,  which  are 
the  subjective  and  primary  motives  of  action,  is  not,  as  I  have  al- 
ready shown,  the  direct  influence  of  our  volitions,  but  comes  chief- 


MOKAL    AGENCY.  143 

Ij  in  these  three  ways ;  first,  by  means  of  the  views  we  entertain 
of  the  objects  of  our  aflfections ;  secondly,  by  means  of  the  circum- 
stances in  which  we  are  placed ;  thirdly,  by  means  of  our  past 
states  of  mind. 

It  is  certain  that  our  views  of  the  objects  before  us  must  have  an 
effect  upon  our  dispositions,  either  to  excite,  and  strengthen  them, 
or  to  detract  from  their  strength.  It  is  equally  certain  that  our 
present  dispositions  are  greatly  affected  by  our  previous  state  of 
mind ;  and  it  is  no  less  certain  that  our  dispositions  are  influenced  by 
the  events  which  take  place  around  us  and  by  the  various  circum- 
stances in  which  we  are  placed.  It  is  by  these  causes  that  our 
original  dispositions  are  brought  into  so  many  different  combinations, 
and  form  so  many  complex  dispositions  or  states  of  mind.  Now 
if  the  things  above  mentioned  are  in  fact  the  causes  which  operate 
upon  our  dispositions,  and  have  such  an  effect  to  excite,  modify 
and  control  them,  we  shall  easily  determine  what  kind  of  power 
we  have  respecting  them,  and  how  that  power  is  exercised.  First ; 
it  consists  partly  in  the  power  we  have  to  regulate  our  own  con- 
templations and  views.  This  power,  which  is  to  be  learnt  by  ex- 
perience and  observation,  is  doubtless  much  greater  than  is  common- 
ly supposed.  It  is  a  well  known  fact,  that  some  men  by  patient  ef- 
forts acquire  an  ability  to  regulate  their  views  and  trains  of  thought 
in  a  manner  quite   above  what  others  would  consider  practicable.  _] 

Secondly ;  the  power  we  have  over  our  dispositions  consists 
partly  in  the  power  we  have  over  the  events  and  circumstances 
around  us.  This  power  we  know  to  be  of  great  importance.  To 
influence  our  circumstances  and  the  course  of  events  appertaining 
to  us,  is  the  object  of  a  great  part  of  the  agency  we  exert. 

Thirdly ;  the  influence  we  exercise  over  our  dispositions  at  any 
particular  time  consists  in  part  in  the  previous  dispositions  we  have 
exercised,  and  is  in  a  measure  dependent  upon  them. 

From  the  view  we  have  taken  of  the  subject  it  clearly  follows,  | 
that  the  power  we  have  over  our  present  dispositions  is  indirect  | 
and  limited.     It  is  indirect,  as  we   are  able  to  influence  our  dis- 
positions in  no  other  way  than  by  means  of  our  views,  our  circum- 
stances, and  our  previous  states  of  mind.     It  is  limited,  as  the 


144  MORAL     AGENCY. 

various  causes  -wliicli  affect  our  present  dispositions  are  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  beyond  our  control.  There  are  many 
things,  such  as  the  agency  of  our  fellow  creatures,  and  the  course 
of  divine  providence,  which  have  an  influence  not  subject  to  our 
direction  over  our  views  and  trains  of  thought,  and  over  the 
events  and  circumstances  which  most  nearly  concern  us.  And 
as  to  the  previous  states  of  mind,  they  were  at  the  time  more  or 
less  under  the  influence  of  causes  direct  from  our  voluntary 
agency,  and  we  are  now  wholly  unable  to  alter  what  has  actually 
taken  place.  Such  in  brief  are  the  limitations  of  our  power 
over  our  present  dispositions.  In  some  instances  we  voluntarily 
exert  a  decided  influence  over  those  things  which  operate  as 
causes  upon  our  dispositions.  In  other  instances  our  voluntary 
agency  has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  those  causes. 

We  have  proceeded  far  enough  in  this  investigation  to  see,  that 
whether  the  motives  we  speak  of  are  the  objects  presented  to  us 
from  without,  or  the  dispositions  of  our  own  minds,  we  can  ex- 
ercise no  power  over  them,  except  in  accordance  with  the  estab- 
lished laws  of  the  mind.  In  this  affair  we  can  accomplish 
nothing  independently  of  the  settled  constitution  of  our  intelligent 
and  moral  nature.  The  laws  of  mind  are  indeed  more  subtile 
and  complex,  and  the  effects  resulting  from  them  are  less  visible, 
than  what  belong  to  the  physical  world ;  but  they  are  no  less 
regular  and  certain.  It  is  the  knowledge  of  these  mental  laws, 
that  lays  the  foundation  of  all  practical  wisdom.  It  is  this,  that 
gives  us  ability  to  exert  a  salutary  influence  over  our  fellow  crea- 
tures, and  to  manage  skilfully  those  concerns  in  which  we  are 
connected  with  them.  The  power  we  possess  is  evidently  of 
such  a  nature  and  extent,  as  the  purposes  of  our  present  ex- 
istence require,  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  under  such  limita- 
tions as  are  necessary  to  guard  against  irregularity,  and  to 
secure  the  general  order  of  an  intelligent,  moral  kingdom. 

The  doctrine  of  moral  necessity,  which  I  have  endeavored  to 
explain  and  defend,  is  this,  that  all  the  voHtions  and  actions  of 
men  result  from  the  operation  of  causes,  and  that  between  these 
causes,  which  are  commonly   called  motives,  and  their  effects, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  145 

which  are  the  mental  and  bodily  actions  of  men,  there  is  a  cer- 
tain and  invariable  connection,  —  a  connection  as  certain  and 
invariable,  as  between  physical  causes  and  effects.  A  question 
arose  whether  we  have  not  power  to  vary  this  connection,  and 
even  to  set  it  aside ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  whether 
we  have  not  power  to  act  differently  from  what  we  are  in- 
fluenced to  by  motives.  Now  if  the  power  we  possess  is  such, 
and  such  only,  as  I  have  represented  it  to  be ;  if  all  its  exer- 
cises, however  diversified  and  complex,  come  under  the  influence 
of  what  we  have  called  moral  causes,  and  if  they  are  just 
what  those  causes  by  their  own  proper  operation  produce,  then 
the  exercise  of  such  power  as  we  have,  is  so  far  from  being 
inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  that  it  is  itself  a 
plain  instance  of  it.  It  is  to  be  particularly  observed,  that 
whatever  we  do  to  regulate  any  of  our  motives,  whether  exter- 
nal or  internal,  in  that  very  thing  we  are  still  influenced  by 
some  motive.  If  we  endeavor  by  one  means  or  another  to 
check  or  increase  the  influence  which  a  particular  outward  ob- 
ject or  a  particular  disposition  of  the  mind  is  likely  to  have 
over  us,  we  certainly  endeavor  to  do  this  for  some  reason,  or 
because  we  are  led  to  it  by  some  motive.  Should  we  exert 
or  endeavor  to  exert  power  without  having  any  motive  for 
it,  we  should  put  off  or  endeavor  to  put  off  the  character 
of  rationality.  Thus  all  our  actions  external  and  internal 
fall  under  the  influence  of  motives,  and  as  certainly  flow 
from  them  as  effects  in  any  other  case  flow  from  their  proper 
causes. 

VOL.  n.  13 


LECTURE    LIV 


DO  MOTIVES  INFLUENCE  MEN  NECESSARILY?  SCRIPTURAL  REPRE- 
SENTATION. NATURE  OF  THIS  NECESSITY.  OBJECTION  FROM 
A    CASE    OF   INDIFFERENCE    CONSIDERED. 

But  do  motives,  wliicli  are  the  moral  causes  of  whatever  we 
do,  act  upon  us  and  produce  their  eflfects  necessarily  ?  The  an- 
swer must  depend  upon  the  meaning  of  the  word.  If  necessity 
is  used  in  the  natural  or  physical  sense,  implying  what  is  com- 
monly called  coercion  or  force,  if  it  means  anything  whatever 
which  supersedes  the  perfect  use  of  our  rational  and  moral 
powers,  then  there  is  no  necessity  in  the  influence  of  motives. 
In  other  words,  it  is  not  by  a  physical  necessity  that  motives  act 
upon  us.  Why  then,  it  may  be  asked,  do  we  make  use  of  a  word 
which  in  its  original  and  proper  sense  is  inapphcable  to  the  sub- 
ject ?  I  answer,  for  the  same  reason  that  we  use  metaphorical, 
technical,  or  scientific  language  in  any  other  case.  There  is  such 
a  resemblance  between  necessity  in  its  natural  sense  and  the  in- 
fluence of  motives,  that  the  use  of  the  word  to  express  this  in- 
fluence becomes  convenient  and  suitable.  The  point  of  resem- 
blance is  clear  and  obvious.  As  physical  effects  result  uniformly 
and  certainly  from  their  appropriate  physical  causes  ;  so  moral 
efiects,  that  is  bodily  and  mental  actions,  result  with  equal  uni- 
formity and  certainty  from  their  appropriate  moral  causes.  As 
the  constitution  of  the  natural  and  moral  world  is,  such  efiects 
will  and  must  result  from  such  causes.  This  established  and 
certain  influence  of  causes  to  produce  effects  is  what  we  mean 
by  necessity.     In  the  natural  world  it  is  natural  necessity,  in  the 


MORAL     AGENCY.  147 

moral  world,  moral  necessity.  Considering  that  moral  causes  ope- 
rate so  certainly,  never  failing  to  produce  their  effects,  we  are 
naturally  led  to  speak  of  these  effects  as  taking  place  necessarily 
and  to  say  they  must  be  so,  they  cannot  be  otherwise,  it  is  im- 
possible they  should  not  take  place.  Expressions  of  this  kind 
and  with  this  meaning  are  common  in  all  languages.  They  are 
found  particularly  in  the  Bible.  Christ  and  the  apostles  used 
such  expressions  with  perfect  familiarity.  Christ  told  his  dis- 
ciples that  he  must  go  to  Jerusalem  and  die  there.  He  said  on 
the  supposition  of  his  avoiding  death,  "  how  then  shall  the  Scrip- 
twes  be  fulfilled,  that  thus  it  must  be?"  "When  ye  hear  of 
wars,  etc.,  be  not  troubled,  for  such  things  must  be."  "  The 
things  which  are  written  of  me  must  be  accomplished."  "  Jesus 
must  needs  go  through  Samaria."  "  There  ?nust  be  heresies 
among  you."  "  Offences  must  come."  In  all  these  cases,  the 
necessity  referred  to  consisted  in  the  influence  of  moral  causes, 
such  as  the  wise  purpose  and  Providence  of  God,  the  dispositions 
of  men  and  the  circumstances  of  the  world.  Take  the  declara- 
tion of  Christ  respecting  offences.  "  Wo  to  the  world  because  of 
offences,  for  it  must  needs  be  that  offences  come  ;  but  wo  to  that 
man  by  whom  the  offence  cometh."  "  It  must  needs  be."  The 
original.  Matt.  18:  7,  is  stronger.  ^vdyxTj  ydg  iariv  iXd-siv  zd  ay.dv- 
daia.  There  is  a  necessity  that  offences  should  come.  Luke  17 : 
1,  "  It  is  impossible  but  that  offences  will  come."  But  see  what 
this  necessity  is,  namely,  the  perverse  dispositions  of  men.  These 
will  produce  offences  just  as  a  bad  tree  will  produce  bad  fruit. 
The  inspired  writers  express  this  kind  of  necessity  with  the 
greatest  freedom  and  in  the  most  emphatic  language,  and  seem 
never  to  have  the  least  apprehension  that  there  can  be  any 
mistake.  Nor  does  any  man  now  apprehend  any  mistake  from 
the  use  of  such  language  in  common  conversation.  We  say  of 
a  man,  that  while  he  has  such  wicked  passions  he  will  certainly, 
and  necessarily  commit  sin  —  that  he  cannot  do  otherwise  than 
sin.  So  Jesus  said ;  "  How  can  ye  being  e^dl  speak  good 
things  ? "  And  he  illustrated  the  impossibility  by  the  impossi- 
bility of  a  bad  tree  bearing  good  fruit.     And  we  say  of  Paul, 


148  MORAL     AGENCY. 

as  he  said  of  himself,  that  a  necessity  was  laid  upon  him  to 
preach  the  gospel,  implying  that  he  had  such  love  to  Christ  and 
to  the  souls  of  men,  and  such  a  strong  feeling  of  obligation,  that 
he  could  not  do  otherwise  than  preach.  He  says  too  of  the 
carnal  mind,  —  "it  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  in- 
deed can  be."  Such  must  be  the  result  of  such  a  state  of  mind. 
It  cannot  be  otherwise. 

Thus  the  language  of  Scripture  and  common  discourse  agrees 
with  the  language  of  philosophy  in  showing,  that  motives  act 
upon  us  uniformly,  and  that  our  determinations  and  actions  cer- 
tainly follow  as  effects  from  the  moral  causes  which  operate  upon 
us.  The  causes  remaining  entirely  the  same,  the  effects  must 
follow.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  moral  necessity,  or  the  necessity 
with  which  motives  act  upon  us. 

As  an  objection  to  the  doctrine  which  I  have  endeavored  to 
defend,  it  has  been  urged  by  some  writers,  and  it  is  the  argu- 
ment on  which  they  chiefly  rely,  that  we  sometimes  act  volun- 
tarily in  a  case  of  indifference,  that  is,  that  we  will  or  determine 
to  do  a  thing,  without  any  motive  to  do  that  rather  than  some- 
thing else.  For  example,  we  take  one  of  two  oranges  which  are 
equally  distant  from  us,  and  which  appear  perfectly  alike,  so  that 
it  must  be  a  matter  of  perfect  indifference  to  us  whether  we  take 
one  or  the  other. 

In  regard  to  such  a  state  of  indifference,  and  the  argu- 
ment which  has  been  made  to  depend  on  it,  I  shall  make  a  few 
remarks. 

1.  In  a  general  view  it  is  as  obvious  in  this  case  as  in  any 
other,  that  we  neither  act,  nor  determine  to  act  without  a  motive. 
Any  man  who  takes  an  orange  to  eat,  though  the  orange  is  ever 
so  hke  to  others,  has  a  motive  to  do  it,  either  an  appetite  for  the 
orange,  or  a  wish  to  gratify  his  friends,  or  something  else  which 
prompts  him  to  the  action,  and  which  he  may  properly  assign  as 
a  reason  for  it.  And  as  his  choice  in  this  case,  and  the  action 
which  follows  it,  even  if  it  is  an  exercise  of  a  self-determining 
power,  takes  place  under  the  influence  of  a  motive,  the  case  af- 
fords a  very  slender  argument  truly  against  the  doctrine,  that  our 


MORAL    AGENCY.  149 

volitions  are  determined  by  motives.  For  as  to  the  act  of  taking 
an  orange,  the  man  is  not  indifferent.  Whatever  indifference  he 
may  feel  as  to  other  points,  he  feels  none  as  to  this.  He  has  a 
motive,  whatever  that  motive  may  be,  which  influences  him  to  the 
act  of  taking  an  orange.  This  act  follows  as  an  effect  from 
a  cause,  as  much  so  as  if  there  were  but  one  orange  set  before 
him.  And  it  ought  to  be  remembered,  that  the  comparison  of 
the  one  taken  with  the  one  left  may  not  be  a  subject  of  the  least 
consideration,  it  may  not  come  before  the  mind,  and  so  the  act 
of  the  mmd  may  have  no  reference  to  it.  It  may  be  no  more 
a  matter  of  comparison  and  choice,  than  if  he  should  take  the 
orange  with  his  eyes  shut. 

2.  But,  even  if  the  mind  makes  a  comparison  and  acts  with 
reference  to  it,  it  is  not  so  clear  as  some  have  imagined,  that  we 
make  the  particular  choice  without  a  motive.  If  we  are  con- 
scious of  preferring  this  to  the  other,  it  implies  that,  if  we  act 
rationally,  there  is  some  reason  for  such  preference.  And  if  so, 
this  reason  for  preference  is  the  motive.  Even  if  we  perceive  in 
the  things  themselves  no  ground  of  preference,  there  may  still 
be  something  in  our  habits  of  mind  which  leads  us  to  prefer  one 
to  the  other.  Some  slight  incident,  or  some  turn  of  thought,  or 
some  remark  from  others,  may  have  led  us,  without  any  particular 
reflection,  to  form  a  habit  of  preferring  in  such  a  case  that  which 
lies  on  the  right  or  that  which  lies  on  the  left.  This  may  have 
become  a  circumstance  of  real  consequence  to  our  feelings,  and 
may  have  an  influence,  though  perhaps  not  apparent  to  us  at  the 
time,  to  determine  us  to  the  particular  choice  we  make.  If  such 
is  the  fact,  we  cannot  fully  analyze  the  action  without  recurring 
to  the  motive,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  which  first  led  us  to 
form  such  a  habit  of  mind ;  for  we  must  consider  the  present 
action,  flowing  as  it  does  from  such  a  habit,  as  only  one  of  a  series 
of  similar  actions  resulting  from  the  same  original  cause. 

And  even  if  it  should  be  a  fact  that  we  are  totally  unable  to 
trace  the  act  of  taking  one  orange  and  not  the  other  to  any  par- 
ticular motive  accounting  for  the  preference,  still  this  would  not 
prove  that  there  was  no  such  motive.     The  movements  of  the 

13* 


150  MORAL    AGENCY. 

mind  are  in  many  cases  so  rapid,  so  subtile  and  so  evanescent, 
that  it  becomes  impossible  for  any  skill  of  ours  to  analyze  or  ex- 
plain them.  Some  of  the  circumstances  of  the  action,  making  at 
the  time  but  a  slight  impression,  may  have  vanished  from  the 
mind's  view,  and  we  may  never,  by  any  power  of  memory  which 
we  possess,  be  able  to  recall  them.  This  is  the  case  we  know 
with  a  multitude  of  our  common  actions,  actions  too,  vastly  more 
important  than  such  an  one  as  we  are  now  considering,  where  the 
mind  apjjears  to  be  in  a  state  of  indiflference.  But  who  will  say 
that  all  the  common  actions  referred  to  were  performed  without 
the  influence  of  motives,  merely  because  no  motives  can  be  defi- 
nitely recalled  ?  In  every  such  case,  it  is  perfectly  reasonable 
to  consider  our  actions  as  taking  place  in  the  usual  manner, 
that  is,  under  the  influence  of  motives,  however  unable  we  may 
be  distinctly  to  recollect  what  the  motives  were,  or  how  they  pro- 
duced their  effect,  or  why  this  motive  prevailed  rather  than 
another.  You  may  illustrate  this  by  such  a  case  as  the  following. 
Put  into  a  pair  of  scales,  as  equally  balanced  as  possible,  two 
weights  which  as  far  as  you  can  perceive  are  perfectly  alike.  But 
one  end  of  the  scales  rises  and  the  other  falls.  You  can  perceive 
no  cause  for  this,  as  the  scales  appeared  to  be  equally  balanced  and 
the  weights  perfectly  ahke.  But  who  would  say  that  the  common 
laws  of  the  physical  world  are  violated,  and  that  the  motion  of 
the  scales  takes  place  without  any  cause  ?  The  judgment  of 
all  men  would  be,  that  there  is  a  cause,  however  imperceptible. 
The  same  must  be  our  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  instance  of 
volition  now  referred  to.  Although  we  may  not  have  a  memory 
sufficiently  retentive,  or  a  discernment  sufficiently  nice,  to  dis- 
cover the  particular  motive  which  operated  on  our  mind  and  in- 
fluenced the  particular  choice  we  made  ;  still  we  have  no  reason 
to  think  that  the  common  laws  of  the  mind  were  infringed,  and 
that  a  determination  took  place  without  a  cause.  How  much 
more  reasonable  it  is  to  conclude,  that  there  is  some  want  of 
recollection  or  discernment  in  us,  and  that  the  act  of  the  mind 
is  really  to  be  accounted  for  on  the  common  principles  of  our 
rational  nature. 


MORAL     AGENCY.  151 

3.  But  it  is  altogether  unphilosopliical  to  found  a,  theory 
upon  facts  which  are  at  best  obscure  and-  doubtful,  facts  which 
rarely  occur  and  which  are  of  no  real  consequence,  in  opposition 
to  those  facts,  which  are  common,  and  perfectly  plain,  and  of  the 
highest  moment.  In  all  the  important  actions  of  life,  in  which 
there  is  deliberation  and  choice  in  the  proper  sense,  we  are  alto- 
gether under  the  influence  of  motives,  an  influence  Avhich  we  can 
easily  recall  and  plainly  describe.  These  deliberate  actions, 
which  are  always  the  result  of  an  object  distinctly  contemplated, 
and  acting  upon  some  of  our  affections,  constitute  the  substance 
of  life  and  of  character.  We  never  look  for  anything  of  impor- 
tance to  character  or  to  happiness  in  those  actions,  if  there  be 
any  such,  which  result  somehow  from  a  state  of  indifference.  In 
any  determinations  or  actions  which  may  be  supposed  to  take 
place  in  this  manner,  there  is  no  exercise  of  judgment.  And 
there  is  no  deliberation ;  for  we  deliberate  for  the  purpose  of 
comparing  different  motives  and  satisfying  ourselves  which  is  of 
the  greatest  consequence.  Nor  is  there  any  moral  agency,  for 
this  imphes  that  we  exercise  our  rational  and  moral  powers,  and 
are  governed  by  rational  and  moral  considerations,  and  that  our 
volitions  flow  from  the  dispositions  and  desires  of  our  hearts.  I 
say  therefore  that  if  there  are  any  such  voluntary  actions  as 
are  contended  for  by  those  who  oppose  our  doctrine,  actions 
which  men  perform  without  being  influenced  by  motives,  they 
must  be  considered  as  insignificant  starts  or  unmeaning  accidents, 
and  must  be  wholly  set  aside  in  our  reasoning  on  moral  agency, 
just  as  we  set  aside  dreams,  spasmodic  motions,  and  the  actions  of 
the  insane,  when  we  reason  about  the  principles  of  rational,  ac- 
countable agency ;  and  our  theory,  if  we  would  be  philosophers, 
must  be  made  to  rest  on  those  facts  which  are  undoubted,  and 
important,  and  which  may  be  fairly  examined  and  satisfactorily 
explained. 

The  most  powerful  objection  which  has  ever  been  offered 
against  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity  is,  that  it  is  inconsistent 
with  moral  agency  ;  in  other  words,  that  if  man  is  under  the  in- 
fluence of  moral  necessity,  he   cannot  be  a  moral,  accountable 


162  MORAL    AGENCY. 

agent.  I  assert,  that  a  man  cannot  be  moral  and  accountable, 
unless  he  is  under  this  very  influence,  and  acts  in  this  very  way. 
But  we  will  examine  the  objection. 

To  satisfy  ourselves  whether  any  two  things  are  inconsistent 
with  each  other,  we  must  have  a  clear  and  distinct  conception  of 
what  those  two  things  are.  WJiat  then  is  it  to  be  a  free,  moral 
and  accountable  agent  P  And  what  is  moral  necessity  f  As  we 
have  already  attended  to  these  questions,  we  shall  merely  glance 
at  them  here. 

I  shall  make  my  appeal  then  directly  to  your  moral  sense, 
which,  as  has  often  been  remarked,  must  be  the  ultimate  test  of 
truth  on  all  such  subjects.  The  doctrine  of  moral  necessity  is, 
that  we  always  act  under  the  influence  of  motives,  that  our  ac- 
tions flow  as  consequences  from  motives,  and  that  it  is  impossible 
for  us  to  perform  voluntary  actions  except  as  we  are  influenced 
by  motives,  —  including  in  this  word  all  those  dispositions  of  the 
mind  and  those  outward  objects,  which  are  in  their  nature 
adapted  to  exert  an  influence  upon  us.  Now  I  put  the  question 
to  common  sense.  Let  it  answer.  Is  it  inconsistent  with  moral, 
accountable  agency  that  we  should  be  influenced  by  motives  ? 
First,  take  motives  to  mean  considerations  from  without.  Is  it 
inconsistent  with  our  being  moral  and  accountable  agents,  that 
the  riches,  honors  and  pleasures  of  the  world  should  influence 
our  conduct  ?  Is  it  indeed  true,  that  the  man  whose  actions 
are  prompted  by  these  worldly  objects  ceases  to  be  a  moral 
agent  and  of  course  ceases  to  be  blame-worthy  ?  Is  it  true, 
that  a  judge,  who  is  influenced  by  a  bribe  to  pervert  judgment 
and  to  injure  the  widow  and  the  fatherless,  is  not  a  moral  agent 
and  not  subject  to  blame  ?  If  it  is  so,  then  just  note  the 
reason  why  he  is  not  a  moral  agent  and  why  he  cannot  be 
subject  to  blame.  It  is  because  bad  motives  influence  him, 
because  he  is  governed  by  a  bribe,  —  the  very  reason  why  Scrip- 
ture condemns  him,  and  the  very  reason  why  conscience  con- 
demns him. 

But  secondly  ;  by  the  word  motive  the  dispositions  of  the  heart 
are  often  intended.     In  this  view  the  question  is,  whether  it  is 


MORAL    AGENCY.  153 

inconsistent  with  a  man's  moral  agency  that  he  is  influenced  in 
his  conduct  by  his  own  dispositions  and  feeUngs  ?  Now  did  you 
evei'  imagine  such  a  thing  as  that  Christians  are  not  moral 
agents,  and  so  not  praise-worthy  for  their  obedience,  because 
they  are  influenced  to  it  by  love  to  God  ?  Or  that  wicked  men 
are  not  moral  agents  and  so  not  blame-worthy,  because  in  their 
crimes  they  are  influenced  by  selfishness,  pride  or  malice  ? 
Every  man  knows,  and  if  he  is  honest  will  say,  that  our  being 
influenced  to  do  right  or  wrong  by  the  dispositions  of  our 
hearts  is  the  very  thing  which  makes  us  moral  agents  and 
renders  us  deserving  of  praise  or  blame  for  our  actions,  and 
consequently  that  these  two  things  are  so  far  from  being  in- 
compatible with  each  other,  that  they  cannot  exist  apart. 

But  we  must  pursue  the  objection  a  little  further.  Some, 
who  readily  admit  that  motives  have  a  real  and  important  in- 
fluence on  our  volitions  and  actions,  may  think  that  moral  agency 
would  be  destroyed  by  their  having  a  complete  influence,  an  entire 
control  over  us. 

Here  keep  in  mind  that  the  influence  of  motives,  be  that  in- 
fluence ever  so  great  and  absolute,  is  totally  different  from 
physical  force  or  compulsion.  Keep  in  mind  too,  that  there 
is  notliing  in  the  influence  of  motives  which  precludes  or  pre- 
tends to  preclude  the  deliberate  use  of  our  rational  faculties, 
or  the  perfect  use  of  our  will.  The  motives  which  act  upon  the 
mind  of  a  reasonable  man,  directly  lead  him  to  deliberate,  to 
use  all  his  rational  faculties,  and  most  freely  to  exercise  his 
will. 

Come  then  to  the  question.  Is  it  incompatible  with  moral 
agency,  that  motives  should  have  a  complete  influence  over  us 
and  should  perfectly  control  all  our  actions  ?  The  subject  of 
inquiry  here  is  the  high  degree  of  influence  which  motives  are 
said  to  exert. 

It  is  granted  that  some  influence  of  motives  is  consistent  with 
moral  agency.  I  ask  then  what  there  is  which  interferes  with 
moral  agency  in  a  liigh  degree  of  that  influence,  more  than  in  a 
low  degree  ?     I  appeal  again  to  common  sense  and  conscience. 


154  MORAL    AGENCY. 

Is  it  inconsistent  with  a  man's  moral  agency  that  ho  should  be 
influenced  in  his  actions  wholly  by  love  to  God  ? — that  this  holy 
affection  should  have  a  perfect  control  over  him  ?  If  so,  then 
it  is  inconsistent  with  moral  agency  for  a  man  to  obey  the  divine 
law,  which  requires  him  to  love  God  with  all  the  heart  and  soul 
and  mind  and  strength.  For  where  this  is  done,  love  to  God 
becomes  the  great  and  controlling  motive  to  action.  Again :  If 
the  entire  influence  of  motives  is  inconsistent  with  moral  agency, 
then  a  man  who  is  entirely  enslaved  by  any  perverse,  wicked 
passion,  as  covetousness,  malice  or  revenge,  is  no  longer  a 
moral  agent,  and  no  longer  culpable  for  his  conduct ;  that  is, 
a  man  ceases  to  be  a  moral  agent  and  to  be  blame-worthy  for  his 
conduct,  because  he  violates  the  commands  of  God  in  a  high 
degree,  whereas  if  he  had  violated  them  in  a  lower  degree  he 
might  have  been  considered  as  worthy  of  blame  ! 

Dwell  a  little  upon  this  point.  Suppose  a  case  preposteroua 
as  it  may  be,  in  which  a  man  is  not  entirely  under  the  influence 
of  motives.  Suppose  he  performs  some  very  useful  action,  in 
which  he  is  partly  influenced  by  love  to  God  or  love  to  man,  or 
some  other  good  motive,  and  partly  by  something  else  which  is 
not  a  motive,  that  is,  partly  not  influenced  at  all.  Now  in  what 
light  do  you  view  him  ?  So  far  as  he  is  influenced  by  a  good 
motive,  you  can  have  no  difiiculty.  He  is  thus  far  praise-worthy. 
But  so  far  as  he  acts  without  a  motive,  in  what  light  will  you 
regard  him  ?  He  cannot  be  praise-worthy,  because  he  acts  with- 
out a  good  motive.  He  cannot  be  blame-worthy,  because  he 
acts  without  a  bad  motive.  Both  of  these  positions  are  clear,  as 
we  do  always  by  the  constitution  of  our  minds  refer  to  motives  as 
determining  actions  to  be  good  or  bad.  Now  as  a  man,  so  far  as 
he  acts  without  motives,  is  neither  praise-worthy  nor  blame-worthy, 
what  is  he  ?  Certainly  he  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  moral  agent, 
for  moral  agency  always  implies  desert  of  praise  or  blame.  But 
if  he  is  not  a  moral  agent,  what  is  he  ?  Is  he  a  dreamer  or  a 
madman  ?  Even  a  dreamer  or  a  madman  is  influenced  by  mo- 
tives, though  they  operate  irregularly,  just  as  a  watch  without  a 
regulator  is  still  kept  in  motion  by  the  elastic  power  of  the  spring. 


MORAL     AGENCY.  155 

So  far  then  as  a  man  acts  without  motives,  I  leave  you  to  judge 
in  what  predicament  he  must  be  placed. 

The  supposition  above  made,  and  our  own  reflections  upon  it, 
are  sufficient  to  show  that  just  in  the  degree  in  which  anj  one 
acts  without  motives,  or  otherwise  than  as  he  is  influenced  by 
motives,  he  is  so  far  from  having  a  more  perfect  moral  agency, 
that  he  has  none  at  all ;  is  so  far  from  exercising  a  more  perfect 
freedom,  that  he  comes  into  subjection  to  some  blind,  fatal  im- 
pulse, which  acts  independently  of  reason  and  in  opposition  to  it. 
There  is,  it  may  be,  a  kind  of  freedom  secured  in  this  way,  but 
it  is  freedom  from  the  influence  of  reason.  It  is  freedom  from 
the  principles  and  laws  which  essentially  belong  to  our  intelligent 
and  moral  nature.  And  such  a  freedom,  if  a  privilege,  is  the 
privilege  of  brutes. 

If  a  man  is  partly  influenced  by  good  motives  and  partly  by 
bad,  then  we  consider  him  as  partly  praise-worthy  and  partly 
blame-worthy.  Is  it  not  then  manifest  that  the  difficulty,  which 
the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity  occasions  as  to  moral  agency,  is 
imaginary  ?  that  the  fact  of  our  being  influenced  by  motives  is 
involved  in  the  very  idea  of  moral  agency,  and  that  the  more 
perfectly  we  are  under  the  influence  of  motives,  the  more  per- 
fect is  our  accountable  and  moral  agency  ?  This  conclusion  en- 
tirely agrees  with  the  instructions  of  the  Scriptures,  which  every- 
where represent  men  to  be  praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy  for 
acting  under  the  influence  of  motives,  that  is,  for  acting  as  they 
are  impelled  to  act  by  their  own  dispositions  or  feelings  in  view 
of  outward  objects,  and  which  never  undertake  to  influence  their 
actions  or  to  improve  their  characters  in  any  other  way,  than  by 
the  power  of  motives. 


LE  CTURE    L  V. 


DIFFICULTY  AS  TO  MORAL  INABILITY  CONSIDERED,  ALSO  AS  TO 
THE  DIVINE  PURPOSES,  OUR  DEPENDENCE  ON  GOD,  AND  THE 
WORK    OF   HIS    SPIRIT   IN    SANCTIFICATION. 

The  discussions,  in  which  we  have  been  engaged,  will  I  think 
help  us  to  clear  away  several  difficulties  in  relation  to  our  present 
subject. 

First.  A  difficulty  has  been  supposed  to  arise  from  the  doc- 
trine of  moral  inability.  Come  then  directly  to  the  point,  and  take 
the  case,  so  often  brought  into  view,  of  unrenewed  sinners,  who 
according  to  the  representations  of  the  Scriptures  cannot  believe  in 
Christ,  and  cannot  obey  the  divine  law.  The  question  is,  if  they 
are  unable  to  beheve  and  obey,  how  can  they  be  held  guilty  for 
not  behoving  and  obeying  ?  How  can  they  be  culpable  for  not 
doing  that  which  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  do  ? 

Now  to  avoid  needless  difficulty  arising  from  ambiguous  terms, 
just  do  what  is  acknowledged  to  be  perfectly  allowable  and  fair  in 
other  cases,  that  is,  lay  aside,  for  the  present,  the  words  inability 
and  impossibility,  and  employ  others  which  will  clearly  and  fully 
express  what  is  meant  by  these.  The  inability  spoken  of  is 
such  as  we  should  naturally  suppose  it  to  be,  from  the  fact  that 
it  relates  to  a  moral  agent  and  results  from  moral  causes.  The 
question  then,  freed  from  ambiguity,  is  this.  If  sinners  are 
kept  from  behoving  in  Christ  by  the  moral  causes  which  influence 
them,  that  is,  by  the  wicked  dispositions  of  their  hearts,  how  can 
they  be  culpable  ?  It  is  really  a  strange  question,  and  might  be 
answered  by  asking,  how  they  could  be  culpable,  if  they  were 


MORAL     AGENCY.  157 

kept  from  believing  in  any  other  way  ?  The  fact,  that  they  are 
hindered  from  believing  by  the  wicked  dispositions  of  their  hearts, 
is  the  very  thing  which  constitutes  their  criminality.  And  it 
would  be  singular  indeed,  if  that  which  we  know  to  be  the  very 
thing  which  constitutes  blame-worthiness,  should  be  thought  in- 
consistent with  it.  Considering  what  kind  of  inability  this  is, 
and  in  what  it  consists,  that  is,  the  wickedness  of  the  heart,  it 
is  as  certain  as  any  truth  in  morals,  that  the  higher  the  inability 
rises  and  the  more  uncontrollable  it  is,  the  greater  is  the  degree 
of  guilt.  If  a  man  has  a  heart,  so  proud,  so  worldly  or  so 
selfish,  that  we  are  led  to  say  emphatically,  it  is  impossible  for 
him  to  leave  off  sinning,  or  according  to  the  representation  of 
Scripture,  he  cannot  cease  from  sin  any  more  than  the  leopard 
can  change  his  spots,  he  is  the  man  who  is  worthy  of  the  severest 
condemnation.  This  then  must  be  fixed  once  for  all,  namely, 
that  which  constitutes  a  wicked  man's  inability,  and  makes  it 
impossible  for  him  to  obey  God,  is  the  strength  of  his  corrupt 
inclinations  or  his  criminal  passions.  Now  to  say  that  any  one 
on  this  account  cannot  repent,  or  that  it  is  impossible  for  him  to 
obey  the  gospel,  is  the  same  as  to  say,  he  is  blame-worthy  in  a 
very  high  degree.  Accordingly  when  the  inspired  writers  would 
set  forth  the  inexcusable  wickedness  of  sinners  in  the  clearest 
light,  they  say,  that  sinners  cannot  beheve,  and  cannot  be  sub- 
ject to  the  divine  law,  that  it  is  as  impossible  for  them  to  cease 
to  do  evil  and  learn  to  do  well,  as  for  the  Ethiopian  to  change 
his  skin.  The  language  is  indeed  metaphorical,  inasmuch  as 
words,  which  in  their  literal  sense  express  an  inability  of  another 
kind,  that  is,  belonging  to  physical  subjects  and  arising  from 
physical  causes,  (as  a  man's  inability  to  fly)  —  are  used  to  de- 
note an  inability  belonging  to  an  intelligent  being,  arising  from 
moral  causes,  that  is,  the  sinful  dispositions  of  the  heart.  But 
this  metaphorical  language  is  naturally  prompted,  as  in  other 
cases,  by  the  strength  of  our  conceptions  and  feelings,  and  is 
easily  understood  by  those  who  know  what  such  conceptions  and 
feeUngs  are.  The  chief  reason,  why  there  is  so  much  mistake  on 
this  subject,  is  the  want  of  a  clear  and  vivid  impression  of  the 
VOL.  n.  14 


158  MORAL     AGENCY. 

nature  of  that  which  constitutes  the  inabiUtj,  and  of  the  infinite 
evil  involved  in  it.  Let  the  minds  of  men  be  opened  to  the 
hatefulness  and  malignity  of  sin,  consisting  in  the  wicked 
disposition  of  the  heart,  and  they  will  perceive  at  once  that  the 
invincible  strength  and  obstinacy  of  that  disposition,  which  pre- 
vents sinners  from  repenting  and  urges  them  forward  in  their 
fatal  career,  is  so  far  from  affording  any  justification  of  their  con- 
duct, that  it  constitutes  their  guilt  and  stamps  their  characters  as 
objects  of  unqualified  abhorrence.  It  is  here  then  Ave  should  lay 
out  our  principal  efforts.  We  should  treat  this  inability  of  sinners, 
not  so  much  as  a  subject  of  philosophical  reasoning,  as  of  moral 
perception  and  feeling.  While  a  man  is  unable  to  see,  it  is  in 
vain  to  reason  with  him  as  to  the  nature  of  an  object  which  can 
be  known  only  by  sight.  The  first  thing  to  be  attempted  is  to 
cure  the  disease  of  his  eyes  and  give  him  clear  vision,  so  that  he 
may  see  the  object  the  nature  of  which  you  wish  him  to  under- 
stand. Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  the  prevailing  error  in  regard 
to  the  subject  is  primarily  an  error  of  feeling,  not  of  intellect.  Of 
course  we  cannot  expect  to  remove  it  by  arguments  addressed 
merely  to  the  understanding. 

Secondly.  Another  difficulty  respecting  moral  agency  has  been 
supposed  to  arise  from  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  purposes,  or  from 
the  doctrine  of  necessity  as  involved  in  the  divine  purposes.  In  a 
previous  Lecture  we  looked  at  this  difficulty  from  another  point  of 
view.  The  present  question  is,  whether  the  doctrine  of  God's  un- 
changeable purposes,  which  plainly  impUes  such  a  necessity,  can 
be  reconciled  with  man's  free  agency.  Now  if  any  one  affirms 
that  these  doctrines  are  inconsistent,  let  him  show  what  the  incon- 
sistency is.  I  know  it  has  often  been  asserted,  that  an  eternal, 
immutable  purpose  of  God,  determining  the  actions  of  men,  puts 
them  under  a  necessity  of  performing  those  actions  which  is  totally 
at  variance  with  their  freedom  as  moral  agents,  that  it  sets  aside 
and  destroys  their  accountableness,  and  makes  them  passive  ma- 
chines. But  has  it  ever  been  proved  that  the  divine  purpose,  or 
the  necessity  involved  in  it,  does  in  fact  destroy  man's  free  agen- 
cy ?     A  man  may  say,  if  he  pleases,  that  the  law  of  gravitation  is 


MORAL    AGENCY.  159 

inconsistent  with  the  motion  of  a  clock.  But  such  an  assertion  is 
entitled  to  no  regard,  unless  the  alleged  inconsistency  can  be  clear- 
ly proved.  If  the  divine  purpose  is  really  incompatible  with 
moral  agency,  it  must  be  because  it  takes  away  or  opposes  some- 
thing which  belongs  to  that  agency.  If  all  the  properties  and 
circumstances  of  moral  agency  exist  without  hinderance  or  impedi- 
ment under  the  influence  of  a  divine  purpose,  as  perfectly  as  they 
could  if  there  were  no  such  purpose,  then  certainly  there  is  no  in- 
consistency between  them.  Examine  this  point  then,  and  inquire 
whether  there  is  anytliing  in  the  eternal,  immutable  purpose  of 
God,  or  in  the  necessity  implied  in  it,  which  interferes  with  any 
part  of  moral  agency.  To  make  the  examination  easy  and  satis- 
factory, take  a  particular  case.  It  was  most  certainly  the  deter- 
minate counsel  and  purpose  of  God  that  Paul  should  preach  the 
gospel  to  the  Gentiles.  And  in  preaching  the  gospel,  he  was  under 
the  influence  of  the  divine  purpose,  as  much  as  a  man  ever  was. 
Now  I  ask  you,  first,  whether  the  Apostle  had  a  real  agency  in 
preaching  ?  Was  he  active  in  it  ?  He  certainly  was  active. 
He  exerted  the  most  intense  agency.  If  Paul  was  not  active,  what 
man  ever  was  ?  But  did  he  exercise  a  free  agency  ?  Free  from 
what  ?  I  ask.  It  was  certainly  free  from  physical  compulsion. 
But  if  by  a  free  agency  is  meant  an  agency  free  from  the  influence 
of  motives,  such  as  love  to  Christ  and  desire  for  the  salvation  of 
men,  then  certainly  Paul's  agency  was  not  free,  for  these  afiections 
not  only  existed,  but  were  so  powerful  as  to  govern  all  his  actions. 
The  love  of  Christ  constrained  him.  If  Paul  had  been  free  in  this 
respect,  that  is,  free  from  the  influence  of  his  own  dispositions  or 
affections,  he  could  have  exercised  no  moral  agency.  For  it  is 
manifestly  essential  to  a  man's  moral  agency,  that  he  should  act 
according  to  the  dispositions  of  his  own  heart  and  be  influenced 
by  them.  Again  ;  was  Paul  voluntary  ?  He  certainly  was.  From 
love  to  Christ  and  a  desire  to  advance  his  kmgdom,  he  willed  to 
engage  in  the  work  of  preaching  to  the  Gentiles.  Both  in  taking 
upon  him  the  office  of  an  Apostle  and  in  all  his  labors  in  that  office, 
he  was  perfectly  voluntary.  He  acted  according  to  his  will. 
Again.   It  is  the  part  of  a  discreet  moral  agent,  that  in  important 


160  MORAL     AGENCY. 

matters  lie  deliberates  before  he  acts,  and  chooses  in  consequence 
of  deliberation.  This  is  what  Paul  did.  He  carefully  weighed 
the  subject  before  him,  and  yielded  to  those  considerations  which 
he  found  to  be  most  important.  These  are  the  main  points.  Paul 
was  an  agent,  he  acted.  In  his  agency  he  was  free  from  com- 
pulsion, free  from  every  blind,  convulsive  passion,  and  from  what- 
ever might  tend  to  unhinge  his  rational  powers.  He  was  voluntary, 
and  his  choice  was  always  conformed  to  his  dispositions.  And, 
finally,  he  acted  with  deliberation.  Now  if,  while  acting  accor- 
ding to  the  divine  purpose  and  under  the  influence  of  the  divine 
purpose,  he  still  possessed  and  exercised  everything  which  moral 
agency  implies,  then  what  becomes  of  the  alleged  inconsistency 
between  his  moral  agency  and  the  divine  purpose  ?  And  what 
confusion  must  pervade  the  understanding  of  any  one,  who  serious- 
ly thinks  them  inconsistent ! 

The  views  I  have  expressed  in  regard  to  the  Apostle  are  of 
universal  application.  The  divine  purpose  can  never  be  consider- 
ed as  incompatible  with  moral  agency,  if  while  acting  under  that 
purpose  we  do  really  exercise  the  whole  and  every  part  of  moral 
agency.  Whether  the  two  things  are  compatible,  that  is,  wheth- 
er they  can  exist  together,  is  to  be  learned,  just  as  the  consisten- 
cy of  all  other  facts  is,  by  experience  and  observation.  For  the 
sake  of  illustration,  suppose  that  any  one  wholly  unacquainted 
with  the  subject  should  inquire,  whether  the  absence  of  sensation 
and  the  suspension  of  vokmtary  motion  in  sleep  is  compatible  Avith 
the  regular  pulsation  of  the  heart  and  the  continued  activity  of  the 
will  and  other  mental  faculties  ;  in  what  way  could  he  determine 
this  ?  Surely  by  determining  whether  there  is  in  fact  a  regular 
pulsation  of  the  heart  and  a  continued  activity  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties in  sleep.  As  soon  as  he  should  find  what  is  the  fact,  he  would 
consider  the  question  of  consistency  determined.  And  universal- 
ly, whenever  we  inquire  whether  any  two  things  are  consistent, 
we  must  deem  it  satisfactory  to  find,  that  they  have  in  fact  uni- 
formly existed  together  without  interference.  This  must  be  satis- 
factory, even  in  cases  where  previously  to  the  knowledge  of  facts 
we  should  be  most  likely  to  suspect  an  inconsistency.     We  might, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  161 

for  example,  think  that  the  general  law  of  gravitation  is  utterly  in- 
consistent with  some  of  the  properties  of  the  magnet.  But  when 
we  find  that  the  magnet  actually  possesses  those  peculiar  proper- 
ties, without  losing  any  of  its  weight,  we  have  no  further  question 
as  to  their  consistency.  The  same  as  to  the  present  subject. 
When  we  have  found  it  to  be  true,  that  God  has  predetermined 
the  actions  of  men,  and  also  that  we  are  moral  agents,  we  have 
come  to  the  end  of  our  inquiry.  If  the  two  things  actually  exist 
together,  we  know  certainly  that  they  are  consistent,  which  is 
really  the  same  thing  as  knowing  that  they  do  exist  together. 
After  finding  this,  we  have  nothmg  to  do  but  to  give  such  a  de- 
scription of  the  two  things  as  shall  correspond  with  Scripture 
and  our  own  consciousness.  But  if  after  all  any  one  thinks  that 
moral  agency  cannot  exist  together  with  an  immutable  divuie 
purpose,  it  must  be  because  he  disregards  the  evidence  of  facts, 
and  indulges  groundless  and  false  imaginations. 

Thirdly.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  reason  and  revelation  that  in 
God  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being,  that  we  think  and 
speak,  choose  and  act,  with  power  derived  from  him.  The 
question  is,  how  this  universal  dependence  of  ours,  which  involves 
one  form  of  moral  necessity,  can  consist  with  our  being  free, 
moral  and  responsible  agents. 

Here  we  arrive  at  satisfaction  in  the  same  way  as  before. 
First,  we  inquire  for  evidence  of  each  of  these  points,  —  our  de- 
pendence on  God,  and  our  moral  agency.  The  evidence  in 
one  case  is  different  from  that  in  the  other,  but  perfect  in 
both.  And  this  perfect  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  one 
and  the  other,  is  equally  perfect  evidence  that  one  is  consistent 
with  the  other. 

Again ;  we  examine  the  subject  of  our  dependence  by  itself, 
and  the  subject  of  our  moral  agency  by  itself,  and  particularly 
search  out  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  each.  Then  we  in- 
quire whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  they  interfere  with  each  other  ? 
If  they  interfere,  how  and  in  what  respect  ?  Take  anything 
essential  to  moral  agency,  take  for  example  the  consciousness  of 
good  and  evil.  Does  our  dependence  on  God  interfere  with 
14* 


162  MOKAL     AGENCY. 

this  ?  Have  we  any  the  less  consciousness  of  doing  right  when 
we  ohej  God,  and  of  doing  wrong  when  we  disobey,  because  we 
are  dependent  ?  Does  the  circumstance  of  our  being  created  and 
dependent,  exclude  the  sense  of  guilt  in  us  when  we  commit  acts 
of  dishonesty  and  malice  ?  On  the  contrary,  does  not  the  very 
consideration  of  our  dependence  on  God  impress  our  minds  with 
our  obligation  to  worship  and  obey  him,  and  make  us  feel  with 
additional  force,  that  Ave  are  without  excuse  if  we  neglect  this  ? 
Further.  Does  our  dependence  on  God  hinder  us  from  being 
voluntary  ?  Or  does  it  hinder  us  from  being  influenced  by  ra- 
tional motives  ?  Or  you  may  vary  the  method  of  inquiry  thus : 
Does  our  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  or  our  being  volun- 
tary, or  our  being  influenced  by  motives,  or  anything  else  be- 
longing to  moral  agency,  prove  that  we  are  not  dependent  on 
God?  And  this  is  much  the  same  as  to  ask,  whether  our 
moral  agency  proves  that  God  is  not  our  Creator  and  Pre- 
server ;  or  whether  God's  having  made  us  is  consistent  with  our 
heing  moral  agents.  As  to  this,  I  tliink  we  might  more  properly 
ask,  how  we  could  be  moral  agents,  if  God  had  not  made  us. 
In  truth,  the  Almighty  Agency  of  God  on  which  we  are  entirely 
dependent,  instead  of  interfering  with  our  moral  agency,  is  the 
cause  and  the  only  cause  of  it. 

Fourtlily.  This  brings  us  to  the  last  point  of  difficulty  on 
which  I  shall  now  remark,  that  is,  the  Scripture  doctrine  of 
divine  inflvience  in  the  sanctification  of  sinners,  which  involves 
moral  necessity  in  another  form.  The  Scriptures  teach  that  it 
IS  God  who  renews  men  to  holiness,  and  works  in  them  both  to 
will  and  to  do.  The  question  is,  how  we  can  be  under  obligation 
to  be  holy,  and  be  praise-worthy  when  we  are  holy,  if  God  pro- 
duces holiness  in  us. 

We  may  answer  this  question,  as  we  have  answered  others,  by 
showing  that  there  is  evidence  of  the  divine  influence  in  pro- 
ducing hohness  in  us,  and  evidence  also  of  our  being  under  ob- 
ligation to  be  holy,  and  praise-worthy  when  we  are  holy.  And 
this  will  be  the  same  as  showing,  that  there  is  evidence  of  their 
being  consistent  with  each  other. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  163 

The  Scripture  view  of  this  subject  seems  to  me  to  be  encum- 
bered with  no  special  difficulty.  The  Spirit  of  God  is  the  cause 
of  holiness  in  moral  agents.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  Spirit  of 
God  which  influences  them,  as  moral  agents,  to  love  God,  to 
repent,  and  to  do  what  is  right.  Holiness  being  an  effect,  which 
takes  place  in  dependent  sinful  beings,  must  have  the  Holy  Spirit 
for  its  cause.  And  if  one  thing  is  the  cause  of  another,  they 
are  surely  consistent,  that  is,  there  is  a  consistency  between  one 
of  them  as  a  cause  and  the  other  as  an  effect.  And  why  should 
it  seem  strange  to  any  man,  that  God  should  be  the  cause  of 
such  an  effect  ?  Is  he  not  competent  to  produce  the  effect  ?  Is 
holiness  of  such  a  nature,  that  it  cannot  be  an  effect,  produced 
by  a  divine  cause  ?  To  assert  this  would  be  to  assert  that  hoU- 
ness  cannot  exist  in  any  created  being.  For  it  is  clear,  that  the 
existence  and  all  the  properties  and  actions  of  created  beings 
must  be  the  result  directly  or  indirectly  of  God's  agency.  They 
must  be  so,  or  they  must  be  self-originated  and  independent. 
But  who  will  maintain  the  principle,  that  in  order  to  be  moral 
agents  we  must  be  self- existent  or  independent?  Who  will 
maintain  that  God  cannot  create  a  dependent  agent,  and  cause 
that  dependent  agent  to  exercise  holiness  ?  But  if  God  is 
able  to  produce  such  an  effect,  and  if  holiness  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  may  be  an  effect,  then  there  is  nothing  in- 
credible and  nothing  inconsistent  with  moral  agency  in  the 
doctrine  that  the  commencement  and  the  continuance  of  holiness 
in  man  is  the  effect  of  the  divine  operation. 

I  might  here  remind  you  of  the  principle,  so  ably  and  perfectly 
maintained  by  Edwards,  that  the  praise-worthiness  or  blame- 
worthiness of  a  thing  depends  not  on  its  cause,  but  on  its  nature. 
And  I  might  also  appeal  to  moral  feeling  and  Christian  experi- 
ence. Did  any  apostle  or  any  other  good  man  ever  regard  his 
own  piety  and  holiness  as  less  excellent  and  less  worthy  of  ap- 
probation, because  it  was  wrought  in  him  by  the  grace  of  God  ? 
When  Paul  mentions  the  variety  of  lovely  and  praise-worthy  vir- 
tues, he  mentions  them  as  the  fruit  of  the  Spirit.  And  so  they 
are  regarded  in  the  prayers  and  praises  of  all  the  saints. 


LECTURE    LVI. 


MORAL  AGENCY  CONTINUES  THROUGH  ALL  CHANGES  OP  CHARAC- 
TER. THE  NARRATIVE  GEN.  Ill,  A  SATISFACTORY  ACCOUNT  OF 
THE   FIRST  HUMAN   SIN. 

There  is  one  more  subject  connected  witli  the  doctrine  of 
moral  agency  and  moral  necessity,  to  which  I  would  ask  your  at- 
tention, namely,  the  existence  of  moral  evil,  and  particularly  the 
commencement  of  human  sin.  This  is  a  subject  which  has  for 
ages  produced  a  deep  interest  in  the  minds  of  men.  It  has 
been  a  standing  topic  for  those  especially  who  have  been  fond  of 
abstruse  investigation.  A  multitude  of  treatises  have  been  writ- 
ten on  the  subject,  some  of  them  with  a  good  measure  of  ability, 
a  larger  number  weakly  or  obscurely,  and  a  few  with  clearness 
and  plain  common  sense.  For  me  to  think  of  discussing  this 
subject  satisfactorily  or  usefully,  may  expose  me  to  the  charge 
of  presumption.  But  in  whatever  difficulties  the  subject  may 
be  involved,  and  however  inadequate  I  may  be  to  the  task  of 
clearing  them  away,  I  may  perhaps  be  able  to  give  a  few  proper 
and  useful  hints  as  to  the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  and  to  turn 
your  thoughts  to  what  is  intelligible  and  obvious  and  certain. 
This  is  what  I  shall  attempt  to  do,  willingly  leaving  other  parts  of 
the  subject  to  those,  who  may  have  a  particular  liking  to  what  is 
uncertain  and  obscure,  and  to  what  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of 
human  intelligence. 

The  first  point  I  shall  bring  to  view  is,  that  moral  agency  con- 
tinues unimpaired  and  uninterrupted  through  all  the  changes  which 
take  place  in  the  character  of  men.     These  changes,  so  far  as 


MORAL     AGENCY.  165 

I  shall  speak  of  them,  may  be  included  under  the  following 
heads ;  first,  change  from  entire  holiness  to  sinfulness ;  second, 
change  from  entire  sinfulness  to  holiness ;  third,  change  from  a 
less  to  a  greater  degree  of  sinfulness  ;  fourth,  change  from  a 
less  to  greater  degree  of  holiness.  My  position  is,  that  man  is 
a  moral  agent  and  exercises  all  the  powers  necessary  to  moral 
agency,  when  he  changes  from  a  state  of  moral  rectitude  to  a 
state  of  depravity,  and  proceeds  from  one  degree  of  depra\"ity, 
to  another ;  and  also  when  he  changes  from  a  state  of  entire  de- 
pravity to  a  state  of  holiness,  and  rises  from  one  degree  of 
hohness  to  another.  Of  the  first  of  these  changes,  that  is,  from 
holiness  to  sin,  there  has  been  no  instance  in  our  world,  except 
that  of  Adam  and  Eve.  Of  all  the  others,  there  are  instances 
innumerable.  Through  all  these  changes,  I  maintain  that  moral 
agency  remains  unimpaired.     This  appears. 

First,  from  the  very  terms  employed  to  express  the  change. 
A  man  changes  from  holiness  to  sin,  or  from  sin  to  holiness,  or 
from  a  less  degree  of  one  of  these  to  a  greater.  But  what  is 
holiness  or  sin,  but  a  moral  property  belonging  to  a  moral  agent  ? 
The  very  fact  that  one  exercises  holiness  or  sin,  presupposes  that 
he  is  under  a  moral  law,  and  is  praise-Avorthy  or  blame-worthy 
for  what  he  does.  A  change  from  holiness  to  sin,  or  the  reverse, 
is,  if  the  terms  have  any  meaning,  a  change  from  one  exercise  or 
state  of  moral  agency  to  another.  To  speak  of  holiness  or 
sin,  except  as  the  property  of  a  moral  agent,  would  be  a 
solecism. 

Secondly.  The  truth  of  my  position  appears  from  this  con- 
sideration, that  everything  which  constitutes  moral  agency  is 
found  to  belong  to  man  through  all  these  changes  of  character. 
When  man  changes  from  holiness  to  sin  or  from  sin  to  holiness,  he 
continues  to  be  intelliyent.  He  possesses  and  exercises  his  intel- 
lectual faculties,  when  these  changes  take  place,  as  much  as  he 
does  at  any  other  time.  If  he  changes  from  sin  to  holiness,  he 
exercises  his  understandino;  riorht.     If  he  changes  from  hohness  to 

0,0  O 

sin,  he  still  exercises   it,  though   improperly.      So  far  then  as 
reason  or  understanding  goes  to  constitute  a  moral  agent,  man's 


166  MORAL     AGENCY. 

moral  agency  remains  through  all  the  changes  which  can  be  sup- 
posed in  his  character.  We  find  also  that  he  as  perfectly  re- 
tains and  exercises  affection  and  ivill,  when  changes  of  character 
take  place,  as  at  any  other  time.  When  he  changes  from  holi- 
ness to  sin,  he  begins  to  love  and  to  choose  what  is  bad.  When 
he  changes  from  sin  to  holiness,  he  begins  to  love  and  choose 
what  is  good.  And  these  first  exercises  of  affection  and  will  are 
as  free  and  as  complete  as  any  subsequent  ones,  though  perhaps 
not  equal  in  degree.  Further:  In  all  the  changes  of  charac- 
ter, which  take  place,  man  is  influenced  hy  motives.  A  man, 
who  has  been  uniformly  obedient  to  God,  does  not  cease  to  obey 
and  begin  to  disobey  without  a  motive.  He  is  as  much  influenced 
by  motives  in  such  a  change  of  character,  as  in  anything  else. 
He  is  the  same  as  to  all  the  attributes  and  circumstances  of 
moral  agency.  The  most  thorough  examination  will  show  that 
they  all  exist  here  without  diminution  or  interruption. 

Thirdly.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  these  changes 
themselves  are  made  the  subjects  of  divine  precepts.  God  re- 
quires men  to  change  from  sin  to  holiness,  and  forbids  them  to 
change  from  holiness  to  sin.  But  God  does  not  merely  command 
men  to  change  from  sin  to  holiness,  and  not  to  change  from 
hohness  to  sin,  but  enforces  his  commands  by  various  and  power- 
ful motives.  All  this  implies,  that  a  man  must  exercise  his  moral 
agency  in  obeying  or  disobeying  these  commands,  as  much  as 
in  any  other  action  of  his  life.  We  conclude  then  that  God's 
giving  us  these  particular  commands  must  imply  that  we  are 
moral  agents  in  respect  to  the  changes  of  character  to  which 
these  commands  relate. 

Fourthly.  The  unbiassed  conviction  of  every  man's  con- 
science shows  that  moral  agency  is  never  interrupted  or  dimin- 
ished by  change  of  character.  This  view  of  the  subject  is  more 
or  less  implied  in  previous  remarks,  but  it  deserves  to  be  con- 
sidered more  distinctly.  Let  any  man  then,  Avho  has  turned 
from  sin  to  holiness,  reflect  on  this  change,  and  on  himself  in 
respect  to  it.  Let  him  ask  himself,  —  did  I  not  do  right  in 
turning  from  sin,  in  ceasing  to  hate  my  Maker,  and  in  beginning 


MORAL    AGENCY.  167 

to  love  and  obey  him  ?  Had  I  not  sufficient  reasons  for  such  a 
change  ?  Do  I  not  approve  of  myself  for  having  submitted,  to 
the  influence  of  those  reasons  ?  Do  I  not  feel  it  to  have  been 
suitable  and  virtuous  and  holy,  that  I  became  a  friend  to  Christ? 
The  answer,  which  the  conscience  of  every  converted  man  must 
give  to  such  inquiries,  will  contaui  a  full  recognition  of  his  own 
moral  agency  in  the  act  of  his  conversion,  as  clearly  and  as  per- 
fectly so,  as  in  any  virtuous  action  he  ever  did  or  can  do.  It  is  the 
same,  if  a  man  has  turned  from  holiness  to  sin.  The  spontaneous 
sentiment  of  his  own  heart  is,  that  he  has  done  wrong.  He  dis- 
approves and  condemns  himself  for  it.  In  his  own  unfettered 
conscience  he  considers  it  to  be  a  criminal  act,  as  much  as  any 
sin  in  his  subsequent  life.  So  it  evidently  was  with  our  first 
parents,  and  so  it  must  be  with  every  moral  agent  who  falls 
from  holiness  to  sin,  whatever  may  be  the  influence  that  acts 
upon  him. 

Let  us  now  pause  and  see  what  purpose  is  answered  by  this 
train  of  remarks.  The  position  which  I  have  here  taken  wiU 
and  must,  I  think,  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  things  which  are 
plain  and  certain.  You  will  then  consider  it  as  perfectly  set- 
tled, and  never  again  to  be  the  subject  of  doubt,  that  man's 
moral  agency  continues  unimpaired  through  all  the  changes 
which  take  place  in  his  character.  In  regard  to  this  part  of 
the  subject  you  cannot  reasonably  indulge  any  doubt,  and  you 
need  not  feel  any  difficulty.  When  you  recur  to  instances,  in 
which  men  are  turned  from  sin  to  holiness,  you  have  no  occasion 
whatever  to  perplex  yourselves  in  regard  to  these  changes,  any 
more  than  in  regard  to  the  common  actions  of  life.  And  when 
you  recur  to  the  first  human  sin,  and  consider  that  man,  who 
had  for  a  time  rendered  uniform  obedience  to  God,  did  at  lenorth, 
under  the  influence  of  temptation,  become  a  transgressor,  you 
have  indeed  the  strongest  reason  for  astonishment  and  sorrow, 
that  a  change  took  place  so  criminal  in  its  nature  and  so  dread- 
ful in  its  consequences.  But  you  have  not  the  least  reason  for 
any  difficulty  as  to  the  consistency  of  that  event  with  moral 
agency.      As  a  moral  agent,  man  was  as  capable  of  committing 


168  MOKAL     AGENCY. 

the  first  sin,  as  any  subsequent  sin.  To  begin  to  transgress  is  as 
much  within  the  province  of  moral  agency,  as  to  continue  to  trans- 
gress. It  was  truly  most  grievous  and  deplorable,  that  the  father 
of  the  human  family  sinned  against  God.  And  it  was  grievous 
and  deplorable  too,  that  David  and  Peter  and  Judas  sinned  against 
God,  and  that  all  men  have  sinned.  But  you  are  to  remember 
that  the  father  of  the  human  family,  and  David  and  Peter  and 
Judas  were  equally  moral  agents.  The  moral  agency  of  Adam 
in  his  first  offence  is  as  plain  and  certain,  as  that  of  any  man  in 
any  offence  he  ever  commits.  You  have  then  no  more  reason  to 
ask,  how  it  could  be  consistent  with  moral  agency  that  Adam 
who  was  holy  became  unholy,  or  began  to  disobey,  than  to  ask 
how  it  can  be  consistent  with  moral  agency,  that  any  man  now 
disobeys,  or  continues  to  disobey. 

The  difiiculty  which  many  feel  on  this  subject  arises,  I  appre- 
hend, from  an  incorrect  view  of  the  laws  or  principles  which  per- 
tain to  the  mind  of  a  moral  agent.  They  seem  to  imagine  that 
every  affection  must  be  like  the  preceding  affection,  and  so  that 
there  certainly  will  and  must  be  in  every  moral  agent,  an  unbrok- 
en, perpetual  series  of  affections  of  the  same  kind.  But  experi- 
ence shows  that  changes  in  the  affections  of  moral  agents  actually 
and  often  take  place,  and  of  course  that  the  supposed  principle 
does  not  exist.  It  is  indeed  the  case,  that  affections  of  the  same 
kind  are  likely  to  continue,  and  that  in  ordinary  circumstances 
there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  this.  But  we  well  know  that  such 
causes  may  operate  ,upon  the  mind  as  will  interrupt  the  uniform 
series  of  affections,  and  excite  those  which  are  of  a  different  char- 
acter from  any  which  preceded.  Accordingly  whatever  may  be 
true  as  to  the  j^revailing  tendency  of  things,  it  cannot  be  considered 
as  one  of  the  laws  of  the  mind,  that  the  same  affections  will  cer- 
tainly be  continued.  And  when  in  any  case  the  series  of  good 
or  bad  affections  is  interrupted,  and  those  are  exercised  which  are 
different  from  the  preceding,  we  are  not  to  consider  this  as  super- 
seding any  established  law  of  the  mind  appertaining  to  moral 
agency.  And  we  have  no  occasion  to  ask,  Jioio  it  can  he,  as  though 
such  a  law  was  violated.     I  shall  just  add,  that  if  changes  from 


MORAL    AGENCY.  169 

holiness  to  sin  and  from  sin  to  holiness  occurred  as  frequently,  as 
changes  in  respect  to  the  degree  of  holiness  or  sin,  we  should  no 
more  consider  the  former  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  moral  agen- 
cy than  the  latter. 

My  next  general  remark  is,  that  the  simple  narrative  given  in 
Q-en.  dd  is  to  be  received  as  a  true,  unreserved  and  satisfacto- 
ry account  of  tlie first  human  sin.  The  account  is  true.  It  agrees 
with  facts.  The  things  mentioned  actually  took  place,  as  they  are 
represented  to  have  taken  place.  The  account  is  unreserved. 
Nothing  is  purposely  concealed.  Everything  is  told,  which  is 
essential  to  a  just  view  of  the  case.  The  account  is  satisfactory. 
It  not  only  relates  the  fact  of  the  original  transgression,  but 
mentions  the  circumstances  which  led  to  it,  and  in  this  way  as 
really  accounts  for  it,  as  history  in  any  other  case  accounts  for 
human  actions.  Is  the  history  which  the  Bible  gives  of  the  con- 
duct of  Joseph's  brethren,  of  Pharaoh's  opposition  to  Moses,  of 
David's  offence  in  respect  to  Bathsheba,  of  Herod's  treatment  of 
John,  of  Peter's  cowardice,  and  Judas's  treachery,  to  be  received 
as  satisfactory  ?  The  answer  is  easy,  if  we  consider  that  noth- 
ing is  necessary  to  constitute  a  satisfactory  history  of  any  mis- 
conduct, but  to  describe  the  misconduct  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  to 
show  what  were  the  circumstances  which  led  to  it.  In  regard  to 
the  instances  just  referred  to,  the  sacred  historian  describes  the 
conduct  of  Joseph's  brethren  in  selling  him,  of  Pharaoh  in  opposing 
Moses,  of  David  in  committing  adultery,  and  of  Herod  in  be- 
heading John,  and  suggests  to  us  the  motives  by  which  they 
were  led  to  commit  those  sins.  In  hke  manner,  the  author  of 
the  Pentateuch  gives  us  an  account  of  the  transgression  first  of 
Eve,  then  of  Adam,  and  informs  us  what  temptations  operated 
upon  them,  and  how  they  were  influenced  to  transgress.  There 
was  a  motive  presented  to  the  mind  of  Eve,  which  in  the  view 
of  the  tempter  was  suited  to  influence  her  and  which  actually 
did  influence  her  to  disobey  the  divine  command.  And  the 
same  as  to  Adam. 

We  must  acknowledge  that  there  are  difficulties  attending  thia 
subject,  which  we  are   not  able  to  solve.     And  it  seems  very 

VOL.  n.  16 


170  MORAL     AGENCY. 

natural  to  expect  sucli  difficulties  in  relation  to  an   event,  whicli 
lies  beyond  the   circle  of  our  experience  ;  an  event  which  occur- 
red so  many  thousand  years  ago,  when  man  possessed  a  charac- 
ter and  was  in  a  condition  so  diflferent  from  what  has  ever  be- 
lono-ed  to  human  beings  since.     But  in  a  metaphysical  view,  what 
greater  difficulty  are  we  obliged  to  encounter  respecting  the  first 
sin,  than  respecting  any  other  ?     No  affection  or  action  of  man 
can  exist  without  a  cause.     In  the  ordinary  sense,  the   cause  of 
an  affection,  and  of  a  consequent  action,  is  the  consideration,  the 
motive,  which  excites  it,  in  connection  with  the   state   of  mind 
from  which  it  proceeds.     In  this  sense,  the  motives  presented  to 
Adam  and  Eve,  in  connection  with  the  state  of  mind  they  then 
had,  and  with  all  their  circumstances,  were  as  really  the  means 
of  inducing  them  to  commit  the  first  sin,  as  motives  were  the 
means  of  inducing  them  to  transgress  at  any  subsequent  period. 
In  this  respect  then,  there  is  no  pecuhar  difficulty  attending  the 
first  sin.     And  if  you  refer  to  the  supreme  cause  of  all  things, 
is  there  not  as  real  a  difficulty  in  the  case  of  every  other  sin,  as 
of  the  first  sin  ?     No  affection  exists  and  no  action  is  performed 
independently  of  the   Supreme   Being.     Other  causes  produce 
affections   and  consequent   actions  as  God  has  appointed,  or  ac- 
cording to  his  wise  and  holy  constitution.     The  motive,  which  led 
to  a  sinful  act  in  Adam  many  years  after  he  apostatized,  had  no 
more  efficacy  independently  of  the  appointment  of  God  or  the 
laws  of  mind  which  he  had  established,  than  the  motive  which 
led  to  the  first  sin.     Who  has  a  right  to  say  that  God  had  any 
more   concern  in  regard  to  the  first  sin,  than  he  has  in  regard 
to  any  other?     In  respect  to  the  first  and  all  that  follow,  it  is 
the  divine  constitution  or  appointment,  which  invests  motives  with 
power  to  induce  a  sinful  action ;  or  if  you  choose  another  form 
of  expression,  it  is  God  who  orders  things  so  that  sin  shall  exist 
in  a  moral  agent  as  the  effect  of  motives,  or  as  the   consequence 
of  temptation.     This,  I  repeat  it,  is  as  much  the  case  in  regard 
to  all  the    sins  of  men,  as  it  was  in   regard    to   the   first   sin. 
And  if  so,  then  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose,  that  there  is  any 
more   difficulty   as   to  the   cause   of  the    first   sinful   affection, 


MORAL    AGENCY.  171 

than  there  is  as  to  the  cause  of  any  other?  Instead  then, 
of  pursuing  the  inquiry  in  reference  merely  to  the  first  sin- 
ful aifection,  make  the  inquiry  general,  and  pursue  it  in  refer- 
ence to  every  sinful  act.  Why  should  we  perplex  ourselves  with 
the  imagination,  that  there  is  anything  more  inscrutable  in  regard 
to  free,  moral  agency,  and  more  difficult  to  be  accounted  for  in 
the  first  sin,  than  in  any  other,  considering  that  sinful  doings  in 
all  cases  equally  result  from  motives,  that  motives  in  all  cases 
equally  owe  their  efficacy  to  a  divine  constitution,  and  that 
the  manner  in  which  God  imparts  efficacy  to  motives  is,  in  all 
cases,  equally  correspondent  with  the  laws  of  moral  agency. 

That  man  always  exercises  his  faculties  in  a  state  of  entire 
dependence  on  God  must  be  allowed  by  all  who  believe  the 
Bible,  or  who  soberly  consider  the  condition  of  created  beings. 
It  was  the  declaration  of  a  heathen  poet  and  of  an  Apostle  after 
him,  that  in  God  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being.  But 
neither  the  dependence  of  intelHgent  beings,  nor  the  divine 
agency  as  to  the  existence  of  moral  good  and  evil  —  whatever 
else  may  be  true  respecting  it  —  is  such  as  to  be  at  all  in- 
consistent with  the  nature  or  condition  of  natural  and  accountable 
beings.  The  agency  which  God  exercises,  is  an  agency  which 
preserves  all  the  intellectual  and  moral  powers  of  man,  secures 
them  against  force  or  coercion,  coalesces  with  them,  and  makes  it 
certain  that  nothing  shall  hinder  their  free  and  unconstrained 
operation.  In  other  words,  the  divine  agency,  instead  of  destroy- 
ing or  interfering  with  moral  agency  in  man,  first  makes  man 
a  moral  agent,  and  then  continues  him  perpetually  in  the  exercise 
of  moral  agency.  It  supports  all  the  faculties  of  the  mind  and 
guards  them  against  interruption.  It  prevents  coercion.  It  se- 
cures man  against  all  influence,  except  that  which  is  suited  to 
an  intelligent,  free  and  accountable  being.  Thus  on  all  sides  it 
guards  moral  agency  against  infringement,  and  renders  it  com- 
plete in  all  its  parts.  This  it  did  in  regard  to  the  first  sin,  and 
this  it  does  in  regard  to  sin  in  all  cases.  Instead  therefore  of 
contemplating  the  difficulties  in  relation  to  Adam's  first  sin,  — 
an  event  at  a  great  distance,  —  let  us,  if  need  be,  contemplate 


172  MORAL     AGENCY. 

them  in  relation  to  objects  -which  are  near,  and  with  ^Yhich  we 
are  famihar,  that  is,  our  own  sins  and  the  sins  of  our  fellow  crea- 
tures around  us.  And  as  there  are  difficulties  which  are  in- 
capable of  solution,  and  depths  which  we  cannot  fathom,  let  us 
be  so  just  and  candid  as  to  acknowledge  it  in  regard  to  those 
things  which  occur  every  day  in  our  own  experience,  and  not 
lay  out  our  thoughts  so  disproportionately,  as  we  may  have  been 
inclined  to  do,  upon  an  event  which  took  place  six  thousand 
years  ago,  and  which  is  described  to  us  in  the  most  concise  and 
simple  manner,  not  to  gratify  an  unhallowed  curiosity,  but  for 
practical  purposes.  And  let  us  ever  guard  with  sacred  care 
against  the  folly  and  sin  of  pretending  or  even  of  aspiring  to 
know  what  lies  so  far  beyond  the  grasp  of  our  feeble  under- 
standing. 


LECTURE    LVII. 


THE  INABILITY    OF  SINNERS  TO  OBEY  THE  DIVINE  COMMANDS. 

The  subject  which  is  now  to  be  considered,  and  which  has  in 
previous  Lectures  been  repeatedly  brought  into  view,  is  in  some 
respects  perfectly  plain.  But  by  means  of  controversy,  and  in 
other  ways,  it  has  been  involved  in  such  obscurity  and  perplexity, 
that  some  special  efforts  seem  to  be  necessary  to  place  it  in  a 
clear  and  satisfactory  light ;  —  efforts  which  I  am  not  a  little  re- 
luctant to  make,  because  the  subject  has  been  understood  and 
treated  in  so  many  different  ways,  and  because  these  different 
modes  of  treating  the  subject  have,  to  such  an  extent,  become 
visible  marks  of  different  parties  in  religion.  But  from  a  long 
and  intimate  acquaintance  with  those  who  have  adopted  different 
modes  of  handling  the  subject,  I  have  been  happy  to  learn,  that 
they  differ  more  in  their  phraseolog}'',  than  in  their  opinions.  And 
I  hope,  by  the  following  discussion  to  make  this  evident ;  and 
thus  to  do  something  towards  accomplishing  an  object  which  I 
regard  with  strong  desire,  that  is,  a  more  manifest  and  cordial 
agreement  among  evangelical  Christians. 

In  my  treatment  of  this  subject,  I  shall  have  the  pleasure  of 
going  in  company  with  such  men  as  Edwards,  Dwight,  Smalley, 
Fuller,  Day,  and  other  well  known  defenders  of  sound  theology. 
My  purpose  is,  to  proceed  with  as  much  distinctness  as  possible, 
attending  to  one  thing  at  a  time,  but  taking  care  that  nothing  of 
conse(juence  shall  be  omitted. 

Here,  as  in  other  cases,  instead  of  going  about  to  establish  any 
theory  of  my  own,  I  invito  you  to  go  with  me  directly  to  the 

15* 


174  MORAL    INABILITY. 

word  of  God,  which  we  are  always  to  regard  as  the  infaUible 
standard  of  our  faith  and  our  practice,  and  which,  by  common 
consent,  teaches  the  truth  in  plain,  intelligible  language,  and  em- 
ploys words  in  a  sense  manifestly  suited  to  the  purposes  of  re- 
hgious  instruction.  You  will  certainly  find  it  safe  and  advan- 
tageous to  receive  your  first  impressions  on  the  subject  from  the 
holy  Scriptures. 

Let  us  begin  then  with  the  text  in  John  6;  44,  "  No  man 
can  (pivatai,  is  able)  to  come  unto  me,  except  the  Father  who 
hath  sent  me  draw  him."  No  man  is,  of  himself,  able  to  do 
this ;  and  if  any  one  does  it,  it  must  be  ascribed,  not  to  any 
power  which  he  possesses,  but  to  an  influence  exerted  upon  him 
from  above,  that  is,  the  drawing  of  the  Father.  In  a  following 
verse,  the  thing  is  expressed  in  different  language :  "  Therefore 
I  said  unto  you,  that  no  man  can  come  unto  me,  except  it  be 
given  him  of  my  Father." 

Matt.  12  :  34,  Jesus  said  to  the  Jews  :  "  How  can  ye,  being 
evil,  speak  good  things  ;  for  out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart, 
the  mouth  speaketh."  He  had  just  before  illustrated  the  same 
sentiment  by  the  figure  of  a  tree,  and  its  fruit,  "  Either  make 
the  tree  good  and  its  fruit  good,  or  make  the  tree  bad  and  its 
fruit  bad.  For  by  the  fruit  the  tree  is  known."  Then  follow 
the  words  ;  "  How  can  ye,  being  evil,  speak  good  things  ?  For 
out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart,  the  mouth  speaketh."  The 
same  illustration  is  used.  Matt.  7  :  18,  "  A  good  tree  cayinot 
bring  forth  evil  fruit,  nor  an  evil  tree  good  fruit." 

John  5  :  44,  "  How  can  ye  believe,  who  receive  honor  one  of 
another,  and  seek  not  the  honor  which  cometh  from  God  ?  "  The 
interrogative  form  is  used  for  the  purpose  of  saying  with  greater 
force,  that  they  who  seek  worldly  honor  cannot  believe  in 
Christ. 

John  12 :  39,  "  Therefore  they  could  not  believe  ;  because 
that  Esaias  said  again,  he  hath  blinded  their  eyes,  etc."  That 
is,  they  could  not  believe  because  they  were  in  such  a  blinded, 
hardened  state. 

John  8 :  43,  "  Why  do  ye  not  understand  my  speech  ?  Be- 
cause ye  cannot  hear  my  word." 


MORAL     INABILITY.  175 

Rom.  8  :  7,  "  The  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God  ;  for  it 
is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be.  The 
Apostle  first  asserts  the  fact,  that  the  carnal  mind  is  not  subject 
to  tlie  law  of  God.  He  does  not  however  content  himself  with 
affirming  this,  but  goes  on  to  say  further,  that  the  carnal  mind 
cannot  be  suljcct  to  the  law.  And  in  the  next  verse,  he  affirms 
the  same  thing  of  those  who  possess  the  carnal  mind :  —  "So  then 
they  that  are  in  the  flesh  m/moi  please  God"  —  cannot  render 
that  obedience  to  the  law  which  is  pleasing  to  the  Holy  Law- 
giver. 

1  Cor.  2 :  14,  "  The  natural  man  receiveth  not  the  things 
of  the  Spirit ;  for  they  are  foolishness  to  him ;  neither  can  he 
know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  discerned."  You  see 
here  also,  that  the  Apostle  docs  not  stop  with  asserting  the  mere 
fact,  that  the  natural  man  does  not  know  the  things  of  the  Spirit, 
as  though  that  were  all  which  belongs  to  the  subject,  but  de- 
clares the  additional  truth,  that  he  cannot  know  them,  suggesting 
the  obvious  reason  namely,  that  the  things  referred  to  are  of 
such  a  nature  that  they  can  be  discerned  only  by  the  spiritual 
mind. 

2  Tim.  3 :  7,  The  Apostle  speaks  of  some  who,  though 
always  learning,  "  are  never  able  to  come  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  truth." 

Heb.  6:  4 — 6,  The  writer  speaks  of  some  whom  it  was  im- 
possible to  renew  to  repentance. 

Jer.  13 :  23,  "  Can  the  Ethiopian  change  his  skin,  or  the 
leopard  his  spots  ?  Then  may  ye  also  do  good  who  are  accus- 
tomed to  do  evil." 

On  a  certain  occasion  Jesus  asserted  that  it  was  as  difficult  for 
a  rich  man  to  be  saved,  as  for  a  camel  to  go  through  the  eye 
of  a  needle.  His  disciples  exclaimed,  "  who  then  can  be  saved  ?  '* 
Jesus  did  not  tell  them,  that  they  had  mistaken  his  meaning, 
and  that  there  was  no  such  difficulty  as  they  understood  him  to 
affirm ;  but  simply  said  to  them,  "  With  men  it  is  impossible^ 
but  not  with  God  ;  for  with  God  all  things  are  possible."  Sal- 
vation cannot  come  from  the  power  of  man,  but  can  come  from 
the  power  of  God,  Matt.  19  :  26. 


176  MORAL     INABILITY. 

Such  is  the  representation  of  Scripture  respecting  the  inability 
of  sinners  to  do  what  is  required.  And  how  is  it  with  the  regen- 
erate ?  Do  the  sacred  writers  ascribe  even  to  them  the  power  to 
render  holy  obedience  to  God  ?  It  must  surely  be  supposed  that 
true  Christians  possess  as  much  power  to  obey,  as  impenitent  sin- 
ners, there  being  no  reason  whatever  to  think,  that  persons  lose 
any  part  of  their  power  by  conversion. 

See  then  what  the  Scriptures  teach  on  this  point.  John  15  : 
4,  5,  "  As  the  branch  caimot  bear  fruit  of  itself,  except  it  abide 
in  the  vine,  no  more  can  ye,  except  ye  abide  in  me,  —  without 
me  ye  can  do  nothing."  Ye  are  no  more  able,  without  help 
from  me,  to  bear  the  fruits  of  holiness,  than  a  branch  is  able  to 
bear  fruit  when  separated  from  the  vine.  This  is  the  precise 
sentiment  conveyed  by  the  words  of  Christ.  And  this  senti- 
ment his  apostles  remembered  and  felt.  There  is  nothing  which 
they  assert  more  strongly  than  their  dependence  on  divine  aid. 
"  Not  that  we  are  sufficient  of  ourselves,"  the  Apostle  says  — 
"  not  that  we  are  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  anything,  as 
of  ourselves ;  but  our  sufficiency  is  of  God."  In  2  Cor.  12 : 
7  —  9,  we  are  informed,  that  the  Apostle  prayed  to  be  delivered 
from  a  particular  infirmity,  but  that  Christ  let  his  infirmity  re- 
main, and  answered  his  prayer  indirectly,  that  is,  by  afibrding 
him  the  assistance  he  needed.  "  My  grace,"  he  says,  "  is 
sufficient  for  thee  ;  for  my  strength  is  made  perfect  in  weakness. 
Most  gladly  therefore  will  I  glory  in  my  infirmity  that  the 
power  of  Christ  may  rest  upon  me."  In  Phihp.  4  :  13,  the 
Apostle  shows  very  clearly  how  he  felt  in  regard  to  this  subject. 
He  says  ;  "  I  can  do  all  things."  A  very  bold  assertion  surely  ! 
A  very  extraordinary  claim  !  "I  can  do  all  things !"  But 
how  ?  Was  he  conscious  of  having  sufficient  ability  in  himself  ? 
No.  He  claimed  nothing  like  this.  His  rehance  was  upon  the 
power  of  Christ.  "  I  can  do  all  things  through  Christ  who 
strengtheneth  we."  He  expressed  the  same  sentiment  in  his 
direction  to  believers,  2  Tim.  2  :  1,  "  Be  strong  in  the  grace 
that  is  in  Christ  Jesus. ^^  Ephes.  6  :  10,  "Be  strong  in  the 
Xord  and  in  the  power  of  his  might."     And  in  ch.  3  :  16,  of  the 


MORAL    INABILITY.  177 

same  epistle,  he  prays  that  believers  may  "be  strengthened  with 
might  by  God's  Spirit."  Under  the  former  dispensation  the  peo- 
ple of  God  had  the  same  conviction  of  their  own  weakness,  and 
the  same  reliance  upon  the  power  of  God.  "  Blessed  is  the  man 
whose  strength  is  in  thee."  "  The  Lord  is  our  help."  "  Our  help 
Cometh  from  the  Lord  who  made  heaven  and  earth."  "  Strength- 
en thou  me  according  to  thy  word  ;"  —  all  which  is  in  accordance 
with  the  devout  language  of  the  writer  to  the  Hebrews,  4 :  16, 
"  Let  us  therefore  come  boldly  to  the  throne  of  grace,  that  we  may 
obtain  mercy,  and  find  grace  to  help  in  time  of  need." 

This  is  the  current  language  of  the  sacred  writers  in  regard 
even  to  believers.  They  have  no  power  of  themselves  to  obey 
the  divine  commands.  Without  Christ  they  can  do  nothing.  It  is 
only  through  Christ  who  strengtheneth  them,  that  they  can  ac- 
compUsh  their  work.  His  strength  is  made  manifest  in  their 
weakness.  They  are  not  sufficient  of  themselves  to  do  any  thing 
spiritually  good,  and  they  trust  in  God  to  strengthen  them.  This 
is  true  of  all  the  followers  of  Christ,  and  this  they  know  to  be 
true.  And  can  it  be  that  unbelievers  are  in  a  better  condition 
than  they  as  to  sufficiency  of  power  to  obey  God  ?  Far  from  it. 
The  Scriptures,  as  we  have  seen,  teach  plainly,  that  unrenewed 
sinners  cannot  come  to  Christ  unless  they  are  drawn  of  the  Father ; 
that  they  cannot  be  subject  to  the  law,  that  they  cannot  believe, 
that  they  cannot  please  God.  And  I  desire  you  to  take  particular 
notice,  that  the  inspired  writers  do  not  teach  this  truth  m  a  timid, 
hesitating  manner,  as  though  they  were  afraid  that  what  they 
were  saying  might  not  be  quite  true,  or  might  mean  too  much.  They 
assert  it  boldly  and  emjjhatically.  Nor  is  it  a  thing  which  they 
teach  mdirectly  or  by  imphcation  merely.  They  teach  it  directly, 
and  in  so  many  words.  And  they  maintain  it  constantey  and 
uniformly,  when  they  have  occasion  to  speak  on  the  subject.  They 
do  not  say  at  one  time  that  unrenewed  sinners  cannot  beheve  in 
Christ  and  cannot  obey  his  commands,  and  at  another  time  that 
they  can.  As  to  that  inability  of  which  they  speak  and  which 
properly  belongs  to  the  subject,  they  always  teach  the  same  thing, 
declaring  repeatedly  that  smners  cannot  obey,  and  never  intimat- 


178  MORAL    INABILITY. 

ing  the  contrary.  Fui'ther,  the  sacred  writers  never  appear  to 
apprehend  that  what  they  say  of  sinners  will  in  the  least  inter- 
fere with  their  moral  agency,  or  their  obligation  to  do  their  duty. 
Nor  do  they  ever  take  pains  to  qualify  what  they  say,  in  order 
to  guard  against  the  danger  of  such  interference.  In  their  free, 
artless  and  fearless  way,  they  declare,  that  unrenewed  sinners 
cannot  be  subject  to  the  divine  law,  and  cannot  come  to  Christ 
except  the  Father  draw  them  ;  and  they  leave  it  to  common  sense, 
candor  and  experience  to  give  the  interpretation.  What  the 
proper  interpretation  is  we  shall  inquire  at  another  time.  My 
present  remark  is,  that  the  sacred  writers  would  not  so  frequently 
and  forcibly  declare  that  sinners  cannot  obey  the  divine  law,  unless 
they  had  good  reason  to  declare  it,  and  unless  they  considered  it  a 
truth  of  momentous  import.  No  one  can  deny  or  even  doubt  this 
statement  without  implicitly  charging  the  inspired  writers  with 
error  ;  and  this  would  be  to  impute  error  to  the  Holy  Spirit.  As 
I  have  a  deliberate  and  confident  behef,  that  the  Scriptures  were 
given  by  inspiration  of  God,  and  that  the  sacred  pen  men  wrote 
as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  I  must  hold  that  they 
taught  the  exact  truth  on  the  subject  before  us,  and  taught  it  in 
a  just  and  proper  manner,  and  that  the  case  of  sinners  is  really 
what  the  Bible  represents  it  to  be. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  further  discussion  of  the  subject,  I  invite 
your  attention  to  one  particular  conclusion  from  the  Scriptural 
view  which  we  have  taken  of  the  sinner's  inability. 

If  then  it  was  proper  and  important  for  the  sacred  writers  to  teach 
the  sinner's  inability  to  obey  God  ;  the  same  must  be  proper  and  im- 
portant for  us.  And  if  the  language  which  they  employed  to  con- 
vey this  instruction  was  just  and  suitable  for  them ;  it  is  just  and 
suitable  for  us.  And  if  they  trusted  to  the  nature  of  the  subject 
and  the  drift  of  their  discourse  to  indicate  the  meaning  of  the  words 
which  they  employed ;  we  may  properly  do  the  same,  certainly 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  instruction.  It  is  undeniable,  that  fall- 
en man  is  the  same  now,  as  he  was  formerly ;  that  the  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  his  behoving  and  obeying  is  the  same  ;  and,  of  course, 
that  there  is  the  same  reason  to  say,  that  he  cannot  obey.     And 


3I0RAL    INABILITY.  179 

who   can  doubt  the  propriety  of  pointing  out  that  inability  in  the 
same  manner  ? 

This  view  of  the  matter  appears  to  me  so  important,  that  I  shall 
present  it  to  you  again  in  a  varied  form.  Did  not  the  inspired 
writers  judge  correctly  as  to  the  real  condition  of  the  unsanctified  ? 
And  in  what  they  taught  respecting  it,  did  they  not  employ 
language  that  was  plain  and  intelligible  and  well  suited  to  enlight- 
en the  conscience  and  touch  the  heart  ?  And  why  should  not  we 
copy  their  example  in  regard  to  this  subject,  as  well  as  in  regard 
to  any  other  ?  And  if  we  faithfully  copy  their  example,  and 
teach  the  same  thing  in  the  same  or  in  a  similar  manner,  can  any 
one  reasonably  object  ?  If  any  one  does  object,  I  ask,  why  ?  Is 
not  the  sinner  as  dependent  on  divine  help  now,  as  he  was  fonner- 
ly  i  Is  he  not  in  himself  as  poor  and  needy,  and  as  destitute  of 
spiritual  strength  ?  What  then  can  be  more  safe  and  more  be- 
coming, than  for  us  to  follow  the  example  of  the  inspired  writers 
in  teaching  a  doctrine,  which  is  equally  true  of  all  men  at  all 
times  and  in  all  circumstances  ?  Our  obUgation  to  do  this  is  evi- 
dently involved  in  the  great  Protestant  principle  that  the  Bible  is 
to  be  received  as  a  perfect  and  infallible  guide.  How  do  we  make 
the  Bible  our  guide,  if  we  neglect  to  teach  what  it  teaches,  or 
neglect  to  do  it  in  the  same  or  a  similar  manner  ?  While  the  word 
of  God  declares  that  sinners  cannot  obey  the  gospel,  suppose  we 
say  in  unquahfied  terms  that  they  can.  While  the  word  of  God 
represents  it  as  exceedingly  diiEcult,  and  without  divine  help  im- 
possible for  sinners  to  be  converted  and  saved,  suppose  we  say,  it 
is  neither  impossible  nor  difficult,  but  as  much  within  our  power 
as  the  common  actions  of  life ;  would  this  be  making  the  word  of 
God  our  standard  ?  Do  the  sacred  winters  assert  that  sinners, 
without  the  influence  of  the  Spirit,  can  believe  and  obey  the  gos- 
pel —  that  they  are  as  able  to  do  this,  as  they  are  to  rise  up  and 
walk  —  do  they  assert  this,  or  any  thing  like  this,  as  a  means  of 
taking  away  the  excuse  which  sinners  are  prone  to  oJBFer,  and  im- 
pressing upon  them  a  sense  of  moral  obligation  ? 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  sacred  writers  considered  the 
ability  of  sinners  to  be  so  evident,  that  there  was  no  need  of 


180  MORAL     INABILITY. 

affirming  it,  that  they  always  took  it  for  granted,  just  as  they 
took  it  for  granted  that  man  exists,  and  has  the  faculties  of  a 
rational  being. 

I  reply,  that  it  would  be  strange  indeed,  if  they  took  that  for 
granted,  which  was  contrary  to  what  they  taught.  I  allow  in- 
deed, that  what  is  often  meant  by  ability,  that  is,  the  powers  and 
faculties  essential  to  moral  agency,  did  so  manifestly  belong  to 
sinners,  that  the  inspired  writers,  who  taught  this  truth  in  the 
best  manner,  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  make  it  the  subject  of 
direct  affirmation,  but  assumed  it  as  an  acknowledged  principle. 
The  question  then  is,  why  we  should  not  treat  the  matter  as  they 
did. 

But  you  may  ask  whether  the  circumstances  of  the  present 
time  do  not  render  it  expedient  and  necessary  to  adopt  new 
modes  of  instruction.  Are  there  not  new  errors  to  be  confuted, 
new  false  refuges  to  be  exposed,  and  new  mistakes  to  be  cor- 
rected ?  And  must  not  our  manner  of  teaching  be  adapted  to 
the  accomplishment  of  these  objects  ? 

It  is,  I  agree,  very  important,  that  our  manner  of  teaching 
should  be  suited  to  the  different  states  of  the  human  mind,  and 
to  the  circumstances  of  the  present  day ;  and  that  we  should 
earnestly  endeavor  to  expose  the  ever-varying  forms  of  error, 
and  to  remove  from  the  minds  of  men  whatever  hinders  the 
salutary  influence  of  divine  truth.  And  if  the  declarations  of 
Scripture  that  unrenewed  men  cannot  obey  the  divine  law,  and 
cannot  come  to  Christ  unless  the  Father  draw  them,  are  mis- 
understood, and  hence  prove  the  occasion  of  error ;  it  is  our  duty 
carefully  to  explain  them,  and  thus  to  remove  error,  and  to 
inculcate  upon  the  minds  of  men  the  true  meaning  of  the  word 
of  God.  But  how  can  any  one  think,  that  contradicting  the 
word  of  God  is  the  right  way  to  explain  it  ?  The  Apostle  Paul 
declares  that  they  who  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please  God.  Who 
can  suppose  it  to  be  a  proper  explanation,  to  say  of  the  same 
persons,  that  they  can  please  God  ?  Who  can  suppose  that  we 
explain  the  passage,  John  6 :  44,  by  saying,  m  direct  contra- 
diction to  the  declaration  of  Christ,  that  sinners  can  come  to  him 


MORAL    INABILITY.  181 

without  being  drawn  of  the  Father  ?  It  is  our  duty  to  search 
the  inspired  volume  with  reverence  and  submission,  and,  instead 
of  using  any  language  which  is  really  or  apparently  opposed  to 
its  declarations,  to  endeavor  to  find  out  and  exhibit  the  true 
meaning  of  those  declarations.  A  right  explanation  of  the 
passages  above  quoted  relative  to  the  inability  of  sinners  would 
show  as  clearly  as  possible,  in  what  sense  and  on  ivhat  account 
they  cannot  believe  and  obey,  and  so  would  guard  against  as- 
cribing to  them  an  inability  which  does  not  belong  to  them,  and 
which  the  sacred  writers  never  meant  to  ascribe  to  them.  If 
the  texts  referred  to  are  ever  made  use  of  to  countenance  any 
particular  error,  we  should  labor  to  expose  that  error,  and  to 
shield  the  minds  of  men  effectually  against  its  influence.  In  the 
next  Lecture  I  shall  endeavor  to  give  the  explanation  which  is 
required.  What  I  would  say  here  is,  that  while  we  freely  use 
the  language  of  Scripture,  or  other  language  similar  to  it,  we 
should  endeavor,  at  proper  times,  to  give  that  language  a  faith- 
ful explanation,  and  thus  to  guard  the  minds  of  men  against 
mistakes,  and  to  impress  them  with  the  true  meaning  of  the 
divme  word. 

Finally  ;  if  on  such  a  subject  as  this,  we  would  teach  the 
truth  and  confute  error ;  may  we  not  most  effectually  accomplish 
our  object  by  going  back  to  the  serious,  plain,  practical  manner 
of  Christ  and  the  apostles,  employing  the  same  considerations,  and 
more  frequently  the  very  language  which  they  employed  ?  If 
it  should  appear  that  the  meaning  of  Scripture  phrases  has 
been  changed,  so  that  they  do  not  now  convey  the  sense  which 
the  inspired  writers  intended  to  convey  by  them ;  it  should  then 
be  our  aim  to  restore  its  original  and  proper  sense,  so  that 
when  we  would  teach  the  same  things  which  Christ  and  the 
apostles  taught,  we  may  teach  them  in  the  same  manner. 

VOL.  II.  16 


LECTURE    LYIII. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE    SINNER  S   INABILITY   EXPLAINED. 

Having  in  the  previous  Lecture  brought  distinctly  before  you 
various  texts  of  Scripture,  in  which  it  is  affirmed  that  sinners 
cannot  comply  with  the  requisitions  of  the  gospel,  my  present 
object  is  to  show  as  clearly  as  possible  what  is  the  sense  which 
those  texts  are  intended  to  convey.  And  in  doing  this  I  shall 
endeavor  to  conform  to  just  and  established  rules  of  interpreta- 
tion. 

And  here  I  must  regard  it  as  a  point  not  to  be  called  in  ques- 
tion, that  the  inability  which  is  predicated  of  sinners,  is  a  reality, 
not  a  fiction.  We  may  be  assured  that  the  inspired  writers 
would  not  have  asserted  it  so  earnestly,  and  with  such  a  seri- 
ous emphasis,  had  they  not  regarded  it  as  a  very  important 
truth.  If  in  setting  it  forth  they  employed  language  more  or 
less  figurative,  they  did  it,  not  to  detract  from  the  reahty  or 
the  importance  of  the  truth  which  they  declared,  but  to  illus- 
trate it  more  clearly,  and  to  impress  it  on  our  minds  more 
strongly  and  permanently.  Keep  in  mind  therefore,  that  we 
have  now  to  do  with  a  fact,  and  one  of  tremendous  import  in 
regard  to  our  spiritual  interests. 

But  while  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  the  texts  which  represent 
sinners  to  be  the  subjects  of  an  inability  to  obey  the  gospel, 
teach  a  certain  truth,  —  an  inability  which  is  real  and  of  serious 
moment ;  we  are  not  therefore  to  regard  them  as  teaching,  that 
sinners  are  the  subjects  of  every  land  of  inability.  For  it  may 
be,  that  the  sacred  writers  had  their  eye  upon  an  inability  of 


MOKAL     INABILITY.  183 

one  particular  kind  ;  and  the  drift  of  their  discourse  and  the 
nature  of  the  case  may  clearly  show  what  kind  of  inabihty  was 
intended.  And  if  this  is  made  to  appear,  it  would  be  wholly 
unauthorized  to  suppose,  that  they  meant  to  assert  an  inability  of 
any  other  kind,  and  especially  that  they  meant  to  predicate  of  sin- 
ners every  kind  of  inability.  When  they  affirm  the  inability  of 
sinners  for  the  very  purpose  of  showing  the  high  degree  of  their 
criminahty,  it  would  be  absurd  to  suppose,  that  they  speak  of 
an  inability  which  would  exclude  criminahty. 

The  general  remarks  I  have  now  made,  may  be  applied  to  a 
multitude  of  cases,  in  which  the  sense  of  particular  declarations 
of  Scripture  must  be  limited  by  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  by 
the  evident  scope  of  the  writer.  For  example,  when  the  sacred 
writers  speak  of  sinners  as  blind  and  dead,  we  cannot  suppose 
they  meant  to  teach  that  sinners  are  blind  and  dead  in  every 
sense.  They  evidently  refer  to  what  we  call  a  moral  or  spiritual 
blindness  and  death.  Sometimes  they  show  this  to  be  their 
meaning  by  expressly  declaring  that  sinners  have  a  blindness  of 
mind,  and  are  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins.  In  regard  to  such  a 
subject,  when  we  find  a  particular  thing  asserted  in  the  Scriptures, 
the  fair  presumption  is  that  a  particular  and  specific  sense  is  in- 
tended, and  that,  by  proper  inquiries,  we  may  discover  what  that 
^ensef*  is.  But  it  would  be  doing  violence  to  the  Scriptures  to 
suppose,  that  whatever  they  afiirm  is  to  be  considered  as  true  in 
every  possible  sense. 

My  present  object  is  to  ascertain  in  what  particular  and  spe- 
cific sense  we  are  to  understand  the  sacred  writers,  when  they 
assert  that  sinners  cannot  obey  the  divine  commands. 

It  may  contribute  something  to  the  accomplishment  of  my 
design,  to  notice  distinctly,  that  the  inspired  writers  require  the 
sinner  to  obey  the  divine  commands — that  they  require  this 
often  —  that  they  require  it  always  when  the  subject  comes  be- 
fore them  —  that  they  require  it  in  the  most  unequivocal  and 
emjahatical  terms,  and  that  they  require  it  of  the  sinner  as  un- 
hesitatingly and  earnestly  as  of  the  behever.  There  is  no  more 
appearance  of  any  doubt  or  draw-back  ui  their  minds  in  the  one 


184  MORAL     INABILITY. 

case,  than  in  the  other.  And  they  uniformly  ascribe  it  to  the 
sinner's  o'svn  fault,  which  exposes  him  to  just  condemnation,  that 
he  does  not  obey.  This  is  an  important  point,  and  it  leads  to  two 
conclusions.  One  is,  that  commanding  the  sinner,  just  as  he  is, 
to  obey  God,  is  perfectly  proper.  For  those  who  spake  as  they 
were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 
given  to  the  sinner  any  unjust  command.  If  we  think  other- 
wise, we  do  not  think  as  the  inspired  Avriters  did.  The  other 
conclusion  and  that  which  relates  directly  to  our  subject  is,  that 
the  inability  of  the  sinner  cannot  be  of  such  a  kind,  as  to  ex- 
empt him  from  the  obligation  to  obey,  or  to  diminish  the  guilt  of 
disobedience.  We  may  suppose  a  kind  of  inability  that  would 
exclude  all  obhgation  to  obey.  If  any  one  is  deprived  of  the 
faculty  of  reason  and  conscience,  and  is  a  complete  idiot,  his  in- 
capacity to  obey  God  is  such  that  he  cannot  be  properly  re- 
quired to  obey,  or  blamed  for  not  obeying.  But  we  are  sure 
that  the  sinner's  inability  is  not  such  as  to  have  this  effect  in  any 
degree. 

But  we  have  direct  and  certain  means  of  understanding  the 
nature  of  the  inability  spoken  of ;  the  most  important  of  which 
is,  a  careful  examination  of  the  passages  themselves  where  the 
inabihty  is  brought  into  view.  Some  of  these  passages  very 
clearly  indicate  what  kind  of  inability  is  intended,  Matt.  12 : 
34,  "How  can  ye,  being  evil,  speak  good  things  ?  For  out  of 
the  abundance  of  the  heart  the  mouth  speaketh."  "  How  can 
ye?"  But  what  was  the  hinderance  ?  Why  could  they  not 
speak  good  things  ?  The  reason  was  suggested :  "  How  can  ye, 
being  evil,  speak  good  things?"  Their  heart  was  evil,  and  from 
such  a  heart  good  cannot  come  ;  as  Jesus  had  just  said  in  relation 
to  the  same  subject :  "  An  evil  tree  cannot  bring  forth  good 
fruit."     The  badness  of  the  tree  prevents. 

The  passage,  John  5 :  44,  indicates  what  land  of  inability  is 
intended.  "  How  can  ye  believe,  who  receive  honor  one  of  an- 
other, and  seek  not  the  honor  which  cometh  from  God  only  ? " 
That  which  hindered  their  believing  was  their  ambition  —  their 
love  of  worldly  honor.  It  was  this  which  kept  them  from  re- 
ceiving Christ  and  obeying  his  gospel. 


MORAL    INABILITY.  185 

John  12  :  39,  "  Therefore  thej  could  not  believe."  Why  ? 
"  Because  that  Esaias  said,"  or  because  as  he  said,  "  he  hath 
blinded  their  eyes  and  hardened  their  hearts ;"  that  is,  because 
they  were  in  such  a  state  —  blinded  and  hardened  by  sin. 
This  sinful  blindness  and  hardness  constituted  their  inability,  or 
was  the  reason  why  they  could  not  believe.  Rom.  8 :  7,  8, 
brings  out  the  same  sentiment  very  clearly.  What  is  the  reason 
why  those  whom  the  Apostle  mentions,  cannot  be  subject  to  the 
divine  law,  and  cannot  please  God  ?  The  reason  is,  that  they 
are  in  the  flesh,  and  have  that  carnal  mind  which  is  enmity 
against  God.  It  is  this  which  stands  in  the  way  as  a  hinderance 
to  their  obedience  and  their  acceptance  with  God.  In  like  man- 
ner our  Saviour  suggests  what  it  is  which  renders  it  so  hard  for  a 
rich  man  to  be  saved,  that  is,  his  love  of  riches.  And  that 
which  rendered  it  so  difficult  for  those  mentioned  in  Jer.  13  : 
23,  to  cease  to  do  evil  and  learn  to  do  well  was,  that  they  were 
accustomed  to  do  evil. 

In  these  and  other  places,  the  kind  of  inability  which  belongs 
to  the  sinner  is  suggested  by  the  words  which  the  sacred  writers 
employ.  The  passages  themselves  show  in  what  respect  and  for 
what  reason  an  inability  is  predicated  of  the  sinner. 

In  other  places  the  kind  of  inability  intended  is  made  known 
by  implication,  or  becomes  evident  from  the  nature  and  circum- 
stances of  the  subject.  John  6  :  44,  "  No  man  can  come  unto  me 
except  the  Father  who  hath  sent  me  draw  him."  Jesus  said  this 
to  unbelieving,  cavilling  Jews.  They,  being  what  they  were, 
could  not,  of  themselves,  come  to  Christ.  The  hinderance  lay 
in  their  character.  Of  this  you  will  be  still  more  satisfied  from 
the  consideration  of  that  divine  influence  which  was  necessary. 
It  was  an  influence  to  draw  them  to  Christ,  or  to  induce  them  to 
believe,  implying  that  they  were  indisposed  to  come  to  Christ  — 
that  they  had  no  heart  to  beheve. 

John  8  :  43,  "  Why  do  ye  not  understand  my  speech  ?  Be- 
cause ye  cannot  (ye  are  not  able  to)  hear  my  word."  What 
follows   shows   why  they  could   not.     "  Ye   are   of  your  father 

the  Devil,  and  the  lusts  of  your  father  ye  will  do.     He  that  is 

16* 


186  MORAL     INABILITY. 

of  God  heareth  God's  words.  Ye  therefore  hear  them  not, 
because  ye  are  not  of  God."  Their  ungodly  disposition  was 
what  hindered  them  from  receiving  divine  truth.  Had  they  been 
of  God,  or  possessed  the  heart  of  God's  children,  they  would 
have  gladly  heard  his  words. 

We  must  also  attend  to  those  texts  which  set  forth  substan- 
tially the  same  thing  in  different  language,  John  5 :  40,  "  Ye 
will  not  (oy  dtXf.zs,')  ye  are  7iot  willing  to  come  unto  me  that  ye 
might  have  life."  The  cause  which  prevented  was  the  same. 
So  it  was  with  those  mentioned  in  the  parable  of  the  Supper, 
who  said,  "  We  cannot  come,"  because  they  had  a  predominant 
attachment  to  other  objects.  From  this  text,  in  which  Christ 
said,  "  ye  will  not  come  unto  me,"  it  is  natural  to  infer  that  the 
umviUingness  or  indisjjositioji  mentioned  is  the  very  thing  which 
constitutes  the  inability  spoken  of  in  other  places.  The  manner 
in  which  the  sacred  writers  treat  this  subject  plainly  impUes 
that  the  sinner's  inability  consists  of  that  which  is  morally  wrong 
and  blame-worthy ;  that  is,  in  wickedness  of  heart,  or  a  disin- 
clination to  do  the  will  of  God. 

We  have  arrived  then  at  the  conclusion,  that  the  inability  of 
the  sinner  to  obey  the  gospel  consists  in  his  settled  aversion  to 
holiness  —  in  the  unyielding  perverseness  of  his  heart.  It  is 
because  his  depravity  is  so  deep  and  entire  as  absolutely  to 
prevent  him  from  coming  to  Christ,  that  the  Scriptures  say,  he 
cannot  come.  As  he  has  that  carnal  mind  which  is  enmity 
against  God,  and  which  effectually  hinders  his  obedience ;  it 
becomes  just  and  suitable  to  say,  that  he  cannot  be  subject  to 
the  law,  and  cannot  please  God.  And  as  an  inability  of  this 
kind  is  sufficient  fully  to  justify  the  language  of  the  sacred 
writers,  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  they  meant  to  assert 
an  inability  of  any  other  kind.  When  Jesus  put  the  cutting 
question  to  the  ambitious  Jews ;  "  How  can  ye  beheve,  who  re- 
ceive honor  one  of  another  and  seek  not  the  honor  which  cometh 
from  God  only ;"  he  pointed  out  an  inability  to  believe  of  a 
particular  kind,  that  is,  the  love  of  worldly  honor.  And  there 
is  no  room  left  to  suppose  that   he  referred   to  an  inability  of 


MORAL    INABILITY.  '  187 

any  other  kmd.  The  unbelievmg  Jews  were  not  like  to  those, 
spoken  of  by  the  Apostle,  who  cannot  believe  in  Christ  because 
they  have  never  heard  of  him,  nor  to  those  who  are  destitute  of 
the  necessary  mental  faculties.  An  inabihty  of  the  kind  which 
we  are  considering  implies  all  that  is  necessary  to  the  existence 
of  moral  agency.  Should  any  one  cease  to  be  a  moral  agent,  he 
could  not  be  chargeable  with  a  culpable  inabihty  to  obey  the  di- 
vine commands. 

Consider  here  the  remarkable  simplicity  and  artlessness  of  the  sa- 
cred wiiters,  who  never  manifested  any  particular  anxiety  about  their 
expressions,  and  never  seemed  to  take  any  pains  to  guard  against 
what  might  possibly  be  misunderstood  or  perverted.  In  regard 
to  the  subject  before  us,  they  had  in  their  own  minds  clear  con- 
ceptions and  strong  emotions,  which  they  wished  to  convey  to  the 
minds  of  others.  And  being  themselves  under  a  powerful  impulse, 
they  expressed  themselves  with  a  freedom  and  force  which  would 
make  a  just  and  powerful  impression  on  the  minds  of  the  candid  and 
honest,  though  liable  to  be  misapprehended  by  persons  of  a  captious 
or  prejudiced  temper.  —  There  is  in  fact  a  mighty  hinderance  in 
the  way  of  the  sinner's  behoving  in  Christ,  a  hinderance  which  noth- 
ing but  the  power  of  the  Holy  Ghost  can  remove.  The  question 
is,  how  this  hinderance,  consisting  in  the  desperate  wickedness  of 
the  heart,  shall  be  truly  and  adequately  expressed.  Shall  the 
sacred  writers  say,  that  the  sinner  does  not  believe  and  will  not 
repent  ?  This  they  do  say.  But  this  is  not  all  that  they  say. 
They  had  occasion  to  express  themselves  in  other  and  more  forci- 
ble language.  They  say  that  the  sinner  cannot  beheve  and  earir 
not  obey.  And  most  certainly  they  say  the  truth,  and  say  it  in  a 
right  manner.  There  are  no  forms  of  speech  by  which  they  could 
set  forth  the  truth  on  this  subject  more  unexceptionably,  than 
those  which  they  employ.  They  do  indeed  employ  the  word  can- 
not in  a  peculiar  sense.  But  this  pecuHar  sense  is  not  an  unusun 
al  sense ;  and  it  is  a  sense  which  agrees  with  the  nature  of  the 
subject  and  which  is  suggested  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
And  were  we  now,  for  the  first  time,  to  be  rightly  impressed  with 
the  depravity  of  the  sinner,  and  were  we  for  the  first  time  to  speak 


188  MORAL    INABILITY. 

on  the  subject  with  suitable  earnestness  and  fidelity,  we  should, 
I  doubt  not,  adopt  the  verj  language,  so  just  and  natural,  which 
we  find  in  the  Scriptures,  and  should  say,  that  the  carnal  mind, 
which  is  enmity  against  God,  is  not  subject  to  his  law,  neither 
indeed  cam  be  ;  that  they  who  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please  God  ; 
that  the  selfish  and  proud  cannot  beheve  in  Christ.  Such  lan- 
guage would  be  the  genuine  expression  of  our  conceptions  and  feel- 
ings, as  it  was  of  the  conceptions  and  feelings  of  the  sacred  writers. 
It  is  generally  the  case  at  the  present  day,  that  Avhen  sinners  are 
thoroughly  convinced  of  sin,  they  spontaneously  adopt  this  em- 
phatic language  respecting  themselves,  not  to  justify  or  excuse 
themselves  —  far  from  it  —  but  for  the  purpose  of  expressing 
what  they  feel  as  to  the  desperate  wickedness  of  their  hearts,  the 
greatness  of  their  guilt,  and  their  utter  ruin,  unless  they  are  saved 
by  grace.  Who  can  impute  any  mistake  or  incorrectness  to  those 
who  speak  as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost  ?  Did  not 
Christ  and  the  apostles  know  what  was  the  truth,  and  what  was 
the  best  manner  of  teaching  it,  and  what  mode  of  instruction  would 
be  safe  and  proper  in  following  ages  ?  Their  language  and  their 
whole  manner  of  teaching,  being  conformed  to  the  truth,  and  suit- 
ed to  the  prmciples  of  human  nature,  must  be  just  and  proper  so 
long  as  truth  and  the  principles  of  human  nature  remain  the 
same.  Still  the  disposition  of  men  to  pervert  the  language  of 
Scripture  and  turn  it  into  an  apology  for  sin,  evidently  imposes 
upon  us  the  duty  of  explaining  it,  and  of  guarding  with  all  possible 
care  against  the  errors  which  may  be  occasioned  by  it.  But  to 
object  to  the  language  itself,  or  to  doubt  its  propriety,  or  to  give 
the  preference  to  that  which  is  different  and  opposite,  would 
be  to  dishonor  the  Author  of  holy  writ. 

I  shall  here  introduce  an  appropriate  quotation  of  some  length 
from  Dr.  Smalley's  treatise  on  the  sinner's  inabihty. 

"  There  is,"  he  says,  "  a  real  necessity  for  using  such  terms 
as  —  incapable,  cannot,  etc.  in  that  diversity  of  signification  in 
which  they  are  used  in  common  speech  as  well  as  in  the  Scrip- 
tures. For  whenever  any  thing,  whether  in  ourselves  or  without 
us,  is  absolutely  inconsistent  with  our  doing  a  thing,  we  have  no 


MORAL    INABILITY.  189 

way  fully  and  strongly  to  express  that  inconsistency,  but  by  say- 
ing, we  cannot  —  it  is  impossible,  or  using  some  other  word  of 
like  import.  Now  it  is  certain  that  the  want  of  a  heart  or  inclinar 
tion  to  do  a  thing  may  be  as  inconsistent  with  our  doing  it,  as 
anything  else  could  be.  Covetousness  is  as  inconsistent  with 
liberahty,  as  poverty  is.  The  want  of  an  upright  heart  is  as  in- 
consistent with  the  character  of  a  good  ruler,  as  the  want  of 
wisdom.  And  the  want  of  all  principles  of  virtue  must  be 
as  inconsistent  with  acting  virtuously,  as  the  want  of  those  intel- 
lectual faculties  which  are  necessary  to  moral  agency.  Every  one 
must  act  his  own  nature  and  choice,  or  he  does  not  act  himself 
he  is  not  the  agent.  And  if  when  we  would  express  this  sort 
of  necessity,  we  should  not  use  the  same  phrases  as  are  made 
use  of  in  cases  of  natural  necessity,  but,  for  fear  of  being  mis- 
understood, should  carefully  avoid  saying,  a  man  cannot,  when 
•we  mean  merely  that  he  has  not  such  a  heart  as  is  necessary, 
and  should  only  say  that  he  will  not  —  our  language  would 
often  sound  odd,  being  out  of  common  custom,  which  governs 
the  propriety  of  words ;  and  not  only  so,  but  it  ivould  not  be 
sufficiently  expressive.  Should  we  be  afraid  to  say,  it  is  im- 
possible for  a  man  to  love  God  whUe  his  heart  is  altogether  wicked 
and  full  of  enmity,  —  people  would  think  we  imagined  this 
might  sometimes  happen,  and  that  there  was  no  real  impossibility 
in  it  of  any  kind,  whereas  there  is  as  real  and  absolute  an  im- 
possibility in  this  case,  as  in  any  supposable  case  whatever.  To 
be  more  guarded  therefore  than  the  Scripture  is,  would  be  to 
be  unguarded.  The  Apostle  demands :  '  Can  a  fig-tree  bear 
olive  berries,  or  a  \ine  figs  ? '  And  our  Saviour  says  :  '  A  good 
tree  cannot  bring  forth  evil  fruit,  neither  can  a  corrupt  tree 
bring  forth  good  fruit.  A  good  man  out  of  the  good  treasure 
of  his  heart  bringeth  forth  good  thmgs ;  and  an  evil  man  out  of 
the  e\il  treasure  of  his  heart  bringeth  forth  evil  things.'  There 
is  as  certain  and  never  failing  a  connection  in  this  case,  as 
any  natural  connection  whatever  ;  —  which  ought  by  no  means 
to  be  dissembled,  but  to  be  openly  maintained.  But  then  it 
is   certainly  of  a  quite   different   and   even  opposite  natui-e   to 


190  MORAL     INABILITY. 

all  intents  and  purposes  of  moral  agency.  And  it  is  of  the 
last  importance  that  this  also  should  be  maintained,  and  mani- 
fested to  everj  man's  conscience." 

There  is  still  another  consideration  which  shows  the  propriety 
of  the  language  above  mentioned  in  the  case  before  us  ;  namely, 
that  such  language  is  used  in  other  cases  without  objections 
from  any  one.  Thus,  Heb.  6 :  18,  it  is  said  to  be  impossible 
for  Crod  to  lie.  What  kind  of  impossibility  is  intended  ?  Not 
any  deficiency  of  power  to  do  whatever  God  pleases,  but  his 
moral  perfection.  It  is  impossible  for  a  Being  of  infinite  right- 
eousness and  holiness  to  lie.  Now  who  can  object  to  the  word 
impossible  in  this  case,  as  not  suited  to  express  the  thing  in- 
tended ?  And  yet  there  is  no  impossibiUty  except  what  arises 
from  God's  moral  excellence.  But  did  any  man  on  this  account 
ever  contradict  the  Scriptures,  and  say,  that  such  a  Being  as 
God  can  lie? 

In  2  Tim.  2 :  13,  It  is  said  of  Christ,  that  he  cannot  deny 
himself.  His  immutable  holiness  prevents.  And  Peter  said  of 
himself  and  the  other  apostles.  Acts  4 :  20,  '''  We  cannot  but 
speak  the  things  which  we  have  seen  and  heard."  The  only 
necessity  in  the  case  was  their  ardent  love  to  Christ  and  their 
strong  conviction  of  duty. 

Similar  language  is  used  in  common  discourse.  Of  a  man 
whose  character  stands  high  in  our  esteem,  we  say,  he  cannot  do 
a  mean  or  dishonest  thing.  Of  a  just  judge  we  say,  he  cannot 
be  bribed.  Ask  a  covetous  man  to  give  money  in  charity,  and 
he  will  say,  I  cannot  do  it.  A  tender  mother  cannot  forget  her 
infant  child. 

Such  is  the  language  of  feeling  and  of  common  life.  And 
such  is  the  language  of  the  sacred  writers.  And  why  should  it 
not  be  ours  ? 

The  chief  objection  is,  that  sinners  may  take  occasion  from  it  to 
excuse  themselves  for  their  impenitence  and  disobedience.  They 
may  say,  if  we  cannot  repent  and  obey,  how  can  we  be  under 
obhgation  to  do  it  ? 

I  am  aware   that  sinners,  destitute  of  conviction,  often  per- 


MORAL    INABILITY.  191 

vert  the  language  of  Scripture  in  this  way,  and  take  occasion 
from  it  to  justify  themselves  in  the  neglect  of  duty.  On  this  ac- 
count we  should  labor  to  give  them  faithful  instruction  respecting 
their  own  character,  and  to  convince  them  that  they  have  no 
such  inability  as  can  in  the  least  excuse  them  for  disobedience. 
We  should  explain  the  nature  of  their  inability,  and  should  show 
them  that  it  only  indicates  the  greatness  of  their  guilt. 

If  you  would  entertain  a  just  view  of  this  subject,  you  must 
keep  in  mind,  that  telling  the  sinner  he  cannot  of  himself  repent 
and  believe  is  not  the  cause  of  his  impenitence  and  unbelief; 
nor  will  his  impenitence  and  unbelief  be  removed  by  telling  him 
that  he  can  repent  and  believe.  Tell  him  what  you  will,  either 
that  he  can  or  cannot  obey  the  gospel,  he  has,  while  unrenewed, 
a  heart  which  will  certainly  prevent  his  obedience.  Tell  him 
as  the  Scripture  does,  that  while  unrenewed  he  cannot  please 
God ;  and  he  may  pervert  your  declaration,  and  make  it  an 
occasion  of  stupidity,  or  despondency,  or  self-justification,  unless 
the  Spirit  of  God  illuminates  his  mind  and  teaches  him  that 
the  difiiculty  lies  in  his  own  inexcusable  wickedness.  If  you 
speak  to  him  in  another  way,  and  tell  him,  what  the  Bible  does 
not  tell  him,  that,  though  unregenerate,  he  has  full  power  to  re- 
pent and  believe  ;  he  will  doubtless  make  your  declaration  the 
occasion  of  self-confidence  and  delusive  hope,  unless  the  divine 
Spirit  interposes  to  prevent.  But  if  he  is  favored  with 
teaching  from  above,  he  will  quickly  learn  that  he  has  no  such 
power  as  he  supposed  —  no  power  in  his  natural  state  which  he 
can  rely  upon ;  that  his  confidence  in  his  own  strength  is 
groundless ;  he  will  leai-n  the  solemn  truth  taught  in  Scripture, 
that  he  has  the  carnal  mind  which  is  enmity  against  God,  and 
which  is  not  and  cannot  be  subject  to  the  divine  law,  and  that 
holiness  in  all  of  its  forms  is  of  God.  As  soon  as  he  is  ef- 
fectually taught  of  the  Spirit,  he  will  adopt  the  sentiment  of 
Scripture,  and  will  express  it  in  the  language  of  Scripture. 


LECTURE    LIX, 


KECAPITULATION.      PRACTICAL   BEARING   OF   THE   SUBJECT. 

I  HAVE  endeavored  to  illustrate  these  three  positions. 

1.  The  Scriptures  teach  that  there  is  an  inability  in  sinners  to 
holy  acts.  We  must  therefore  conclude  that  such  an  inability  is 
a  reality^  and  is  the  great  and  only  hinderance  to  faith  and 
obedience. 

2.  It  is  just  and  proper  to  express  this  inability  of  sinners  in 
the  language  of  inspiration,  and  to  say  that  men,  while  unre- 
newed, cannot  be  subject  to  the  divine  law,  and  cannot  please 
God. 

3.  The  inability  of  sinners  arises  not  from  the  want  of  any  in- 
tellectual or  moral  powers  which  belong  to  accountable  agents, 
but  from  the  desperate  wickedness  of  their  hearts.  Or  per- 
haps it  is  more  correct  to  say,  their  inability  consists  in  the 
wickedness  of  their  hearts. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  to  assert,  as  the  sacred  writers  do,  the 
inability  of  sinners  to  obey  God,  is  to  assert  their  criminality. 
And  any  one  who,  Avith  a  proper  view  of  his  own  condition,  says 
that  he  cannot  love  and  obey  God,  must  say  it  in  the  way  of 
penitent  confession,  and  must  mean  to  imply,  that  he  is  inex- 
cusably guilty. 

It  follows  too  from  what  has  been  said,  that  the  greater  the 
degree  of  inability  to  love  God  and  obey  his  law,  which  is 
found  in  a  moral  agent  who  is  duly  enlightened,  the  greater  is 
the  degree  of  his  guilt.  If  his  inability  to  love  and  obey  is 
only  partial,  his  guilt  is  partial ;  if  total,  his  guilt  is  total. 


MORAL     INABILITY.  193 

It  is  of  great  importance  that  we  should  entertain  just  views 
of  the  practical  bearings  of  the  subject  before  us,  and  particu- 
larly that  we  should  be  well  aware  of  the  natural  consequence 
of  dci)arting  from  the  language  of  Scripture  and  adopting  that 
which  is  diflferent  and  opposite.  Suppose  then  that  instead  of 
saying  that  unrenoiyed  sinners  cannot  believe  and  obey,  you 
tell  them  they  can  do  it,  —  that  they  possess  sufficient  power  in 
themselves  without  the  influence  of  the  Spirit ;  and  that  if  they 
were  not  able  to-  obey,  they  would  be  under  no  ohligation  to  obey. 
Wlaat  will  be  the  natural  consequence  ?  Why,  those  to  whom 
you  thus  preach,  after  searching  the  Scriptures,  will  come  to 
you  and  say ;  —  you  inform  us  that  if  we  are  unable  to  obey 
God,  we  are  under  no  obligation  to  obey.  Now  the  Scriptures 
often  declare,  that  we  are  unable,  but  never,  that  we  are  able. 
Taking  your  instructions  and  the  declarations  of  the  Bible  to- 
gether, we  must  conclude,  that  we  are  under  no  obligation  to  obey 
the  divine  commands,  and  that  your  endeavors  to  make  us  feel 
our  obligation  are  misapplied. 

This  is  one  of  the  natural  results  of  your  making  affirmations 
contrary  to  the  express  declarations  of  Scripture.  And  there  is 
still  another  unhappy  consequence,  namely,  an  impression  upon 
the  minds  of  your  hearers,  that  there  is  a  disagreement  between 
you  and  the  inspired  writers.  This  impression  must  occasion 
great  perplexity  in  their  minds,  diminishing  their  respect  for  your 
preaching,  or  for  the  Bible,  or  for  both. 

But  you  may  ask,  what  is  the  fault  in  the  preaching  just 
supposed  ?  Is  there  not  a  sense  in  which  sinners  can  do  what 
God  requires  ?  Have  they  not  some  kind  of  ability  ?  Yes, 
they  have  some  kind  of  ability.  They  are  not  in  every  sense  unable 
to  obey.  They  have  no  such  inabiUty  as  excuses  or  paUiates  the 
guilt  of  disobedience.  But  they  are  the  subjects  of  another  kind 
of  inability,  which  in  the  Creed  of  the  Professors  of  this  Semi- 
nary, is  called  a  moral  incapacity.  Being  under  the  influence 
of  the  carnal  mind  which  is  enmity  against  God,  they  cann/)t 
render  him  an  acceptable  obedience. 

But  how  do  we  satisfy  ourselves  on  this  point?     When  the 

VOL.  II.  17 


194  MORAL     INABILITY. 

sacred  writers  affirm  that  unrenewed  sinners  cannot  believe  and 
obey,  how  do  we  determine  what  their  meaning  is  ?  I  answer, 
the  subject  and  drift  of  their  discourse  sliow  that  they  have 
their  eye  upon  an  inability  of  a  moral  kind,  because  they  are 
dealing  with  men  respecting  their  duty,  and  the  ground  of 
their  condemnation.  This  is  all  very  plain.  Now  if,  while 
speaking  of  sinners  as  the  sacred  writers  did,  we  say  that  they 
can  obey  God  —  that  although  unregenerate,  they  have  a  per- 
fect ability  to  do  all  which  God  requires ;  we  shall  be  under- 
stood to  contradict  the  word  of  God,  and  to  deny  the  inability 
which  Christ  and  the  apostles  aflSrm ;  of  course  to  deny  that  de- 
pravity of  the  heart  which  keeps  sinners  from  obedience  and 
renders  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Spirit  necessary  to  their 
salvation. 

But  in  other  circumstances,  our  conclusion  would  be  different. 
If  as  philosophers  we  are  setting  forth  the  essential  endow- 
ments of  moral  agents,  the  intellectual  and  moral  faculties  which 
belong  to  men  as  the  subjects  of  a  moral  government,  and  if 
while  speaking  of  men  in  this  respect  we  should  assert  that 
they  have  no  power  to  obey  the  commands  of  God  —  that  they 
are  totally  unable  to  do  what  he  requires ;  v/e  should  be  under- 
stood to  deny  the  equity  of  the  divine  commands  and  the  obli- 
gation of  men  to  obe3^  In  other  words,  we  should  be  under- 
stood to  ascribe  to  men  what  has  been  called  a  natural  inability 
to  ob'ey  the  divine  law,  such  as  belongs  to  brutes  and  idiots,  and 
which  precludes  moral  agency.  In  this  case  as  in  all  others, 
we  must  give  a  sense  to  words  according  to  the  nature  and 
circumstances  of  the  subject  and  the  obvious  design  of  the 
speaker  or  writer ;  —  a  principle  which  requires  the  exercise  of 
diligent  attention  and  candor,  but  does  not  necessarily  expose 
us  to  any  uncertainty.  Those  who  undertake  the  work  of  teach- 
ing men  the  truths  of  revelation  in  regard  to  their  state  as 
sinners  and  of  laboring  for  their  conversion,  have  need  of 
great  wisdom  and  seriousness,  fidelity  and  love  of  souls. 

I  shall  here  quote  a  few  appropriate  passages  from  a  sermon 
of  Dr.  Emmons,  pubHshed  in  the  Christian  Sentinel,  March,  1847. 


MORAL     INABILITY.  195 

And  I  make  these  quotations  with  pleasure,  because,  although 
the  author  maintained  very  decidedly  what  is  called  man's  nat- 
ural ability,  he  here  not  only  adopts  the  truth  taught  in  Scrip- 
ture, but  falls  in  directly  and  entirely  with  Scripture  phrase- 
ology. He  takes  for  his  text  the  passage  in  which  the  people, 
being  solemnly  warned  by  Joshua,  promised  that  they  would 
serve  the  Lord  their  God.  But  "  Joshua  said  unto  the  people, 
ye  cannot  serve  the  Lord ;  for  he  is  a  holy  God." 

The  author  undertakes  to  show,  first,  that  sinners  generally 
think  that  they  can  serve  the  Lord  ;  secondly,  why  they  think 
that  they  can  serve  the  Lord ;  and  tliirdly,  ivky  they  cannot  serve 
him. 

First.  Sinners  generally  think  that  they  can  serve  the  Lord. 
So  long  as  God  suffers  them  to  walk  in  their  own  way,  they 
think  that  they  can  serve  the  Lord,  whenever  they  find  it  con- 
venient or  important.  Though  they  feel  a  present  reluctance 
to  religious  duty,  yet  they  have  no  apprehension  that  their  re- 
luctance will  ever  become  unconquerable.  They  are  very  con- 
fident that  they  can  perform  the  service  which  God  requires. 

Secondly.  Why  sinners  imagine  that  they  can  serve  the 
Lord.  This  must  be  owing  to  some  misapprehension  of  them- 
selves, or  ignorance  of  their  own  hearts. 

Thirdly.  Why  sinners  cannot  serve  God.  Joshua  assigned 
the  reason.  Pie  said  "  ye  cannot  serve  the  Lord  ;  for  he  is  a 
holy  God."  Sinners  are  unholy ;  and  so  their  hearts  are  op- 
posed to  God.  And  while  they  are  in  this  state,  it  is  impossible 
that  they  should  perform  any  acceptable  service  to  him.  They 
cannot  serve  God  because  his  law  is  perfectly  holy,  while  they 
are  unholy.  As  they  feel  a  dislike  and  opposition  to  the  divine 
law,  they  cannot  conform  to  it.  They  do  not  love  the  service  of 
God  ;  and  while  this  is  the  case,  it  is  impossible  that  they  should 
serve  him. 

Then  come  the  author's  inferences. 

1.  If  sinners  think  that  they  can  serve  the  Lord,  then  it  is 
easy  to  see  why  so  many  live  secure  while  they  neglect  to  serve 
him.     Mankind  generally  neglect  to  pursue  what  they  suppose 


196  MORAL     INABILITY. 

they  can  obtain  just  when  they  please.  It  is  owing  to  their 
confidence  in  their  own  power  to  serve  God  whenever  they 
think  it  necessary,  that  they  neglect  it,  and  live  so  easy  in 
their  neglect. 

2.  If  sinners  are  mistaken  in  thinking  that  they  can  serve 
God,  then,  it  is  very  important  that  their  mistake  should  be 
removed  and  that  they  should  be  made  to  see  and  feel  that  they 
cannot  serve  God,  and  to  know  that  the  reason  is,  that  he  is  a 
holy  God,  to  whom  their  hearts  are  opposed.  If  they  think 
they  can  serve  God  because  they  are  ignorant  of  their  own 
hearts,  then  it  is  of  great  importance  that  the  nature  of  their 
depravity  should  be  clearly  and  fully  laid  open  before  them. 

3.  If  the  inability  of  sinnei'S  to  serve  God  arises  from  the  con- 
trariety of  their  hearts  to  God,  then  it  is  altogether  sinful  and 
inexcusable.  Their  inability  lies  in  their  sin ;  and  the  more  un- 
able they  are  to  love  God  for  his  holiness,  the  more  inexcusable 
and  sinful  they  are,  because  all  their  inability  arises  from  the 
utter  aversion  of  their  hearts  to  that  which  is  good. 

These  quotations  though  somewhat  abridged,  are  generally 
made  in  the  words  of  the  author,  and  they  all  express  his  ideas 
exactly. 

I  have  extended  this  discussion  so  far,  because  I  have  wished  to 
avoid  the  fault  of  passing  in  silence  over  any  thing  of  importance. 
There  are  a  few  points  which  deserve  further  notice. 

Some  writers  assert  with  great  earnestness,  that  the  sinner  has 
power  or  ability  in  the  proper  sense  to  do  all  which  the  divine  law 
requires  ;  and  that,  without  holding  this,  we  can  have  no  just  con- 
ceptions of  his  obligation,  or  his  guilt.  Now  if  they  mean  that  the 
sinner  has  what  is  called  natural  ability,  —  that  he  is  endued  with 
all  the  rational  and  moral  faculties  which  are  necessary  to  com- 
plete obligation,  and  that  nothing  is  wanting  to  acceptable  obe- 
dience, but  a  right  disposition  or  uprightness  of  heart ;  if  they 
mean  this,  let  them  say  so  plainly,  and  thus  put  an  end  to  con- 
troversy. All  maintain  that  the  sinner,  though  wholly  destitute  of 
hohness,  fully  possesses  the  powers  and  faculties  which  are  neces- 
sary to  moral   agency.     If  by  natural    ability  any  one  means 


MORAL     INABILITY.  197 

more  than  this,  I  ask  him  what  it  is.  Now  we  agree  that  this  natu- 
ral abiUtv,  or  this  possession  of  rational  and  moral  faculties,  avails 
to  create  perfect  obligation.  But  does  it  avail  and  can  it  avail  to 
produce  holy  love  and  obedience  ?  What  kind  of  power  has  the 
man  whose  heart  is  enmity  against  God,  to  love  God  ?  Has  he 
voluntary  power  ?  That  is,  has  he  power  to  love  God  by  willing 
to  love  him  ?  Can  holy  love  be  kindled  in  his  heart  by  the  influ- 
ence of  an  unholy  volition  ?  We  have  seen  that  volition,  what- 
ever may  be  its  character,  is  not  the  direct  and  proper  cause  of 
love  —  that  the  love  even  of  a  sanctified  man  is  not  excited  by 
the  power  of  a  volition,  even  of  a  right  volition.  And  it  is  very 
manifest,  that  the  unholy  volition  of  an  unregenerate  sinner  can 
do  nothing  towards  exciting  holy  love  in  his  heart. 

The  question  is  sometimes  proposed,  whether  man's  natural 
ability  may  not  be  so  used  as  to  overcome  his  moral  inability  ;  — 
whether  the  sinner  cannot  by  exerting  the  natural  power  which  he 
possesses,  change  his  own  character,  and  bring  himself  to  love 
and  obey  God. 

Let  this  then  be  our  inquiry,  whether  the  sinner  can  so  exercise 
his  natural  ability,  that  is,  his  natural  powers  and  faculties,  as  to 
evercome  his  evil  incHnations  and  bring  himself  to  believe  and 
obey  the  gospel.  Can  any  supposable  exercise  of  the  power  which 
he  possesses,  can  the  best  exercise  of  it  which  is  possible  in  his 
unrenewed  state,  make  him  holy  ?  The  influence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  renewing  the  heart  is  here  excluded,  and  the  question 
relates  to  the  proper  and  sole  effect  of  the  best  supposable  exercise 
of  power  in  the  unrenewed.  Can  one  who  is  destitute  of  hoHness 
produce  holiness  in  himself,  or  make  himself  holy,  by  any  exertion 
of  his  natural  power  ? 

To  those  who  believe  the  teachings  of  Scripture  as  to  the  neces- 
sity of  being  born  again  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  bare  statement  of 
the  question  will  be  sufiicient.  The  experience  of  Christians  and 
of  sinners  conducts  to  the  same  conclusion.  Man's  natural  power, 
which  constitutes  him  a  moral,  accountable  agent,  never  has  availed 
to  his  sanctification.  How  favorable  soever  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  has  been  placed,  and  however  diversified  and  earnest 

17* 


198  MOKAL    INABILITY. 

his  efforts,  lie  has  never  attained  to  the  smallest  measure  of  holi- 
ness, without  the  renewing  of  the  divine  Spirit.  Such  is  the  re- 
sult of  past  experience.  And  such  will  be  the  result  of  future  ex- 
perience. Unre generate  men  will  possess  the  powers  of  moral 
agents  in  various  degrees,  and  in  various  circumstances,  and  will 
be  addressed  bj  an  endless  variety  of  motives,  and  those  of  great 
weight,  and  will  be  excited  to  the  most  strenuous  efforts.  But 
without  the  sanctifying  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  they  will 
never  attain  to  faith  and  obedience.  Their  natural  powers,  how- 
ever excited,  mil  always  act  in  conformity  with  the  predominant 
affection  of  their  heart.  What  is  it  that  moves  men  to  act,  but 
their  incHnation  or  heart  ?  And  if  the  heart  moves  them  to  act, 
their  action  will  be  according  to  their  heart.  If  the  heart  is  un- 
holy, all  the  exercises  which  result  from  it  will  be  unholy. 

It  hence  follows  very  clearly,  that  the  ability  which  sinners 
naturally  possess,  consisting  in  their  intellectual  and  moral  facul- 
ties, cannot  be  relied  upon  to  produce  obedience.  Sinners  them- 
selves cannot  rely  upon  it,  as  it  can  furnish  them  no  ground  to 
expect  that  they  ever  will  repent  and  obey  the  gospel.  If  there 
is  mil/  reason  for  them  to  hope  that  they  shall  ever  repent  and 
obey,  that  reason  does  not  he  at  all  in  their  natural  ability.  For 
without  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  they  will  no  more  obey 
the  gospel  with  their  natural  ability,  than  they  would  ivitliout  it. 
In  other  words,  the  faculties  of  moral  agents  will  of  themselves  no 
more  induce  them  to  obey,  than  the  want  of  those  faculties  would. 
I  Had  sinners  a  real  inclination  to  repent  and  obey,  they  would  have 
a  just  ground  to  expect  that  they  will  repent  and  obey  ;  for  they 
might  reasonbly  expect  to  act  according  to  their  inclination  or  heart. 
But  surely  they  have  no  reason  to  expect,  whatever  their  natural 
faculties  may  be,  that  they  will  ever  repent  and  obey  the  gospel 
without  a  heart  to  do  it.  Such  an  expectation  would  be  prepos- 
terous. Of  course,  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  in  us  to  speak  to 
sinners  of  their  natural  ability  as  a  thing  upon  which  they  can  in 
the  least  degree  rely  to  bring  about  their  repentence.  For  they 
will  in  fact  be  as  certainly  hindered  from  repenting  by  the  wicked- 
ness of  their  heart,  as  if  there  was  a  natural  impossibiUty  in  the 


MORAL    INABILITY.  199 

way.  When  sinners  become  sensible  of  their  sinful  and  ruined 
condition,  and  the  necessity  of  a  change,  and  begin  to  feel  that 
while  unrenewed,  they  cannot  render  an  acceptable  obedience  to 
God ;  if  you  tell  them  that  they  can  do  it,  that  they  have  in 
themselves  a  perfect  ability  to  repent  and  believe,  and  do  not 
need  any  special  help  from  God  to  enable  them  to  obey  his  com- 
mands ;  you  will  naturally  lead  them  to  rely  upon  their  own 
ability  for  the  high  purposes  of  salvation.  For  why  should  they 
not  rely  upon  their  own  ability  to  save  them,  if  you  tell  them, 
and  tell  them  truly,  that  they  are  perfectly  able  of  themselves, 
to  do  all  that  is  necessary  to  their  salvation  ?  And  if  this  idea 
gets  possession  of  their  minds,  they  will  certainly  think  their  case 
very  favorable,  and  will  say  in  their  hearts,  why  should  we  feel 
any  more  alarm  or  anxiety  concerning  our  state,  seeing  we  have 
in  ourselves  a  perfect  ability  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of 
the  gospel,  and  thus  obtain  eternal  hfe  ?  How  erroneous  and 
da,ngerous  must  that  instruction  be,  which  contradicts  the  dec- 
larations of  Scripture,  and  which  evidently  tends  to  produce  in 
sinners  a  reliance  upon  themselves,  and  an  expectation  that 
they  shall  repent  and  beheve  to  the  saving  of  their  souls  be- 
cause they  have,  as  they  are  led  to  suppose,  a  full  and  suf- 
ficient abihty  for  this. 

I  add  one  more  remark,  namely,  that  those  rational  faculties 
which  constitute  the  natural  ability  of  sinners,  and  all  the 
ability  which  they  have,  are  not  at  all  adapted  to  overcome  the 
alienation  of  their  hearts,  and  to  turn  them  to  a  life  of  holy 
obedience.  What  is  called  the  natural  ability  of  sinners  is  not 
fitted  to  such  a  purpose  —  it  has  no  tendency  or  aptitude  to 
produce  such  an  effect.  Their  natural  ability,  that  is,  the  powers 
and  faculties  of  their  minds  have  an  obvious  fitness  and  efficacy 
to  accomphsh  other  objects  of  signal  importance,  but  they  have 
no  fitness  or  efficacy  to  accomplish  this  object.  As  the  natural 
power  of  sinners,  however  great,  is  entirely  under  the  control  of 
their  selfish  and  wicked  hearts,  it  can  never  bring  them  to  any 
holy  affection  or  act ;  and  if  they  rely  upon  it  for  this  purpose, 
they  will  most  assuredly  be  disappointed.     Their  natural  abihty, 


200  MORAL    INABILITY. 

consisting  in  the  faculties  of  their  minds,  does  indeed  make  them 
moral,  accountable  agents,  and  puts  them  under  perfect  obligation 
to  obey  the  divine  commands.  But  as  it  exists  in  their  depraved 
minds,  it  tends  only  to  evil,  and  will  act  itself  out  in  evil,  and 
only  in  evil. 

Reason  and  conscience  do  indeed  utter  the  sentence  of  divine 
truth,  and  warn  sinners  to  cease  to  do  evil  and  learn  to  do  well. 
But  they  utter  this  sentence  to  a  heart  of  stone  that  will  not 
feel,  —  to  a  heart  that  loves  sin  and  will  not  put  it  away  —  to  a 
heart  that  hates  God,  and  that  cannot  love  what  it  hates.  Take 
reason  and  conscience  and  self-love,  and  all  the  powers  and  dis- 
positions of  the  unsanctified  sinner,  —  take  them  either  sepa- 
rately or  together,  and  there  is  no  more  adaptedness  or  tendency 
in  them  to  change  the  depraved  heart  and  to  originate  holy 
love,  than  there  is  in  a  bad  tree  to  produce  good  fruit,  or  in  an 
impure  fountain  to  send  forth  pure  waters.  Take  care  then  how 
and  for  what  purpose  you  speak  to  sinners  of  their  natural 
power,  and  remember  that  how  extensive  soever  that  power  may 
be,  they  will  always  without  exception  use  it  according  to  the 
dispositions  of  their  corrupt  hearts.  They  have  no  ability  that 
will  help  them  to  overcome  sin  and  to  become  holy,  or  that 
has  any  adaptedness  to  such  an  object.  Beware  then  lest  you 
encourage  and  strengthen  in  sinners  that  mistaken  confidence  in 
their  own  ability  which  they  are  of  themselves  so  much  inclined 
to  entertain,  and  lest  you  thus  become  accessory  to  a  delusion 
which  may  be  fatal  to  their  future  well  being.  Dr.  Day  says : 
"  If  you  tell  the  sinner  in  unqualified  language,  that  he  can 
repent,  he  will  draw  the  conclusion  that  he  shall;  and  will  re- 
main at  ease,  waiting  his  own  time  for  repentance."  And  he 
closes  the  paragraph  with  this  important  suggestion :  "  What- 
ever language  you  use  in  impressing  on  the  sinner  a  sense  of 
his  obligation  and  guilt,  you  need  to  guard  it  well,  lest  he 
remain  insensible  of  his  dependence  on  the  influence  of  the 
Spirit." 


LE  CTURE    LX. 


man's  depravity,    preliminary  remarks. 

In  previous  Lectures  we  have  considered  man  as  a  moral  agent. 
We  shall  now  enter  upon  a  particular  consideration  of  him  as  a 
depraved  moral  agent.  And  it  will  be  obvious  to  you,  that 
when  man  is  spoken  of  as  depraved,  degenerate,  corrupt  or 
apostate,  there  is  an  implied  reference  to  the  original  state  in 
which  he  was  created,  which  the  Scriptures  represent  to  have 
been  a  state  of  moral  purity  and  uprightness.  The  brief  state- 
ment which  is  made  in  Gen,  3,  and  various  passages  in  other 
parts  of  Scripture,  manifestly  imply  that  man  in  his  primitive 
state  was  holy,  and  that  the  act  of  disobedience  mentioned 
Gen.  3  :  6,  was  the  commencement  of  human  sin.  What  has 
been  the  character  and  state  of  man  since  the  transgression  of 
Adam  and  Eve,  is  the  important  subject  to  which  I  now  solicit 
your  careful  attention. 

The  following  preliminary  remarks  are  intended  to  guard 
against  groundless  prepossessions  and  wrong  modes  of  reasoning, 
and  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  just  and  profitable  discussion  of 
the  subject  of  human  depravity. 

First.  The  consideration  of  the  divine  character  cannot  he 
made  the  ground  of  any  presumption  against  the  doctrine  of 
human  depravity  or  sinfulness,  and  can  have  no  influence  to  in- 
validate the  arguments  by  which  the  doctrine  is  supported. 

In  reasoning  on  the  present  subject  I  shall  proceed  on  the  prin- 
ciple, that  the  existence  and  moral  perfection  of  God  have  been 


202  man's   depravity. 

satisfactorily  proved,  and  are  unhesitatingly  believed ;  and  that 
he  is  a  righteous  and  benevolent  Governor.  My  position  is,  that 
this  cannot  be  adduced  as  a  proof  against  the  doctrine  of  man's 
apostasy  and  sinfulness. 

No  man  can  urge  the  moral  character  of  God  as  an  argu- 
ment against  the  doctrine  of  man's  depravity,  except  on  the 
supposition,  that  we  are  competent  to  detei-mine  by  our  own 
reason,  in  what  manner  God's  moral  perfection  will  be  de- 
veloped. If  we  make  an  appeal  to  revelation  or  experience, 
we  shall  find  what  all  Christians,  and  what  the  most  enlightened 
of  the  heathen,  have  found  and  acknowledged  ;  that  man  is  the 
subject  of  a  deep  moral  depravity.  But  suppose  that  we  were  now 
at  the  period  immediately  after  the  creation  of  man,  and  that,  with 
our  rational  powers  in  full  exercise,  we  should  look  upon  the  in- 
nocent, happy  pair  in  the  garden  of  Eden,  under  the  inspection 
of  their  Creator,  and  enjoying  his  constant  kindness.  And  sup- 
pose the  inquiry  should  be  made  ;  "  Will  these  lioly  and  happy 
beings  ever  become  transgressors  of  Grod's  righteous  law  ?  Will 
Crod  suffer  them  to  fall  into  siti?  And  will  their  posterity  have 
their  existence  in  a  state  of  moral  evil  P^  What  would  be  the 
proper  answer  to  such  an  inquiry  ?  —  the  answer  which  would 
accord  with  the  truth  ?  We  should  probably  be  inclined  to  say, 
that  such  a  disastrous  event  can  never  take  place.  God  is  in- 
finitely good,  and  he  will  watch  over  his  dependent,  feeble 
creatures,  and  effectually  guard  them  against  danger,  especially 
against  the  pollution  and  misery  of  sin.  But  if  we  should  wait 
a  Uttle,  and  observe  the  course  of  events,  we  should  learn  that 
our  judgment  was  premature.  We  should  see  the  happy  parents 
of  the  human  race  fallen  into  a  state  of  guilt,  and,  through  their 
ofience,  all  their  posterity  "  constituted  sinyiersJ^  And  thus  the 
history  of  God's  providence  would  teach  us,  that  we  were  not 
of  ourselves  competent  to  determine  in  what  particular  manner 
his  infinite  perfection  would  be  displayed. 

The  fact  is,  that  the  goodness  of  God  is,  in  various  respects, 
immensely  different  from  all  that  we  call  goodness  in  man.  And 
if  we  should  undertake   to  determine,  in  particular  cases,  that 


PRELIMINARY    REMARKS.  208 

such  and  such  acts  will  result  from  the  divine  goodness,  because 
similar  acts  result  from  such  goodness  as  we  possess  ;  ■we  should 
fall  into  the  most  evident  mistakes.  Our  proceeding  in  this 
manner  would  be  to  assume  the  principle,  that  we  can  measure 
the  infinite  perfections  of  God  by  our  own  views  and  feelings. 
It  would  be  to  forget  that,  while  we  are  of  yesterday  and  know 
nothing,  the  mind  of  God  is  infinite  ;  —  that  while  our  views  are 
confined  within  a  very  narrow  compass,  the  mind  of  God  com- 
prehends the  whole  extent  of  the  universe,  and  reaches  4;hrough 
endless  ages.  Nothing  can  be  more  reasonable  than  to  believe, 
that  the  divine  wisdom  and  goodness,  which  are  infinite,  and 
which  have  respect  to  the  whole  system  of  the  creation  and  to 
the  whole  length  of  eternity,  must  dictate  measures  exceedingly  di- 
verse from  those  which  our  finite  minds  would  be  likely  to  adopt. 

This  general  principle  is  of  special  use  in  regard  to  a  great 
variety  of  subjects,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  one  now  under 
consideration.  We  can  properly  make  no  inference  from  the 
moral  perfection  of  God,  which  will  interfere  with  our  belief  of 
man's  depra^^ty.  We  should  be  utterly  unable,  from  our  notions 
of  the  divine  goodness  to  determine  whether  all  or  any  human 
beings  would  be  transgressors,  or  in  what  degree  they  would  be 
depraved,  or  at  what  period  of  their  existence,  or  in  what  man- 
ner, their  depravity  would  commence.  Facts  show,  and  the 
Scriptures  show,  that  many  things  are  consistent  with  the  good- 
ness of  God,  which,  judging  from  our  own  reason,  we  should 
have  thought  wholly  inconsistent.  We  are  to  remember  this  ; 
and  to  come  to  the  inquiry  as  to  the  moral  state  of  man,  with  a 
mind  free  from  prepossession,  ready  to  believe  what  is  proved  by 
proper  evidence,  and  with  a  full  persuasion  that  whatever  we  find 
to  be  fact  as  to  the  existence,  the  degree,  the  commencement,  or 
the  consequence  of  depravity  in  man,  must  be  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  the  moral  attributes  of  God.  Accordingly,  the  con- 
sideration that  God  is  infinitely  benevolent  can  have  no  more 
influence  upon  our  inquiry  respecting  man's  moral  character  and 
state,  than  respecting  his  mental  faculties  or  his  bodily  senses. 
This  subject  must  be  treated  wholly  as  a  matter  of  fact. 


204  man's   depravity. 

This  principle  will  entirely  free  us  from  one  of  the  most  per- 
plexing difficulties  respecting  the  reality  and  tlie  degree  of  human 
corruption.  If  we  take  care  to  understand  this  important  prin- 
ciple, and  to  have  it  fixed  in  our  minds,  we  shall  no  longer  deny 
or  doubt  that  man  is  dead  in  sin,  because  God  is  good.  It  will 
no  longer  appear  to  us  any  stain  upon  the  character  of  God,  that 
a  world  of  rational,  moral  beings  have  rebelled  against  him, 
and  exposed  themselves  to  his  wrath.  Feeling  ourselves  utterly 
incompetent  to  judge  what  would  be  suitable  for  a  Being  of  in- 
finite perfection  to  do  in  such  a  case,  we  shall  take  the  attitude 
of  learners.  As  soon  as  we  find  what  God  has  actually  done, 
and  what  he  has  not  done,  what  events  have  occurred  among  his 
creatures,  and  how  he  treats  those  events,  we  shall  be  satisfied. 
Indeed,  we  shall  be  so  far  from  thinking  that  anything  which 
takes  place  among  created  beings  is  incompatible  with  the  per- 
fections of  God,  that  we  shall  regard  all  his  arrangements  and 
operations  in  the  natural  and  moral  woi'ld,  as  manifestations  of 
his  attributes,  and  as  means  of  giving  us  just  conceptions  of  his 
character.  And  if,  in  any  case,  even  where  we  find  the  greatest 
mystery,  the  question  arises,  ivhy  Crod  has  dorie  so,  we  can 
readily  answer,  because  he  sees  it  to  be  right.  This  general 
answer,  arising  altogether  from  our  confidence  in  the  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness  of  God,  should  be  perfectly  satisfactory, 
though  the  particular  reasons  of  his  conduct  lie  wholly  beyond 
the  sphere  of  our  inteUigence. 

Secondly.  No  valid  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  human  de- 
pravity can  be  derived  from  the  fact,  that  God  created  man  at 
first  in  his  oum  moral  image.  In  other  words,  mail's  original 
holiness  is  not  inconsistent  tvith  his  present  sinfulness. 

From  the  very  constitution  of  his  nature,  man  was  finite  and 
mutable.  Though  he  was  created  holy,  he  was  liable  to  become 
unholy.  He  had  no  such  inflexibility  of  principle,  no  such 
strength  of  character,  no  such  confirmation  in  virtue,  as  abso- 
lutely to  secure  him  against  sin.  His  certain  perseverance  in 
hoUness  could  not  be  inferred  from  anything  in  himself.  He  was 
in  his  nature  changeable,  and  was  exposed  to  temptations  which 


P  R  E  L I  xM  I N  A  R  Y     REMARKS.  205 

might  influence  liim  to  become  a  sinner.  There  ^Yas,  therefore, 
no  certain  ground  of  his  continuance  in  a  state  of  hoHness,  unless 
God  saw  fit  effectually  to  preserve  him  from  sin.  And  it  could 
in  no  way  be  inferred  from  God's  moral  perfection,  that  he  would 
preserve  him.  He  was  under  no  obligation  to  do  it.  He  would 
violate  none  of  his  perfections  by  not  doing  it. 

Thus  the  matter  stood.  Man,  as  a  moral  agent,  in  a  state  of 
trial,  might  fall  into  sin.  He  was  hable  to  change,  and  was  ex- 
posed to  the  influence  of  causes  which  might  induce  him  to 
change.  God  was  not  pledged  eflectually  to  preserve  him  from 
sin,  and  none  of  his  perfections  required  him  to  afford  such 
preservation.  And  there  might  be  special  reasons  relating  to 
his  own  glory  and  the  interests  of  his  moral  kingdom,  why  he 
should  not  effectually  preserve  him.  When  therefore  sin  occur- 
red, we  cannot  say  there  was  anything  incredible  in  it,  or  any- 
thing inconsistent  with  man's  having  been  originally  holy.  And 
his  original  holiness  cannot  be  mentioned  as  diminishing  at  all 
the  evidence  of  his  apostasy,  or  as  any  reason  why  we  should  not 
beUeve  it.  Difficulties  may  exist  respecting  this  matter,  and 
difficulties  not  to  be  solved.  But  the  following  things  are 
evident,  namely,  that  man,  though  at  first  holy,  was  changeable, 
and  was  exposed  to  the  influence  of  circumstances  which  might 
induce  him  to  sin ;  that  the  proof  we  have  of  his  apostasy  is  to 
be  admitted  without  hesitation,  and  that  we  can  never  consider  it 
incredible,  that  a  moral  agent,  in  a  state  of  probation,  should 
transgress  the  divine  law  and  fall  under  its  penalty. 

Thirdly.  The  chief  reason  which  prevents  men  from  rightly 
understanding  and  receiving  the  doctrine  of  human  corruption, 
is,  their  blindness  to  the  extent  and  spirituality  of  the  divine  law, 
and  their  iynoranoe  of  their  oivn  hearts. 

The  moral  law  is  the  standard  of  character.  If  we  are  con- 
formed to  its  requisitions,  we  are  holy  ;  if  not  conformed,  we  are 
sinners.  But  men  in  general  have  no  proper  discernment  of 
this  perfect  law,  and  no  practical  regard  to  it,  as  the  rule  of  their 
actions.  Their  eyes  are  directed  to  other  and  very  different 
standards,  according  to  which  they  can  think  highly  of  them- 

VOL.  II.  18 


206  man's    depravity. 

selves,  though  in  truth  thej  are  guilty  and  vile.  Every  human 
being  is  himself  an  example  of  depravity.  And  he  must  learn 
ii;s  nature  and  malignity  chiefly  by  a  careful  survey  of  his  own 
heart  and  life.  While  he  neglects  to  examine  himself,  and  to 
judge  of  his  moral  feelings  and  actions  by  God's  holy  law,  our 
arguments  from  Scripture  and  experience  will  fail  to  convince 
him  of  the  truth,  or  at  best  will  give  him  only  an  intellectual  con- 
viction, a  dry,  speculative  notion  of  what  his  heart  does  not  feel. 
Here  is  the  great  obstacle  to  the  reception  of  that  humihating 
doctrine  which  we  hold  respecting  the  moral  corruption  and  ruin 
of  the  human  race.  Men  are  occupied  with  other  concerns  and 
do  not  look  into  themselves.  Or  if  at  any  time  they  do  this,  thej 
disregard  the  only  true  standard  of  moral  actions,  and  the  only 
just  measure  of  their  obligations,  and  substitute  another  standard, 
which  leads  them  to  overlook  their  moral  delinquencies  and  the 
utter  alienation  of  their  hearts  from  God,  and  to  fonn  an  opinion 
of  themselves  which  will  free  them  from  the  pain  of  self-reproach, 
and  gratify  their  self-love.  They  are  like  a  man  who,  having  a 
deformed  countenance,  induces  a  painter  to  make  such  a  picture 
of  him  as  shall  conceal  his  deformities,  and  please  his  vanity  by 
imaginary  beauties,  and  then  looks  at  it  as  a  true  picture  of 
himself. 

The  fact  that  so  many  men  reject  the  doctrine  of  human  de- 
pravity and  guilt,  or  form  very  inadequate  and  erroneous  con- 
ceptions of  it,  is  so  far  from  disproving  the  doctrine,  that  it  is  in 
reahty  a  striking  illustration  of  its  truth. 

Fourthly.  It  is  in  no  degree  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine 
of  depravity,  as  set  forth  in  the  Scriptures,  and  as  maintained 
by  evangelical  Christians,  that  men  in  their  natural  state  possess 
and  exhibit  many  amiable,  commendable  and  useful  qualities. 

Men  stand  in  various  relations.  Their  character  must  of, 
course  be  viewed  in  a  variety  of  lights,  and  in  each  must  be  esti- 
mated according  as  it  is  conformed  or  not  conformed  to  the  rules  of 
conduct  arising  from  these  various  relations.  They  may  have 
attributes  corresponding  to  some  of  these  relations,  such  as  the 
natural  relations   of  domestic  and  social  life :   and  in  reference 


PRELIMINARY     REMARKS.  207 

to  these  relations  merely,  they  may  be  considered  both  amiable 
and  useful,  and  even  praise-worthy  ;  while  they  have  nothing 
which  corresponds  to  the  high  relation  they  bear  to  God  and  to 
his  spiritual  law,  and  to  their  fellow  men  as  subjects  of  that 
law.  Accordingly  the  natural  affections  of  parents  and  children, 
and  all  the  social  affections  and  sympathies  are  just  as  consistent 
as  bodily  appetites  are,  with  the  fact  that  man  is  without  hohness, 
i.  e.  without  that  affection  which  is  required  of  him  in  relation 
to  God  and  a  moral  government.  What  then  becomes  of  all 
that  the  deniers  of  human  corruption  have  said  of  the  lovely 
simplicity,  the  freedom  from  guile,  the  dutifulness  and  affection 
of  children,  and  the  sympathy,  good  will,  gratitude,  justice,  and 
generosity  which  men  in  their  natural  state  often  exhibit  ?  It  is 
admitted  that  they  may  have  all  these  lovely,  useful  and  com- 
mendable dispositions,  and  that,  in  regard  to  all  tlie  common  do- 
mestic and  social  relations,  those  who  have  these  dispositions  are 
to  be  regarded  in  a  very  different  light  from  those  who  are  des- 
titute of  them.  But,  after  all,  these  natural  dispositions,  however 
amiable,  and  however  useful  their  fruits,  do  not  touch  their  re- 
lation to  God,  and  to  the  immortal  beings  who  compose  his  moral 
kingdom.  And,  for  aught  that  appears,  they  may  be  as  really 
destitute  of  that  holy  love  and  obedience,  which  is  due  from 
them  in  this  paramount  relation,  as  if  they  had  nothing  which 
corresponded  to  their  other  relations.  I  say  they  may  be  as 
really  destitute  of  holiness.  I  speak  not  of  the  degree  of  positive 
wickedness.  For  evidently  the  extinction  of  the  natural  affec- 
tions shows  an  extreme  degree  of  depravity.  Indeed,  there  is 
nothing  but  the  practice  of  wickedness  for  a  long  time  and  with 
uncommon  violence,  which  can  extinguish  the  amiable  and  useful 
dispositions  belonging  to  us  as  domestic  and  social  beings.  Hence 
when  the  Apostle  speaks  of  persons  as  "  without  natural  affec- 
tion," his  object  evidently  is,  to  describe  those  who  are  sunk  to 
the  lowest  degree  of  vice.  To  sum  up  all  in  a  few  words ;  the 
natural  affections,  however  cultivated  and  improved,  and  however 
attractive  the  forms  in  which  they  may  be  exhibited,  do  not  con- 
stitute holiness,  and  are  often  found  where  no  degree  of  holiness 


208  man's   depravity. 

exists.  And  they  are  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  nature  of  man, 
that  they  cannot  be  eradicated,  except  by  the  influence  of  ex- 
treme wickedness,  nor  always  even  by  this. 

My  last  remark  is,  that  no  theory  intended  to  account  pkilo- 
wphicaUi/  for  the  fact  that  man  is  depraved,  can  free  the  subject 
from  difficulty. 

As  I  shall  enlarge  upon  this  view  of  the  subject  in  another 
place,  I  shall  treat  it  briefly  here.  It  will  be  found  on  careful 
inquiry,  that  the  common  theory  of  the  orthodox  relative  to  the 
doctrine  of  depravity  is  exposed  to  no  greater  objections  than 
any  other  theory ;  that  all  the  attempts  which  have  been  made 
by  philosophical  reasoning  to  avoid  or  to  diminish  the  difficulties 
attending  the  subject,  have  effected  but  little ;  and  that  man's 
universal  sinfulness  is,  after  all,  a  ivell  known,  dreadful  fact  — 
a  fact,  lohether  explained  or  unexplained,  as  certain  as  our  ex- 
istence. Now  as  no  hypothesis  which  has  been  invented  for  the 
purpose  of  accounting  for  man's  depravity,  and  freeing  it  from 
objections  and  difficulties,  has  answered  the  purpose ;  we  are 
brought  to  this  conclusion ;  that  depravity  is  a  fact  which 
chief  y  concerns  us  not  in  an  intellectual,  hut  in  a  moral  view ; 
that  tve  are  to  make  use  of  the  doctrine  for  practical  purposes, 
and  that  it  is  the  part  of  Christian  wisdom  to  receive  those  p>ar- 
llcular  vietvs  of  the  subject  which  best  agree  with  the  current  rep- 
resentations of  Scripture  and  with  lessons  of  experience  and  obser- 
vation, to  ivhatever  speculative  objections  those  views  may  he 
exposed. 

I  have  said  this  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  way  before 
us,  and  making  the  object  of  inquiry  as  simple  and  plain  as  pos- 
sible. In  physical  science  we  inquire  for  facts  ;  for  example,  we 
inquire  whether  all  bodies  have  a  tendency  to  the  centre  of  the 
earth,  or  to  the  centre  of  the  solar  system ;  how  this  tendency 
shows  itself,  and  according  to  what  laws  it  is  regulated.  We 
inquire,  what  peculiar  tendency  or  power  the  loadstone  has,  and 
in  what  manner  it  operates.  The  same  in  every  branch  of 
natural  science.  Here  we  suffer  ourselves  to  be  encumbered 
with  no  hypothesis  and  no  preconceived  opinion.     And  if  any 


PRELIMINARY    REMARKS.  209 

one  should  say  to  us,  this  or  that  tiling,  which  is  made  known  as 
a  fact,  is  very  strange  and  unaccountable,  entirely  different  from 
what  we  should  have  supposed,  and  liable  to  difficulties  which 
cannot  be  solved  ;  it  would  be  of  no  avail.  We  should  be  satis- 
fied with  clear  evidence,  and  should  believe  the  truth  of  facts, 
made  known  by  uniform  experience.  What  if  the  facts  should 
appear  strange  and  unaccountable,  and  should  be  attended  with 
insolvable  difficulties  ?  To  those  who  are  just  beginning  to  learn, 
everything  may  be  strange  and  unaccountable.  We  know  that 
many  things  with  which  we  are  famihar,  and  concerning  which 
we  have  no  difficulties,  are  very  strange  and  are  attended  with 
insurmountable  difficulties  to  a  little  child ;  and  that  they  were 
formerly  so  to  us. 

Why  cannot  men  be  brought  to  exercise  as  much  reason  and 
common  sense  on  the  subject  of  religion,  as  they  do  on  other 
subjects  ?  In  every  department  of  natural  science,  they  readily 
acknowledge  facts,  however  new,  and  however  contrary  to  their 
preconceived  opinions.  But  when  they  come  to  the  subject  of 
religion,  on  which  they  are  least  of  all  capable  of  knowing  any- 
thing except  what  Scripture  and  experience  teach,  they  hesitate 
to  admit  what  Scripture  and  universal  experience  make  perfectly 
plain  and  certain.  They  doubt  and  even  deny  a  doctrine  which 
rests  upon  unquestionable  facts  continually  occurring  around 
them  and  within  them.  What  can  be  done  to  convince  men  of 
the  unreasonableness  and  folly  of  such  a  course,  and  to  prepare 
them  to  receive  with  simphcity  whatever  shall  be  made  known  to 
them  as  truth  by  the  word  and  providence  of  God  ? 

18* 


LECTURE    LXI. 


EVIDENCE     OF    DEPRAVITY    FROM     HUMAN     CONDUCT.        EVIDENCE 
FROM   SCRIPTURE   OF   ITS   UNIVERSALITY. 

In  commencing  the  argument  in  support  of  the  common  doc- 
trine of  depravity,  I  shall  offer  a  few  remarks  on  the  partic- 
ular kind  of  evidence  which  arises  from  human  conduct. 

This  is  a  kind  of  evidence  which  is  sanctioned  by  our  Saviour 
himself.  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them.  Do  men  gather 
grapes  of  thorns  or  figs  of  thistles  ?  A  good  tree  cannot  bring 
forth  evil  fruit ;  neither  can  a  corrupt  tree  bring  forth  good 
fruit."  On  this  principle  we  ground  our  judgments  both  of 
ourselves  and  others.  External  action  is  the  only  evidence  of 
character  which  can  fall  under  our  observation,  in  respect  to  our 
fellow  men.  And  external  and  internal  action  furnish  the  proper 
evidence  of  our  own  character. 

Now  the  general  current  of  human  actions  is  such  in  relation 
to  the  divine  law,  as  to  afford  conclusive  and  overwhelming  evi- 
dence of  man's  moral  corruption.  If  we  turn  our  thoughts  to 
the  history  of  human  conduct  from  the  beginning  of  the  world, 
we  shall  see  that  man  has  been  a  sinner.  If  we  survey  the 
conduct  of  man  at  the  present  day,  in  every  situation  and  at 
every  period  of  life,  we  still  find  evidence  of  the  fact  that  he 
is  a  sinner.  And  this  fact  is  made  still  more  evident  to  each 
individual  by  his  own  moral  feelings  and  actions.  Who  among 
the  wisest  and  best  of  men  can  survey  his  own  life,  even  for 
a  single  day,  without  being  constrained  to  acknowledge  that  he 
is  a  sinner?      Every   one  who  attends  seriously  to  his  inward 


DEPRAVITY     PROYED,     ETC.  211 

exercises  and  outward  actions,  and  compares  them  with  the 
standard  of  God's  law,  will  have  a  deep  conviction  of  his  own 
moral  corruption. 

The  evidence  which  arises  from  human  conduct  in  support  of 
the  doctrine  of  depravity,  is  exceedingly  various.  It  is  exhibited 
in  all  conceivable  ways.  Indeed  the  wickedness  of  the  human 
heart  has  forced  itself  out  in  ways  which,  aside  from  our  knowl- 
edge of  facts,  we  should  have  pronounced  impossible. 

This  evidence  exists  in  a  very  high  degree.  The  actions  of 
men  are  not  such  that  we  are  merely  able,  by  careful  examina- 
tion, to  discover  some  taint  of  moral  evil  in  them.  They  have 
an  obliquity  which  is  palpable  and  prominent.  They  have  a 
deep  stain,  hke  scarlet  and  crimson. 

The  evidence  from  human  conduct  is  constantly  exhibited  he- 
fore  our  eyes.  Should  we  at  any  time  forget  the  history  of  past 
ages,  and  begin  to  think  that  man  is  not  so  depraved  as  has 
generally  been  supposed  ;  we  should  soon  be  awakened  from  our 
dream  by  the  fruits  of  depravity  in  those  around  us,  and  espe- 
cially in  ourselves.  Whether  we  are  associated  with  our  fellow 
creatures  in  the  common  business  of  life  or  in  the  concerns  of 
rehgion,  we  cannot  fail  to  witness  in  them,  whoever  they  may 
be,  clear  indications  of  moral  corruption.  And  if  we  are  sepa- 
rated from  the  society  of  men  and  live  in  solitude,  we  shall  still 
have  evidence  of  this  corruption  from  what  takes  place  in  our- 
selves. Wherever  we  go  and  whatever  we  do,  this  evidence  is 
continually  present  with  us. 

From  the  history  of  human  conduct,  we  have  then  evidence  of 
depravity  which  is  various,  powerful,  and  constant.  Indeed  the 
evidence  is  so  great,  that  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  it  could 
be  increased.  There  is,  it  is  true,  an  effort  among  men,  and 
we  may  often  be  conscious  of  such  an  effort  in  ourselves,  to  draw 
a  veil  over  the  naked  deformity  of  sin,  and  to  put  on  the  sem- 
blance of  goodness  when  the  reality  is  wanting.  But  even  this 
affords  additional  evidence  of  the  evil  which  cleaves  to  our 
character.  This  attempt  at  concealment,  this  unwillingness  to  ap- 
pear in  a  true  light,  is  one  of  the  most  hateful  properties  of  the 


212  DEPRAVITY    PROVED 

depraved  heart.  The  more  we  are  in  the  habit  of  searching  out 
the  deceitful  workings  of  sin,  and  the  various  false  refuges  which 
it  invents,  the  more  deep  will  be  our  conviction  of  its  power  and 
malignitj.  It  is  on  the  whole  difficult  to  conceive,  how  the  evi- 
dence of  man's  depravity,  arising  from  his  actions,  could  be  in- 
creased. To  say  the  least,  this  evidence  is  so  great,  that  we 
must  be  the  subjects  of  singular  obstinacy  and  blindness,  not  to  be 
convinced,  and  of  singular  pride,  not  to  be  humbled. 

The  evidence  already  brought  into  view,  even  if  there  were  no 
other,  proves  the  moral  depravity  of  man  as  clearly,  as  the  evi- 
dence of  facts  prove  any  principle  in  natural  science.  Even  the 
law  of  gravitation  cannot  be  proved  more  certainly  than  "  the  law 
of  sin'^  in  man.  If  the  law  of  gravitation  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  all  bodies,  when  left  without  resistance,  show  a  tendency  to 
move  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth  ;  the  moral  depravity  of  man 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that,  when  left  to  himself  in  circumstances 
which  lead  to  a  development  of  his  moral  character,  he  always 
shows  a  propensity  to  sin.  The  appearances  of  human  nature 
from  the  first  apostasy  to  the  present  time,  and  from  early  child- 
hood to  old  age,  evince  the  existence  of  a  deep-rooted  moral  dis- 
ease. That  the  nature  of  man  has  a  wrong  bias,  or  tends  to  evil, 
is  seen  and  acknowledged  by  all  who  have  the  care  of  children 
and  youth,  or  who  seriously  endeavor  to  persuade  men  to  confortn 
to  the  rule  of  duty.  It  is  proved  by  all  the  restraints  which  dis- 
creet parents  feel  themselves  obliged  to  impose  on  their  children, 
and  rulers  upon  their  subjects ;  especially  by  those  restraints 
which  good  men  find  it  necessary  to  impose  upon  themselves.  The 
facts  which  indicate  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  man  are  as 
various  and  clear,  as  those  which  indicate  any  bodily  disease. 
And  the  more  perfect  our  acquaintance  with  the  conduct  of  men, 
and  especially  our  own  conduct,  the  deeper  will  be  our  impression 
of  the  moral  disorder  of  our  nature.  It  is  not  like  a  case  in  which 
a  partial  acquaintance  with  the  symptoms  of  the  disease  excites 
fears  which  are  allayed  by  a  more  perfect  acquaintance.  It  is 
rather  like  a  case  in  which  our  first  observation  might  lead  us  to 
apprehend  that  a  person  is  the  subject  of  some  slight  infirmity, 


FROM  man's   conduct.  213 

still  however  leaving  us  in  doubt  whether  there  is  any  serious  dis- 
order, or  what  the  disorder  is,  until  our  continued  observation  of 
the  symptoms  increases  our  apprehension,  and  finally  makes  it  a 
certainty,  that  the  patient  has  a  disorder  of  the  most  alarming 
character,  and  incapable  of  being  cured,  except  by  the  speedy  ap- 
plication of  extraordinary  means. 

To  give  a  further  illustration  of  the  principle  above  stated,  and 
to  confirm  still  more  fully  the  conclusion  to  which  we  have  arrived, 
I  subjoin  a  few  quotations  from  writers  of  well  known  charac- 
ter. 

Dr.  Beecher  says ;  "  There  must  be  and  there  is  in  man  some- 
thing that  is  the  ground  and  reason  that  the  will  of  fallen  man  does, 
from  the  beginning,  act  wrong,  —  something  anterior  to  voluntary 
action.^^ —  "  There  must  be  some  ground,  in  the  nature  of  the  race, 
for  the  early  personal  and  actual  sin  with  which  they  are  all  charge- 
able."—  "  To  say  that  aU  men  sin  actually,  and  universally,  and 
forever,  until  renewed  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  that  against  the 
strongest  possible  motives,  merely  because  they  are  free  agents, 
and  are  able  to  do  so,  and  that  there  is  in  their  nature^  as  affect- 
ed by  the  fall,  no  cause  or  reason  of  the  certainty,  is  absurd.  It 
is  to  ascribe  the  most  stupendous  concurrence  of  perverted  action 
in  all  the  adult  millions  of  mankind,  to  nothing.  The  thing  to  be 
accounted  for,  is,  the  phenomenon  of  an  entire  series  of  universal 
actual  sin  ;  and  to  ascribe  the  universal  and  entire  obliquity  of 
the  human  will  to  the  simple  ability  of  choosing  wrong,  is  to  as- 
cribe the  moral  obliquity  of  a  lost  world  to  nothing." 

"  Even  though,"  says  Dr.  Chalmers,  "  we  had  outward  exhi- 
bition alone,  we  often  have  enough  to  infer  and  ascertain  the  in- 
ward tendency.  We  need  not  dig  into  a  spring  to  ascertain  the 
quality  of  its  water,  but  to  examine  the  quality  of  the  stream 
which  flows  from  it"  —  "  It  is  thus  that  we  verify  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin  by  experience.  Should  it  be  found  true  of  every  man 
that  he  is  actually  a  sinner  —  should  this  hold  universally  true 
with  each  individual  of  the  human  family;  —  if,  in  every  country 
of  the  Avorld,  and  in  every  age  of  the  world's  history,  all  who  have 
grown  old  enough  to  be  capable  of  showing  themselves,  were 


214  DEPRAVITY     PROVED 

transgressors  against  the  law  of  God  —  and,  if  among  all  the  ac- 
cidents and  varieties  of  condition  to  which  humanity  is  liable,  each 
member  of  humanity  still  betook  himself  to  his  own  wayward  devi- 
ations from  the  rule  of  right  —  then,  he  sins  purely  in  virtue  of 
his  being  a  man  ;  there  is  something  in  the  very  make  and  mech- 
anism of  his  nature  which  causes  him  to  be  a  sinner."  —  "  The  in- 
nate and  original  disposition  of  man  to  sin,  is  just  as  firmly  estab- 
lished by  the  sinful  doings  of  all  and  each  of  the  species,  as  the 
innate  ferocity  of  the  tiger  is,  by  the  way  in  which  tliis  ferocity 
breaks  forth  into  actual  exemplification  in  each  individual  of  the 
tribe.  If  each  man  is  a  sinner,  this  is  because  of  a  pervaduig 
tendency  to  sin,  that  so  taints  and  overspreads  the  whole  nature, 
as  to  be  present  with  every  separate  portion  of  it.  And  to  assert 
the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  in  these  circumstances,  is  to  do  no 
more  than  to  assert  the  reigning  quality  of  any  species  whether 
in  the  animal  or  vegetable  kingdom.  It  is  to  do  no  more  than  to 
affirm  the  ferocious  nature  of  the  tiger,  or  the  odorous  nature  of 
the  rose,  or  the  poisonous  nature  of  the  fox-glove.  It  is  to  re- 
duce that,  which  is  true  of  every  single  specimen  of  our  nature, 
into  a  general  expression  that  we  make  applicable  to  the  whole 
nature.  And  to  talk  of  the  original  sin  of  our  species,  thereby 
intending  to  signify  the  existence  of  a  prior  and  vmiversal  disposi- 
tion to  sin,  is  just  as  warrantable,  as  to  affirm  the  most  certain 
laws,  or  soundest  classifications  in  natural  history." 

"  No  man  however,"  says  Dr.  George  Payne,  "  has  exhibited 
this  point  in  a  more  luminous  manner  than  the  great  Jonathan 
Edwards,  The  substance  of  his  arguments,  —  is  as  follows.  The 
uniformity  of  an  event  proves  the  existence  somewhere  of  a  ten- 
dency to  that  event.  —  For  what  is  meant  by  tendency,  but  a 
prevailing  hableness  or  exposedness  to  such  an  event  ?"  — "  Ten- 
dency to  a  certain  disease,  implies  the  probability  of  an  attack  of 
that  disease,  through  the  existence  and  action  of  certain  elements 
in  the  constitution  which  may  give  birth  to  it.  Now  tendency  is 
always  inferred  from  facts.  If  a  tree  grows  perpendicularly,  and 
not  horizontally,  we  say  it  has  a  tendency  thus  to  grow.  If  wa- 
ter runs  down  hill,  we  conclude  that  it  possesses  a  tendency  to 


FROM  man's   conduct.  215 

flow  in  that  direction.  If  a  tree  brings  forth  certain  fruit,  no  one 
doubts  its  tendency  to  produce  such  fruit.  If,  then,  the  tree  of 
human  nature  uniformly  brings  forth  morally  corrupt  fruit,  we 
not  only  may  but  we  must  infer  that  it  has  a  tendency  to  bring 
forth  such  fruit ;  i.  e.  that  the  doctrine  of  the  native  depravity  of 
man  is  true." 

"  Sufficient,  we  conceive,"  continues  Dr.  Payne,  "  has  been 
said  in  justification  of  our  conclusion,  that  the  invariableness  with 
which  sin  is  committed  proves  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  ;  or, 
that  there  exists,  in  the  nature  of  man,  a  tendency  to  commit  it. 
The  conclusion  rests,  let  it  not  be  forgotten,  not  on  the  mere 
commission  of  sin,  but  on  the  invariableness  of  its  commission. 
Our  argument  does  not  run  thus :  actual  sin  proves  original  sin. 
The  case  of  the  fallen  angels,  and  of  Adam  himself,  would  dis- 
prove this  assertion,  were  we  incautious  enough  to  make  it.  The 
argument  is  as  follows  :  —  all  men,  in  every  age,  in  every  part  of 
the  globe,  under  every  variety  of  circumstances,  in  spite  of  every 
conceivable  moral  inducement  to  avoid  it,  —  all  men  have  sinned. 
'  They  sin,  therefore,'  to  adopt  the  emphatic  language  of  Dr. 
Chalmers,  '  not  solely  because  of  the  peculiar  excitements  to 
evil  that  have  crossed  their  path  ;  they  have  sinned  not  only 
because  of  the  noxious  atmosphere  they  have  breathed,  of  the 
vitiating  example  that  is  on  every  side  of  them ;  but  they  have 
sinned  purely  in  virtue  of  their  being  men.^  The  proper  cause, 
or  occasion  of  sin,  in  other  words,  is  their  own  fallen  nature." 

"  And,  now,"  says  Payne,  "  I  should  not  do  justice  to  my 
subject,  were  I  not  to  add,  that  the  horrible  wickedness  de- 
scribed by  the  Apostle,  has  abounded  in  the  world  in  spite  of 
all  the  means  resorted  to  by  Jehovah  to  check  its  progress." 

"  The  conclusion  we  draw  from  the  preceding  proof  of  the 
universality  of  sin,  in  all  ages  and  nations,  in  spite  of  all  re- 
straints, is,  that  there  must  exist  in  the  nature  of  man  a  ten- 
dency to  sin ;  in  other  words  that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is 
a  true  doctrine.  In  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  the  tree 
of  human  nature  has  brought  forth  bad  fruit ;  its  nature  must 
therefore  be  corrupt.     Or,  to  borrow  an  illustration  from  Jona- 


216  DEPEAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

than  Edwards ;  '  If  there  were  a  piece  of  ground  which  abound- 
ed with  briers  and  thorns,  or  some  poisonous  plant,  and  all  man- 
kind had  used  their  endeavors  for  a  thousand  years  together 
to  suppress  that  evil  growth,  and  to  bring  that  ground  bj  ma- 
nure and  cultivation,  planting  and  sowing,  to  produce  better 
fruit,  all  in  vain  —  it  would  still  be  overrun  with  the  same  nox- 
ious growth  ;  it  would  not  be  a  pi^oof  that  such  a  produce  was 
agreeable  to  the  nature  of  the  soil  in  any  wise  to  be  compared 
to  that  which  is  given  in  divine  providence,  that  wickedness  is 
a  produce  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  the  field  of  the  world  of 
mankind.  For  the  means  used  with  it  have  been  great  and 
wonderful,  contrived  by  the  unsearchable  and  boundless  wisdom 
of  God,  —  medicines  procured  with  infinite  expense,  exhibited 
with  a  vast  apparatus,  a  marvellous  succession  of  dispensations, 
introduced  one  after  another,  displaying  an  incomprehensible 
length  and  breadth,  depth  and  height  of  Divine  wisdom,  love, 
and  power,  and  every  perfection  of  the  Godhead  —  to  the 
eternal  admiration  of  principalities  and  powers  in  heavenly 
places.'  " 

We  come  now  to  the  evidence  from  Scripture  that  all  men  are 
sinners.  This  evidence  is  nothing  less  than  the  testimony  of 
that  Being  who  knows  what  is  in  man,  who  is  no  respecter  of 
persons,  and  who  is  perfectly  qualified  to  be  our  Judge.  It  is 
ihe  testimony  of  a  benevolent  Creator  respecting  his  creatures, 
and  of  a  holy  and  merciful  Father  respecting  his  children.  In 
such  a  testimony  we  may  be  sure  there  will  be  no  partiality  and 
no  injustice. 

The  particulars  of  the  divine  testimony  in  proof  of  the  uni- 
versal sinfulness  of  our  race  will  be  presented  in  the  following 
order : 

1.  Passages  expressly  asserti7ig  the  universality  of  sin. 

2.  Passages  setting  forth  the  sinful  conduct  of  individuals  and 
nations. 

3.  Representations  in  regard  to  other  subjects  which  imply  the 
universal  sinfulness  of  man. 


DEPRAVITY     UNIVERSAL.  217 

1.  Passages  expressly  asserting  the  universality  of  sin. 

Those  which  are  found  in  the  writings  of  the  Apostle  Paul,  are 
very  direct.  Rom.  5:  12  — 19,  "And  so  death  passed  upon 
all  men,  for  that  all  have  sinned."  This  text  clearly  im- 
plies that  all  who  die  are  sinners,  or  that  the  sinfulness  of  men 
extends  as  far  as  their  mortality.  Vai-ious  expressions  in  the  ver- 
ses here  referred  to  show,  that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  in  a 
state  of  sin  and  ruin.  This  is  repeatedly  affirmed  in  ch.  3  :  "  We 
have  before  proved,"  says  the  Apostle,  "  that  both  Jews  and  Gen- 
tiles are  all  under  sin  ;  as  it  is  written  :  There  is  none  righteous,  no, 
not  one.  There  is  none  that  understandeth,  there  is  none  that 
seeketh  after  God.  They  are  all  gone  out  of  the  way ;  they  are 
together  become  unprofitable,  there  is  none  that  doeth  good,  no, 
not  one."  He  then  comes  to  the  conclusion,  that  "  all  the  world 
are  guilty  before  God ;  so  that  by  the  deeds  of  the  law  no  flesh 
can  be  justified  in  his  sight ;"  which  would  not  be  true,  if  any 
were  free  from  sin. 

The  declaration  of  God  by  the  prophet  Jeremiah,  ch.  17 :  9, 
conveys  the  same  sentiment.  "  The  heart  is  deceitful  above  all 
things,  and  desperately  wicked  ;  who  can  know  it  ?"  The  sense 
is  unlimited.  It  is  not  the  heart  of  one  man,  or  of  one  society  of 
men  ;  but  the  heart,  —  the  human  heart  universally.  This  sense 
is  confirmed  by  the  next  verse.  "  I  the  Lord  search  the  heart ;"  the 
heart  universally.  As  there  can  be  no  limitation  in  this  case,  there 
can  be  none  in  the  former.  The  heart  which  God  searches,  is  that 
which  is  deceitful  and  desperately  wicked.  In  Eccl.  9 :  4,  we  find 
a  similar  expression  :  "  The  heart  of  the  sons  of  men  is  full  of  evil." 
So,  Gen.  8  :  21,  "  The  imagination  of  man''s  heart  is  evil  from  his 
youth."  What  does  the  anatomist  mean,  when  he  gives  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  form  and  uses  of  the  heart,  as  a  part  of  the  human  body  ? 
And  what  does  the  writer  on  mental  philosophy  mean,  when  he 
speaks  of  the  mind,  the  understanding,  the  will,  and  the  con- 
science 9  Does  not  the  form  of  expression  always  denote  that 
what  is  said  relates  to  man  as  a  species,  and  is  true  of  the 
species  universally,  unless  there  is  an  express  or  implied  limita- 
tion ?     But  it  may  be  said,  there  is  such  a  limitation,  inasmuch 

VOL.  II.  19 


218  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

as  the  same  writers  who  declare  that  all  are  sinners,  all  corrupL 
—  tJiat  there  is  7ione  that  seeketh  after  Crod,  or  doeth  good,  no, 
not  one,  also  speak  frequently  of  those  who  are  righteous,  of 
those  who  seek  God  and  do  good. 

To  set  this  matter  in  a  proper  light,  we  have  only  to  make 
the  Bible  its  own  interpreter.  How  then  does  the  sacred  volume 
account  for  the  fact,  that  there  are  some  who  form  an  ei:ception 
to  the  general  character  of  man,  and,  in  the  midst  of  a  Avicked 
world,  are  holy  and  obedient  ?  Does  it  teach  that  they  are  so 
hj  nature?  No.  It  unequivocally  ascribes  the  character  of 
those  who  are  holy,  to  the  new  creating  influence  of  the  Divine 
Spirit.  They  were  "  by  nature  children  of  wrath,  even  as 
others."  But  they  are  "  horn  again, -^^  they  "are  washed,  they 
are  justified,  they  are  sanctified  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  Jesus, 
and  hg  the  Spirit  of  their  God.''^  They  are  what  they  are,  "  bg 
the  grace  of  God.^^  Now  if  they  were  holy  by  nature,  the  texts 
which  declare  that  there  is  none  righteous,  would  evidently  be 
subject  to  limitation.  But  as  those  who  are  holy  are  not  so  in 
their  natural  state,  and  become  so  only  by  the  renewing  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  they  furnish  no  exception  to  the  universal  sinfulness 
of  man,  as  he  is  by  nature.  Whatever  men  may  become  in  this 
I  world  or  in  the  next,  by  redeeming,  sanctifying  grace,  they  are 
all  in  their  natural  state  without  exception,  dead  in  sin.  And  it 
is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  even  those  who  are  holy  and  obedient, 
are  so  only  in  a  very  imperfect  measure,  having  much  remaining 
sin.  So  that  if  any  say  they  have  no  sin,  "  they  deceive  them 
selves,"  and  "  make  God  a  liar." 

2.  I  argue  from  those  texts  which  set  forth  the  sinfulness  of 
individuals  and  nations  at  particular  times.  Such  as  Gen.  6  : 
5,  "  And  God  saw  that  the  wickedness  of  man  was  great  in  the 
earth,  and  that  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart 
was-  only  evil  continually."  This  passage  shows  what  was  the 
character  of  the  human  race  before  the  flood.  "  The  wicked- 
ness of  man  was  great."  To  the  same  class  belong  all  the 
passages  which  describe  the  impiety  and  wickedness  of  Jews  and 
Gentiles  at  different  periods.     These  passages  are  very  numerous, 


DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL.  219 

and  are  found  in  the  writings  of  INIoses  and  the  Prophets,  in 
the  Psalms  and  in  the  New  Testament. 

It  is  said,  in  the  way  of  objection  to  the  common  mode  of 
reasoning  from  such  texts,  that  thej  relate  to  men  in  particular 
places  and  at  particular  times,  and  to  those  who  were  the  subjects 
of  an  uncommon  degree  of  depravity  ;  and  that  it  would  be  very 
unjust  to  understand  them  as  descriptive  of  the  character  of  the 
whole  human  race. 

This  objection  can  be  obviated  by  considering  the  manner  in 
which  the  subject  is  treated  by  writers  in  the  New  Testament. 
They  refer  to  the  account  given  in  the  Old  Testament  of  the 
depravity  of  men  in  former  times,  as  truly  descriptive  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  human  race  generally.  The  prophet  Isaiah  said  :  "  Who 
hath  believed  our  report,  and  to  whom  is  the  arm  of  the  Lord 
revealed?"  And  in  Isaiah  6,  God  said  to  the  prophet;  "Go, 
and  tell  this  people  ;  hear  ye  indeed  but  understand  not,  and  see 
ye  indeed  but  perceive  not.  Make  the  heart  of  this  people  fat, 
and  make  their  ears  heavy,  and  shut  their  eyes."  In  this 
commission  God  signified  what  was  the  character  of  the  people 
to  whom  the  prophet  was  sent,  and  pointed  out  the  fearful  effect 
which  his  ministry  would  have  upon  them.  The  words  related, 
primarily  and  directly  to  those  who  were  contemporary  with  the 
prophet  Isaiah.  But  in  the  New  Testament,  these  words  are 
repeatedly  quoted  as  descriptive  of  the  character  of  the  Jews 
under  the  Gospel  dispensation.  John  12:  37  —  40,  "But 
though  he  had  done  so  many  miracles  before  them,  yet  they  be- 
lieved not ;  that  the  saying  of  Isaiah  the  prophet  might  be  ful- 
filled, which  he  spake  ;  Lord  who  hath  believed  our  report^  and 
to  whom  is  the  arm  of  the  Lord  revealed  ?  Therefore  they  could 
not  believe,  because  that  Isaiah  saith  again ;  He  hath  blinded 
their  eyes  and  hardened  their  hearts,  that  they  should  not  see 
with  their  eyes,  nor  understand  with  their  heart,  and  be  converted, 
and  I  should  heal  them.''^  Thus  the  writer  of  the  evangelical 
history  took  two  passages,  which  described  the  stupidity  and 
wickedness  of  the  Jews  at  a  former  period,  and  applied  them 
to  his  contemporaries.     The  Apostle  Paul  did  the  same  in  regard 


220  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

to  the  Jews  in  Home.  In  his  final  address  to  them,  in  order  to 
make  a  deep  impression  of  their  guilt,  he  said  ;  "  Well  spake  the 
Holy  Ghost  bj  Esaias  the  prophet  mito  your  fathers;"  —  re- 
peating the  same  words  from  Isaiah  6,  with  the  manifest  and 
•cutting  implication,  that  the  words  described  their  character,  as 
well  as  the  character  of  their  fathers.  In  his  epistle  to  Titus, 
Paul,  in  the  same  way,  takes  a  passage  from  the  poet  Epime- 
nides,  and  applies  it  to  the  Cretans  of  his  day.  "  One  of  them, 
even  a  prophet  of  their  own,  said  :  The  Cretans  are  alivays  liars, 
evil  beauts,  slotv  bellies.  This  witness  is  true  :  wherefore  rebuke 
them  sharply."  The  passage  from  the  poet  not  only  suggested 
that  the  Cretans  were  depraved,  but  that  they  were  characterized 
from  age  to  age  by  particular  for^yis  of  depravity.  But  the  ex- 
ample of  the  Apostle  in  Romans  3,  is  most  directly  in  point.  In 
making  out  the  proof  that  all  men  are  sinners,  he  enumerates 
the  several  forms  of  wickedness  which  had  been  exhibited  by 
men  in  particular  places,  and  at  particular  times.  The  argu- 
ment is  unquestionably  good.  And  of  course,  it  is  just  and 
proper  for  us  to  regard  all  the  particular  instances  of  wicked- 
ness which  the  history  of  any  portion  of  mankind  brings  to  view, 
as  indicating  what  is  the  character  of  the  species.  In  several  of 
the  Psalms,  particularly  the  v,  x,  xiv,  xxxvi,  and  xl,  and  in 
Isaiah  lix,  the  writers  described  the  sins  which  prevailed  in  their 
day.  "  They  are  corrupt,  they  have  done  abominable  works  ; 
they  are  all  gone  aside,"  etc.  These  passages,  which  originally 
described  the  Jewish  character  in  times  of  great  degeneracy, 
are  used  by  the  Apostle  to  set  forth  the  character  of  the  Jews 
in  his  day.  But  he  entirely  fails  as  to  the  great  object  of  his 
reasoning,  and  the  conclusion  at  which  he  arrives  is  false,  if  the 
passages  he  quotes  from  the  Old  Testament  do  not  contain  a  sub- 
stantially true  account  of  the  character  of  mankind  universally 
in  their  natural  state.  For  he  adduces  the  passages  for  the  very 
purpose  of  proving  that  all  the  world  are  guilty  before  God.  It 
is  a  connected  chain  of  reasoning  ;  and  unless  the  texts  cited 
are,  as  to  the  substance  of  them,  justly  applicable  to  the  Avhole 
race  of  man,  the  reasoning  is  without  force,  and  the  conclusion. 


DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL.  221 

that  all  are  guilty  and  in  need  of  salvation  by  grace,  is  broader 
than  the  premises.  But  when  depravity  is  thus  predicated  of 
all  men  alike,  it  by  no  means  implies  tliat  all  have  the  same 
degree,  or  exhibit  the  same  forms  of  depravity.  This  was  not 
the  case  even  Avitli  those  of  whom  the  Psalmist  and  the  prophet 
Isaiah  originally  spoke.  The  truth  of  the  passages  quoted,  and 
the  propriety  of  reasoning  from  them  as  the  Apostle  does,  need 
not  be  supposed  to  imply  more  than  this,  namely,  that  all  men 
in  their  natural  state  are  unholy  and  disobedient,  and  so,  as  to 
wickedness  of  heart,  are  substantially  alike ;  that  they  have  the 
same  moral  nature,  the  same  wrong  propensities,  the  same  ele- 
ments of  moral  evil;  and  that  the  variety  of  characters  existing 
among  men  is  not  to  be  accounted  for  by  any  essential  differ- 
ence as  to  moral  nature,  but  by  their  different  bodily  constitu- 
tions, by  the  different  circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed, 
and  the  different  influences  under  which  they  act. 

It  may  possibly  be  thought  that,  as  the  passages  quoted  re- 
lated to  the  Jewish  nation  in  former  times,  the  Apostle  meant  to 
apply  them  merely  to  those  Jews  who  had  a  similar  character  in 
his  time,  and  that  it  would  be  improper  to  consider  them  as  a 
proof  of  universal  depravity.  I  admit  that  the  passages  related 
primarily  to  Jews ;  but  the  Apostle  shows  that  his  ai-gument  was 
meant  to  have  a  wider  range.  His  conclusion  is,  that  "  the  whole 
world,"  whether  Jews  or  Gentiles,  are  guilty,  that  is,  convicted  of 
sin,  and  so  must  look  for  justification  by  grace,  not  by  works. 
I  would  not  deny,  that  in  coming  to  this  conclusion  he  might 
refer  to  what  he  had  said  to  the  Gentiles  in  ch.  1,  in  connection 
with  what  he  had  said  of  the  Jews  in  ch.  3.  Nor  would  I 
deny  that  he  might  take  it  for  granted,  and  as  what  would  not 
be  called  in  question  by  those  to  whom  he  wrote,  that  the  Gen- 
tiles were  as  wicked  as  the  Jews,  and  as  worthy  of  the  charges 
which  he  recited  from  the  Old  Testament.  On  this  ground, 
his  making  good  his  charge  against  the  Jews  was,  by  obvious  con- 
sequence, making  it  good  against  the  Grentiles. 

If  any  allege  that  the  passages  quoted  were  meant  by  the 
Apostle  to  be  applied  only  to  the  unbelieving  and  ungodly  part 

19* 


222  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

of  the  Jewish  nation ;  my  reply  is,  that  the  Apostle's  design 
was  to  show,  that  there  is  only  one  mode  of  acceptance  with 
God,  namely,  by  faith  in  Christ,  in  contradistinction  to  salvation 
by  works.  And  was  it  not  true  of  believers,  as  well  as  of 
others,  that  there  was  no  way  of  justification  for  them  except  by 
grace  ?  Had  they  not  been  sinners  ?  And  were  they  not  sin- 
ners still  ?  Does  not  the  Apostle,  in  the  next  chapter,  speak  of 
Abraham  and  David,  as  those  who  were  justified  in  the  gratu- 
itous way,  that  is,  pardoned  ;  —  implying,  that  they  were  trans- 
gressors ?  So  tha,t  what  the  Apostle  here  asserts  of  all  men,  is 
not  to  be  limited  to  the  unbelieving  and  ungodly,  but  is  to  be 
considered  as  justly  applicable  to  all  who  were  ever  in  a  state  of 
sin,  that  is,  to  the  whole  race  of  man,  without  exception  ;  as  he 
says,  verse  23,  "  for  all  have  sinned  and  come  short  of  the  glory 
of  God,"  —  and  so  need  the  grace  of  the  gospel. 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt,  therefore,  that  the  passages 
quoted  in  Romans  3  from  the  Old  Testament,  are  a  true  de- 
scription of  the  character  which,  for  substance,  all  men  naturally 
possess.  These  passages  show  that,  whatever  may  be  the  dif- 
ferent forms  of  character  among  men,  they  all  without  excep- 
tion agree  in  this,  that  they  are  sinners.  And  if  these  passages 
are  to  be  regarded  in  this  light ;  it  is  evidently  proper  that  other 
similar  passages  should  be  regarded  in  the  same  light.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  account  given  of  the  wickedness  of  the  antedilu- 
vian world,  and  of  particular  portions  of  mankind  in  different 
ages,  may  be  produced  as  a  true  exhibition  of  the  natural  char- 
acter of  man,  a  development,  varied  by  circumstances,  but 
substantially  the  same,  of  man's  unrenewed  heart.  What  if 
men,  who  are  educated  in  a  Christian  land,  and  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Christian  instruction,  are  free  from  the  odious  forms 
of  vice  described  by  the  Apostle  ?  Are  they  not  "  by  nature 
children  of  wrath  even  as  others  ? "  In  forming  a  correct  judg- 
ment of  their  case,  we  pass  by  what  is  fair  and  lovely  in  their 
visible  conduct; — we  pass  by  all  the  diversities  of  their  intel- 
lectual and  social  qualities,  and  fix  our  eye  upon  the  moral  affec- 
tions of  the  heart.     In  these  elements  of  evil  all  agree.     And 


DEPRAVITY     UNIVERSAL.  223 

although  they  have  not,  by  formal  outward  acts,  committed  theft, 
murder,  and  idolatry,  they  all  have  in  their  unrenewed  hearts 
what  may  be  called  the  principles  or  seeds  of  these  hateful  vices. 
And  admitting  them  to  be  alike  in  these  original  afiections,  we 
can  satisfactorily  account  for  all  the  varieties  of  character  exist- 
ing among  them,  by  the  influence  of  circumstances.  Who  can 
suppose  that  the  different  degrees  of  wickedness,  and  all  the 
varieties  of  character  among  men,  are  to  be  traced  back,  to  a 
difference  in  their  moral  nature,  or  their  original  moral  disposi- 
tions ?  Nothing  could  be  more  unreasonable,  or  contrary  to  the 
word  of  God,  than  this.  It  is  clearly  suggested  by  common 
observation  and  experience,  and  especially  by  Scripture,  that 
human  nature,  as  to  its  grand  moral  features,  is  always  the  same  ; 
and  that  the  wickedness  committed  in  any  age  or  country,  is  a 
real  exhibition  of  what  is  in  man  as  a  species.  Were  it  not  so, 
the  writings  of  historians,  whether  sacred  or  profane,  would  be 
of  little  use  to  us.  We  have  been  taught  to  regard  it  as  one  of 
the  peculiar  advantages  of  history,  that  it  gives  us  lessons  re- 
specting human  nature ;  that  it  makes  us  acquainted  with  what 
is  in  man,  and  so  is  calculated  to  profit  us  as  individuals  of  the 
species.  But  of  what  advantage  would  history  be  to  us,  if  it 
gave  a  description  of  the  dispositions  and  actions  of  those  who 
have  no  common  nature  with  us,  and  to  whom  we  bear  no  moral 
resemblance  ?  On  this  supposition,  why  did  the  Apostle  John 
refer  to  the  conduct  of  Cain,  for  the  purpose  of  counselling  and 
warning  those  to  whom  he  wrote  ?  Why  did  the  Apostle  Paul 
say,  "  Whatsoever  things  were  written  aforetime,  were  written 
for  our  learning?"  And  why  did  he  bring  into  view  the  in- 
gratitude, unbelief,  murmuring,  and  obduracy  of  the  Israelites 
in  the  wilderness,  for  the  purpose  of  admonition  to  his  contem- 
poraries ?  Suppose  men  in  former  times  ivere  chargeable  with 
various  kinds  of  wickedness  ;  what  is  that  to  us,  if  we  have  no 
tendency  in  our  nature  to  the  same  wickedness  ?  History  has 
been  regarded  as  a  faithful  mirror  in  wliich  we  may  discern  the 
features  of  our  own  character,  even  those  which  were  before 
unobserved,  and  may  learn  the  dangers  against  which  we  ought 


224  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

to  guard.  But  on  the  supposition  above  made,  history  could  no 
longer  be  used  for  these  important  purposes,  but  must  be  con- 
sidered merely  as  affording  gratification  to  our  curiosity.  Nay 
more,  those  texts  in  which  the  sacred  writers  make  the  most 
general  declarations  respecting  the  sinfulness  of  man,  must,  on 
this  supposition,  be  limited  to  those  to  whom  the  writers  originally 
applied  them.  If  they  said  "  that  which  was  born  of  the  flesh 
is  flesh,"  and  that  "  they  who  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please 
God ;"  they  must  have  said  it  of  the  carnal  race  of  men  who 
lived  at  that  time  ;  but  it  by  no  means  proves  that  men  at  the 
present  day  are  in  this  condition.  If  Christ  declared  that  "  ex- 
cept a  man  be  born  again  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven," 
—  and  if  the  apostles  spoke  of  Christians  as  actually  renewed 
by  the  Divine  Spirit ;  we  cannot,  upon  this  principle,  consider 
such  passages  as  intended  to  show  what  the  natural  state  of  man 
is,  and  what  is  necessary  to  the  Christian  character,  at  this 
period  of  superior  light  and  refinement.  Indeed,  if  the  prin- 
ciple involved  in  the  objection  is  correct,  we  cannot  conclude 
that  any  Scripture  precept  is  obligatory  on  us.  For  all  the  com- 
mands of  God  contained  in  the  Bible,  were  given  to  men  who 
lived  in  former  times.  And  how  can  those  commands,  which 
were  given  to  generations  of  men  long  since  passed  away,  show 
what  God  requires  of  us  ?  Those  who  were  spoken  to  by  Moses 
and  the  prophets,  and  by  Christ  and  the  apostles,  were  required 
to  repent  of  sin,  and  to  love  God  with  all  their  hearts,  and 
their  neighbors  as  themselves.  But  when  has  the  inspired 
teacher  expressly  said,  that  these  requisitions  related  to  men 
who  should  live  in  the  nineteenth  century  ?  In  fact,  all  parts 
of  the  Bible  were  addressed  to  men  of  other  times  and  in  other 
circumstances  ;  and  how  can  any  of  its  doctrines  be  applicable 
to  us  ?  How  can  its  precepts  bind  us  ?  And  how  can  its  prom- 
ises animate  and  comfort  us  ?  All  the  good  which  the  sacred 
volume  can  now  do,  is  to  teach  us  what  mankind  were,  and  how 
God  treated  them  in  former  times.  To  all  these  extremities 
should  we  be  carried,  if  we  should  admit  the  supposition  which  we 
have  been  considering.     For  the  principle  which  would  free  us 


DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL.  225 

from  the  high  charges  of  depravity  and  guilt  found  in  the  Bible, 
would  authorize  us  to  set  aside  all  the  other  doctrines  connected 
with  that  of  human  corruption,  —  would  prove  us  to  be  free 
from  the  obligations  of  all  the  precepts  of  the  Bible,  and  would 
entirely  deprive  us  of  its  gracious  and  cheering  promises.  And 
so  the  sacred  volume  would  be  to  us  an  antiquated,  obsolete,  and 
useless  book. 

It  is  maintained  by  all  sober  men,  that  the  general  instruc- 
tions, the  precepts  and  promises  of  God's  word,  relate  to  us  as 
really  as  to  those  who  lived  in  the  time  of  the  prophets  and 
apostles.  But  on  what  principle  are  they  to  be  so  understood  ? 
How  is  it  that  avc  readily  conclude,  that  all  men  now  living  are 
bound  by  the  moral  precepts  contained  in  the  Bible  ?  —  that 
wherever  we  find  human  beings,  we  feel  it  to  be  proper  at  once 
to  address  to  them  the  offers  and  the  promises  of  the  Gospel, 
and  to  call  upon  them  to  repent  and  believe  ?  It  can  be  on  no 
other  principle  than  this ;  that  as  to  all  which  is  necessary  to 
constitute  accountable  beings,  and  as  to  the  essential  qualities  of 
moral  character,  all  men  are  alike.  This  is  a  principle  which  we 
almost  instinctively  admit.  Who  doubts  that  human  beings  whom 
he  meets  for  the  first  time,  even  if  it  be  in  the  most  distant  part 
of  the  world,  have  the  same  rational  and  moral  faculties  with 
those  men  whom  he  has  familiarly  known ;  that  they  possess, 
and  will,  as  occasion  prompts,  exhibit,  self-love,  pride,  a  disposi- 
tion to  resent  injuries,  and  all  the  other  moral  affections  which 
he  is  conscious  of  in  himself,  or  has  witnessed  in  others  around 
him  ?  And  who  does  not  feel  it  to  be  proper  and  necessary  in 
all  his  intercourse  with  men,  whether  familiarly  known  to  him  or 
not,  to  act  on  the  principle  that  they  are  subject  to  all  the  de- 
praved affections  which  the  inspired  teachers  charged  upon  the 
wicked  world  in  their  day?  If  a  man  should  act  on  any  other 
principle,  he  would  be  considered  as  deficient  in  the  knowledge 
of  human  nature.  And  if  any  one  should  think  his  own  heart 
free  from  that  depravity  which  has  misguided  and  ruined  others, 
he  would  show  that  he  is  ignorant  of  himself. 

This  leads  me  to  say,  that  the  propriety  of  considering  the 


226  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

description  of  human  sinfulness  found  in  the  Bible,  as  of  univer- 
sal application,  is  evident  from  the  experience  and  consciousness 
of  every  sober,  reflecting  man.  Let  such  a  man  read  what  the 
sacred  writers  affirm  of  the  wickedness  of  individuals  and  of 
nations ;  and  then  look  into  his  own  heart,  and  ponder  well 
the  emotions  which  have  been  excited  and  the  principles  which 
have  operated  there  ;  and  must  he  not  be  satisfied  that  he  has 
within  him  the  elements  of  all  that  the  apostles  and  prophets 
charged  upon  the  wicked  world  ?  Nay,  it  will  not  be  difiicult 
for  him  to  discover  in  himself  some  real  moral  resemblance  to 
those  who  have  been  stigmatized  by  the  most  hateful  vices. 

I  appeal  to  those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  look  into  their 
own  hearts.  You  know  a  man  who  is  guilty  of  a  henious  crime, 
—  theft,  adultery,  or  murder  ;  and  you  know  all  the  unpropitious 
circumstances  of  his  case  from  early  childhood  ;  the  wrong  in- 
struction he  has  received,  the  corrupting  manners  of  his  asso- 
ciates, the  influence  of  wealth  or  poverty,  of  excessive  indulgence, 
or  irritating  severity,  which  has  operated  upon  him,  —  yea,  the 
whole  combination  of  hurtful  causes  by  which  his  moral  faculties 
have  been  perverted,  and  his  heart  prepared  for  acts  of  wicked- 
ness. Now  had  you  been  placed  in  the  same  circumstances, 
would  you  not  have  been  likely  to  commit  the  same  crimes  ? 
Have  you  not  already,  in  many  instances,  done  that  which  is  as 
really  contrary  to  the  divine  law  ?  And  have  you  not  a  painful 
consciousness  of  those  unholy  dispositions,  which,  had  there 
been  no  influence  to  subdue  or  restrain  them,  and  had  they  been 
ehcited  and  strengthened  by  temptation,  might  have  made  you 
a  Cain,  a  Pharaoh,  a  Saul,  or  a  Judas  ?  Are  you  not  convinced 
that  you  have  in  yourself  the  elements  of  the  same  moral  de- 
formity, and  that  it  is  owing,  not  to  the  natural  purity  of  your 
hearts,  but  to  the  influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  or  to  the  re- 
straints of  Divine  Providence,  that  you  are  not  actually  numbered 
with  the  most  vile  and  wretched  of  the  human  race  ? 

3.  I  argue  from  those  representations  of  Scripture  which 
teach  the  depravity,  of  all  the  human  race  hy  manifest  im- 
plication. 


DEPRAVITY     UNIVERSAL.  227 

Those  passages  which  teach  the  necessity  of  regeneration,  or 
which  assert  that  the  obedient  and  pious  have  been  regenerated, 
clearly  imply  that  all  men  are  naturally  in  a  depraved  state. 
For,  if  any  human  being  is  not  depraved,  surely  he  does  not 
need  to  be  born  again.  He  is  holy  and  obedient  without  re- 
generation. 

The  first  passage  I  shall  quote  is  John  o :  1  —  7,  containing 
the  conversation  of  our  Saviour  with  Nicodemus.  The  four  thou- 
sand years  which  had  passed  q,way  from  the  creation,  had 
furnished  abundant  evidence  of  the  natural  character  of  man. 
A  thorough  experiment  had  been  made  of  the  disposition  of  the 
human  heart  in  a  great  variety  of  circumstances.  Commands 
and  warnings,  promises  and  threats,  favors  and  judgments,  dis- 
plays of  wonderful  mercy  and  of  tremendous  wrath  had  been 
repeatedly  tried.  Jesus  stood  upon  an  eminence  from  which  he 
witnessed  the  whole  development  which  had  been  made  of  human 
nature,  and  all  the  affections  of  man's  heart.  And  he  pro- 
claimed the  grand  result,  the  momentous  truth  which  the 
histoiy  of  all  ages  had  taught,  and  which,  without  the  history  of 
past  ages,  was  perfectly  manifest  to  his  heart-searching  eye, 
when  he  said  to  Nicodemus  ;  "  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  thee, 
except  a  man  he  horn  again,  he  cannot  see  the  Jcingdom  of  Grod.^' 
It  is  evident  that  the  change  here  spoken  of,  is  a  moral  or  spirit- 
ual change  ;  because  it  is  to  prepare  men  for  a  spiritual  kingdom. 
And  it  is  necessary  for  all  mem,  'Edv  (ir^zig^  —  "  Except  any  one 
be  born  again."  No  human  being,  who  is  not  regenerated,  can 
enjoy  the  blessedness  of  Christ's  kingdom.  And  so  it  is  most 
clearly  implied,  that  every  human  being  is  in  such  a  state  of 
moral  depravity,  as  renders  him  unfit  for  Christ's  kingdom.  To 
illustrate  the  necessity  of  a  spiritual  renovation,  our  Saviour 
added  ;  "  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh."  This  implies 
that  the  children  of  men  are  tlie  subjects  of  such  sinful  propen- 
sities as  render  them  incapable  of  holy  enjoyment.  And  as  tills 
state  of  depravity  is  the  direct  and  certain  consequence  of  our 
natural  l>irth,  it  of  course  belongs  alike  to  all.  The  various 
places  where  the  duty  of  repentance  is  enjoined  or  the  necessity 


228  DEPRAVITY  UNIVERSAL. 

of  it  asserted,  imply  the  same  doctrine.  For  how  can  repent- 
ance be  regarded  as  the  duty  of  men,  or  as  necessary  to  their 
salvation,  unless  they  are  sinners  ? 

The  sinfulness  of  all  mankind  is  implied  in  tho  work  of  re- 
demption, particularly  the  death  of  Christ  and  the  dispensation 
of  the  Spirit.  The  reasoning  of  the  Apostle  is,  that  "  if  Christ 
died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead,"  i.  e.,  dead  in  sin.  If  any  of 
our  race  were  not  sinners,  they  would  need  no  atonement,  and 
Christ's  death  could  have  no  relation  to  them ;  for  he  is  every- 
where represented  as  having  died  for  sinners,  the  just  for  the 
unjust.  Redemption  by  the  blood  of  Christ  for  those  who  are 
free  from  sin,  would  be  totally  incongruous.  The  same  is  true 
as  to  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Spirit  is  sent  to  con- 
vince men  of  sin,  to  quicken  them,  to  make  them  holy,  to  shed 
abroad  the  love  of  God  in  their  hearts.  But  what  need  of  all 
this,  nay,  what  place  for  it,  in  regard  to  those  who  are  not  sin- 
ners ?  Unless  the  heart  is  impure,  what  occasion  is  there  for 
purification  ?  Unless  the  mind  is  darkened  by  sin,  what  occa- 
sion for  special  divine  illumination  ?  And  unless  man  in  his 
natural  state  is  depraved,  what  necessity  is  there  of  his  being 
renewed  by  divine  influence  ?  If  then  there  is  any  being  who 
has  no  sin,  he  can  have  no  concern  with  the  special  work  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  for  him  to  ask  for  sanctifying  influence,  or 
for  otliers  to  ask  it  for  him,  would  be  unreasonable  and  senseless. 

The  universality  of  sin  is  implied  in  the  fact,  that  all  men  die. 
Death,  including  the  dissolution  of  the  body,  is  the  penalty  of 
the  law.  Natural  death  is  a  great  and  appalling  evil,  and  when 
inflicted  upon  those  who  are  the  subjects  of  God's  government, 
is  a  manifest  token  of  his  displeasure.  If  men  had  been  per- 
fectly obedient  and  holy,  they  would  not  have  sufiered  death. 
This  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  Apostle,  in  Rom.  5 :  12,  "  By 
one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and  death  hy  sin;  and  so 
death  hath  passed  upon  all  men,  for  that  all  have  sinned." 
Death  came  in  as  the  result  of  sin,  and  extended  as  far  as  sin 
and  no  farther.  The  Apostle  speaks,  verse  14,  of  those  who 
lived  from  Adam  to  Moses,  and  teaches  that  death  reigned  over 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  229 

them  also,  and  consequently  that  they  were  sinners,  though  they 
had  not  sinned  in  the  same  manner  that  Adam  did.  The  reason- 
ing of  the  Apostle  is  perfectly  clear,  and  the  conclusion  certain : 
Death  befalls  all  men  ;  therefore  they  are  all  sinners. 

In  proof  of  the  universality  of  sin  among  men,  I  might  say, 
that  the  fact  has  been  acknowledged  by  all  nations ;  that  the 
structure  of  civil  laws  and  the  administration  of  civil  govern- 
ment have  always  proceeded  on  the  principle  of  human  corrup- 
tion ;  and  that  no  government,  whether  civil  or  domestic,  would 
be  fitted  to  its  end,  or  have  any  prospect  of  success,  if  it  should 
overlook  human  corruption.  I  might  say  too,  that  no  man  ever 
attempted  in  earnest  to  govern  himself  by  the  rules  of  right 
reason,  without  finding  abundant  and  mortifying  evidence  of  his 
own  moral  depravity,  and  that  the  further  any  one  goes  in  the 
work  of  a  just  self-government,  the  clearer  will  he  find  the  evi- 
dence of  "  a  law  in  his  members  warring  against  the  law  of  his 
mind,"  i.  e.,  of  a  corrupt  disposition  of  heart  opposing  his  reason 
and  conscience,  and  urging  him  to  transgress  the  divine  com- 
mands. The  best  men  on  earth  have  been  sinners,  and  are  the 
subjects  of  sin  still.  "  If  we  say  that  we  have  no  sin,  we  de- 
ceive ourselves,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  us." 

VOL  II.  20 


LECTURE    LXII. 


DEPRAVITY   OF   MAN   TOTAL. 


Having  shown  that  all  men,  without  exception,  are  sinners,  I 
shall  next  inquire,  wJiat  is  the  degree  of  sinfulness  which  belongs 
to  them  in  their  unrenewed  state. 

This  inquiry  is  distinct  from  the  preceding.  For  the  fact  that 
all  are  sinners,  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  are  sinful  in 
any  particular  degree,  and  certainly  not  that  they  are  totally  sinful. 
We  well  know  that  all  who  are  renewed  are  still  the  subjects  of 
sin,  though  they  have  a  degree  of  holiness. 

The  total  depravity  of  man  in  his  natural  state,  is  to  be  con- 
sidered altogether  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  to  be  proved  by 
appropriate  evidence.  But  before  entering  on  the  proof  of  the 
doctrine  that  man  in  his  natural  state  is  totally  sinful,  it  will  be 
important  to  obtain  a  clear  and  correct  idea  of  the  meaning  of 
the  doctrine. 

The  doctrine  respects  man  as  a  moral  being,  subject  to  a 
moral  government ;  and  accordingly  the  depravity  predicated  of 
him  is  a  moral  depravity.  And  it  is  to  be  farther  remarked  that 
moral,  in  relation  to  this  subject,  is  used  in  its  highest  sense. 
The  word  is  not  unfrequently  applied  to  those  aifections  which 
pertain  to  our  domestic  and  social  relations,  and  to  the  conduct 
which  those  affections  prompt.  Such  affections,  generally  called 
natural  affections,  may  in  a  secondary  sense  be  regarded  as  of 
a  moral  nature.  They  possess  a  far  higher  excellence  than  the 
animal  appetites,  and  more  directly  involve  our  moral  interests. 
But  the  word  moral,  as  commonly  and  more  properly  used  with 


TOTAL    DEPRAVITY.  231 

regard  to  the  present  subject,  respects  the  high  standard  of 
God's  moral  law,  the  sum  of  which  is,  to  love  G-od  iviih  all  the 
heart,  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  So  far  as  we  are  wanting 
in  this  affection  for  God  and  our  fellow  men,  and  so  far  as  we 
have  an  affection  of  a  contrary  kind,  we  are  morally  depraved. 
And  if  we  are  entirely  destitute  of  the  holy  love  required  by 
God's  law,  and  if  all  the  affections  we  have  in  relation  to  that 
law  are  of  an  opposite  nature,  then  we  are  totally  depraved. 

According  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  the  objection  most 
frequently  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity  is  mani- 
festly without  force.  To  disprove  the  doctrine,  the  objector  al- 
leges that  men  in  general  possess  many  amiable  and  useful  quali- 
ties, and  that  very  few  go  to  that  degree  of  wickedness  which 
they  are  capable  of  reaching.  We  acknowledge  the  facts  al- 
leged, but  deny  that  they  are  of  any  weight  in  opposition  to  the 
doctrine.  The  simple  question  is,  whether  a  moderate  degree  of 
wickedness,  and  the  existence  of  the  amiable  and  useful  quaU- 
ties  referred  to,  may  consist  with  the  entire  absence  of  that  holy 
love  which  God's  law  demands,  and  with  the  predominance  of  an 
opposite  affection.  If  they  may,  then  the  facts  alleged  by  the 
objector  afford  no  conclusive  argument  against  the  doctrine  of 
total  depravity.  For  the  doctrine,  properly  explained,  affirms 
only  that  man  in  his  natural  state  has  no  holiness,  and  that  his 
affections  are  wrong  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  high  standard  of 
God's  holy  law.  The  doctrine  admits  that  man  without  regene- 
ration may  possess  a  great  variety  of  dispositions  and  suscepti- 
bilities and  perform  a  great  variety  of  actions,  which  are  in 
themselves  innocent  and  important,  —  which  are  indeed  what 
they  ought  to  be,  so  far  as  they  have  respect  merely  to  his 
domestic  and  social  relations.  But  the  doctrine  asserts  that, 
notwithstanding  all  these  harmless  and  useful  dispositions,  un- 
renewed man  has  no  hohness  and  is  the  subject  of  total  moral 
depravity.  And  if  any  one  thinks  it  best  to  use  the  word  moral 
in  the  lower  sense,  and  to  say,  that  the  amiable  natural  affec- 
tions above  mentioned  are  morally  good  ;  it  is  sufficient  for  us  to 
say,  that  in  regard  to  this  subject  we  are  accustomed  to  use  the 
word  moral  in  a  different  sense. 


232  TOTAL     DEPRAVITY. 

It  may  perhaps  appear  strange  and  almost  incredible  to  some, 
that  so  many  estimable  and  lovely  qualities  should  be  found  in 
those  who  are  entirely  without  love  to  God.  But  it  is  a  well 
known  fact,  that  a  high  degree  of  domestic  and  social  affection  is 
often  found  in  those  who  are  very  far  removed  from  religious 
principle.  Besides,  the  natural  affections  manifestly  relate  to  a 
different  standard,  have  a  different  nature,  and  are  designed  for 
different  purposes,  from  religious  affection.  They  may  therefore 
exist  where  this  higher  affection  is  wanting.  That  spiritual,  Jwly 
love  which  God's  law  requires  us  to  exercise  towards  our  fellow 
men,  does  indeed  imply  the  existence  of  love  to  God ;  and  love 
to  God  imphes  love  to  men.  It  does  so,  because  the  affection  in 
both  instances  is  of  the  same  nature,  and  the  exercise  of  it  in 
both  instances  indicates  the  same  state  of  mind.  Accordingly 
the  second  command  is  like  to  the  first,  and  every  one  who  loves 
his  brother  as  the  law  requires,  loves  God  also.  But  it  is  not  so 
with  the  natural  affections.  We  cannot  say  that  every  parent 
who  has  a  tender  natural  affection  for  his  offspring,  has  a  holy 
affection  for  God  ;  or  that  every  one  who  has  a  heart  to  sympac 
thize  with  the  afflicted,  has  a  heart  to  feel  for  the  interests  of 
Christ's  kingdom.  The  natural  affections  and  sympathies  have 
no  more  necessary  connection  with  holiness,  than  the  animal 
appetites ;  and  it  is  as  really  contrary  to  fact,  to  say,  he  thai 
has  mere  natural  affection,  loves  God,  as  to  say,  he  that  has  the 
appetite  of  hunger,  loves  God.  Our  Saviour  taught  the  same 
truth.  To  a  youth,  who  possessed  amiable  sensibilities,  attractive 
manners,  and  a  fair  character  in  the  world's  view,  he  said  ;  "  One 
thing  thou  lackest ;"  and  that  one  thing  was  supreme  love  to 
God.     That  lovely  youth  idolized  the  world. 

It  is  well  known,  that  Ave  are  as  ready  as  those  who  entertain 
the  laxest  views  of  religion,  to  acknowledge  the  beauty  and 
utility  of  those  domestic  and  social  qualities  which  are  often 
found  in  the  unregenerate.  But  we  are  admonished  by  the  word 
of  God  and  by  common  observation  not  to  put  them  in  the  place 
of  reUgion. 

The  proof  of  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity  is  found  in  the 


TOTAL    DEPRAVITY.  233 

representations  of  Scripture  and  in  the  consciousness  of  enlight- 
ened Christians. 

There  is  indeed  no  text  which  affirms  in  so  many  words  that 
all  men  in  their  natural  state  are  totally  sinful.  But  there  are 
many  texts  which  clearly  imply  this.  Christ  said  to  the  unbe- 
lieving Jews ;  "  I  know  that  ye  have  not  the  love  of  God  in 
you ;"  and  he  even  charged  them  with  being  enemies  to  God. 

All  unbehevers,  by  not  receiving  Christ,  give  the  same  evidence 
of  disaffection  to  God,  as  the  unbeheving  Jews  did.  And  as  it 
is  a  plain  doctrine  of  the  Bible  that  no  one  believes  in  Christ 
unless  he  is  born  of  God,  it  follows  that  all  the  unrenewed 
have  a  heart  to  reject  Christ,  and  of  course  that  they  are  with- 
out love  to  God. 

In  accordance  with  this  the  Apostle  says  ;  "  The  carnal  mind 
is  enmity  against  God."  By  comparing  this  passage  with  John 
3 :  6,  we  learn  that  the  carnal  or  fleshly  mind  is  that  which  we 
have  naturally.  "  That  which  is  bom  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh." 
And  as  the  carnal  mind  is  thus  the  certain  consequence  of  our 
natural  birth,  it  of  course  belongs  to  all  men.  The  only  ques- 
tion is,  whether  the  enmity  implied  in  the  carnal  mind,  is  en- 
tirely exclusive  of  love.  And  of  this  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
doubt,  as  the  Apostle  says  without  qualification,  that  they  who 
have  the  carnal  mind,  are  in  such  a  state  that  they  cannot  be  sub- 
ject to  the  law  of  God,  and  cannot  please  God ;  which  would  not 
be  the  case,  if  they  had  any  degree  of  holy  love. 

The  representation  often  made  in  Scripture  that  unconverted 
men  are  dead  in  sin,  fairly  impHes  that  they  are  destitute  of 
holiness.  For  holiness  is  spiritual  life.  And  if  unrenewed 
sinners  had  any  degree  of  this,  they  could  hardly  be  said  to  be 
dead,  and  dead  too  in  such  a  sense  that  they  need  to  be  quick- 
ened or  made  ahve  by  supernatural  power,  according  to  the  rep-  \ 
resentation  in  Ephesians  2. 

This  leads  me  to  say,  that  the  necessity  of  rengeneration,  aa 
asserted  by  our  Saviour,  (John  8,)  is  an  obvious  proof  of  man's 
total  depravity.  "  Ye  must  be  bom  agam."  "  Except  a  man, 
(except  any  one}  be  bom  again,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of 

20* 


n 


234  TOTAL    DEPKAVITY. 

heaven."  Why  is  such  a  change  universally  necessary,  if  men 
in  their  natural  state  have  any  degree  of  holiness  ?  The  Bible 
promises  heaven  to  those  who  have  holiness,  or  love  to  Christ,  in 
any  degree.  Even  one  who  gives  a  cup  of  cold  water  to  Christ's 
disciples  from  a  right  motive,  has  the  promise  of  a  future  re- 
ward. The  existence  of  holiness  in  man  is  in  Scripture  attri- 
buted to  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Gfhost.  In  all  its  branches 
and  in  all  its  degrees,  it  is  the  fruit  of  the  Spirit.  It  is  per- 
fectly obvious  then  that  man,  in  his  natural,  unrenewed  state, 
is  wholly  destitute  of  holiness,  and  that  his  moral  affections  are  all 
sinful. 

In  support  of  this  doctrine  I  might  urge  the  failure  of  the 
most  powerful  motives  to  induce  unrenewed  man  to  turn  from 
sin  and  believe  in  Christ.  When  the  persuasive  considerations 
of  the  Gospel  are  clearly  presented  before  the  mind  of  a  sinner, 
they  would  certainly  influence  him  to  the  exercise  of  penitence, 
faith,  and  love,  if  he  had  any  degree  of  moral  rectitude. 
What  could  be  a  more  decisive  proof  that  his  moral  nature  is 
entirely  perverted,  than  the  fact  that,  when  the  amiable  and 
glorious  character  of  Christ  is  held  up  before  him,  it  excites 
no  love  ;  that  when  the  condescending  kindness  and  grace  of 
God  are  described  to  him,  he  feels  no  gratitude ;  and  that  he 
renders  no  cordial  obedience  to  that  law  which  is  holy,  just, 
and  good  ?  What  greater  evidence  of  man's  total  moral  cor- 
ruption could  there  be  than  this,  that  he  is  not  persuaded  to  for- 
sake sin  and  follow  Christ,  either  by  the  threat  of  eternal  misery, 
or  the  offer  of  eternal  blessedness  ? 

I  appeal  for  proof,  finally,  to  the  experience  and  consciousness 
of  the  enlightened  Christian.  Wlien  he  reflects  upon  the  ex- 
ercises of  his  own  heart,  and  compares  them  with  the  demands 
of  God's  perfect  law,  he  is  satisfied  that  in  him,  naturally,  there 
was  no  good  thing,  that  he  was  wholly  alienated  from  God,  and 
that  the  first  existence  of  holy  affection  in  his  heart  was  the  fruit 
of  regenerating  grace.  And  he  is  equally  satisfied  that  he  is 
still  dependent  and  must  continue  to  be  dependent  for  all  holy 
affections,  upon  the  sanctifying  influence  of  God's  Spirit;  and 


TOTAL     DEPRAVITY.  235 

that,  if  the  Holy  Spirit  should  be  wholly  taken  from  him,  he 
would  sink  at  once  into  a  state  of  entire  moral  pollution.  If 
any  Christian  aflBrms  that  he  had  any  holy  affections,  or  per- 
formed any  holy  actions,  in  his  natural  state,  it  must  be  because 
he  uses  words  in  a  very  vague  sense,  or  because  he  has  not 
properly  reflected  on  the  nature  of  that  divine  law  which  is  the 
standard  of  holiness. 


LECTURE    LXIII 


NATIVE  DEPRAVITY.  EXPLANATION  OP  TERMS.  MARKS  OF  OTHER 
THINGS  WHICH  ARE  NATIVE.  THESE  MARKS  PROVE  NATIVE 
DEPRAVITY. 

Having  considered  the  depravity  of  man  as  universal  and  as 
total,  I  now  proceed  to  inquire  whether  it  is  native. 

The  doctrine  of  man's  native  depravity/  has  been  held  by  all 
orthodox  churches  in  Europe  and  America,  both  Lutheran  and 
Calvinistic.  It  is  contained  in  all  their  creeds.  It  is  distinctly 
asserted  even  in  the  creed  of  Arminius.  It  is  a  prominent 
article  in  the  only  public  confession  of  faith  ever  adopted  by  the 
Congregational  churches  in  New  England,  and  by  the  Presby- 
terian and  Dutch  Reformed  churches  in  America.  It  is  main- 
tained also  by  the  Episcopalians,  the  Methodists,  and  the  Baptists, 
and  also  by  the  Catholics.  The  opposite  doctrine  has  been  held 
by  no  respectable  society  of  men  in  Christendom,  except  Pela- 
gians and  Socinians.  Among  those  who  profess  to  maintain  the 
substance  of  evangelical  truth  at  the  present  day,  there  are  a 
few  individuals  who  set  aside  the  common  doctrine  of  native  de- 
pravity ;  but  they  are  not  so  much  as  one  to  a  thousand  of  those 
ministers  and  intelligent  Christians  who  unhesitatingly  believe 
the  doctrine.  And  yet  some  of  those  few  individuals,  though 
they  still  profess  to  adopt  the  common  orthodox  creeds,  represent 
the  doctrine  of  native  depravity  as  a  doctrine  which  was  bred 
in  an  age  of  ignorance  and  superstition,  and  as  destined  to 
vanish  with  other  forms  of  ancient  error.  Yea,  they  sometimes 
speak  of  it  as  though  it  had  already  past  away  from  the  minds 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  237 

of  all  enlightened  Christians.  And  I  am  sorry  to  add,  that 
instances  are  not  wanting  in  which  professedly  orthodox  men 
treat  the  doctrine  with  ridicule  and  scorn.  Whether  all  this  is 
just  and  proper,  and  indicative  of  a  becoming  state  of  mind, 
I  leave  to  the  judgment  of  others.  We  must  indeed  acknowl- 
edge that  the  great  body  of  Christians,  being  uninspired,  ha,ve 
been  and  still  are  liable  to  error ;  and  their  opinions  have  no 
authority  to  bind  our  faith.  The  word  of  God  is  our  only  sure 
guide.  This  divine  word  we  must  examine  for  ourselves.  And 
in  present  circumstances  it  is  important  that  we  should  examine 
it  with  special  care,  guarding  against  prejudice,  opening  our 
hearts  to  conviction,  keeping  our  minds  candid  and  patient  and 
our  feelings  unruffled-,  and  looking  continually  to  God  for  the 
guidance  of  his  Spirit.  And  if  we  would  be  established  in  the 
truth  and  secure  the  benefits  of  Christian  faith,  we  must  reso- 
lutely avoid  the  pernicious  habit  of  ruminating  perpetually  on 
objections  and  difficulties,  and  must  give  our  undivided  attention 
to  the  evidence  which  supports  the  truth. 

To  avoid  ambiguity,  and  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  fair  investi- 
gation of  the  subject,  I  shall  briefly  explain  the  terms  commonly 
employed  in  relation  to  it. 

The  word  depravity,  relating  as  it  here  does  to  man's  moral 
character,  means  the  same  as  sinfulness,  being  the  opposite  of 
moral  purity  or  holiness.  In  this  use  of  the  word  there  is  a  gen- 
eral agreement.  But  what  is  the  meaning  of  native  or  natural  ! 
Among  the  variety  of  meanings  specified  by  Johnson,  Webster, 
and  others,  I  refer  to  the  following,  as  relating  particularly  to 
the  subject  before  us. 

"  Native.  Produced  by  nature.  Natural,  or  such  as  is  ac- 
cording to  nature  ;  belonging  by  birth  ;  original.^''  Natural  has 
substantially  the  same  meaning :  "  produced  by  nature  ;  not  ac- 
quu-ed."  So  Crabbe.  "  Of  a  person  we  say,  his  worth  is 
native,  to  designate  it  as  some  valuable  property  born  with  him, 
not  foreign  to  him  or  ingrafted  upon  him  ;  but  we  say  of  his  dis- 
position, that  it  is  natural,  as  opposed  to  that  which  is  acquired 
by  habit."     And  Johnson  defines  nature  to  be  "  the  native  state 


~o»  MARKS     OF 

or  properties  of  anythiny^  hy  ichieli  it  is  discriminated  from 
others.''''  He  quotes  the  definition  of  Bojde ;  "  Nature  some- 
times means  what  belongs  to  a  living  creature  at  its  nativity^  or 
accrues  to  it  hy  its  birth,  as  when  we  say  a  man  is  noble  by 
nature,  or  a  child  is  naturally  fonvard.  "  This,"  he  says,  "  may 
be  expressed  by  saying,  the  man  was  born  so." 

After  these  brief  definitions,  which  come  to  nearly  the  same 
thing,  I  proceed  to  inquire,  what  are  the  marks  or  evidences 
which  show  anything  in  man  to  be  natural  or  native ;  and  how 
far  these  marks  are  found  in  relation  to  depravity. 

What  then  are  the  evidences  that  anything  belonging  to  man 
is  natural  or  native  ?  What  are  the  circumstances  which  mark 
that  which  is  so  1  There  will  be  some  evident  advantages  in 
pursuing  this  inquiry,  in  the  first  place,  in  relation  to  those 
things  concerning  which  our  minds  cannot  be  subject  to  any 
prepossession,  or  wrong  bias.  Having  the  advantage  of  an  im- 
partial, candid  state  of  mind,  we  shall  be  hkely  to  arrive  at  a 
just  conclusion.  And  then  we  can  apply  the  same  reasoning, 
and  bring  the  same  impartial  state  of  mind,  to  the  subject  before 
us,  and  so  have  the  same  prospect  of  coming  to  an  equally  just 
conclusion. 

1.  One  of  the  marks  which  we  should  expect  would  belong 
to  a  native  attribute  or  quality  of  man,  is  its  universality. 
There  are  indeed  characteristics  of  particular  individuals  or 
families,  which  we  consider  to  be  native,  although  they  are  not 
found  in  men  generally.  But  if  we  say  that  any  attribute 
naturally  belongs  to  man,  as  a  species,  or  that  it  belongs  to 
human  nature,  it  would  seem  to  be  implied  that  it  is  universal, 
unless  some  special  change  occurs  in  individuals  touching  that 
particular  attribute. 

Thus  we  consider  memory  to  be  a  natural  attribute  of  the 
human  mind,  as  is  universally  found  in  man,  except  in  those 
instances  in  which  its  operation  is  prevented  by  some  disorder. 

It  is  a  circumstance  especially  in  favor  of  supposing  that  a 
particular  attribute  is  natural  to  man,  if  it  is  not  only  found  in 
all  men  of  the  present  generation,  but  has  been  found  in  all  the 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  239 

individuals  of  the  human  race  from  generation  to  generation  in 
times  past.  This  would  show  clearly,  that  the  attribute  intended 
does  not  arise  from  any  particular  causes  which  operate  at  one 
time  or  in  one  part  of  the  world  more  than  another,  but  from  a 
cause  which  affects  all  alike  ;  that  it  belongs  to  the  very  nature  of 
man,  or  certainly  results  from  it,  so  that  wherever  human  nature 
exists,  there  this  attribute  will  exist, 

2.  Another  circumstance  showing  a  particular  attribute  to  be 
natural  to  man  is,  its  developing  itself  in  early  life.  If  any  thing 
begins  to  manifest  itself  very  early  ;  if  without  exception  it  comes 
out  in  visible  operations  and  fruits  as  soon  as  the  bodily  and  men- 
tal powers  of  individuals  render  them  capable  of  such  operations ; 
in  other  words,  if  it  is  developed  as  early  as  there  is  opportunity 
or  capacity  for  its  development ;  we  consider  this  as  a  proof  that 
it  is  natural  to  man,  that  it  is  a  native  quality. 

3.  It  is  a  circumstance  which  affords  additional  proof  that  a 
particular  attribute  or  quality  is  natural  to  man,  if  it  is  evident 
that  it  is  not  Giving  to  any  change  ivhich  takes  place  in  him  suhse- 
quently  to  his  birth.  Should  we  be  able  to  trace  the  particular  thing 
which  is  early  exhibited  by  any  individual,  to  a  change  which 
occurred  in  him  still  earlier ;  we  should  consider  it  as  attributable 
to  that  change,  or  perhaps  more  properly,  to  the  particular  cause 
from  which  the  change  resulted.  But  if  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  any  such  change  previous  to  the  development  of  the 
particular  thing  under  consideration,  we  of  course  regard  it  as 
natural. 

4.  Another  circumstance  which  generally  marks  an  attribute 
which  is  natural  to  man,  is,  its  operating  freely  and  spontaneously. 
This  may  indeed  be  found  to  belong  to  some  things  which  are  not 
natural.  But  we  expect  that  a  principle  or  disposition  which  is 
natural  to  man,  will  operate  with  freedom ;  that  when  a  fair  occa- 
sion comes,  it  will  show  itself  spontaneously. 

5.  That  which  is  natural  to  man  is  generally  hard  to  be  resist- 
ed and  overcome.  This  is  the  case  with  all  those  affections  which 
are  usually  called  natural.  They  are  deeply  rooted  in  man's 
nature  ;  and  no  ordinary  means  are  suflBcient  to  eradicate  or  sub- 


240  MAKKS     OF 

due  them.  Accordingly  when  we  find  it  so  with  any  particular 
thing,  we  regard  it  as  a  mark  of  its  being  natural ;  although  the 
same  is  true  of  some  of  those  habits  or  propensities  whicTi  are 
acquired. 

6.  There  is  one  more  mark  of  what  is  natural  to  man,  which, 
though  not  essentially  different  from  the  preceding,  may  be  dis- 
tinctly considered,  namely,  tJiat  tee  can  predict  with  cei^tainty  that 
it  will  in  due  time  act  itself  out.  This  we  are  able  to  do  in  regard 
to  every  native  principle  or  quality  in  man.  But  if  any  attribute 
of  man,  instead  of  being  natural,  depends  on  external  circumstances 
which  may  belong  to  some  individuals  and  not  to  others,  how  can 
we  be  sure  that  it  will  ever  show  itself  or  have  existence  in  man- 
kind generally  ? 

I  mio;ht  mention  other  marks  of  what  is  natural  to  man,  but 
these  are  the  most  obvious  and  important.  If  now  we  examine 
any  thing,  whether  bodily  or  mental,  which  we  consider  as  natu- 
ral to  man,  we  shall  find  it  has  these  or  most  of  these  marks,  and 
that  we  have  no  other  way  of  proving  it  to  be  natural  but  by  re- 
ferring to  these  very  marks.  How  do  we  prove  the  bodily  appe- 
tites or  senses  to  be  natural  ?  How  do  we  prove  the  faculties  and 
propensities  of  the  mind,  such  as  reason,  will,  memory,  conscience, 
parental  love,  sympathy  and  gratitude  to  be  natural  ?  We  have 
no  better  evidence  and  no  other  evidence  than  this,  that  these 
things  are  found  universally  to  exist  in  mankind,  except  in  cases 
where  some  extraordinary  cause  has  operated  to  produce  an  ex- 
ception ;  that  they  show  themselves  very  early,  or  at  farthest  as 
soon  as  circumstances  exist  which  are  suited  to  call  them  forth  ; 
that  they  are  evidently  not  owing  to  any  essential  change  which 
takes  place  in  man's  nature  after  his  birth  ;  that  they  are  found 
to  operate  spontaneously ;  that  they  are  hard  to  be  resisted  and 
subdued  ;  and  that  it  is  manifestly  certain  that  every  human  being 
who  comes  into  the  world  will  in  due  time  exhibit  them,  unless 
some  extraordinary  cause  interposes  to  prevent.  That  the  bodily 
senses  and  appetites  are  natural  to  man,  no  one  doubts.  Nor  is 
there  any  more  doubt  as  to  the  leading  attributes  of  the  mind. 
Who  does  not  admit  that  reason  and  moral  sense  and  memory  and 


WHAT    IS    NATIVE.  241 

sympathy  and  love  of  offspring  are  as  natural  to  man,  that  they  as 
really  appertain  to  the  nature  "which  man  possesses,  as  the  bodily 
senses  ?  The  corporeal  and  the  mental  attributes  of  man,  are 
indeed  brought  into  visible  action  at  different  periods,  some  at  the 
very  commencement  of  life  and  others  afterwards.  But  this 
makes  no  difference  in  our  judgment  on  the  present  subject.  We 
always  consider  the  sense  of  seeing,  hearing,  and  tasting  as  na- 
tive properties  of  man ;  and  we  should  consider  them  in  the  same 
light,  if  they  were  first  exercised  at  a  much  later  period  than  ia 
common.  So  it  is  with  reason,  memory,  conscience,  and  parental 
affection.  They  do  not  develop  themselvss  at  the  commencement 
of  Hfe.  The  new  born  child  does  not  immediately  show  reason, 
or  memory,  or  conscience.  And  that  love  to  offspring  which  is 
by  way  of  eminence  called  natural  affection,  hardly  begins  to  rise 
in  the  mind  and  to  act  itself  out,  before  the  parental  relation  exists. 
The  faculty  of  speech,  which  is  natural  to  man  in  distinction  from 
the  brutal  species,  waits  for  its  development  till  the  bodily  organs 
and  the  mental  faculties  have  acquired  the  necessary  strength  and 
activity ;  and  then  it  develops  itself  very  gradually,  beginning  with 
broken,  defective  expressions,  and  proceeding  slowly  to  a  perfect 
language. 

These  remarks  prepare  the  way  for  a  proper  view  of  the  subject 
of  depravity.  For  if  this  has  all  the  marks  belonging  to  other 
things  which  are  acknowledged  to  be  natural  to  man,  why  should 
it  not  be  considered  in  the  same  Ught  ?  The  question  then  is ; 
has  it  the  same  marks  f  Are  there  as  many  and  as  strong  reasons 
for  considering  man's  sinfulness  to  be  natural,  as  for  considering 
any  of  his  other  attributes  to  be  so  ?   In  my  apprehension  there  are. 

In  the  first  place,  moral  depravity,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is 
universal.  It  extends  through  the  whole  species.  All  are  sin- 
ners. We  can  no  more  find  those  who  are  free  from  depravity, 
than  we  can  find  those  who  are  without  reason,  or  memory,  or 
social  affection,  or  bodily  appetites. 

Secondly.  Depravity  sJiows  itself  very  early.  As  soon  as  chil- 
dren acquire  such  strength  of  body  and  mind,  as  to  be  capable  of 
unfolding  their  true  character,  they  show  that  they  are  depraved. 

21 


242  MARKS     WHICH     PROVE 

As  soon  as  they  manifest  any  moral  feelings,  they  manifest  those 
which  are  sinful.  Among  the  earliest  things  which  we  can 
observe  in  others,  or  recollect  in  ourselves,  we  find  the  indications 
and  incipient  exercises  of  wrong  affection.  This  then  has  the  same 
mark  of  belonging  naturally  and  originally  to  man,  as  any  thing 
else  which  begins  to  act  itself  out  in  early  hfe. 

Thirdly.  The  sinfulness  which  thus  early  shows  itself  in  man, 
cannot  he  traced  to  any  antecedent  change  in  his  character.  Were 
it  owing  to  such  a  change,  it  could  not  with  propriety  be  called 
natural,  however  early  it  might  appear.  Suppose  any  disorder  or 
defect  of  mind,  for  example,  idiocy,  shows  itself  very  early  in  a 
child  ;  yet  if  it  can  be  traced  to  any  injury  or  bodily  distemper 
which  occurred  after  birth,  we  never  speak  of  it  as  native.  But 
if  there  has  been  no  such  calamity  ;  if  without  any  injury  or  any 
bodily  distemper  occurring  subsequently  to  his  birth,  the  child 
shows  uniformly,  as  soon  as  he  shows  any  thing,  that  he  is  wanting 
in  the  power  of  understanding ;  then  we  consider  his  idiocy  as 
natural.  We  say,  he  ivas  born  an  idiot.  Now  what  is  the  fact 
in  regard  to  our  moral  depravity  ?  Does  it  result  from  any 
previons  change  in  our  moral  nature  ?  If  there  is  such  a 
change,  it  must  evidently  take  place  very  early  in  life  ;  because 
the  sinfulness  which  is  here  supposed  to  result  from  it,  shows  itself 
as  soon  as  children  are  capable  of  manifesting  what  is  in  their 
hearts  by  inteUigible  signs.  The  change  supposed  must  also  be 
universal.  At  the  very  dawn  of  existence,  even  before  any  dis- 
tinct and  visible  exercise  of  reason,  it  must  take  place  in  the  na- 
ture of  every  human  being.  Is  there  any  proof  that  this  is  the 
case  ?  Is  the  supposition  one  which  any  reasonable  man  will  ad- 
mit ?  And  would  not  such  a  supposition,  if  admitted,  be  attended 
with  all  the  difficulties  which  attend  the  common  doctrine,  and 
with  others  in  addition  ? 

There  is  then  no  conclusion  left  for  us  but  this,  that  as  moral  de- 
pravity shows  itself  at  so  early  a  period  in  human  life,  and  as  there 
is  no  reason  to  think  that  it  results  from  any  change  in  man  subse- 
quent to  his  birth,  it  must  belong  to  his  original  disposition,  and 
is  justly  considered  to  be  native. 


DEPEAVITY    NATIVE.  243 

FourtUy.  The  moral  depravity  of  man  operates  spontaneously. 
Like  the  other  natural  principles,  it  acts  itself  out  freely  as  soon 
as  the  faculties  of  body  and  mind  are  sufficient,  and  objects  of 
moral  feeling  are  presented.  Hard  labor  is  not  necessary  to  pro- 
duce sinfulness  in  man,  nor  is  great  urgency  of  motives  necessary 
to  call  it  forth  into  action.  Just  as  soon  as  an  occasion  offers,  it 
rises  to  view  of  its  own  accord.  Instead  of  waiting  for  pressing  so- 
Ucitation,  it  seems  to  have  an  inward  force  which  can  hardly  brook 
restraint,  and  is  impatient  to  break  forth  into  action  almost  with- 
out occasion.  How  soon  does  moral  evil  in  some  form  show  itself! 
How  readily  does  the  feehng  of  pride  or  selfishness  or  ill-will  come 
out  to  view  in  the  looks  and  words  and  actions  of  little  children ! 
It  waits  not  to  be  elicited  by  overpowering  inducements,  or  to  be 
produced  by  long,  laborious  effort.  It  is  not  like  the  useful  vege- 
table, which  will  not  spring  up  and  grow  unless  it  is  planted  and 
cultivated ;  but  like  the  useless  weeds,  which  are  natural  to  the 
soil,  and  spring  up  and  grow  spontaneously,  yea  in  spite  of  all  our 
efforts  to  prevent.  Sinful  affection  takes  possession  of  the  minds 
of  children  before  they  are  aware.  It  becomes  active  and  pre- 
dominant in  them  before  they  deliberately  inquire  into  its  nature  ; 
and  so  they  first  become  distinctly  acquainted  with  its  turpitude 
by  experiencing  its  operation  in  their  own  hearts.  And  this  spon- 
taneous putting  forth  of  the  energy  of  the  soul  in  moral  evil  ia 
characteristic,  not  only  of  early  childhood,  but  of  every  period  of 
fife.  And  it  belongs  to  human  depravity  as  much  as  to  any  of 
those  propensities,  whether  corporeal  or  mental,  which  are  univer- 
sally allowed  to  be  natural. 

Fifthly.  Human  depravity  has  also  the  next  mark  above  men- 
tioned of  belonging  to  what  is  natural ;  namely,  its  being  overcome 
with  great  difficulty.  The  enlightened  and  pious  parent  is  aware 
of  the  strong  and  early  propensity  of  his  children  to  evil.  He 
makes  use  of  all  possible  means  to  restrain  and  subdue  that  pro- 
pensity ;  but  it  breaks  through  all  restraints.  And  even  when 
he  succeeds  in  preventing  his  children  from  exhibiting  their  de- 
pravity in  gross  outward  acts  of  wickedness,  it  still  maintains  its 
dommion  m  their  hearts,  and  gives  character  to  all  their  affections. 


244  MARKS     WHICH     PROVE 

But  in  this  respect  the  Christian's  own  experience  furnishes  more 
striking  proof  than  any  observation  he  makes  upon  others,  that  sin 
is  no  superficial,  accidental  thing ;  that  it  is  deep-rooted  in  his 
nature:  that  it  is,  as  it  has  generally  been  called,  inbred ;  that 
it  makes  a  part  of  himself  ;  that  opposing  it  is  opposing  his  own 
natural  disposition  ;  and  that  getting  rid  of  it  is  cutting  oflF  a  right 
hand  or  plucking  out  a  right  eye.  He  often  finds  that  the  most  reso- 
lute resistance  which  he  can  make  against  the  evil  bias  of  his  heart 
is  unsuccessful ;  that  all  the  strength  which  he  can  array  against 
it  has  no  effect,  but  to  make  its  superior  power  more  conspicuous. 
And  he  well  knows  that  no  motive  which  can  be  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  mind  of  an  unrenewed  man,  will  ever  prevail  to  subdue 
his  earthly,  selfish  affection,  and  excite  him  to  love  the  Lord  Jesus 
Christ  in  sincerity  ;  and  he  is  convinced  that  no  power  can  accom- 
plish this,  except  the  new-creating  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

Sixthly.  That  which  I  have  adverted  to  as  the  last  circum- 
stance attending  what  is  natural  in  man,  is  not  here  introduced 
as  anything  essentially  different  from  the  particulars  before  men- 
tioned, but  rather  as  what  results  from  them.  The  circumstance 
is  this,  and  how  remarkable  a  circumstance  it  is  !  —  that  we  can 
predict  with  cei'tainty,  that  every  human  being,  as  soon  as  he  acts 
out  his  moral  nature,  ivill  commit  sin.  We  fix  our  eyes  upon  a 
new  born  child,  now  incapable  of  exhibiting  any  of  the  signs  of 
rational  and  moral  existence  ;  but  we  can  certainly  predict  that 
as  soon  as  he  comes  to  be  capable  of  intelligent  and  responsible 
action,  he  will  be  a  sinner.  We  do  not  speak  of  it  as  a  conjecture 
or  a  probability,  but  a  certainty.  We  are  sure  that  no  precau- 
tions, no  happy  combination  of  circumstances  will  prevent  this 
dreadful  result.  Suppose  a  child  to  be,  from  the  first,  placed 
under  the  care  of  parents  and  teachers  who  are  among  the  wisest 
and  holiest  of  mankind,  so  that  he  hears  nothing  from  their  lips 
but  words  of  truth  and  wisdom,  purity  and  love,  and  sees  no  con- 
duct in  them  which  is  not  marked  with  excellence  throughout. 
He  is  watchfully  guarded  against  whatever  would  corrupt  him  or 
lead  him  astray,  and  is,  with  the  utmost  solicitude,  placed  under 
those  influences  which  tend  to  enlighten  the  understanding,  to 


DEPRAVITY     NATIVE.  245 

direct  and  strengthen  conscience,  and  to  excite  good  affections. 
May  it  not  be  that  this  child,  living  in  such  circumstances,  and 
trained  up  under  such  salutary  influences,  will  escape  the  fatal 
contagion  and  be  pure  from  sin  ?  If  ten  thousand  children,  yea  if 
all  the  children  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  should  be  placed  in  such 
circumstances,  and  should  be  trained  up  in  the  wisest,  purest, 
holiest  manner  ;  may  it  not  be  that  some  of  them  would  have  a 
character  free  from  moral  evil  ?  The  answer  must  be,  "  no,  not 
one."  Now  how  could  we  confidently  and  certainly  predict  that 
all  human  beings,  in  all  circumstances,  continuing  unchanged  by 
divine  grace,  will  sin  against  God,  were  there  not  some  ground  of 
this  certainty  in  the  moral  nature  of  man  ?  It  is  agreed  that  no 
outward  circumstances,  no  influences  however  favorable,  which 
can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  minds  of  men,  -will  ever,  in  a 
single  instance,  guard  them  against  the  pollution  of  sin,  without 
the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  evil  then  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  originate  in  any  unfavorable  circumstances,  such  as  cor- 
rupting examples,  or  insinuating  and  strong  temptations ;  for  if 
these  were  entirely  removed,  all  human  beings  would  still  be  sin- 
ners. With  such  a  moral  nature  as  they  now  have,  they  would 
not  wait  for  strong  temptations  to  sin.  Nay,  they  would  be 
sinners  in  opposition  to  the  strongest  motives  to  the  contrary. 
We  know  indeed  that  human  beings  will  turn  those  very  motives 
which  most  powerfully  urge  to  holiness,  into  occasions  of  sin. 
Now  does  not  the  confidence  and  certainty  with  which  we  fore- 
tell the  commission  of  sin,  and  of  sin  unmixed  with  moral 
purity,  presuppose  a  full  conviction  in  us,  and  a  conviction 
resting  upon  what  we  regard  as  satisfactory  evidence,  that  sin,  in 
all  its  visible  actmgs,  arises  from  that  which  is  within  the  mmd 
itself,  and  which  belongs  to  our  very  nature  as  moral  beings  ? 
Have  we  not  as  much  evidence  that  this  is  the  case  in  regard  to 
moral  evil,  as  in  regard  to  any  of  our  natural  affections  or  bodily 
appetites?  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  prediction  of 
future  sin,  as  above  described,  does  not  imply,  that  we  have  a 
))articular  insight  into  the  mind  of  any  individual  child.  It  is 
sufficient  that  we  know  the  child  to  belong  to  our  species.     The 

21* 


246      MAKES     WHICH    PROVE    DEPRAVITY    NATIVE. 

fact  that  he  is  human  is  the  ground  of  our  prediction.  We  know 
it  to  be  a  law  of  our  fallen  nature,  or,  if  any  prefer  it,  I  will 
say,  we  know  our  moral  state  to  he  such,  that  every  one  of  our 
species,  whether  now  born,  or  to  be  born,  will  he  a  sinner;  and 
that  he  tvill  he  a  sirmer  wholly  and  forever,  unless  he  is  created 
anew  hy  the  Holy  Spirit.  And  we  know  and  predict  this  on  the 
same  general  principle  on  which  we  predict  any  fact  as  the 
result  of  the  known  laws  of  the  moral  or  material  world.  There 
are  doubtless  laws  as  settled  and  uniform,  a  connection  of 
causes  and  effects  as  certain  in  the  moral  world,  as  in  the 
physical  world.  Nor  will  this  view  of  the  subject  expose  us 
to  any  difficulty  in  regard  to  our  responsibiUty  or  free  agency,  if 
we  remember  that  the  causes  which  operate  in  the  moral  world 
correspond  to  the  nature  of  the  mind,  while  the  causes  which  operate 
in  the  physical  world  correspond  to  the  nature  of  material  sub- 
stances ;  and  that  the  influence  of  causes,  though  in  both  cases 
equally  uniform  and  certain,  is  in  one  case  as  different  from  what 
it  is  in  the  other,  as  the  nature  of  mind  is  different  from  the 
nature  of  matter. 

Now  if  there  were  no  such  invariable  law  as  that  above  men- 
tioned, no  such  steady,  uniform  principle  operating  in  the  human 
mind  in  its  present  fallen  state  ;  how  could  we  certainly  conclude 
that  every  descendant  of  Adam  will  be  a  sinner,  however  many 
external  motives  and  influences  may  combine  to  prevent  it  ? 
Can  it  be  imagined  that  a  rational  and  moral  being  will  certainly 
and  constantly  resist  the  strongest  motives  which  act  upon 
him  from  without  and  from  within,  under  the  glorious  dispen- 
sation of  the  Gospel,  and  rush  into  transgression,  without  any 
cause  ?  Nay,  must  there  not  be  a  cause  of  astonishing  power,  to 
account  for  it  that  he  should,  even  in  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, uniformly  be  a  sinner,  and  a  sinner  wholly  and 
forever,  unless  he  is  created  anew  by  the  Holy  Ghost?  Surely 
that  is  a  most  deplorable  state  into  which  man's  natural  birth 
brings  him,  and  a  most  fearful  internal  principle  under  the  in- 
fluence of  which  his  natural  birth  leaves  him.  "  That  which  is 
born  of  the  flesh  is  Jlesh.'^  And,  according  to  the  Apostle,  the 
firuit  of  the  flesh  is  sin  in  all  its  various  forms. 


OBJECTIONS     CONSIDERED.  247 

In  opposition  to  the  general  course  of  reasoning  here  exhib- 
ited, it  is  sometimes  said,  that  Adam,  without  any  original  cor- 
ruption of  his  nature,  was  exposed  to  sin,  and  did  actually  com- 
mit sin ;  and  therefore  that  the  occurrence  of  sin  in  moral 
beings  is  no  certain  proof  of  a  preceding  corruption  of  na- 
ture. 

In  reply  to  this,  I  would  first  recommend  the  remarks  of 
Edwards  on  this  point  in  answer  to  John  Taylor,  as  worthy  of 
special  regard.  See  his  work  on  Original  Sin,  Part  1,  ch.  1. 
Sect.  9. 

Secondly.  Allowing  it  to  be  possible  that  all  men  would  sin 
without  any  inherent,  natural  corruption,  we  still  ask,  whether  it 
is  probable.  Is  it  a  fact,  that  men  go  into  the  commission  of 
crimes,  without  anything  faulty  in  their  previous  dispositions  ? 
Does  observation,  and  does  our  own  consciousness  teach  this  ? 
It  is  certainly  most  natural  and  satisfactory  in  all  ordinary 
cases,  to  refer  the  conduct  of  men  to  their  disposition,  or  moral 
state.  What  is  more  common  than  to  trace  lying,  stealing  and 
murder  to  a  false,  thievish  and  murderous  disposition  ?  We  ac- 
count for  it  that  they  commit  such  crimes  by  the  existence  of  such 
a  disposition.  And  no  one  ever  doubts  that  the  disposition  exists, 
if  the  crimes  are  committed.  The  latter  is  always  regarded  as  a 
proof  of  the  former. 

Such  is  the  mode  of  thinking  and  judging  w^hich  commonly 
prevails  among  men ;  and  such  doubtless  it  will  be,  so  long  as 
human  nature  remains  as  it  is.  And  we  infer  men's  disposition 
or  state  of  mind  from  their  conduct,  with  special  confidence,  when 
their  conduct  is  uniform  and  strongly  marked.  If  any  one 
denies  this  inference  to  be  just  in  relation  to  the  posterity  of 
Adam,  and  maintains  that  the  fact  of  their  uniformly  sinning 
can  be  accounted  for  without  supposing  anything  amiss  in  their 
disposition ;  he  sets  aside  a  principle  which,  in  other  cases,  is 
fully  admitted.  And  why  does  he  set  it  aside  here,  more  than 
in  other  cases  commonly  occurring  ?  Why  here  especially,  where 
the  actions  denoting  the  disposition  are  so  uniform,  uninterrupted, 
and  unmixed  ?     It  would  seem  to  be  at  least  as  agreeable  to  the 


248  OBJECTIONS     CONSIDERED. 

common  rules  of  judging,  to  say  that  the  dehberate  and  habitual 
practice  of  theft  and  fraud  does  not  prove  a  thievish  and  fraud- 
ulent disposition,  as  to  say  that  the  fact  of  men's  universally 
sinning  does  not  prove  them  to  be  the  subjects  of  a  sinful  dis- 
position. Nor  can  I  see  the  reason  why  any  one  should  take  this 
position,  except  it  be  out  of  respect  to  a  fovorite  hypothesis,  or 
because  he  finds  the  common  theory  exposed  to  certain  specu- 
lative objections.  That  objections  of  such  a  kind  should  not 
be  permitted  to  influence  our  belief  in  matters  of  fact,  or  in. 
matters  of  revelation,  has,  I  apprehend,  been  made  sufficiently 
clear. 

But  if,  after  all,  any  one  doubts  the  propriety  of  inferring 
from  men's  sinful  conduct  an  original  sinful  disposition  or  cor- 
ruption of  nature,  and  asks  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  account 
for  their  sinful  conduct  without  supposing  any  such  antecedent 
corruption  ;  I  will  endeavor  to  satisfy  him  in  the  sequel,  by 
proving  the  existence  of  such  an  original  corruption  of  human 
nature  from  the  holy  Scriptures.  If  this  original  corruption  is 
thus  satisfactorily  proved,  no  one  can  deny  that  it  directly  leads 
to  actual  sin,  just  as  any  particular  disposition,  say  avarice  or 
revenge,  existing  in  a  man,  leads  to  a  corresponding  conduct ; 
and  no  one  can  deny  that  actual  sin  directly  proceeds  from  such 
a  corrupt  disposition,  and  is  a  clear  development  of  it. 

That  Adam  commenced  his  existence  in  a  state  of  moral 
purity,  or  with  a  disposition  to  love  and  obey  God,  is  generally 
allowed.  That  his  posterity  commence  their  existence  in  a  moral 
state  materially  different  from  what  his  originally  was,  and  from 
what  theii'S  would  have  been  had  not  he  apostatized,  is  made  as 
certain  as  language  can  make  it,  by  the  fifth  chapter  of  Ro- 
mans, and  by  other  passages  of  holy  writ. 

If  such  is  the  principle  we  are  taught  by  the  word  of  God, 
and  such  our  natural  conclusion  from  the  in^-ariable  conduct 
of  Adam's  posterity ;  and  if  we  can  satisfactorily  account  for 
their  sinful  conduct  by  the  admission  of  a  corrupt  disposition  in 
them  ;  any  one  who  rejects  this  commonly  received  principle, 
ought  to  be  sure  that  he  has  a  good  reason  for  so  doing,  and  that 


OBJECTIONS     CONSIDERED.  249 

there  is  another  view  of  the  subject  more  confonnable  to  the 
Scriptures,  and  to  the  facts  of  our  own  experience.  It  will  not 
answer  the  purpose  to  argue  from  the  case  of  Adam  ;  as  it  is 
easy  to  reply  to  such  an  argument,  that  there  may  have  been 
something  peculiar  in  his  case,  which  would  render  it  improper 
to  reason  concerning  it  as  we  do  concerning  the  case  of  mankind 
generally  in  their  present  fallen  state.  There  is  this  difference 
at  least,  that  while  Adam's  sinning  evidently  implied  a  change 
in  the  state  of  his  mind  from  what  it  originally  was  ;  the  sinning 
of  his  posterity  docs  not  imply  any  change  from  their  original, 
native  character.  They  are  born  in  sin;  he  was  created  holy. 
Their  first  moral  state  is  sinful;  his  was  sinless.  And  if  his 
sinning  implied  a  chayige  of  character,  it  could  not  result  from 
his  original  character.  But  in  his  posterity,  sinning  does 
not  imply  a  change  in  their  moral  state  or  character,  but  is 
tiie  result  of  the  state  in  which  they  are  born.  The  question 
here  is  a  question  of  fact,  not  a  question  as  to  what  is  pos- 
sible. 


LE  CTURE    LXIV 


THE     DOCTRINE    OF     NATIVE    DEPRAVITY     CONTINUED.       SCRIPTURE 
EVIDENCE.       CONSEQUENCES    OF   DENYING    THE    DOCTRINE. 

In  discussing  the  subject  of  native  depravity,  I  have  pro- 
ceeded thus  far,  without  any  direct  appeal  to  the  word  of  God. 
I  have  inquired,  first,  what  particular  marks  distinguish  those 
things  which  are  generally  allowed  to  be  natural  to  man.  I  have 
specified  these  marks,  and  have  shown  that  they  appertain  to  our 
depravity.  By  this  course  of  reasoning  it  has  been  my  object 
to  show,  that  we  have  as  many  and  as  powerful  reasons  to  consider 
depravity  a  native  attribute  or  quahty  of  man,  as  most  of  those 
things  which  are  generally  acknowledged  to  be  native.  These 
reasons  have  satisfied  men  of  enlightend,  sober  minds  in  the 
Christian  and  even  in  the  heathen  world.  And  why  should  they 
not  satisfy  us?  What  should  hinder  us  from  acknowledging 
our  sinfulness  to  be  natural,  when  we  have  such  a  variety  of 
proofs  that  it  is  so,  and  proofs  which  in  every  other  case  are 
considered  as  perfectly  convincing  ?  Why  should  the  same 
evidence  which  is  received  as  satisfactory  in  one  case,  be  rejected 
in  the  other  ? 

The  way  seems  now  prepared  for  a  just  and  satisfactory  con- 
sideration of  the  Scripture  evidence.  As  we  have  already  seen 
that  so  many  reasons  exist  for  believing  the  doctrine  of  native 
depravity,  no  one  can  properly  come  to  the  word  of  God  with  a 
prepossession  against  it.  If  any  prepossession  is  proper,  it  is  a 
prepossession  in  favor  of  the  doctrine. 

But  I  only  ask  that  those  who  mquire  what  the  Bible  teaches 


SCRIPTURE   EVIDENCE   OF   NATIVE   DEPRAVITY.    251 

on  this  subject,  would  free  their  minds  from  prejudice  ;  that 
they  Avould  hold  themselves  ready  to  receive  what  the  sacred 
writers  teach ;  that  they  would  interpret  the  Scriptures  here  as 
they  do  in  other  cases,  without  the  influence  of  any  preconceived 
opinion,  or  the  influence  of  any  speculative  difficulties  which  may 
be  supposed  to  attend  the  common  doctrine. 

The  first  passage  which  I  shall  produce  is  Rom.  5  :  12  —  19. 
It  is  for  from  my  design  to  consider  the  various  difficulties  at- 
tending the  explanation  of  this  passage,  or  to  enter  into  the  con- 
troversies which  have  grown  out  of  it.  There  are  several  truths 
which  are  here  taught  with  great  clearness,  and  without  the 
admission  of  which  the  reasoning  of  the  Apostle  would  be  in- 
conclusive, and  the  effort  he  makes  to  magnify  the  grace  of  God 
in  redemption,  totally  nugatory. 

It  is  evident  that  the  Apostle  mentions  the  connection  which 
the  sin  of  Adam  had  with  the  state  of  his  posterity,  as  a  matter 
well  understood.  He  brings  it  forward,  not  as  a  doctrine  which 
is  noAv  for  the  first  time  to  be  declared,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
making  out  a  forcible  illustration  of  another  subject;  i.  e.,  the 
abounding  grace  of  God  in  the  salvation  of  his  people.  The 
manner  in  Avhich  the  Apostle  accomphshes  this  design,  implies  a 
fixed  and  very  close  connection  between  Adam  and  the  whole 
race  of  mankind  ;  a  connection  of  such  a  kind,  that  his  trans- 
gression involved  them  in  great  and  dreadful  evils.  These  evils 
are  described  in  a  variety  of  expressions.  "  By  the  offence  of 
one  the  many  died.^^  ''  The  sentence  was  by  one  offence  unto 
condemnation.^^  "  By  the  offence  of  one,  death  reigned.''^  "  By 
one  offence  the  sentence  came  upon  all  men  unto  condemnation.''^ 
"  By  the  disobedience  of  one  man  the  many  were  constituted 
sinners.''''  Now  if  by  these  expressions,  so  strong  and  so  often 
repeated,  the  Apostle  did  not  mean  to  teach  that  the  sin  of 
Adam  brought  i-uin  upon  his  posterity  ;  then  with  what  propriety 
does  he  refer  to  this  case  as  an  illustration  of  the  blessings  which 
Christ  i.rocured  for  his  people  ?  And  if  death  and  condemnation 
come  upon  the  posterity  of  Adam  hy  his  offence,  or  in  consecjuence 
of  his  transgression,  it  would  seem  plainly  to  follow,  even  if  it 


252  SCRIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

were  not  so  expressly  asserted,  that  all  the  iyidividuals  of  the 
human  ro.ce  are  involved  in  those  evils,  seeing  they  all  stand  in 
the  same  relation  to  him.  So  that  if  we  look  upon  any  who  are 
the  posterity  of  Adam,  y^e  look  upon  those  on  whom  death  and 
condemnation  come  by  his  offence.  There  can  be  no  exception. 
As  to  any  of  the  posterity  of  Adam,  and  as  to  any  to  whom  the 
benefits  of  Christ's  death  can  be  applied,  this  passage  makes  it 
evident,  that  they  are  among  those  who  were  brought  into  a  state 
of  condemnation  and  death  by  the  "  one  offence."  The  question 
to  which  I  would  now  ask  your  attention,  is,  whether  the  evils 
which  ai-e  the  consequence  of  Adam's  offence,  come  upon  any 
who  are,  in  every  sense,  really  and  entirely  sinless,  and  who  are 
80  regarded  by  the  divine  government. 

The  proper  answer  to  this  question  will  be  made  apparent  by 
the  following  considerations. 

First.  It  is  represented  in  this  passage,  that  one  of  the 
consequences  of  Adam's  sin  is,  that  all  men  are  "  constituted 
sinners."  And  in  another  part  it  is  taught  that  death  comes 
upon  all  men  for  the  very  reason,  that  "  all  have  sinned."  Though 
"  death,"  or  "  the  sentence  of  condemnation,"  comes  upon  all  by 
Adam's  offence,  as  the  original  and  general  cause  ;  still  it  may 
not  come  upon  them  without  involving  their  own  personal  sin- 
fulness. It  is  said,  that  the  children  of  Israel  suffered  the  judg- 
ments of  heaven  from  generation  to  generation  "  for  the  sin  of 
Jeroboam," — this  having  been  the  more  distant  and  general 
cause  which  brought  those  judgments  upon  them,  while  their 
sufferings  were  to  be  traced  to  their  oivn  wickedness  as  the  im- 
mediate cause.  The  sin  of  Jeroboam  affected  them  primarily 
by  corrupting  their  minds  and  leading  them  into  sin ;  and  con- 
sequently, by  bringing  just  punishments  upon  them  from  the  hand 
of  God.  The  cases  are  not  in  all  respects  parallel.  But 
this  at  least  is  clear,  that  when  the  Apostle  says,  "  death,"  or 
"  the  sentence  of  condemnation,"  came  upon  all  men  by  the 
"  offence  of  Adam,"  there  is  good  reason  to  understand  him  as 
including  their  own  personal  sinfulness.  Why  may  we  not  be- 
lieve that  the  natural  evil  which  comes  upon  the  human  race, 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  253 

has  a  connection  hoik  with  Adatn's  sin,  and  their  own?  Why 
may  it  not  have  resulted  from  his  sins  as  a  general  and  distant 
cause,  and  still  have  a  more  immediate  relation  to  their  own 
sinfulness  ?  Why  may  it  not  have  been  related  to  both,  though 
in  different  ways  ?  Nothing  is  more  common  than  the  relation 
of  one  thing  to  two  or  more  other  things  in  different  respects  and 
m  different  degrees  ?  The  conclusion  then  which  seems  to  be 
the  most  natural  and  obvious  is,  that  Adam's  sin  does  not  bring 
death  and  condemnation  upon  his  posterity,  they  being  sinless  ; 
that  none  of  them  suffer  penal  evil  in  consequence  of  his  sin, 
without  being,  in  some  sense,  sinful  themselves,  it  being  expressly 
declared  to  be  one  of  the  effects  of  his  offence,  that  they  are 
ail  constituted  sinners. 

Secondly.  Many  other  passages  of  Scripture  teach  that  the 
evils  which  come  upon  mankind,  respect  them  not  as  innocent 
and  pure,  but  as  sinners.  When  the  prophet  Ezekiel  declares, 
that  the  son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,  it  would  seem 
to  be  his  object  to  guard  against  the  idea,  that  men  suffer  for 
the  sin  of  others  while  they  themselves  are  free  from  ill-desert. 
The  real  meaning  of  the  complaint  made  by  the  children  of 
Israel  was,  that  on  account  of  their  father's  wickedness  they 
suffered  what  they  themselves  did  not  deserve.  The  prophet 
corrects  this  mistake,  by  telling  them  that  punishment  follows 
personal  ill-desert.  But  surely  he  does  not  mean  to  contradict 
the  declaration  which  God  himself  had  made,  that  he  would 
visit  the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  upon  the  children  unto  the 
third  and  fourth  generation ;  —  a  principle  so  important,  that 
God  appended  it  to  the  second  Command  in  the  decalogue, 
and  Avrote  it  on  a  table  of  stone.  Notwithstanding  this  general 
principle  of  the  divine  government,  it  is  often  represented  in 
Scripture  that  it  is  the  soul  which  sinneth  that  shall  die,  —  that 
the  wages  of  sin  is  death ;  sin  and  death  belonging  to  the 
same  subject. 

Thirdly.  It  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  it  with  the  justice  and 
equity  of  God,  as  moral  Governor,  that  he  should  visit  the  evils 
implied  in   "  death"  and  "  condemnation,"  upon  any  who   are, 

VOL.  II.  22 


254  SCRIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

in  their  own  personal  character,  wholly  free  from  moral  evil. 
The  divine  law  connects  the  death  and  condemnation  of  men 
with  their  own  sinfulness ;  and  it  connects  their  happiness  with 
their  obedience.  Now  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  there  is  anything  in  the  divine  constitution  or  the  divine 
conduct,  which  tends  in  the  least  to  subvert  or  contravene  this 
grand  principle  of  moral  government.  Whatever  may  be  said 
as  to  the  sufferings  of  the  brutal  species,  it  is  certainly  the  case 
that  when  pain  is  inflicted  by  the  Governor  of  the  world  upon 
those  whom  he  has  made  intelligent  and  moral  beings,  and 
placed  by  the  very  constitution  of  their  nature  under  his  moral 
government,  our  impression  naturally  is,  that  the  infliction  in- 
dicates divine  displeasure,  and  so  implies  that  he  sees  sinfulness 
and  ill-desert  in  those  who  suffer.  Unless  therefore  there  is 
some  evidence  from  Scripture  which  plainly  opposes  this  impres- 
sion, we  must  conclude  that  among  intelligent,  moral  beings,  sin 
is  in  some  form  co-extensive  with  suffering. 

The  application  of  this  principle  to  the  case  of  children 
will  be  more  particularly  considered  before  closing  the  discussion. 
My  present  object  is  to  show  that  the  Apostle  in  Rom.  5:12  — 
19,  meant  among  other  things  to  teach,  that  man  is  really,  in  a 
very  important  sense,  depraved  or  degenerate,'  from  the  com- 
mencement of  his  existence  ;  that  he  is  born  in  sin ;  that  the 
uniform  consequence  of  his  natural  birth  is,  not  only  that  he 
will  actually  sin,  but  that  he  is  morally  corrupt. 

If  any  of  you  should  be  startled  at  the  difliculties  of  the 
doctrine  which  I  have  here  laid  down,  and  which  has  always  been 
and  is  maintained  by  evangelical  ministers  and  Christians  through 
the  world ;  let  me  tell  you  that  the  rejection  of  the  doctrine  will 
involve  you  in  difficulties  far  more  startling. 

Before  proceeding  to  other  texts,  let  us  briefly  recapitulate 
what  I  have  advanced  on  the  important  passage  in  Rom.  5 : 
12  —  19. 

In  attending  to  the  representation  which  the  Apostle  here 
makes  in  regard  to  the  death  and  condemnation  which  come 
upon   mankind    in   consequence   of   the  offence    of  Adam,   the 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  255 

question  arose,  whether  these  evils  come  upon  them  as  beings 
morally  pure  ;  in  other  words,  whether  the  Apostle  teaches  that 
any  of  those  whom  he  represents  as  standing  in  such  a  connec- 
tion with  Adam,  and  as  brought  under  death  and  condemnation  by 
his  offence,  do  in  fact  suffer  those  tremendous  evils  without  being 
themselves  in  some  way  sinful.  I  answered  in  the  negative,  for  the 
reasons  above  given.  First ;  we  are  taught  in  this  very  passage 
that  those  who  suffer  these  evils,  are  constituted  sinners,  and  that 
death  comes  upon  all  because  that  all  have  sinned.  No  excep- 
tion is  suggested.  Secondly ;  other  parts  of  Scripture  teach  the 
same.  And,  thirdly ;  it  is  a  well  known  principle,  and  one 
which  we  almost  instinctively  admit,  that  suffering  is  never  in- 
flicted on  those  who  are  placed  under  a  just  moral  government, 
while  they  are  pure  from  sin.  The  result  of  the  whole  is,  that 
the  fact  here  stated,  namely,  that  all  the  human  race  are  sub- 
jected to  death  in  consequence  of  Adam's  offence,  manifestly 
implies  that  they  are  all  morally  depraved.  And  they  are  de- 
praved because  they  are  the  children  of  apostate  Adam  ;  they  are 
constituted  sinners  by  his  offence.  His  sin  is  the  occasion  of 
their  being  sinners  ;  and  it  has  this  effect  by  the  sovereign  con- 
stitution of  God,  which  brings  them  into  such  a  relation  to  their 
common  father.  They  are  depraved  in  consequence  of  their 
coming  into  existence  as  his  posterity.  And  this  is  the  same  as 
saying  that  their  depravity  is  natural  —  that  it  belongs  to  them 
in  their  native  state,  the  state  in  which  they  are  born. 

The  next  passage  which  I  shall  cite,  and  which  will  confirm 
the  views  above  expressed,  is  John  3  :  6 ;  ''  That  which  is  born 
of  the  flesh  is  flesh,"  adql  sgti.  The  connection  and  drift  of  the 
discourse  make  the  meaning  evident.  Our  Saviour  referred  to 
that  state  or  quality  of  man  which  disquahfies  him  for  the  king- 
dom of  God,  and  which  renders  it  necessary  that  he  should  be 
created  anew  by  the  Divine  Spirit.  And  what  is  that  but  a  state 
of  moral  depravity  ?  What  but  a  sinful  heart  can  debar  any 
man  from  the  blessedness  of  heaven  ?  What  but  this  can  make 
it  necessary  to  our  happiness  that  we  should  experience  so 
great  a  change  as  to  be  born  again  ?     It  is  then,  in  my  view, 


2o6  SCRIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

perfectly  obvious  that  the  word  flesh  is  here  used  to  denote  a 
depraved  nature,  a  state  in  which  the  soul  is  subject  to  carnal 
and  sinful  affections,  instead  of  being  subject  to  the  law  of 
God. 

This  interpretation  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  same  word 
is  often  used  in  a  similar  sense  in  other  passages  of  Scripture. 
In  Rom.  7  and  8,  to  be  "  in  the  flesh,"  to  have  a  "  fleshly"  or 
"  carnal  mind,"  denotes  a  state  opposite  to  holiness  —  a  state  of 
enmity  against  God — a  state  of  spiritual  death.  In  Gal.  5,  the 
Apostle  speaks  of  the  flesh  as  that  in  man  which  lusteth  against 
the  spirit,  i.  e.,  has  desires  in  opposition  to  that  moral  purity  of 
which  the  Divine  Spirit  is  the  Author.  And  when  he  mentions 
the  works  of  the  flesh,  he  mentions  the  various  forms  of  sin. 
As  we  thus  find  that  the  word  flesh  is  used  by  the  Apostle  in 
this  moral  sense,  and  is  manifestly  intended  to  denote  the  sinful 
disposition  and  character  of  man,  we  are  confirmed  in  the  in- 
terpretation which  has  been  given  of  it  as  used  by  Christ  in 
John  3 :  6. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  other  part  of  the  passage  :  "  That 
which  is  born  of  the  flesh."  To  be  born  of  the  flesh  is  the 
common  characteristic  of  human  beings.  It  is  that  natural 
birth  by  which  they  are  brought  into  personal  existence.  Now 
Christ  teaches  us  that  the  vitiated  nature  of  man  comes  by  his 
natural  birth;  '"  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh."  It  is 
sometimes  thought  that  the  word  flesh  is  here  used  in  widely 
different  senses.  But  may  not  the  senses  in  the  two  cases  be 
more  alike  than  has  been  frequently  supposed  ?  It  is  very  evi- 
dent that  the  word  in  the  last  case  denotes  a  morally  depraved 
nature,  a  sinful  character  in  all  who  are  born.  And  may  it  not 
in  the  first  case  denote  the  same  nature  in  those  of  whom  they 
are  born  ?  The  children  are  like  their  parents.  This  is  a  gen- 
eral law  of  our  nature.  Fact  proves,  as  well  as  the  Bible,  that 
this  is  as  true  in  a  moral  sens&  as  in  any  other.  Through  all 
generations  parents  and  children  have  had  unholy  affections, 
sinfulness  of  character.  We  except  no  one  but  Jesus  of  Naza- 
reth, whose  conception  was  not  according  to  the  established  laws 


OF     NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  257 

of  human  descent.  The  fact  has  been  known  and  acknowledged 
from  the  beginning  to  the  present  day.  So  that  it  was  a  per- 
tinent question  in  Job's  time,  and  is  so  at  all  times  ;  "  Who  can 
bring  a  clean  thhig  out  of  an  unclean  ?  "  And  "  how  can  he  be 
clean  that  is  born  of  a  woman  ?  " 

The  two  points  above  mentioned  are,  I  think,  specially  impor- 
tant in  the  interpretation  of  the  text ;  "  That  which  is  born  of 
the  flesh,  is  flesh."  First,  flesh  as  used  at  the  close  of  the  sen- 
tence, signifies  man's  sinful  disposition,  his  vitiated  moral  nature. 
It  relates  to  man  as  a  moral,  accountable  being,  and  indicates 
such  a  sinfulness  in  his  character  that  he  must  be  renewed  by 
the  Spirit,  or  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  And, 
secondly,  this  depravity  comes  by  natural  descent.  Man  has  it 
in  that  state  into  which  he  is  born,  or  as  he  is  born,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  his  being  born  of  parents  who  have  the  same  de- 
praved nature. 

This  construction  is  sustained  by  the  clause  immediately  follow- 
ing. "  That  which  is  born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit."  "  Spirit," 
at  the  close,  must  mean  spiritual,  holy  affections,  —  a  pure  and 
heavenly  state  of  mind,  —  a  character  conformed  to  the  divine 
law.  And  this  character  is  that  which  he  has  as  born  of  the 
Spirit,  or  in  consequence  of  being  bom  of  the  Spirit.  The  Holy 
Spirit  is  the  Author  of  the  new  birth  ;  and  as  that  which  is  de- 
rived from  depraved  parents  is  depraved,  so  that  which  is  de- 
rived from  the  Holy  Spirit  is  holy.  As  the  phraseology  in  the 
two  parts  of  the  verse  is  similar,  the  interpretation  of  both  pro- 
ceeds on  the  same  principle.  That  which  is  born  in  each  case  re- 
sembles that  of  which  it  is  born. 

This  sense  of  the  passage  is  maintained  by  the  best  commen- 
tators. Even  Rosenmuller  gives  nearly  the  same  signification. 
"  By  flesh,"  he  says,  "  is  meant  the  nature  of  man,  —  man  with 
all  his  moral  imperfection,  subject  to  the  dominion  of  his  bodily 
appetites.  And  he  that  is  born  of  parents  wlw  have  this  moral 
imperfection^  is  like  his  parents.^^  So  Knapp :  "  That  which  is 
born  of  tliefiesh  is  flesh.  From  men  who  are  weak,  erring,  and 
sinful  men  of  the  same  character  are  bom.''^     And  Dwight  says  ; 

22* 


258  SCRIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

"  The  fleslilv  character  is  mseparablj  connected  with  the  birth  of 
man.^'' 

As  a  farther  proof  of  the  correctness  of  the  above  interpretation, 
and  of  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  I  cite  Ephes. 
2:  3.  The  Apostle  says  of  himself  and  other  Jews  ;  "  We  were  by 
nature  children  of  wrath,  even  as  others."  To  be  children  of  wrath, 
is  to  be  exposed  to  God's  displeasure,  to  be  deserving  of  punish- 
ment. So  Schleusner  and  others.  Jews  and  Gentiles  then  are 
deserving  of  divine  punishments,  "  poenis  divinis  digni ;"  which  is 
the  same  as  to  say,  they  are  sinners.  And  the  Apostle  says  they 
are  so  "  %  nature^  The  first  meaning  of  the  word  (fvaig^  nature, 
according  to  Schleusner,  Wahl,  and  others,  is,  "  birth,  origin,  na- 
tivity.''^ Gal.  2:  15.  We  were  by  nature  Jews  ;  (fvaei  lovdaloi. 
We  were  native  Jcivs  —  born  Jews.  —  The  next  meaning  given 
by  Schleusner  and  Wahl  is,  "  that  which  belongs  to  a  thing  from 
its  origin  or  birth  ;  native  disposition,  native  qualities  or  properties 
of  any  person.''^  When  therefore  the  Apostle  teaches  that  men 
are  sinners,  and  so  children  of  wrath,  "  by  nature^''  the  obvious 
meaning  is,  that  they  are  so  by  birth,  or  in  that  state  into  ivhich 
they  are  born ;  that  this  is  their  native  character  and  condition. 
If  a  man  comes  to  possess  a  particular  character  in  consequence 
of  a  change  which  takes  place  in  him  when  he  is  a  child  or  after- 
wards, we  never  say,  h«  is  what  he  is  by  7iature.  Accordingly 
we  never  say  a  man  is  by  nature  holy ;  because  this  would  mean 
that  holiness  is  his  native  character,  or  is  natural  to  him,  which 
would  be  wholly  inconsistent  with  its  resulting  from  a  spiritual  and 
supernatural  change,  or  a  new  birth.  We  say  of  some  persons  of 
a  particular  temperament,  that  they  are  naturally  indolent.  But 
if  their  indolence  is  the  consequence  of  disease,  we  say,  it  is  not 
their  natural  disposition,  but  has  come  upon  them  in  consequence 
of  such  a  physical  cause. 

Knapp,  in  his  remarks  on  Eph.  2:  3,  explains  the  term  (pvaig, 
(nature,)  thus  ;  "  (fvaig  properly  signifies,  first,  origin,  birth,  from 
qpvo,  nascor,  to  be  born.  So  in  Gal.  2:  15,  cpvau  lovdaioi,  Jews 
by  birth,  native  Jews  ;  and  so  in  the  classics.  Secondly.  It  is 
also  used  both  by  the  Jews  and  classics  to  denote  the  original,  in- 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  259 

born,  and  peculiar  properties,  attributes,  or  nature  of  a  thing  or 
person,  the  naturalis  indoles,  or  aflfectio,  as  Rom.  11:  21,  24. 
The  term  natural  is  used  in  this  doctrine  in  opposition  to  what  is 
acquired,  or  first  produced  or  occasioned  by  external  causes.  It 
denotes  that  for  which  there  is  a  foundation  in  man  himself.  We 
say  for  example,  that  such  a  man  has  natural  sagacity,  that  a  dis- 
ease is  natural  to  another,  that  he  is  by  nature  a  poet,  etc.,  be- 
cause the  qualities  here  spoken  of  are  not  the  result  of  diligence, 
practice,  or  exteraal  circumstances."  He  says,  "  Some  prefer 
the  word  innate,  a  term  which,  as  well  as  the  other,  is  Scriptu- 
ral." He  refers  to  the  elder  Pliny's  use  of  the  word  congenitus 
in  the  sense  of  innate,  and  Cicero's  use  of  nativum  ;  and  then 
adds  ;  "  It  is  with  justice  that  a  quality  which  had  its  origin  at  the 
same  time  Avith  man,  which  is  found  in  him  from  his  earliest  youth, 
and  can  be  wholly  eradicated  by  no  efibrt,  is  denominated  natural. 
In  this  sense  we  speak  at  the  present  day  of  innate  or  hereditary 
faults,  virtues,  and  excellencies."  Knapp's  Theology,  vol.  2,  pp. 
65,  67.* 

A  careful  comparison  of  Eph.  2:  3,  with  John  3:  6,  confirms  all 
that  has  been  said.  Christ  represents  our  carnal,  depraved  dis- 
position, as  arising  from  our  hirth.  "  That  which  is  born  of  the 
flesh  is  flesh ;"  just  as  holiness  arises  from  our  renewal,  or  the 
second  birth.  And  here  the  Apostle  says,  we  are  children  of 
wrath,  (and  by  imphcation  sinnei*s,)  hy  nature.  The  general  idea 
is  manifestly  the  same. 

The  words  of  David,  Ps.  51:  3,  have  generally  been  cited  as 
evidence  of  native  depraAaty.  "  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity, 
and  in  sin  did  my  mother  conceive  me."  A  similar  representation 
is  made  in  Ps.  58:  3,  where  the  wicked  are  said  to  "  be  estranged 
from  the  womb,"  and  in  Isa.  58:  8,  where  men  are  called  "  trans- 
gressors from  the  womb."     The  sense  of  the  text,  Ps.  51:  3,  may 


♦  Dr.  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor,  speaking  of  the  sin  of  man,  says,  "  The  canse  is  in 
his  nature,  not  in  his  circumstances."  He  says  also,  "All  the  world  ascribe  an  ef- 
fect to  the  nature  of  a  thing,  when  no  possible  change  in  its  appropriate  ciiTum- 
stanccs  will  change  the  efiFect.' 


260  SCRIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

be  determined,  first,  by  tbe  general  scope  of  the  passage.  David 
is  deeply  impressed  with  his  own  sinfulness,  makes  humble  con- 
fession, and  prays  for  purification  and  forgiveness.  "  Wash  me 
thoroughly  from  my  iniquity  and  cleanse  me  from  my  sin.  For  I 
acknowledge  my  transgression,  and  my  sin  is  ever  before  me. 
Against  thee,  thee  only,  have  I  sinned,  and  done  this  evil  in  thy 
sight.  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity,"  etc.  Then  he  recog- 
nizes God  as  requiring  purity  of  heart,  and  prays  that  he  would 
impart  it.  "  Purge  me  with  hyssop,"  etc.  The  declaration, 
verse  3,  stands  thus  in  the  midst  of  the  most  humble  confessions 
of  moral  pollution,  and  the  most  fervent  supplications  for  cleans- 
ing ;  and  it  doubtless  has  a  meaning  correspondent  with  the 
general  current  of  thought  in  the  place.  When  the  same  writer 
saj'S  of  the  wicked,  that  they  are  estranged  from  the  womb  and 
go  astray  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  and  the  prophet  says,  "  I 
knew  that  thou  wouldst  deal  very  treacherously,  and  wast  called 
a  transgressor  from  the  womb,"  they  evidently  intend  to  make 
a  strong  impression  of  criminality.  It  is  the  same  as  though 
they  had  said  of  the  wicked,  that  they  have  not  only  sinned  in 
particular  instances  and  under  great  temptation,  but  have  always 
been  wicked,  sinning  from  the  very  beginning  of  their  existence  ;  in 
the  forcible  language  of  Scripture,  sinning  from  the  womb  or  as 
soon  as  born.  Now  it  is  obviously  natural  to  consider  David  in 
Ps.  51,  as  reflecting,  first,  upon  the  particular  transgression  he 
had  committed  ;  then  turning  liis  eye  upon  the  fountain  of  pol- 
lution within,  and  upon  the  various  exhibitions  of  it  in  past  life, 
and  acknowledging  with  shame  and  penitence  and  self-loathing, 
that  he  had  been  sinful  all  his  days  ;  that  he  was  even  born  in 
sin.  Just  as  we  sometimes  say  of  a  proud,  selfish,  mahcious 
man,  to  aggravate  the  hatefulness  of  his  character,  he  has  had 
that  vile  disposition  ever  since  he  was  born.  It  is  his  very  7iature; 
he  was  born  so.  The  passage  under  consideration  very  naturally 
signifies  that  moral  corruption  is  a  native  quality  of  man ;  that 
it  is  contemporaneous  with  his  birth ;  that  the  human  soul  has 
from  the  commencement  of  its  existence  what  Professor  Stuart 
very  aptly  calls  "  the  germ  of  sin,"  which,  as  soon  as  there  is 


OF     NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  261 

sufficient  growth  and  maturity,  will  develop  itself  in  sinful  action. 
The  language  in  which  David  charges  himself  with  being  so 
sinful  from  the  beginning  of  his  life,  is  undoubtedly  figurative, 
and  expressive  of  strong  emotions.  But  because  he  expresses 
the  thing  very  forcibly,  and  in  language  which  goes  beyond  what 
is  customary  where  there  is  no  emotion,  shall  we  coldly  explain 
away  the  obvious  sense  of  the  passage,  and  overlook  that  con- 
sciousness of  deep  pollution  which  the  words  reveal  ?  The  best 
means  of  understanding  the  passage  is,  to  possess  the  same  state 
of  mind  with  David.  If  any  of  us  were  in  his  circumstances, 
and  had  his  conviction  of  sin,  his  penitence  and  self-loathing,  and 
his  desire  for  purification,  we  should  be  likely  to  utter  our  feel- 
ings in  the  same  impassioned  language. 

But  the  sense  of  the  words  before  us,  which  is  so  apparent 
from  a  consideration  of  the  scope  of  the  passage,  will  be  still 
more  satisfactorily  seen  by  comparing  this  text  with  the  other 
passages  before  mentioned,  where  the  same  truth  is  set  forth  in 
a  more  didactic  form,  and  in  language  which  admits  of  a  more 
exact  and  rigid  interpretation.  David  utters  the  sense  he  has 
of  that  deep  depravity  of  his  heart  which  had  been  acting  itself 
out  all  his  days,  by  saying,  that  he  was  born  in  iniquity  and  con- 
ceived in  sin,  i.  e.,  was  sinful  from  his  birth  and  by  his  birth,  a 
degenerate  plant  of  a  strange  vine.  Paul  teaches  that  we  are 
children  of  wrath  '■'' by  nature  f  and  Christ  teaches  that  a  car- 
nal mind,  an  earthly,  sinful  disposition,  is  born  with  us  ;  —  "  That 
which  is  horn  of  the  fiesh  is  fleshy  And  to  remove  every 
reasonable  doubt,  compare  all  these  texts,  and  others  bearing  on 
the  same  subject,  with  the  general  fact  which  every  attentive 
observer  of  human  nature  has  noticed,  namely,  the  putting  forth 
of  a  wrong  spirit  of  mind  in  early  life. 

On  the  whole  I  think  it  will  appear  to  every  one  who  ex- 
amines the  subject  with  candor,  that,  even  without  revelation,  we 
have  as  much  evidence  in  this  case,  as  we  have  in  other  cases 
where  no  one  has  any  doubt.  Take  those  things  which  are 
usually  regarded  as  natural  to  man,  —  native  attributes  or  quali- 
ties of  his  mind.     Take,  for  example,  intelligence,  a  disposition 


262  SCKIPTURE     EVIDENCE 

for  society,  and  jMreyital  affection.  Why  are  these  regarded  as 
native  properties  of  man  ?  Evidently  because  they  uniformlv 
and  spontaneously  develop  themselves  -when  his  bodily  and 
mental  powers  become  capable  of  making  such  a  development, 
and  when  the  proper  occasion  for  it  occurs.  What  other  evi- 
dence have  we  that  these  naturally  belong  to  man  ?  And  is 
there  any  other  proof  than  what  I  have  above  suggested,  that 
it  is  natural  to  man  to  have  a  soul,  or  that  he  is  born  with  a 
soul  ?  Is  it  said  by  way  of  objection,  that  there  is  no  appear- 
ance of  depravity  in  man  for  some  time  after  his  birth  ?  This 
is  admitted.  And  is  not  the  same  true  of  reason,  of  the  social 
and  sympathetic  dispositions,  of  parental  affection,  and  even  of 
the  existence  of  the  soul  ?  Some  of  these  are  indeed  developed 
very  early,  as  the  existence  of  mind,  and  reason,  and  a  social 
disposition.  But  other  properties  which  are  natural  to  the  mind 
are  developed  at  a  later  period ;  and  the  parental  affection  can 
hardly  be  said  to  come  into  distinct  operation  before  the  paren- 
tal relation  exists.  And  yet  who  ever  hesitated  on  this  account 
to  consider  parental  affection  as  natural  to  man  ?  It  is  just  as 
evident  that  this  affection  results  from  the  nature  which  man 
receives  at  his  birth,  as  it  would  be  if  it  began  to  operate  as 
soon  as  he  is  born.  Such  is  the  argument  for  native  depravity, 
even  withovit  calling  in  the  evidence  from  revelation.  But  when 
this  is  added,  the  proof  is  in  the  highest  degree  convincing. 

I  have  at  present  only  one  additional  view  of  the  subject. 
Suppose  then  we  had  the  same  evidence  of  the  opposite  fact,  as 
we  have  of  native  depravity ;  suppose  that  human  beings  were 
universally  holy,  as  Jesus  was  ;  suppose  the  feelings  developed  in 
early  life,  and  afterwards,  were,  in  every  man  uniformly  right ; 
suppose  that  all  the  temptations  to  sin  with  which  mankind  are 
beset  from  the  beginning  of  their  life,  should  fail,  as  they  did  in 
the  case  of  our  Saviour,  of  producing  the  least  moral  pollution ; 
and  suppose,  in  addition  to  all  this,  we  had  a  declaration  of  an 
Apostle,  that  all  men  are  hi/  nature  objects  of  divine  compla- 
cency and  heirs  of  heaven,  and  a  declaration  of  Christ,  that 
that  which  is  born  of  earthly  parents  is  holy;  and  suppose  that 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  263 

there  had  been  good  reason  for  the  inquiry  among  thinking  men, 
how  can  that  which  is  born  of  a  tvoman  be  impure?  and  that 
an  eminent  saint,  Avhile  contemplating  with  complacency  his  own 
uniform  goodness  of  heart,  should  exclaim,  that  he  was  conceived 
in  purity  and  brought  forth  in  the  holy  image  of  G-od ;  and 
suppose,  once  more,  that  if  there  were  any  instances  of  sin,  they 
were  instances  of  a  change  from  a  previous  state  of  holiness, 
brought  about  through  the  extraordinary  influence  of  some  ma- 
lignant being ;  suppose  all  this  ;  and  should  we  hesitate  a  mo- 
ment to  say,  that  man  is  naturally  holy?  or  that  moral  purity  is 
his  native  character?  Do  we  hesitate  to  say  this  of  Jesus,  the 
son  of  Mary  ?  And  if  evidence  like  this  would  prove  the  doc- 
trine of  man's  native  purity,  why  does  not  the  same  kind  and 
degree  of  evidence  on  the  other  side  prove  the  doctrine  of  his 
native  depravity?  And  if  any  are  not  convinced  of  the  truth 
of  the  doctrine  by  evidence  like  this,  I  beg  leave  to  ask,  wheth- 
er any  conceivable  evidence  would  convince  them  ?  What  better 
evidence  would  they  desire  ?  Let  them  describe  the  proof  which 
they  would  think  reasonable,  and  which  would  satisfy  them  of  the 
truth  of  the  doctrine.  Do  any  say,  the  doctrine  is  such  that  it  is 
impossible  to  prove  it ;  no  evidence  whatever  would  convince  us 
of  its  truth  ?  With  such  persons  arguments  would  be  in  vain. 
They  take  the  position  of  those  Unitarians  who  say,  that  whatever 
evidence  there  might  be  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  it  would 
not  convince  them ;  a  position  which  we  should  hardly  expect 
would  be  taken  by  men  who  entertain  even  a  common  respect 
for  reason  and  philosophy. 

It  has  always  been  considered  proper  to  argue  in  support  of 
any  doctrine, //-ow  the  evident  consequences  of  denying  it.  This 
kind  of  argument  I  think  not  unimportant  in  relation  to  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity. 

Professor  Stuart  expresses  an  opinion  which  few  will  call  in 
question,  when  he  says,  "  Whatever  may  be  the  degradation  into 
which  we  are  now  bom  —  ive  are  still  born  moral  agents,  free 
agents,  ivitli  faculties  to  do  good,  yea  all  the  faculties  that  are 
needed^     This  is  a  point  in  which  men  are  generally  agreed. 


264  CONSEQUENCES     OF    DENYING 

We  are  born  with  an  intelligent  and  moral  nature ;  in  other 
words,  we  have  rational  souls  from  the  beginning.  If  any  one 
denies  this,  he  must  hold  that  the  human  soul  is  created  after 
the  birth  of  the  bodj.  And  he  must  hold  that  this  creation  of 
the  soul  takes  place  very  soon  after  the  birth  of  the  body ;  be- 
cause only  a  short  time  elapses  before  the  human  ofispring  be- 
gins to  show  signs  of  thought.  Does  any  one  hold  that  the  signs 
of  thought  and  feeling  which  a  young  child  at  first  exhibits,  are 
nothing  different  from  what  appear  in  the  brutal  species,  and  so 
are  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  rational  and  moral  nature  ? 
And  does  he  hold  accordingly  that  a  human  being  exists  for  a 
considerable  time,  —  maybe  six  months  or  a  year,  —  with  only 
that  principle  of  intelligence  and  feeling  which  belongs  to  irra- 
tional animals,  and  that  he  afterwards  receives  from  the  creative 
hand  of  God  a  rational  and  immortal  soul  ?  I  reply :  if  a  child 
may  exist  so  long,  and  advance  so  far  towards  developing  a 
human  character,  without  a  human  soul ;  why  may  he  not  do 
without  a  soul  still  further  ?  Or  if  it  should  be  thought  that 
after  a  time,  (six  months  or  a  year)  the  exigencies  of  human 
existence  demand  the  addition  of  a  soul,  we  should  suppose  that 
the  time  when  this  important  event  takes  place  would  be  at- 
tended with  some  visible  signs  ;  that  the  transition  from  the  state 
of  mere  animal  existence,  to  rational  and  moral  existence,  must 
be  followed  at  once  by  some  very  noticeable  effects.  To  say 
that  so  momentous  a  change  could  take  place  without  being 
observed,  would  be  unreasonable.  On  the  contrary,  we  should 
suppose  that  past  experience  must  have  clearly  shown  at  what 
period  or  near  what  period  of  life,  such  an  event  usually  takes 
place  ;  and  that,  when  the  period  approaches,  an  intense  interest 
must  be  waked  up  in  the  minds  of  parents  and  friends,  —  an 
interest  far  greater  than  that  which  is  commonly  felt  in  the  birth 
of  the  body.  For  surely  the  production  of  an  immortal  soul  is 
a  vastly  more  important  event,  than  the  bringing  forth  of  a 
mortal  body.  If  the  opinion  under  consideration  is  true,  then  we 
should  think  that  when  the  time  for  the  occurrence  of  such  a 
wonderful  event   draws  near,  whether  by  night  or  by  day,  all 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  265 

eyes  would  be  awake  to  observe  it.  For  who  can  be  inattentive 
when  a  little  child,  say  a  year  old,  is  about  to  receive  from  the 
hand  of  God  a  never  dying  soul,  —  to  be  changed  from  a  mere 
animal  to  a  rational  and  moral  being,  and  so  to  be  joined  to  the 
society  of  those  who  are  subject  to  the  law  and  accountable  for 
their  actions  ?  But  what  evidence  is  there  of  such  a  change  ? 
To  suppose  such  a  thing  would  be  unreasonable  and  unphilosophi- 
cal,  if  not  ridiculous.  On  such  a  supposition  we  might  wish  to 
inquire,  what  becomes  of  those  who  die  in  infancy,  before  they 
have  a  soul  ?  Will  they  ever  have  a  soul  ?  If  so,  we  suppose 
it  must  be  created  and  joined  to  the  body  at  or  after  the  resur- 
rection ;  for  it  could  hardly  be  thought  that  God  would  create 
souls  in  the  intermediate  time  between  death  and  the  resurrec- 
tion. If  those  who  die  in  infancy  die  without  souls,  and  are 
never  to  have  souls ;  then  we  can  hardly  believe  that  their  bodies 
will  be  raised  from  the  dead  ?  For  what  concern  can  mere 
animal  bodies  have  in  the  judgment  day,  which  is  intended  for 
moral  beings,  and  appertains  wholly  to  a  moral  government? 
And  if  those  who  die  in  early  childhood,  are  not  to  be  raised 
from  the  dead,  then  what  John  says,  "  I  saw  the  dead,  both 
small  and  great,  stand  before  God,"  must  be  understood  in 
a  very  limited  sense  ;  for  those  who  die  in  infancy  make  no  in- 
considerable part  of  the  human  race.  Such  a  notion  as  this 
would  occasion  great  and  distressing  difficulties.  How  would 
parents  feel,  how  ought  they  to  feel,  in  respect  to  children  who 
live  and  die  without  souls,  and  who  of  course  do  not  belong  to 
the  family  of  rational  and  moral  beings,  and  to  whom  death  will 
be  an  eternal  sleep  ?  What  would  parents  do  with  their 
natural  affections,  which  manifestly  imply  that  their  offspring 
have,  not  only  the  same  animal  nature,  but  the  same  intelligent, 
social,  and  moral  nature  with  themselves  ?  How  should  they 
regulate  their  prayers  for  their  children  ?  Or  rather  how  could 
they  with  propriety  pray  for  them  at  all  ?  Or  if  they  should 
pray,  for  what  should  they  pray  ?  And  what  would  be  the 
meaning  of  religious  rites  in  relation  to  those  who  have  no 
souls? 

VOL  n.  23 


266  CONSEQUENCES     OF     DENYING 

But  I  have  said  enough,  perhaps  too  much,  on  such  a  subject. 
For  who  will  deny  that  human  beings  are  born  with  souls,  —  born 
rational  and  moral  agents  ?  Some  however  admit  that  men  are 
born  rational  and  moral  beings,  while  thej  do  not  admit  that 
they  are  born  subjects  of  moral  depravity.  But  if  mankind  are 
born  intelligent  and  moral  agents,  and  yet  are  not  subjects  of 
depravity  at  the  commencement  of  their  being,  then  one  of  two 
things  must  be  true  ;  they  are  either  holy,  or  they  have  no  character 
at  all,  i.  e.,  are  in  a  state  of  indiiference  as  to  holiness  and  sin. 
Rational  and  moral  beings  cannot  be  supposed  capable  of  ex- 
isting in  more  than  three  states ;  a  state  of  holiness  or  moral 
purity,  a  state  of  sin  or  depravity,  and  a  state  of  neutrality,  in 
which  they  are  neither  holy  nor  sinful.  But  human  beings  as 
they  commence  their  existence,  are  not  holy.  This  is  proved  by 
evidence  too  clear  to  be  doubted ;  and  it  is  a  point  in  which  all 
who  believe  the  Bible  are  agreed.  If  then  they  are  not  morally 
depraved,  they  are  in  a  state  of  neutrality,  having  nothing  either 
morally  good  or  evil.  Our  present  business  is  to  examine  thia 
position,  and  see  what  difficulties  attend  it  and  what  consequen- 
ces would  seem  to  flow  from  it. 

Here  then  we  have  a  being  with  a  rational  soul,  —  one  horn  a 
moral  agent,  without  any  disposition,  either  right  or  wrong,  with- 
out any  bias  or  tendency  either  to  good  or  evil ;  —  a  moral  na- 
ture but  no  moral  character,  not  even  the  first  elements  of  it ;  — 
a  rational  and  immortal  mind  existing  in  no  state  either  of  holi- 
ness or  sin  ?  There  seems  to  be  some  difficulty  too  of  another 
kind,  and  still  more  important.  A  rational  being,  a  moral  agent, 
is  of  course  a  subject  of  moral  government.  From  his  very 
nature  he  is  under  law.  But  according  to  the  supposition,  this 
being,  who  is  by  his  very  nature  under  law,  has  no  relation  to 
law  ;  and  has  nothing  which  the  law  can  pronounce  either  good 
or  bad,  —  nothing  which  can  be  either  approved  or  disapproved 
by  the  final  Judge.  Now  suppose  he  dies  in  early  childhood. 
As  he  is  born  a  moral  agent,  a  subject  of  moral  government,  he 
will  exist  hereafter,  and  will  be  called  to  judgment  at  the  last 
day.     But  what  can  the  judgment  day  have  to  do  with  him  ? 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  267 

What  sentence,  either  favorable  or  unfavorable,  can  be  passed 
upon  him?  He  is  neither  righteous  nor  wicked,  —  neither  pure 
nor  impure ;  has  no  character,  and  is  in  no  moral  state, 
unless  a  change  has  taken  place  in  him  between  death  and 
judgment.  Accordingly  he  cannot  be  admitted  to  heaven, 
because  he  is  not  holy ;  nor  doomed  to  hell,  because  he  is  not 
sinful. 

Again  ;  if  man  is  not  the  subject  of  moral  depravity  from  the 
first,  then  there  is  a  period,  longer  or  shorter,  at  the  beginning 
of  life,  during  which  regeneration  is  not  necessary,  nor  even 
possible.  It  is  not  necessary,  because  there  is  no  impurity  to 
be  removed,  no  sinful  disposition  to  be  subdued,  no  moral  defi- 
ciency to  be  supplied.  And  as  to  the  holiness  which  God  re- 
quires,—  what  is  there  to  hinder  it  when  the  proper  time  for  it 
shall  arrive,  and  a  suitable  object  shall  be  presented  to  view  ? 
Evidently  there  can  be  no  need  of  the  renewal  of  the  heart  in 
order  to  the  exercise  of  holiness  ;  for  the  heart,  remaining  in  its 
native  state,  in  which  there  is  nothing  wrong,  will,  we  should 
think,  have  right  affections  when  it  has  any.  In  such  a  case 
how  is  regeneration  even  possible  ?  The  change  imphed  in  re- 
generation is  a  change  from  sin  to  holiness.  But  according  to 
the  supposition,  man,  at  that  period  of  his  existence,  neither  has 
nor  is  capable  of  having  anything  either  sinful  or  holy,  either 
morally  right  or  wrong.  So  that  to  suppose  a  change  from  the 
one  to  the  other  would  be  absurd.  And  if  no  moral  change  is 
necessary  or  conceivable  during  the  first  period  of  hfe,  then  it 
would  be  manifestly  unsuitable  to  pray  that  a  child  during  that 
period  may  have  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  to  sanctify  his  heart ; 
and  all  the  fervent,  agonizing  supplications  which  pious  parents 
have  offered  up  to  God,  that  their  infant  children  might  be  bom 
again,  and  so  fitted  for  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  have  resulted 
from  mistake,  and  have  been  in  vain. 

If  infant  children  are  the  subjects  of  no  depravity  and  no 
moral  deficiency,  —  if  they  are  in  no  sense  sinful ;  then  how  is 
their  state  different  ^m  what  it  would  have  been  if  Adam  had  not 
sinned  ?     And  what  is  the  meaning  of  Rom.  5  :  15  — 19.  which 


268  CONSEQUENCES     OF     DENYING 

in  different  forms  of  expression  sets  forth  the  important  effect  of 
Adam's  sin  upon  the  state  of  his  posterity  ? 

Further ;  if  the  children  of  men,  during  the  first  period  of 
their  Hfe,  have  no  depravity;  if  they  are  in  no  sense  to  be 
regarded  as  sinners  ;  then  how  are  they  capable  of  receiving 
the  special  benefits  of  Christ's  death  and  mediation  ?  And  if 
they  die  during  that  period  and  go  to  the  state  of  the  blessed, 
how  are  they  indebted  to  Christ  for  salvation  ?  He  died  for 
%inners.  He  came  to  seek  and  save  that  which  was  lost.  The 
Apostle  says,  "  if  one  died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead ;"  i.  e., 
dead  in  sin.  Thus  he  makes  the  design  of  Christ's  death  reach 
to  those,  and  those  only,  who  are  sinners,  or  in  a  state  of  spiritual 
death.  Accordingly  if  tliere  are  any  human  beings  who  are  not 
sinners,  for  fhe)n  Christ  did  not  die.  For,  unless  the  Apostle 
was  mistaken,  Christ's  dying  for  them  evinced  that  they  were 
sinners.  If  he  died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead.  It  would  be 
contrary  to  the  uniform  representation  of  God's  word  to  suppose, 
that  the  death  of  Christ,  or  the  redemption  which  he  accom- 
plishes, relates  to  any  who  are  not  sinners.  Theorizers  may  say 
what  they  will ;  this  plain  truth  will  come  out,  namely,  that  if  all 
those  who  die  during  the  first  stage  of  their  existence,  (and  a 
vast  multitude  they  are,)  die  without  any  sin,  they  are  saved, 
if  saved  at  all,  in  a  different  way  from  the  rest  of  mankind. 
They  owe  nothing  to  Christ  as  Redeemer.  He  did  not  die  for 
them.  And  they  can  never  join  in  the  song  of  the  redeemed ; 
"  Unto  him  that  loved  us,  and  washed  us  from  our  sins  in  his 
own  blood,  —  be  glory  and  dominion  forever  and  ever."  They 
can  never  sustain  the  same  relation  to  Christ  with  the  redeemed, 
:and  can  never  have  the  same  emotions  of  gratitude  to  him. 
The  two  great  blessings  which  flow  from  Christ's  work  as  Re- 
deemer, are  forgiveness  and  sanctificatioyi.  If  the  doctrine  of 
native  depravity  is  not  true,  those  who  die  in  infancy  are  in- 
capable of  receiving  either  of  these  blessings.  There  can  be 
no  forgiveness  where  there  is  no  guilt,  and  no  sanctification  where 
there  is  no  depravity  of  heart.  If  mankind  are  not  naturally 
depraved,  what  significancy  can  those  who  hold  to  the  baptism  of 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  269 

infant  children,  attribute  to  that  rite  ?  Would  it  not  be  totally 
unmeaning  ?  The  ordinance  of  baptism  is  commonly  understood 
to  denote  purification,  i.  e.,  spiritual  renewal,  either  as  already 
effected,  or  as  necessary.  But  the  baptism  of  infant  children 
could  not  have  any  significancy,  if  they  were  not  in  any  sense 
depraved.  And  if  any  one  who  denies  native  depravity  ad- 
ministers this  rite  to  children,  does  he  know  what  he  is  doing  ? 
He  may  pray  that  God  would  bless  the  children,  and  preserve 
their  life,  and  make  their  parents  faithful.  But  unless  he 
forgets  himself  and  his  piety  prevails  over  his  speculations, 
he  will  not  pray,  as  is  usual,  that  what  is  signified  by  the 
washing  of  water,  may  be  accomplished  in  the  souls  of  the 
children,  that  they  may  now  be  renewed  by  the  Spirit  and 
made  the  children  of  God,  and  that  whether  they  live  to  adult 
years  or  die  in  infancy,  they  may  thus  be  prepared  for  the 
kino-dom  of  heaven.  And  if  the  same  Christian  minister  is 
called  to  pray  for  infant  children  who  are  about  to  die,  he 
will  not, —  (unless  his  piety  prevails  over  his  speculations,)  — 
he  -will  not  earnestly  pray  that  they  may  be  renewed  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  that  the  blood  of  Christ  may  cleanse  them 
from  sin.  He  -will  not  look  to  redeeming  grace  to  save  them. 
Se  cannot  do  this  consistently  tvith  his  denial  of  native  de- 
pravity. We  have  witnessed  more  than  once,  how  a  minister 
who  has  renounced  this  doctrine  is  embarrassed  and  strait- 
ened, when  he  prays  for  infant  children,  either  publicly  or 
privately.  He  does  not  honestly  regard  them  and  feel  for 
them  as  belonging  to  the  ruined  race  of  man,  upon  whom 
death  and  the  sentence  of  condemnation  have  come  through 
the  offence  of  one  ;  and  he  does  not  pour  out  his  heart  to 
God  that  he  would  grant  them  the  blessings  of  redemption. 
He  does  not  commit  them  in  faith  to  the  Lamb  of  God 
that  taketh  away  sin.  Thus  does  vain  philosophy  turn  man 
aside  from  the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel,  and  check  the  spirit 
of  prayer,  and  chill  the  warmest  affections  of  the  soul. 

Such  as  I   have  now   described,  appear  to   me    to   be   con- 
sequences of  denying  the   native   depravity  of  man.      I   might 

23* 


270    CONSEQUENCES   OF   DENTING   DEPRAVITY,   ETC. 

mention  still  more.  Some  of  those  who  deny  this  doctrine,  are 
so  bold  and  independent  as  to  avow  these  consequences,  at 
least  the  most  important  of  them.  Now  in  view  of  these  con- 
sequences which  seem  plainly  to  flow  from  such  a  denial,  we 
shall  find  great  reason  to  be  jealous  over  ourselves  and  to  guard 
our  judgment,  our  imagination,  and  our  heart,  against  either 
neglecting  or  going  beyond  the  dictates  of  God's  holy  word. 


LE  CTURE    LXV. 


COMMON   OBJECTIONS   TO   NATIVE   DEPRAVITY  INADMISSIBLE. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  the  doctrine  of  man's  natural  de- 
pravity has  been  stated,  and  the  evidence  which  supports  it 
briefly  exhibited.  And  in  addition  to  this,  some  of  the  conse- 
quences of  denying  the  doctrine  have  been  adverted  to.  Be- 
fore leaving  the  subject  it  will  be  proper  to  examine  very  par- 
ticularly the  objections  which  are  commonly  urged  against  the 
doctrine.  But  before  entering  upon  this  examination,  let  us 
pause  a  little  and  inquire  into  the  nature  of  the  objections  usually 
brought  against  our  doctrine,  and  how  far  objections  of  this  kind 
are  worthy  of  our  serious  regard. 

I  cannot  but  think  that  we  are  in  danger  of  being  perplexed 
and  led  into  hurtful  mistakes  by  admitting  all  kinds  of  objections 
to  be  brought  against  a  Scripture  doctrine  and  allowing  them 
to  have  influence  upon  our  faith,  or  even  to  be  entitled  to  par- 
ticular consideration.  My  meaning  may  be  illustrated  by  an 
example.  A  man  is  tried  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  and  by 
evidence  which  is  clear,  abundant,  and  unquestionable,  is  proved 
to  be  guilty.  But  those  engaged  as  counsel  for  the  accused 
bring  forward  various  objections  to  the  fact  of  his  having  com- 
mitted the  deed.  They  argue,  first,  that  it  is  extremely  im- 
probable, and  even  incredible,  that  a  man  endued  with  reason 
and  conscience,  should  commit  such  a  crime ;  especially  that  a 
man,  endued  with  self-love,  and  a  desire  for  his  own  safety  and 
happiness,  should  commit  a  crime  which  would  certainly  expose 
him   to  ruin.      Secondly,  they   argue  that   it    is  specially  un- 


272  COMMON     OBJECTIONS     INADxMISSIBLE. 

reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  man  should  lay  violent  hands  upon 
the  wife  of  his  bosom,  the  mother  of  his  children,  and  long  the 
object  of  the  tenderest  affections  of  his  heart.  Thirdly,  they 
argue  that  the  man  had  a  good  education,  was  brought  up  in  a 
good  family,  was  esteemed  and  loved  by  his  friends,  and  knew 
the  happiness  of  domestic  and  social  life ;  and  that  he  had  long 
proved  himself  to  be  a  very  affectionate  husband ;  and  that  it 
cannot  be  supposed  that  he  should  voluntarily  break  all  the  ties 
which  bound  him  to  his  dearest  relatives,  and  sacrifice  all  the 
pleasure  he  might  enjoy  in  their  society  and  friendship.  Fourth- 
ly, they  say,  how  can  we  believe  that  a  benevolent  and  powerful 
God,  who  directs  and  controls  all  events,  would  give  a  man  up 
to  commit  a  crime  so  horrible  and  destructive,  or  that  a  just  and 
compassionate  God  would  suffer  a  harmless  and  lovely  wife  to 
fall  a  sacrifice  to  the  violence  of  her  husband  ?  These  and 
other  like  objections  are  urged  to  discredit  the  fact  proved,  and 
to  make  it  out  that  the  man  cannot  be  considered  as  guilty  of 
the  crime  laid  to  his  charge.  But  the  learned  and  upright 
judge  tells  the  advocates  for  the  accused,  that  their  arguments 
are  irrelevant  and  of  no  iveight ;  that  objections  of  such  a  kind 
are  wholly  inadmissible  in  a  Court  of  Justice.  He  says  to  them, 
have  you  anything  to  allege  against  the  character  of  the  wit- 
nesses, or  anything  to  invalidate  the  testimony  they  have  given  ? 
The  advocates  for  the  prisoner  at  the  bar  reply,  that  they  have 
nothing  in  particular  to  allege  in  that  w^ay,  but  that  they  verily 
think  the  witnesses  are  somehow  mistaken,  and  that  the  man 
cannot  be  guilty  of  such  a  crime.  The  judge  says  to  them ; 
^'  We  do  not  inquire  for  opinions,  but  for  facts.  These  specu- 
lative objections  which  you  urge  with  so  much  warmth,  have  no 
force,  being  mere  conjectures,  empty  7iotions,  ^natters  of  imagina- 
tion or  feeling,  which  are  set  aside  by  the  rules  of  justice.  The 
Court  cannot  consent  even  to  take  such  objections  into  consid- 
eration. They  are  inadmissible.  How  plausible  soever  they 
may  be,  they  can  avail  nothing  against  testimony  and  facts. 
They  are  excluded  by  the  laws  of  evidence." 

The   principle  involved  in   this   statement  is  of  great  impor- 


COMMON     OBJECTIONS     INADMISSIBLE.  273 

tance,  and  should  be  carefully  observed  in  regard  to  every 
doctrine  of  revelation  and  of  natural  religion.  When,  for  ex- 
ample, we  have  clear  and  conclusive  evidence,  from  within  or 
from  without,  of  the  hein(j  of  God,  of  his  providential  and  moral 
government,  and  of  the  truth  of  the  Jewish  and  Christian 
Scriptures  ;  we  believe  these  doctrines ;  and  we  believe  them 
confidently,  notwithstanding  any  objections  which  can  be  urged 
against  them.  But  suppose  the  objections  are  such  as  we  are 
not  able  to  obviate  ;  what  shall  we  say  then  ?  Our  reply  is  that 
the  objections  are  nothing  but  speculative  opinions,  the  product 
of  an  irregular  imagination,  perhaps  of  a  proud,  unsubdued  heart. 
And  what  can  such  objections  avail  in  opposition  to  legitimate 
evidence  and  plain  facts  ?  The  infidel  comes  forward  with 
arguments  against  the  existence  and  government  of  God.  Some 
of  his  arguments  are  such  that  we  arc  not  able  to  meet  them  and 
to  show  directly  that  they  have  no  force.  What  shall  we  do  ? 
Shall  we  allow  them  to  be  valid  ?  No  ;  we  say  they  are  inad- 
missible. Why  ?  Because  they  are  of  such  a  nature,  and  used 
for  such  a  purpose ;  —  because  they  are  mere  opinions,  dubious 
speculations,  and  are  arrayed  against  clear  evidence  and  well 
knotvn  facts.  The  Socinian  urges  a  multitude  of  difficulties  and 
objections  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Are  we  able  fully 
and  satisfactorily  to  remove  them  ?  No  ;  we  do  not  pretend  to 
this.  How  then  do  we  proceed  ?  We  hold  that  whatever  ob- 
jections and  difiiculties  may  be  insisted  upon  by  the  Socinian, 
they  are  made  up  of  mere  speculative  opinions  and  conjectures, 
and  cannot  be  admitted  to  have  any  weight  in  opposition  to  plain 
Scripture  evidence  ;  that,  having  satisfied  ourselves  that  the  Bible 
is  the  word  of  God,  our  great  inquiry  is,  whether  the  Bible 
teaches  the  doctrine,  not  whether  there  are  any  speculative 
difficulties  attending  it.  We  proceed  in  the  same  way  as  to  the 
atonement,  the  resurrection,  and  other  doctrines.  And  this  is 
the  only  safe  and  correct  mode  of  proceeding  in  regard  to  the 
subject  now  before  us.  The  doctrine  that  man  is  by  nature 
entirely  depraved,  is  supported  by  the  clearest  evidence  from  the 
word   of  God  and  from  obvious  facts.      Our  depravity  has  as 


274  COMMON     OBJECTIONS     INADMISSIBLE. 

many  marks  or  evidences  of  being  natural  as  any  of  the  attri- 
butes or  qualities  of  our  mind.  First ;  it  is  universal.  Sec- 
ondly ;  it  shows  itself  very  early,  —  i.  e.,  just  as  soon  as  we 
become  capable  of  acting  it  out.  Thirdly ;  it  cannot  be  attri- 
buted to  any  change  which  takes  place  in  man  subsequently  to 
his,  birth.  Fourthly  ;  it  operates  spontaneously,  like  other  natu- 
ral quahties.  Fifthly  ;  it  is  hard  to  be  resisted  and  subdued. 
Sixthly  ;  such  obviously  is  the  nature  and  condition  of  mankind, 
that  we  can  certainly  predict  that  all  who  are  born  into  the  world 
during  the  present  and  every  future  generation,  will  sin,  and 
sin  only  through  their  whole  moral  existence,  unless  they  are 
created  anew  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  These  marks  of  native  de- 
pravity are  presented  before  us  by  the  word  of  God  and  by 
observation  and  experience.  I  hold  that  this  evidence  is  suf- 
ficient to  establish  the  doctrine.  Any  objection  in  order  to  be 
valid,  must  lie  against  this  evidence.  But  if  no  one  can  show 
any  fault  in  the  evidence,  the  doctrine  is  proved.  If  any  one 
affirms  that  the  evidence  is  defective,  let  him  show  wherein  it  is 
defective.  What  better  evidence,  nay,  what  other  evidence  could 
the  doctrine  have,  supposing  it  to  be  true  ?  Review  the  whole 
argument  again,  and  examine  every  part  of  it  with  still  greater 
care.  Take  each  of  the  marks  of  native  depravity  above  men- 
tioned by  itself,  and  see  whether  it  is  not  as  clear  an  evidence 
as  you  could  reasonably  expect  to  find,  on  the  supposition  that 
our  doctrine  is  true.  Depravity  is  universaL  Now  could  it  be 
more  evidently  universal,  if  it  actually  belonged  to  the  moral 
nature  of  man  from  the  beginning  ?  It  shoivs  itself  early.  If 
it  were  in  fact  a  native  quahty,  could  it  show  itself  earlier  than 
it  now  does  ?  Does  it  not  take  the  very  first  opportunity  which 
the  state  of  the  body  and  mind  aifords,  to  act  itself  out  ?  And 
does  it  not,  as  it  were,  press  for  such  an  opportunity,  even  before 
the  season  for  moral  action  fully  arrives  ?  Does  not  the  principle 
of  evil  thrust  itself  out  in  a  partial  and  broken  manner,  before 
a  capacity  exists  for  any  more  perfect  forms  of  transgression  ?* 

*  "  In  combatting  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  Mr.  Locke,  following  Aristotle, 


COMMON     OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE.  275 

Again ;  ynoral  evil  in  man  is  not  owing  to  any  cJiange  which 
takes  place  in  his  disposition  or  character  subsequently  to  his  birth. 
If  this  is  true,  is  it  not  a  clear  proof  that  depravity  is  a  natural, 
original  property  of  man  ?  Most  evidently  moral  depravity  be- 
longs to  him  aftenvards,  when  he  becomes  capable  of  showing 
what  he  is.  Now  if  he  afterwards  has  a  depraved  disposition, 
and  if  no  change  takes  place  in  his  disposition  subsequently  to 
his  birth,  then  this  depravity  of  nature  belongs  to  him  from  the 
first.  Is  not  this  evident  ?  It  is  true  that  our  first  parent^  were 
depraved.  But  the  Scriptures  show  that  their  depravity  implied 
a  change  in  their  moral  state.  At  first  they  were  obedient  and 
holy.  After  a  time  they  disobeyed.  That  act  of  disobedience 
was  their  fall.  Before  that  they  stood.  They  were  upright. 
The  act  of  sin  mentioned  was  their  first  sin.  Accordingly  we 
never  say  that  their  depravity  was  natural.  If  they  had  pos- 
sessed the  same  disposition  from  the  first,  as  they  showed  when 
they  disobeyed  the  divine  command ;  if  that  disobedience  had 
been  only  the  acting. out  of  a  heart  which  had  always  been 
disinclined  to  obey  God ;  we  should  say  their  sinfulness  was 
natural,  that  they  commenced  their  existence  in  a  state  of  moral 
depravity.  There  is  however  clear  evidence  that  this  was  not 
the  case.  But  how  is  it  with  their  posterity  ?  Is  there  any 
evidence  that  their  first  state  is  a  state  of  moral  purity  ?  that 
they  are  originally  inclined  to  good  ?     What  evidence  should  we 


has  compared  the  human  mind  to  a  sheet  of  white  paper,  on  which  characters 
of  different  descriptions  may  subsequently  be  written.  By  those  philosophers 
who  deny  the  innate  depravity  of  human  nature,  the  comparison  has  frequently 
been  applied  to  the  mind  in  regard  to  its  moral  state,  its  dispositions  and  ten- 
dencies. It  will  be  a  juster  comparison,  if,  in  this  respect,  we  liken  the  mind  to 
a  sheet  of  paper  on  which  have  been  written  characters  in  sympathetic  ink,  which 
are  not  discernible  by  the  eye,  till,  by  approximation  to  the  fire,  or  by  some  ap- 
propriate chemical  application,  they  arc  brought  out  into  legible  distinctness.  So 
is  it  with  the  principles  of  evil  in  infancy.  We  may  not,  for  a  time,  be  sensible 
of  their  presence ;  and  may  be  delighted  with  the  smiling  harmlessncss  of  the 
little  babe.  But  the  principles  are  there;  and  require  oidy  the  influence  of  cir- 
cumstances to  bring  them  into  practical  and  visible  manifestation,  a  manifestation 
which,  to  the  eye  of  even  a  superficial  observer,  commences  at  a  very  early 
period."     Wardtaw^s  Christian  Ethics,  p.  98.    London  Ed. 


276  COMMON     OBJECTIONS     INADMISSIBLE. 

expect  if  this  were  actually  the  case  ?  We  should  expect  the 
evidence  of  facts.  We  should  expect  to  see  a  natural  inclination 
to  good  unfolded  in  acts  of  goodness,  as  soon  as  men  are  capable 
of  such  acts.  We  should  expect  to  see  an  early  development 
of  those  right  feelings  which  are  the  first  principles  of  holiness, 
— just  such  a  development  as  teas  77iade  by  the  child  Jesus  ;  I 
add,  and  such  as  was  first  made  by  Adam  and  Eve.  Jesus  be- 
gan his  existence  as  a  man  in  a  state  of  perfect  moral  purity. 
His  nature  was  holy  from  the  first,  and  he  acted  out  that  pure 
and  holy  nature  very  early,  in  the  way  of  loving  and  obeying 
God.  The  good  tree  bore  good  fruit.  This  was  the  visible  evi- 
dence he  gave  of  his  native  purity,  —  his  original  disposition  to 
goodness.  It  was  just  such  evidence  as  would  naturally  be  ex- 
pected. And  it  is  what  we  should  now  expect  of  human  beings 
generally,  if  they  were  born  in  a  state  of  moral  purity,  —  unless 
they  were  corrupted  after  they  were  born,  and  before  they  were 
capable  of  visible  moral  actions.  But  do  the  children  of  men 
show  any  such  signs  that  they  have  a  nature  originally  pure 
and  holy  ?  Or  do  the  Scriptures  teach  that  they  have  ?  I  de- 
mand then  of  any  who  assert  the  native  purity  of  man,  that 
they  produce  some  plain  proof  of  such  purity.  And  if  there  is 
no  proof  of  this,  then  clearly  there  is  no  proof  that  any  moral 
change  takes  place  in  man  after  his  birth,  in  order  to  his  being 
depraved.  If  it  is  said,  as  it  is  said  by  Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Dr. 
Ware,  that  we  are  originally  without  any  moral  bias  one  way  or 
the  other,  —  neither  inclined  nor  disinclined  to  holiness  or  to  sin, 
—  that  we  are  perfectly  neutral  ;  here  again  I  look  for  evidence. 
"What  proof  might  we  naturally  and  justly  expect,  were  this  the 
fact  ?  If  the  minds  of  men  were  at  first  as  much  inclined  one 
way  as  the  other,  certainly  we  should  expect  they  would  show^ 
this.  If  in  some  circumstances,  that  is,  in  circumstances 
strongly  tempting  and  urging  them  to  sin,  they  were  to  bend 
one  way ;  in  other  circumstances  as  strongly  urging  them  to 
holiness,  we  should  expect  they  would  bend  the  other  way.  But 
our  expectation  would  be  sadly  disappointed.  For  the  children 
of  men,  whom  the  writers  above  named  suppose  to  be  equally 


COMMON    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE.  277 

inclined  both  ways  do  all  actually  incline  one  way  and  that  the 
wrong  way ;  —  all  of  them,  as  soon  as  they  are  capable,  yield 
themselves  servants  to  sin; — Jesus  only  excepted, —  not  one 
of  the  "whole  race,  unless  born  again,  ever  inclines  to  the  way  of 
holiness.  I  say  then,  there  is  no  such  evidence  as  we  should  nat- 
urally look  for,  to  prove  that  men  commence  their  existence  in  an 
indiflferent,  neutral  state,  inclined  neither  one  way  nor  the  other. 
Of  course  there  is  no  evidence  against  the  common  position,  that 
the  depravity  which  shows  itself  in  early  life  is  natural  to  man  ; 
as  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  is  the  result  of  a  change 
either  from  an  original  state  of  holiness,  or  from  a  neutral  state. 
The  evidence  in  favor  of  our  position  is  then,  in  this  respect,  sub- 
ject to  no  abatement ;  nor  is  it  conceivable  how  it  could  be  great- 
er than  it  is. 

Another  evidence  before  mentioned  in  favor  of  considering  our 
depravity  native,  is,  that  it  operates  spontaneously.  It  operates 
thus  in  early  life,  and  ever  afterwards.  Is  not  this  such  evidence 
as  we  should  naturally  look  for  to  prove  human  depravity  to  be 
natural  ?  Is  it  not  the  same  proof  that  we  have  that  other  things 
are  natural  ?  Does  not  this  principle  of  evil  which  we  have  in  our 
hearts,  operate  as  freely  and  spontaneously  as  any  of  our  bodily 
appetites  ?  Does  it  not  manifest  as  much  intrinsic  force,  as  much 
impulse  to  action,  as  what  we  call  natural  affection  ?  And  does  it 
not  manifest  this  as  early  as  the  state  of  the  body  and  mind  will 
allow  ?  Now  supposing  our  depravity  to  be  natural,  could  we  in 
this  respect  look  for  any  greater  evidence  of  its  being  so  than  we 
have  ?  Is  it  conceivable  that  a  heart  really  depraved  from  the 
first,  could  act  out  its  depravity  more  spontaneously,  more  prompt- 
ly, or  under  less  force  of  temptation,  in  early  life  and  afterwards, 
than  the  heart  of  man  actually  does  ? 

Farther ;  depra^^ty  has  the  same  mark  of  being  natural,  with 
other  things  commonly  considered  as  natural,  in  this  respect  also, 
that  it  is  hard  to  he  resisted  and  overcome.  Is  not  this  one  of  the 
marks  which  we  should  expect  to  find,  supposing  our  depravity  to 
be  natural  ?  And  so  far  as  this  is  concerned,  is  there  any  defect 
in  the  evidence  ?     Is  there  any  instance  among  human  beings, 

24 


278  COMMOX    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE. 

even  among  those  who  attend  to  religion  in  very  early  life,  in 
which  the  principle  of  evil  in  the  heart  is  easily  subdued?  Is 
there  any  instance  in  which  it  is  overcome  and  eradicated  without 
immense  labor  and  difficulty  ?  Yea,  is  it  ever  overcome  without 
the  almighty  help  of  God's  Spirit  ?  On  supposition  that  depravi- 
ty does  really  belong  to  our  moral  nature  from  the  beginning,  can 
we  conceive  that  it  would  require  more  earnest  or  more  lasting 
effort,  or  more  divine  help,  to  overcome  it,  than  is  found  to  be 
necessary  now  in  the  experience  of  Christians  ?  In  this  respect 
then,  could  any  one  demand  greater  evidence  than  we  actually 
have,  that  our  doctrine  is  true  ? 

There  is  still  another  point,  namely ;  such  is  the  nature  of  man, 
— such  the  state  in  which  human  beings  are  born,  that  ive  can  cer- 
tainly predict  that  they  will  all  sin,  and  only  sin,  unless  they  are 
horn  again.  Is  there  any  defect  in  this  evidence  of  native  cor- 
ruption ?  Does  not  the  circumstance  that  we  can  certainly  foretell 
what  will  be  the  moral  development  of  the  mind  in  every  one  of 
our  race,  imply  that  the  original  state  of  the  mind  is  disordered  ? 
In  this  matter  we  do  not  wait  for  development.  We  do  not  wait 
for  a  single  action  or  motion  of  a  new  born  child.  As  soon  as  we 
see  a  human  being,  though  at  the  very  beginning  of  life,  we 
know  that  such  a  being  will  sin.  Does  not  this  imply  that  we 
know  what  sort  of  a  being  he  is  ?  But  how  do  we  know  this  ? 
Why,  how  do  we  know  that  a  young  grape-vine  will  bear  grapes, 
and  that  a  young  fig-tree  will  bear  figs  ?  And  how  do  we  know 
that  a  young  thorn-bush  wiU  bear  thorn-berries,  and  not  oranges  ? 
And  how  do  we  know  that  a  young  lion  will  be  fierce  and  carni- 
vorous ?  And  how  do  we  know  that  a  new  born  child  will  think  and 
remember  and  feel  ?  We  know  it  from  uniform  experience.  And 
is  not  experience  just  as  uniform  in  regard  to  sin  ?  Accordingly, 
we  know  that  every  human  being  will  sin,  as  certainly  as  we  know 
what  will  take  place  in  any  of  the  other  instances  above  men- 
tioned. Have  we  not  then,  in  this  respect,  the  highest  possible 
evidence  that  man's  moral  nature  is  from  the  first  depraved  ? 
Does  not  this  perfect  uniformity  of  effects  indicate  a  settled  con- 
stitution of  things,  —  a  uniform  cause  ?      Is  not  this  a  maxim 


COMMON    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE.  279 

"with  all  sober  men,  both  as  to  the  physical  and  moral  world  ? 
Does  any  one  doubt  the  conclusion  and  say,  it  may  he,  after  all, 
that  something  different  will  result  from  the  nature  or  state  of 
mind  ivhieh  man  originally  has.  Children  are  born  intelligent, 
free,  onoral  agents.  Noiv  it  may  he  that  some  of  them  will  avoid 
sin  and  he  completely  holy,  as  Jesus  was.  It  may  be  that  some 
change  of  circumstances  will  lead  to  this.  It  7nay  be  that  some  of 
these  millions  of  free  agents  tvill  give  a  right  direction  to  their  ra- 
tional and  moral  powers,  and  by  a  sinless  life,  show  that  they  had 
no  sinfulness  of  nature.  It  may  be  that  some  of  these  trees  mil 
bear  good  fruit,  and  tvill  thus  manifest  that  they  are  good  trees. 
If  any  of  you  think  that  this  may  be  the  case,  or  if  you  have 
doubts  on  the  subject,  then  wait  and  see.  Let  future  experience 
solve  your  doubts.  If  you  find  that  any  of  the  descendants  of 
Adam,  in  any  circumstances,  are  not  sinners  —  if  you  find  that 
any  of  the  multitude  who  are  now  in  infancy,  or  any  who  shall 
be  bom  hereafter,  are  free  from  sin,  if  you  find  any  one,  who 
without  being  born  again,  has  any  degree  of  holiness ;  then  I  will 
acknowledge  that  the  evidence  here  presented  is  defective.  The 
efifects,  if  not  perfectly  uniform,  could  not  be  considered  as  pro- 
ceeding from  the  uniform  cause  above  mentioned,  i.  e.  the  original 
state  of  the  human  mind,  or  the  moral  nature  of  man.  But  as 
all  past  experience  has  been  uniform,  we  must  consider  the  argu- 
ment good,  imtil  future  experience  shall  furnish  some  exception. 
If  one  single  exception  shall  ever  be  made;  if  there  is  ever 
found,  even  in  the  millennium,  a  single  son  or  daughter  of  Adam 
who,  without  being  changed  by  the  Divine  Spirit,  shall  love  and 
obey  God  ;  then  and  only  then  will  it  be  evident  that  the  argu- 
ment here  used  is  not  conclusive.  And  if  future  experience 
should  prove  the  argument  inconclusive,  how  could  we  support 
the  credit  of  the  holy  Scriptures  ? 

As  to  the  evidence  from  the  Scriptures,  I  put  the  same  ques- 
tion. Is  there  any  defect  in  it  ?  Take  the  passages  separately 
and  together.  Do  they  not  teach  as  clearly  as  any  language 
could  teach,  that  the  character  which  we  have  by  nature,  or  in 
consequence  of  our  natural  birth,  is  such  that  we  cannot  be  ad- 


280  COMMON     OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE. 

mitted  into  heaven,  without  being  changed  by  the  Spirit  of  God  ? 
No  words  could  more  certainly  show  that  we  have,  while  unre- 
newed, a  sinful  character  ;  or  that  this  character  comes  in  conse- 
quence of  our  natural  birth.  No  words  could  more  certainly 
show  that  we  are  depraved  by  nature.  The  texts  need  not  be 
repeated.  I  contend  that  the  Scriptures  clearly  teach  the  com- 
mon doctrine,  and  that  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  how  they  could 
teach  it  more  clearly. 

I  make  the  appeal  then  to  those  who  love  the  truth,  and  who 
are  accustomed  to  use  their  reason,  and  to  judge  according  to  ev- 
idence. Is  there  any  flaw  in  the  argument  by  which  the  doctrine 
is  supported  ?  Is  there  any  mistake  in  the  facts  which  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  the  reasoning  ?  Is  not  the  fact  in  each  case  such, 
both  in  regard  to  nature  and  degree,  as  I  have  represented  ? 
And  does  not  each  fact  contain  evidence  which  bears  directly  up- 
on the  question  at  issue  ?  I  ask  then,  is  the  evidence  which  has 
been  adduced,  defective  ?  Wherein  does  it  fail  ?  But  if  you 
have  nothing  to  offer  against  the  evidence  of  the  doctrine,  showing 
that  it  is  in  some  way  faulty  or  inconclusive  ;  then,  according  to 
the  rules  of  reasoning,  you  must  acknowledge  that  the  doctrine  is 
established. 

The  objections  which  are  most  frequently  urged  against  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity,  and  which  have  the  greatest  weight 
in  the  minds  of  men,  are  of  such  a  kind,  that  they  may  be  dis- 
missed at.  071CQ  as  umvorthy  of  regard.  They  are  of  no  weight  in 
respect  to  the  point  at  issue.  Consisting  as  they  do  of  specula- 
tions, abstract  reasonings,  conjectures  and  cavils,  they  can  never 
avail  anything  against  the  evidence  of  facts.  Let  these  objec- 
tions be  multiplied  a  hundred  fold  ;  if  arrayed  against  clear,  un- 
impeachable evidence  —  evidence  which  is  addressed  to  common 
sense,  and  such  as  is  acknowledged  in  all  other  cases  to  be  con- 
clusive ;  we  fling  them  to  the  winds.  An  objection  is  stated. 
We  say,  we  have  clear,  conclusive  evidence  of  the  fact.  Anoth- 
er objection  is  stated,  and  another,  and  another.  We  meet  them 
with  the  same  reply,  that  we  have  clear  evidence  of  the  fact. 
You  may  allege,  that  we  cannot  reconcile  native  depravity  either 


COMMON    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE.  281 

with  the  benevolence  of  God,  or  with  his  justice,  or  with  our  free 
moral  agency  and  accountability.  Well,  suppose  we  cannot  rec- 
oncile these  things.  Does  it  follow  that  God  cannot?  Are  we 
equal  to  God  ?  And  because  we  are  now  unable  to  reconcile 
these  things,  does  it  follow  that  we  shall  always  be  unable  ?  Be 
it  so,  that  we  are  wholly  unable  to  reconcile  our  native  depravity 
with  the  divine  benevolence  or  justice.  Wliat  does  this  inability, 
or  more  properly  what  does  this  ignorance  of  ours  weigh  against 
clear  evidence  of  the  fact  ?  Be  it  so,  that  we  cannot  reconcile 
our  doctrine  with  our  moral  agency  and  accountabihty,  or  the 
principles  of  a  righteous  moral  government.  What  does  our  igno- 
rance in  this  respect  weigh  against  a  plain  matter  of  fact  ?  If 
our  ignorance,  or  the  objections  and  difficulties  which  arise  from 
our  ignorance,  are  to  be  regarded  as  valid  arguments,  if  they 
are  sufficient  to  outweigh  clear  evidence,  and  to  disprove  well  nt- 
tested  facts ;  then  we  can  disprove  the  Scripture  account  of  the 
creation,  the  deluge,  and  the  destruction  of  Sodom  ;  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity,  the  atonement  of  Christ,  the  influence  of  the 
Spirit,  the  resurrection,  future  punishment,  and  most  of  the  doc- 
trines of  revelation.  And  in  the  same  way,  we  can  disprove  well 
known  facts  in  regard  to  the  magnetic  power,  the  growth  of  a 
tree,  the  operations  of  mind  both  awake  and  asleep,  and  number- 
less things  which  occur  in  our  daily  experience  ;  yea,  we  can 
disprove  the  existence  of  God,  and  all  the  doctrines  of  natural 
rehgion.  For  we  can  ask  questions  in  regard  to  each  of  these, 
which  no  man  can  answer.  We  can  bring  forward  objections  and 
difficulties  which  no  man  can  solve.  But  what  do  these  un- 
answerable objections  and  these  insolvable  dfficulties  prove  ? 
they  prove  our  ignorance,  and  should  make  us  very  humble. 
But  they  can  never  be  admitted  as  valid  arguments  against  obvi- 
ous and  well  attested  facts. 

The  remarks  I  have  made  involve  a  principle  of  great  prac- 
tical importance.  We  are  often  employed  in  attempting  to 
answer  the  speculative  objections  which  are  urged  against  the 
doctrine  of  natural  depravity  and  other  important  articles  of  our 
faith.  And  we  sometimes  proceed  in  such  a  manner  as  seems  to 
24* 


282  COMMON    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE. 

imply,  that  we  cannot  consistently  hold  the  doctrines  of  religion, 
unless  all  objections  and  difficulties  are  removed  ;  and  we  labor 
bard  and  spend  much  precious  time  in  endeavoring  to  remove 
them.  But  this  is  needless.  These  speculative  objections  may 
be  dismissed  at  once  as  of  no  weight  —  as  totally  inadmissible. 
What  are  empty  notions,  imaginations,  surmises,  dreams,  origi- 
nating in  minds  disordered  and  dark,  and  what  are  complaints 
and  cavils,  originating  in  proud  unbelieving  hearts,  that  they 
should  avail  any  thing  in  opposition  to  clear  evidence  and 
fact  ?  When  we  have  looked  at  the  evidence  furnished  by 
the  word  and  providence  of  God,  and  find  Avhat  is  the  fact,  our 
great  business  as  inquirers  after  the  truth  is  at  an  end,  and  our 
faith  settled.  And  if  any  one  comes  forward,  not  to  show  any 
want  of  clearness  or  conclusiveness  in  the  evidence  we  produce, 
or  any  flaw  in  our  arguments,  but  to  bring  speculative  objections 
and  cavils  against  a  Scrijjture  doctrine  —  a  well  established  truth  ; 
the  Apostle  has  taught  us  how  to  meet  him  :  "  Who  art  thou,  0 
man,  that  repliest  against  God  ?  "  We  prove  the  doctrine  of 
divine  purposes,  by  clear,  indisputable  arguments,  drawn  from 
reason  and  Scripture.  Now  if  the  objector  passes  by  all  this 
evidence,  which  is  the  very  thing  he  is  concerned  with,  and  goes 
to  finding  fault  with  the  doctriyie  itself^  he  replies  against  God. 
He  is  a  caviller.  We  prove  that  all  men  are  naturally  depraved 
—  sinners  from  the  first,  and  that  they  are  so  in  consequence  of 
the  original  apostasy  ;  that  they  are  constituted  sinners  by  the 
■one  offence  of  Adam.  We  prove  this  doctrine  by  the  plainest 
and  most  conclusive  evidence.  The  objector  neglects  this  evi- 
dence, and  disputes  against  the  doctrine  itself — against  that 
which  the  word  of  God  and  facts  clearly  teach.  He  too  is  a 
caviller.  He  replies  against  God.  He  finds  fault  with  God's 
appointment  and  the  mode  of  his  operation,  and  says,  it  is  unjust. 
He  says,  if  this  is  God's  constitution,  then  we  are  not  culpable 
for  our  sinfulness  ;  and  to  punish  us  would  be  unrighteous.  Now 
when  it  comes  to  this,  I  have  only  one  answer  to  repeat,  the  an- 
swer of  Paul  to  the  caviller  of  his  day  :  "  Who  art  thou,  0  man, 
that  repliest  against  God  ?     Shall  the  thing  formed  say  to  him 


COMMON    OBJECTIONS    INADMISSIBLE.  283 

that  formed  it,  Why  hast  thou  made  me  thus  ?  Hath  not  the 
potter  power  over  the  clay  ?  "  —  Who  art  thou  that  demandest 
the  reasons  of  God's  unsearchable  dispensations  ?  Docs  it  belong 
to  thee  to  give  counsel  to  the  only  wise  God,  or  to  pronounce  judg- 
ment on  his  waj'S  ?  Does  it  become  an  ignorant,  guilty  man  to 
say  to  the  Almighty,  "  What  doest  thou  ?  "  Shall  the  infinite 
God  ask  such  a  one  as  thou  art,  what  will  be  proper  for  him  to  do 
in  creating  a  world  and  in  fixing  the  condition  of  his  creatures  ? 
Has  he  not  wisdom  enough  without  coming  to  be  instructed  by 
thee  ?  Has  he  not  justice  and  benevolence  enough  without  being 
prompted  by  thee  ?  And  is  he  not  powerful  enough  without  bor- 
rowing strength  of  thee  ?   Who  art  tliou  that  repliest  against  God  ? 


LECTURE    LXVI 


OBJECTIONS   TO   NATIVE   DEPRAVITY   PARTICULARLY   EXAMINED. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  it  has,  I  think,  been  made  to  appear 
that  the  objections  commonly  brought  against  the  doctrine  of  de- 
pravity, directed  as  they  are,  not  against  the  evidence  by  which 
the  doctrine  is  supported,  but  against  the  doctrine  itself,  are 
totally  inadmissible.  The  great  question  at  issue  is,  whether  the 
doctrine  is  true,  not  whether  it  is  attended  with  difficulties ;  — 
whether  it  is  proved  by  sufficient  evidence,  not  whether,  being 
thus  proved,  it  is  liable  to  objections  from  the  ignorance,  or  pride, 
or  ingenuity  of  man.  Even  should  the  objections  be  unanswerable, 
they  cannot  be  allowed  to  have  any  weight  against  a  doctrine 
which  rests  on  clear,  abundant,  and  unquestionable  evidence. 
Accordingly  I  might  claim  the  right  of  stopping  here,  resting  the 
truth  of  the  doctrine  on  the  direct  arguments  which  have  been 
urged  in  its  favor,  and  leaving  objections  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves. This  would  in  itself  be  right.  And  nothing  more  can  be 
deemed  necessary,  when  the  doctrine  is  held  forth  merely  for 
common,  practical  purposes.  There  is  even  an  injury  to  be  ap- 
prehended from  an  attempt  to  obviate  metaphysical  objections  and 
difficulties  before  those  who  are  not  capable  of  understanding  met- 
aphysical discussion. 

But  inasmuch  as  objections  have  been  continually  urged  by 
learned  and  able  disputants,  and  as  these  objections  are  of  such 
a  nature  as  may  occasion  doubt  and  perplexity  to  sincere  Chris- 
tians, and  to  those  who  are  engaged  professionally  in  the  study 


OBJECTIONS   EXAMINED.  285 

of  theology,  and  may  greatly  diminish  the  salutary  influence  of 
divine  truth,  I  have  thought  it  expedient  to  bring  the  chief  of 
them  under  a  more  extended  review.  If  I  succeed  in  detecting 
the  fallacy  of  the  principles  wliich  the  objections  involve,  or  in 
showing  that,  however  plausible,  they  have  httle  or  no  weight, 
and  do  not  disprove  the  truth  of  the  doctrine ;  I  shall  do  all  that 
the  case  requires. 

The  first  objection  that  I  shall  now  more  particularly  examine, 
relates  to  tlie  moral  perfections  of  Grod.  It  is  alleged  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  holiness  and  benevolence  of  God,  and  even  with 
his  justice,  to  bring  men  into  existence  destitute  of  that  holiness 
which  is  essential  to  their  well-being,  and  in  such  a  state  of  de- 
pravity as  will  certainly  lead  on  to  a  life  of  sin  and  an  eternity  of 
misery  unless  redeeming  grace  prevent,  and  to  involve  the  whole 
human  race  in  this  dreadful  calamity  on  account  of  the  one  of- 
fence of  their  first  father. 

This  objection  I  have  already  briefly  noticed.  But  I  shall  now 
present  it  in  a  varied  form,  and  subject  it  to  a  more  particular  ex- 
amination. 

With  our  very  limited  faculties,  and  especially  while  those  fac- 
ulties are  so  disordered  by  sin,  we  are  by  no  means  competent  to 
determine  what  is  or  is  not  consistent  with  the  moral  attributes 
of  God,  except  as  we  are  instructed  by  his  word  and  providence. 
"  Who  hath  known  the  mind  of  the  Lord  ?  Who  hath  been,"  and 
■who  is  quaUfied  to  be,  "  his  counsellor  ?  "  In  regard  to  the  plan 
of  creation  and  providence,  who  is  qualified  to  tell  God  what  will 
be  fit  and  what  will  be  unfit  for  him  to  do  ?  Wliat  means  have 
we  of  determining  beforehand  in  what  manner  infinite  perfection 
will  be  developed,  what  scheme  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  will 
adopt,  and  how  that  scheme  can  best  be  carried  into  execution  ? 
In  order  to  judge  on  such  a  subject,  we  must  have  an  under- 
standing, capable  of  taking  into  view  and  knowing  perfectly  the 
whole  extent  of  a  created  universe,  and  all  its  operations  and 
results  through  endless  duration ;  whereas  we  are  not  able  per- 
fectly to  know  the  smallest  part  of  it,  even  at  the  present  time. 
Before  the  incomprehensible  greatness  of  such  an  object  as  the 


OBJECTIONS     EXAMINED. 

universe,  even  that  inconsiderable  part  of  it  to  which  we  belong, 
we  are  constrained  to  say,  "  We  are  of  yesterday  and  know  noih- 
ingy  An  ability  to  judge  on  this  subject  would  moreover  imply 
a  comprehensive  and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  infinite  perfections 
of  God  ;  because  the  whole  system  of  creation  and  providence 
must  be  considered  as  standing  in  a  most  intimate  relation  to  the 
divine  perfections,  as  entirely  corresponding  with  them,  and  as 
suited  most  clearly  to  make  them  known  to  intelligent  creatures. 
This  view  of  the  subject  is  suited  to  cure  our  pride  and  arrogance, 
and  to  make  us  feel  that  we  are  to  occupy  the  place  of  learners, 
not  of  judges. 

What  then  is  the  position  which  we  are  to  take  ?  As  rational 
creatures,  with  the  works  and  word  of  our  Creator  before  us,  and 
with  the  idea  of  his  infinite  perfection  within  us,  what  have  we  to 
do  ?  Not  surely  to  settle  the  question  whether  God  is  infinitely 
wise  and  good,  but  to  inquire  how  this  infinitely  wise  and  good 
being  has  made  Jiimself  known ;  not  what  he  could  consistently 
do.,  but  what  he  has  done  ;  not  what  his  plan  of  operation  should 
be,  but  what  it  is.  There  is  nothing  within  the  province  of  our 
intelligence  which  we  know  more  certainly  than  this,  that  whatev- 
er God  does  is  right.  So  far  then  as  we  can  determine  what 
Crod  does,  we  can  determine  what  is  right.  As  soon  as  we  come 
to  know  what  the  manner  of  God's  acting  is,  either  in  creation  or 
providence,  that  moment  we  know  what  agrees  with  infinite  wis- 
dom and  benevolence.  This  is  true  in  respect  to  everything 
which  God  accomphshes  in  the  whole  compass  of  his  agency. 
Viewed  in  the  light  in  which  God  views  it,  and  in  relation  to  the 
mode  of  bis  operation  and  to  the  ends  which  he  aims  at,  it  is 
right.  And  as  soon  as  we  know  in  any  case  what  the  divine  con- 
duct is,  though  we  may  be  totally  unable  to  understand  in  what 
particular  light  God  regards  it,  or  what  particular  ends  he  means 
to  subserve  by  it,  we  beheve  and  know  that  it  is  right.  But 
why  do  we  believe  this  ?  and  how  do  we  know  it  ?  We  believe 
and  know  it  to  be  right  merely  because  God  does  it.  Our  conclu- 
sion results  from  our  full  confidence  in  God.  Suppose  that 
Abraham,  not  yet  informed  of  God's  intentions  respecting  Sodom, 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  287 

inquires  with  himself ;  "  What  ought  to  be  clone  and  what  will  a 
righteous  God  do  with  thai  guilty  city?"  He  cannot  answer 
the  question.  Suppose  the  inquiry  arises  in  his  mind,  whether 
God  will  destroy  the  city  and  all  its  inhabitants,  both  old  and 
young,  with  a  sudden  and  dreadful  destruction  ;  he  cannot  an- 
swer ;  or  perhaps  he  may  say,  "  Far  be  it  from  a  God  of  infinite 
mercy  to  do  this."  But  the  moment  he  sees  that  God  has  done 
it,  or  knows  that  he  will  do  it,  he  says,  it  is  right.  And  if  any 
one  had  said  to  him  :  "  Do  you  think  that  your  God  and  the  God 
of  your  seed  will  command  you  to  offer  up  your  son  Isaac  as  a 
sacrifice  ?  "  he  would  probably  have  answered,  "  No  ;  a  holy  and 
merciful  and  covenant-keeping  God  can  never  do  this."  But 
what  does  he  do  when  God  actually  commands  it  ?  Does  he  hes- 
itate and  inquire  how  it  can  be  consistent  with  the  holiness  and 
goodness  and  faithfulness  of  God  ?  No  ;  he  instantly  acquiesces, 
and  proceeds  to  do  what  is  commanded.  He  has  confidence  in 
God,  and  believes  and  knows  that  his  command  is  right. 

This  is  the  principle  on  which  the  Apostle  proceeds  in  Rom.  9. 
He  shows  what  is  the  actual  conduct  of  God  in  saving  some  and 
not  saving  others ;  in  making  some  vessels  of  mercy,  and  others 
vessels  of  wrath.  He  brings  to  view  an  important  fact  in  the  di- 
vine administration.  Some  call  in  question  the  propriety  of  this, 
and  object.  But  Paul  allows  no  objection  to  he  brought.  He 
does  not  allow  men  to  put  the  question ;  "  Why  doth  God  then 
find  fault  ?  "  He  shows  them  that  it  is  altogether  unbecoming 
for  them  to  reply  against  God,  or  to  call  in  question  the  righteous- 
ness of  his  dispensations.  He  rebukes  them.  The  principle  he 
adopts  is,  that  we  are  to  have  perfect  confidence  in  God  ;  that  as 
soon  as  we  know  what  he  does,  we  must  be  satisfied  that  it  is 
right. 

This  principle,  if  carried  into  our  reasoning  on  the  present  sub- 
ject, will  help  us  at  once  to  dispose  of  the  common  objections  and 
difficulties,  and  will  prepare  us  to  believe  the  truth,  just  as  it  is 
made  known  by  God's  word  and  providence. 

The  first  point  we  are  to  settle  is  the  matter  of  fact.  Do  men 
come  into  existence  destitute  of  that  holiness  which  is  essential  to 


288  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

their  well-being,  and  in  such  a  state  of  depravity  aa  certainly 
leads  to  a  life  of  sin  and  an  eternity  of  suffering  ?  The  evidence 
of  this  fact  from  the  word  and  providence  of  God  has  been  sum- 
marily laid  before  you.  Hardly  any  doctrine  has  proof  so  abun- 
dant and  satisfactory.  Do  you  say  then,  that  this  fact  is  not  con- 
sistent with  the  perfections  of  God  ?  This  is  now  the  same  as  to 
say,  that  his  perfections  are  not  consistent  with  the  ordering  of 
his  providence.  But  who  is  to  decide  whether  it  is  consistent 
for  God  to  do  what  he  actually  does  ?  God  has  decided  that  it 
is  consistent,  by  doing  it.  Do  you  say  he  has  not  done  it  ?  I 
ask,  why  do  you  say  this  ?  Is  it  because  evidence  of  the  fact  is 
wanting  ?  No  ;  you  admit  other  things  upon  evidence  not  half  so 
clear.  Is  not  this  the  reason  why  you  say  that  God  has  not 
brought  man  into  existence  in  the  state  above  described,  namely, 
that  you  have  made  up  your  minds  beforehand,  that  it  is  not  con- 
sistent for  God  to  do  it  ?  And  have  you  not  made  up  your  minds 
thus,  merely  because  you  are  unable  to  make  out  the  consistency 
of  it  by  your  own  reason  ?  But  is  this  just  ?  Would  it  be  safe 
to  apply  this  mode  of  reasoning  to  other  things  ?  Suppose  we 
find  it  impossible  for  us  by  our  own  reason  to  prove  the  justice 
and  propriety  of  God's  "  visiting  the  iniquities  of  the  fathers 
\ipon  the  children  unto  the  third  and  fourth  generation;"  may 
we  hence  conclude  that  it  is  not  just,  and  so  contradict  the  ex- 
press declaration  of  God,  uttered  on  Mount  Sinai  and  written  on 
a  table  of  stone,  and  say,  he  does  not  visit  the  iniquities  of  fath- 
ers upon  the  children  ?  We  should  not  be  able  by  our  own  rea- 
soning, independently  of  Revelation,  to  show  the  justice  of  God's 
commanding  the  Israelites  to  cut  off  the  inhabitants  of  Canaan, 
both  men  and  women  ;  and  that  he  should  be  particular  in  requir- 
ing them  to  destroy  all  the  children.  Now  because  we  are  not 
able  to  reason  out  the  justice  of  this,  shall  we  say  it  is  not  just ; 
and  then  deny  that  God  ever  commanded  such  a  thing  ?  In  this 
way  we  should  deny  no  small  part  of  the  Bible,  and  no  small  part 
of  the  facts  which  occur  in  the  course  of  divine  providence.  We 
are  never  to  adopt  this  groundless  and  impious  principle,  that  what 
we  think  to  be  just  and  right,  God  will  do,  and  what  we  think  not 
just  and  right,  God  will  not  do. 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED,  289 

This  is  a  fair  reply,  and  all  that  is  due  to  one  who  denies  a 
well  known  fact,  and  takes  upon  him  to  say  that  the  doctrine 
of  man's  natural  depravity  is  inconsistent  with  the  perfections  of 
God. 

But  I  will  now  go  into  a  more  free  and  thorough  examination  of 
this  and  other  principal  objections. 

The  objector  alleges  that  the  common  doctrine  of  man's  natural 
state  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  rectitude  and  goodness  of 
God.  The  doctrine  is,  that  all  men  come  into  being  in  such  a 
moral  state,  that  as  soon  as  they  are  capable  they  will  certainly 
and  uniformly  commit  actual  sin,  or  that  their  moral  affections 
and  actions  will  all  be  wrong,  unless  they  are  regenerated  by  the 
Holy  Spirit ;  and  that  they  are  thus  constituted  sinners  by  the 
one  offence  of  their  first  father  and  in  connection  with  their  nat- 
ural birth.  Now  in  what  respects  is  this  doctrine  supposed  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  perfections  of  God  ?  What  are  the  difficul- 
ties which  attend  it  in  relation  to  the  divine  character  and  govern- 
ment ?  Does  the  doctrine  imply  that  God  is  pleased  with  sin 
and  misery,  inasmuch  as  he  brings  men  into  being  in  such  a  state, 
that  they  Avill  all  certainly  sin,  and  so  expose  themselves  to  end- 
less misery  ? 

Reply.  This  difficulty  may  be  merely  apparent,  arising  from 
our  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  case.  It  may  be,  that  if  we 
could  have  a  perfect  view  of  the  subject,  as  God  has,  we  should 
be  satisfied  at  once  that  no  such  difficulty  exists.  We  must  be 
careful  then  not  to  make  too  much  of  appearances,  especially  as 
we  have  so  often  found  them  fallacious.  But  let  us  inquire  a  lit- 
tle as  to  the  fact.  Are  there  not  then  sufficient  reasons  to  satisfy 
us,  that  God  looks  upon  sin  with  holy  displeasure  ?  Here  the 
Scripture  gives  us  the  clearest  possible  instruction.  God  in  his 
commands  forbids  all  sin  and  requires  all  that  is  opposite ;  thus 
plainly  expressing  his  feelings  as  to  sin  and  holiness,  and  showing 
that  he  hates  the  one  and  loves  the  other.  His  law  too  contains 
sanctions.  He  promises  tokens  of  his  approbation  to  those  who 
avoid  sin,  and  threatens  tokens  of  his  disapprobation  to  those  who 
commit  it.  Besides  this,  he  expressly  declares,  that  sin  is  the 
VOL.  n.  25 


290  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

abominable  thing  which  his  soul  hateth  ;  and  the  whole  course  of 
his  providence  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  the  present  mo- 
ment, has  shown  his  perfect  abhorrence  of  sin  and  his  love  of 
hohness.  The  verj  constitution  of  our  minds  shows  this.  The 
whole  work  of  redemption  shows  it.  The  judgment  day  and  the 
retributions  of  eternity  will  show  it.  The  evidence  of  God's 
hatred  of  sin  is  indescribably  great,  so  that  all  sinners  have  rea- 
son to  fear  and  tremble  in  view  of  his  indignation  and  wrath 
against  sin.  We  certainly  know  then  that  God  is  so  for  from 
being  pleased  with  sin,  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  that 
he  hates  so  much.  As  to  sufiering,  he  inflicts  it  as  an  expression 
of  his  displeasure  against  sin.  Were  it  not  for  sin  there  would  be 
no  misery. 

The  use  of  these  remarks  in  relation  to  the  difiiculty  before  us 
is  this.  As  we  have  the  clearest  possible  evidence  that  God 
hates  sin,  we  are  sure  the  fact  of  our  depravity  must  be  consist- 
ent with  his  hatred  of  sin.  As  both  are  obviously  and  certainly 
true,  we  know  they  are  consistent  with  each  other ;  and  the  diffi- 
culty above  supposed  is  imaginary. 

Again ;  it  is  said  that  the  doctrine  of  man's  natural  depravity 
is  inconsistent  with  the  benevolence  of  God.  Benevolence  seeks 
to  do  good  ;  it  aims  at  the  happiness  of  intelligent  beings.  How 
then  can  it  be  reconciled  with  benevolence  in  God,  that  he 
should  bring  a  whole  race  of  intelligent  creatures  into  existence, 
in  a  state  which  will  be  certainly  followed  with  their  disobedience 
and  their  consequent  punishment  ?  For  God  to  give  them  exist- 
ence in  such  circumstances,  would  be  wholly  incompatible  with 
benevolence. 

Reply.  The  alleged  inconsistency  between  our  natural  de- 
pravity and  God's  benevolence  may  here  also  be  merely  in  ap- 
pearance. When  we  arrive  at  that  degree  of  intelligence  which 
will  qualify  us  to  judge  correctly  on  this  subject,  we  may  see  with 
perfect  satisfaction  that  these  two  things  which  now  seem  to  be 
inconsistent,  are  perfectly  consistent.  It  may  be  that  angels  and 
saints  in  heaven  see  this  now.  And  it  may  be  that  some  men  of 
illuminated  minds  and  purified  hearts  on  earth  see  it.     And 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  291 

all  who  have  divine  teaching  may  hereafter  obtain  such  clear  and 
extensive  knowledge,  that  they  will  be  so  far  from  thinking  the 
fallen,  depraved  state  of  man  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  benevo- 
lence of  God,  that  they  will  look  upon  it  as  furnishing,  in  its  bear- 
ings and  results,  the  brightest  illustration  of  that  benevolence. 
This  must  always  be  a  delightful  thought  to  those  who  sincerely 
desire  to  know  the  truth  and  are  pressing  after  higher  and 
better  views  of  it.  The  time  will  come  when  we  shall  have  those 
higher  and  better  views.  Present  difficulties  Avill  vanish.  We 
shall  behold  in  noon-day  brightness,  the  excellence  of  God's 
character  and  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  all  his  dispensations. 
And  we  shall  look  back  with  humiliation  and  shame  upon  the  ig- 
norance to  which  we  are  now  subject,  and  the  mistakes  into  which 
we  are  now  continually  falling.  To  a  mind  laboring  in  the  dark 
in  regard  to  many  important  subjects,  it  is  a  mighty  rehef  to 
dwell  upon  such  a  reflection  as  this.  The  certain  expectation  of 
clearer  light,  and  the  habit  of  anticipating  it,  may  have  an  influ- 
ence upon  us  in  some  respects  like  what  we  should  experience  if 
we  actually  possessed  that  light. 

But  there  is  another  view  to  be  taken  of  this  difficulty.  As 
the  benevolence  of  God  is  the  benevolence  of  the  Creator  and 
Governor  of  the  universe,  it  must  have  respect  to  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  creation,  and  must  have  respect  to  this,  not  only  for 
the  present  time,  but  through  all  future  time.  The  benevolence 
of  God,  considered  in  this  large  sense,  which  is  the  only  just 
sense  in  which  the  benevolence  of  such  a  being  is  to  be  considered, 
cannot  be  satisfied  with  any  event  because  it  would  be  beneficial 
in  its  influence  on  a  small  part  of  the  creation,  unless  at  the  same 
time  it  would  promote  the  welfare  of  the  whole  creation,  and  would 
promote  it  in  the  liighest  degi-ee  and  in  the  best  manner.  And 
if  the  highest  welfare  of  the  whole  intelligent  creation  through  all 
ages  to  come  requires  an  arrangement  less  favorable,  [yet  not 
unjust],  to  some  part  of  the  creation,  or,  for  the  present,  even  to 
the  whole,  than  some  other  arrangement  might  be  ;  that  arrange- 
ment will  certainly  be  chosen  by  a  just  and  benevolent  God. 
Clearly  if  God  is  the  guardian  of  the  interests  of  that  universe 


29?.  OBJECTIONS     EXAMINED. 

which  he  has  created  and  which  he  has  destined  to  exist  forever, 
his  benevolence  will  lead  him  to  adopt  those  measures  which  he 
knows  to  be  most  beneficial  to  those  great  interests,  though  not 
beneficial  in  the  highest  conceivable  degree  to  the  interests  of  a 
particular  part.  But  this,  let  us  always  remember,  does  not  imply 
that  God  ever  adopts  a  measure  which  is  unjust  to  a  part  in  order 
to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  whole.  Far  otherwise.  The  sup- 
position that  such  a  Being  as  God  can  do  an  act  of  injustice,  is 
impious.  The  supposition  is  absurd  too.  God's  kingdom  is  a 
moral  kingdom.  It  is  placed  under  a  moral  law.  That  law  re- 
quires holiness  and  justice  and  truth,  and  forbids  the  contrary. 
And  the  welfare  of  the  universe  is  made  to  depend  on  the  mani- 
fested glory  of  God,  which  arises  especially  from  the  support 
which  he  gives  to  his  just  and  holy  law.  Now  to  suppose  that 
God  will  do  an  act  of  injustice  to  a  part  of  his  kingdom  for  the 
good  of  the  whole,  is  in  reality  to  suppose  that  he  will  promote 
the  good  of  the  whole  by  injuring  the  whole.  For  if  God  should 
do  an  act  of  injustice,  it  would  countenance  the  principle  of  injus- 
tice. This  would  destroy  his  moral  character.  And  the  destruc- 
tion of  his  character  would  be  the  destruction  of  the  welfare  of 
the  universe.  His  glorious  character,  displayed  in  a  righteous 
and  benevolent  law  and  administration,  is  the  grand  security  of 
the  interests  of  his  kingdom.  It  establishes  the  principles  of  his 
moral  government,  and  binds  his  subjects  to  him  and  to  one 
another.  That  glorious  character  dishonored  and  injured,  and 
the  universe  is  undone.  I  say  therefore  it  is  the  greatest  absurd- 
ity to  suppose  that  God  will  do  an  act  of  injustice  even  to  the 
meanest  of  his  subjects  and  thus  mjure  that  great  interest  which 
lie  aims  to  promote,  and  that  he  will  thus  iyijiire  it  for  the  sake  of 
promoting  it  I  The  view  which  I  take  of  the  subject  is  this.  The 
only  wise  God,  acting  as  the  guardian  of  the  universe,  adopts 
those  just  and  righteous  measures  which  he  sees  will  be  most  ben- 
.eficial  to  the  whole,  though  they  may  bring  less  good  to  a  part 
than  some  other  measures.  Thus  he  places  a  part,  perhaps  even 
the  greater  part  of  our  race,  in  circumstances  less  favorable  to 
their  happiness,  than  other  circumstances  would  have  been.     But 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  293 

he  does  them  no  injustice.  He  violates  no  perfection,  not  even 
the  most  expansive  benevolence.  The  acts  of  his  goodness  to- 
wards them  are  constant  and  numberless  ;  and  thej  have  reason 
to  thank  and  love  and  obey  him  Avith  all  their  hearts  forever. 
And  jet  it  is  a  fact  well  known  and  acknowledged,  that  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  God  has  placed  them  are  less  favorable  to 
their  present  and  eternal  happiness,  than  some  other  circumstan- 
ces might  have  been.  Now  the  all-wise  God,  the  God  of  love, 
pursues  such  a  course,  (it  being  in  all  respects  just  and  right 
eous,)  because  he  sees  that  it  will  ultimately  be  more  conducive 
to  the  welfare  of  the  whole,  than  another  measure  which  would 
be  more  advantageous  to  a  part,  but  less  advantageous  to  the 
whole.  And  this  is  only  saying,  that  God,  being  infinitely  benev- 
olent, prefers  a  greater  amount  of  happiness  in  his  kingdom  to  a 
less.  This  sovereign  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  God  is  exercised 
in  a  great  part  of  his  operations,  as  God  of  the  universe. 

The  sum  of  my  remarks,  as  they  respect  the  present  subject,  is 
this.  If  God  saw  that  such  a  constitution  of  things  as  this, 
namely,  that  all  mankind  in  consequence  of  the  transgression  of 
their  common  father,  should  be  constituted  sinners,  and  should 
have  their  moral  existence  from  the  first  in  a  state  of  depravity  ; 
if  he  saw  that  such  a  constitution  would  in  itself  be  just  and  suit- 
able as  a  part  of  his  universal  system,  and  would  on  the  whole  be 
beneficial  in  its  influence  upon  the  great  interests  of  his  kingdom ; 
it  was  not  only  consistent  with  his  benevolence,  but  was  what 
his  benevolence  required,  that  he  should  adopt  such  a  constitu- 
tion. If  any  one  asks  what  proof  we  have  that  God  actually 
viewed  such  a  constitution  in  such  a  light ;  I  answer,  we  have  the 
most  satisfactory  proof,  namely,  that  he  has  actually  adopted  it. 

We  see  here  what  is  incumbent  on  those  who  assert  that  man's 
existing  in  a  depraved  ruined  state  is  inconsistent  with  the  benev- 
olence of  God.  To  support  their  allegation,  they  must  prove  that 
the  fact  of  man's  depravity,  considered  as  involved  in  God's 
universal  system,  will  not  be  made  to  promote  his  glory  and  the 
ultimate  good  of  his  creation.  This  is  what  they  assert ;  and 
this  is  what  they  ought  to  prove.     And  as  it  is  a  very  serious 

25* 


294  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

matter,  they  ought  to  prove  it  by  clear  and  conclusive  evidence. 
We  allow  the  fact  of  man's  sinfulness  to  be,  in  itself,  altogether 
and  in  the  highest  degree  undesirable  and  deplorable.  And  we 
look  upon  the  consequences  of  the  fact,  namely,  the  endless  mise- 
ry of  such  a  multitude  of  rational  beings,  with  grief  and  horror. 
But  we  hold  that  all  this  evil  has  been,  and  will  be  so  overruled 
by  the  almighty  Governor  of  the  world,  that  it  will  be  the  occasion 
of  making  the  brightest  displays  of  his  glorious  attributes,  and 
of  promoting,  in  a  degree  not  to  be  measured  by  finite  minds,  the 
blessedness  of  his  moral  empire.  Those  who  bring  the  objection 
above  named,  must  prove  that  sin  will  not  be  overruled  in  this 
manner.  For  if  God  does  thus  overrule  it  for  good,  his  benevo- 
lence cannot  be  impeached  ;  and  so  the  objection  falls  to  the 
ground. 

The  other  principal  objection  is,  that  God's  bringing  us  into  ex- 
istence in  such  a  state  as  the  common  doctrine  implies,  is  incon- 
sistent with  our  being  moral,  accountable  agents,  and  with  the 
Scripture  doctrine  of  a  just  and  impartial  retribution. 

But  I  ask,  how  or  in  what  manner  is  it  inconsistent  ?  First ; 
how  is  it  inconsistent  with  moral  agency  f  Is  the  fact  of  our 
being  sinners  thought  to  be  inconsistent  with  moral  agency  ?  But 
how  strange  a  supposition  is  this,  when  our  being  sinners  is  one 
of  the  ways  in  which  our  moral  agency  is  exhibited.  To  suppose 
that  we  are  sinners  without  being  moral  agents,  is  the  same  as  to 
suppose  that  we  are  sinners,  without  being  sinners.  Sinners  are 
bad  moral  agents,  —  moral  agents  of  a  wrong  character.  They 
are  agents  certainly ;  and  they  are  moral  agents,  because  they 
have  sin ;  sin  being  attributable  only  to  a  moral  agent. 

Is  then  the  fact  of  our  being  sinners /rom  the  beginning  of  our 
rational,  moral  existence,  in  any  way  inconsistent  with  moral 
agency  ?  But  why  is  it  any  more  inconsistent  with  moral  agency 
for  a  man  to  be  a  sinner  at  the  very  commencement  of  his  ex- 
istence, than  at  any  subsequent  period  ?  It  is  substantially  the 
same  thing  to  be  a  sinner  at  one  time,  as  at  another.  And  he 
who  is  the  subject  of  sin,  whether  it  be  at  one  period  of  his  ex- 
istence or  at  another,  is  truly  a  moral  agent.     If  sin  exists,  it 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  295 

must  begin  to  exist  either  at  the  commencement  of  our  being,  or 
at  some  subsequent  time.  And  the  only  difference  between  its 
commencement  at  one  time  and  another,  must  respect  its  particu- 
lar form  and  degree.  If  sin  takes  place  when  the  rational  and 
moral  powers  are  in  a  low  and  feeble  state,  it  will  exist  in  a  low 
degree,  and  in  a  form  corresponding  with  the  state  of  the  mind. 
If  it  takes  place  afterwards,  when  the  powers  of  the  mind 
are  increased,  its  form  and  degree  will  be  altered,  so  as  to  be 
still  correspondent  with  the  state  of  the  mental  faculties. 

Does  any  one  say,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  very  nature  of  sin, 
that  it  should  exist  at  the  beginning  of  our  existence  ?  I  ask, 
why  ?  The  answer  of  Dr.  John  Taylor  and  others  is,  that  the 
first  existence  of  sin  must  be  the  consequence  or  result  of  the 
actual  exercise  of  our  moral  powers  for  some  time ;  in  other 
words,  that  a  person  must  produce  sin  in  himself,  or  make  himself 
a  sinner,  by  his  own  antecedent  determinations  and  voluntary 
actions. 

This  view  of  the  subject  we  are  now  to  examine.  The  suppo- 
sition is,  that  a  person,  in  the  first  instance,  makes  himself  a  sin- 
ner, or  produces  in  himself  the  very  commencement  of  sin,  hy 
voluntary  determinations  and  acts  ;  which  determinations  and  acts 
must  of  course  precede  the  existence  of  the  sin  which  they  pro- 
duce. It  is  evident  that  the  previous  determinations  and  acts 
here  supposed,  must  be  either  right  or  wrong  —  either  holy  or 
sinful  —  or  else  they  must  be  indifferent,  that  is,  neither  right 
nor  wrong,  and  so  not  moral  acts.  Now  if  the  previous  acts  are 
what  they  ought  to  be,  i.  e.  right ;  then  we  have  the  strange 
supposition,  that  right  voHtions  and  actions  in  a  moral  agent  pro- 
duce what  is  wrong  ;  that  his  hohness  produces  sin  ;  that  the  con- 
sequence of  his  wiUing  and  acting  right  is,  that  he  becomes  a  sin- 
ner. If  this  is  the  fact,  then,  how  is  a  man  culpable  for  becoming 
a  sinner,  seeing  that  all  those  determinations  and  actions  of  his 
which  produce  sin,  are  right  ?  According  to  this  notion,  what 
assurance  could  we  have  that  any  being  will  not  soon  corrupt 
himself  and  make  himself  a  sinner  hy  acting  right  ?  Indeed  why 
would  it  not  on  this  supposition  be  true,  that  the  sure  way  for  a 


296  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

man  to  produce  sin  in  his  own  heart,  is  to  do  what  is  right  ?  A 
singular  motive  trulj  to  the  exercise  of  holiness ! 

Take  then  the  other  supposition  ;  viz  ;  that  a  person  produces 
in  himself  the  commencement  of  moral  evil,  or  makes  himself  a 
sinner  in  the  first  instance,  by  previous  volitions  and  actions  which 
are  wrong.  According  to  this,  a  person  has  wrong  exercises,  and 
has  them  voluntarily,  before  he  has  any  thing  wrong  ;  exercises 
which  are  sinful  before  he  has  any  sin.  But  how  long  must  sin- 
ful volitions  and  acts  be  continued  in  a  person  in  order  to  his  be- 
ginning to  have  sin  ?  How  long  must  he  be  a  sinner  in  order  to 
become  a  sinner  ?  Doubtless  the  sinful  exercises  which  are  there 
supposed  to  precede  the  first  existence  of  sin,  occupy  time.  How 
long  must  that  time  be  ?  —  But  who  does  not  see  the  gross  ab- 
surdity of  such  a  supposition  ?  Sin,  instead  of  being  the  product 
or  effect  of  wrong  exercises  of  mind,  lies  in  them.  They  them- 
selves are  sin. 

The  only  supposition  which  remains  for  one  who  holds  the 
opinion  we  are  examining,  is,  that  a  person  makes  himself  a  sin- 
ner or  produces  sin  in  himself,  by  vohtions  and  acts  which  are 
indfferent,  that  is,  neither  holy  nor  sinful. 

Now  inasmuch  as  the  person  supposed  is  a  moral  agent,  and 
inasmuch  as  he  wills  and  acts  in  this  case  with  reference  to  moral 
objects ;  how  happens  it  that  his  volitions  and  acts  are  not  of  a 
moral  nature  ?  Is  it  because  at  the  time  he  is  not  capable  of 
good  or  evil,  and  so  is  not  accountable  for  his  actions  ?  It  would 
then  come  to  this,  that  while  a  person  is  incapable  of  good  or 
evil,  and  so  not  accountable  for  his  actions,  he  does  that  which 
corrupts  his  heart  and  makes  him  a  sinner.  Now  is  it  not  a 
strange  supposition,  that  such  amazing  consequences  —  conse- 
quences affecting  our  immortal  condition,  should  depend  on  our 
conduct  before  we  are  capable  of  doing  either  right  or  wrong  ? 
According  to  this  supposition,  we  are  so  constituted  by  our  Crea- 
tor, that  we  destroy  ourselves  by  our  actions  before  we  are  capa- 
ble of  acting  as  moral  accountable  beings. 

But  we  must  look  at  this  matter  a  little  further.  A  person 
now  puts  forth  acts  which  are  in  no  respect  wrong,  as  he  is  inca- 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMIMED.  29T 

pable  of  doing  wrong,  not  being  as  yet,  a  real  moral  agent.  But 
these  indifferent  actions  —  actions  wholly  blameless,  are  soon  to 
result  in  sin,  which  is  the  quality  or  act  of  a  moral  agent.  Now 
by  what  process  or  in  what  manner  does  he  become  a  moral 
agent  ?  And  how  does  it  happen  that  he  becomes  so  just  at  this 
time  ?  Do  those  indifferent,  blameless  actions  which  produce  sin, 
produce  moral  agency  too  ?  And  if  so,  how  does  it  always  hap- 
pen, that  moral  agency  and  sin  come  into  existence  precisely  at 
the  same  time  ?  Or  does  a  person  become  a  moral  agent  a  very 
little  time,  a  moment  or  so,  before  he  becomes  a  sinner  ?  Or 
does  he  become  a  sinner  a  moment  or  so  before  he  becomes  a 
moral  agent  ? 

But  it  may  be  said,  there  is  no  need  of  supposing  the  person 
loTioUy  incapable  of  moral  agency,  nor  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  of 
supposing  that  those  voluntary  acts  which  produce  sin  are  really 
holy  or  sinful.  They  may  occupy  a  middle  place  between  good 
and  bad  ;  and  the  person  may  somehow  be  responsible  for  them, 
though  he  is  not  really  responsible  ;  and  through  his  own  fault, 
as  it  were,  he  may,  before  he  sins,  do  that  which  will  result  in 
sin  ;  and  so  he  may  somehow  be  culpable  for  making  himself  a 
sinner,  by  doing  that  which  he  does  before  he  is  a  sinner.  But  on 
this  supposition,  does  the  person  aim  at  this  result.  Does  he 
intend  to  make  himself  a  sinner  ?  Does  he  know  what  he  is 
about  ?  And  does  he  mean  by  what  he  does,  to  become  a  trans- 
gressor ?  Does  he  choose  to  be  a  sinner  ?  and  is  not  this  a  sin  ? 
But  if  he  does  not  understand  the  matter,  and  does  not  mean  to 
produce  this  result,  but  something  else,  then  would  it  not  appear 
strange  that  he  should  be  plunged  into  a  state  of  sin  by  his  own 
conduct  without  his  own  choice,  and  when  he  thought  of  no  such 
thing  ? 

But  I  have  not  yet  done  with  the  opinion,  that  a  person  is  cul- 
pable, not  for  the  present  affection  or  act  which  is  wrong,  but 
for  that  previous  voluntary  conduct  or  free  determination  of  mind 
which  produced  the  wrong  affection  or  act.  Take  present  love  of 
sin,  or  enmity  against  God,  which  is  an  affection  of  the  heart. 
Do  you  say,  the  sinner  is  not  culpable  for  this  affection  or  state 


298  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

of  mind,  but  for  those  previous  acts  of  mind  which  occasioned  it  ? 
You  say  then,  that  if  this  wrong  aifection  should  be  the  very  first 
act  of  his  mind,  and  so  should  not  be  the  result  of  any  previous 
determinations  or  acts,  he  would  not  be  blameworthy  for  it. 
Though  it  would  be  an  unsuitable,  mistaken  affection,  and  might 
in  a  very  loose  sense,  be  called  sin,  he  would  not  be  justly 
answerable  for  it,  because  he  did  not  produce  it  by  his  own 
voluntary  agency,  or  by  the  acts  of  his  free  will. 

Here  it  must  be  noted  that  the  word  will,  as  I  have  remarked 
in  a  previous  Lecture,  is  often  used  in  common  discourse,  and  in 
the  sacred  Scriptures,  to  denote  the  entire  moral  faculty  of  the 
mind.  According  to  this  use  of  the  word,  all  the  affections,  as 
well  as  those  acts  of  the  mind  more  appropriately  called  volitions, 
are  acts  of  the  will.  If  this  is  the  view  we  are  to  take  of  the 
subject,  then  my  question  is,  "  Why  are  we  not  answerable  for 
one  act  of  the  will  as  well  as  another  ?  —  for  the  present  act,  as 
well  as  the  previous  act?"  And  then  it  would  seem,  according 
to  the  supposition  now  made,  that  we  are  answerable  for  the  pres- 
ent act  merely  because  it  leads  to  a  subsequent  act.  If  this  is  the 
case,  then  it  would  follow  that  the  evil  and  blame-worthiness  of 
any  affection  or  act  of  the  mind,  does  not  lie  in  the  act  itself,  but 
in  the  circumstance  that  it  tends  to  produce  other  acts  which  are 
wrong ;  —  the  same  holding  true  of  each  of  those  other  acts, 
namely,  that  its  blame-worthiness  lies  not  in  itself,  or  in  its  own 
nature,  but  in  the  circumstance  that  it  leads  on  to  other  acts 
which  are  sinful.  And  then,  it  is  to  be  noticed,  that  this  influ- 
ence of  the  present  act  of  the  mind  to  produce  other  acts,  is  gen- 
erally, to  say  the  least,  not  a  matter  of  design.  Such  an  effect 
is  not  commonly  aimed  at.  In  exercising  the  present  affection, 
our  mind  has  a  particulur  object  in  view.  Towards  that  object 
we  put  forth  an  act.  We  love  it,  or  hate  it.  We  have  a  desire 
for  it,  or  an  aversion  to  it.  The  affection  is  very  simple,  being  a 
feeling  or  emotion  of  the  mind  towards  that  object.  Generally 
we  have  no  other  object  in  view  ;  and  certainly  we  do  not  com- 
monly take  into  view  the  effect  of  this  present  act  upon  future 
acts  of  the  mind.     In  truth  we  do  not  know  what  that  effect  will 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  299 

be,  before  we  have  learned  it  by  experience.  And  suppose  we 
have  learned  what  it  will  be ;  still  that  effect  is  not  the  thing  we 
commonly  aim  at ;  it  is  not  commonly  our  intention  by  this  pres- 
ent affection  to  produce  other  wrong  affections.  Thus  the  suppo- 
sition would  imply,  that  we  are  answerable  for  an  affection  or  act 
of  the  mind,  on  account  of  a  circumstance  which  does  not  fall  un- 
der our  voluntary  control ;  which  generally  is  not  a  matter  of 
choice  or  intention  on  our  part,  and  which  is  often  contrary  to 
our  choice.  For  how  frequently  is  it  the  case  with  the  sinner, 
that  he  would  be  glad  to  avoid  the  effect  of  his  present  act  upon 
the  subsequent  state  of  his  mind  ?  He  desires  not  that  effect ; 
he  dreads  it.  In  tne  present  act  of  his  mind  he  has  quite  an- 
other object  in  view.  The  supposition  would  therefore  make  us 
answerable  for  a  circumstance,  (viz.  the  influence  of  our  present 
affection  or  act,)  which  does  not  depend  on  our  choice,  and  which 
is  often  contrary  to  it. 

But  why  is  it  supposed  that  we  are  answerable  for  the  preced- 
ing act  of  mind,  and  not  for  the  present ;  and  that  our  blame- 
worthiness lies,  not  in  the  present,  but  in  the  preceding  ?  Is  it 
because  the  one  is  thought  to  be  of  a  different  nature  from  the 
other  ?  But  why  is  it  thought  to  be  of  a  different  nature  ?  Sup- 
pose the  present  affection  of  the  mind  relates  to  the  same  object 
as  the  past.  Suppose  that  object  to  be  a  moral  object,  and  the 
feeling  of  the  mind  towards  it  to  be  love  and  desire,  or  hatred 
and  aversion.  Does  the  circumstance  that  one  of  them  follows 
the  other,  make  any  difference  in  their  nature  ?  The  present 
affection  may  be  stronger  than  the  former,  and  if  so  it  will  be 
more  culpable  in  degree  ;  but  is  not  its  nature  the  same  ?  They 
are  by  the  supposition  both  exercises,  and  equally  exercises  of  the 
will,  taken  in  the  sense  above  noted.  Both  relate  to  the  same 
object.  The  mind  is  equally  active  in  both,  and  equally  free 
from  all  compulsory  influence.  Why  are  they  not  both  of  the 
same  nature  ?  And  if  so,  why  are  we  not  as  answerable  for  one 
as  for  the  other  ? 

But  the  word  will  is  used  in  a  more  restricted  sense  by  Locke 
and  others.     In  this  sense  a  volition  or  an  act  of  the  will  is  that 


300  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

determination  of  the  mind  which  produces  some  bodily  act,  or 
some  other  act  of  the  mind,  and  in  which  we  actually  aim  at  that 
effect ;  as  when  we  will  to  move  our  limbs,  or  to  exercise  the  mind 
in  a  particular  way  ;  and  so  a  volition  is  distinguished  from  the 
affections  of  love,  hatred,  compassion,  etc.  Let  us  examine  the 
subject  with  this  distinction  in  view.  The  opinion  we  are  ex- 
amining is,  that  our  blame-worthiness  does  not  lie  in  the  present 
affection,  but  in  the  previous  volition  or  choice  which  led  to  it ;  in 
other  words,  that  we  are  not  answerable  for  the  present  wrong 
affections,  but  for  those  acts  of  our  free-will  by  which  we  pro- 
duced or  excited  these  affections.     Here  I  remark, 

1.  That  volition,  in  the  sense  here  intended,  is  not  the  cause  of 
affection.  It  does  not  by  its  own  influence  produce  it.  This  is 
so  obviously  true,  that  no  man  of  sound  judgment  and  experience 
ever  expects  such  a  thing,  as  to  excite  an  affection  m  his  own 
mind  by  the  direct  power  of  volition.  The  affection  is  excited, 
and  from  its  very  nature  must  be  excited,  by  a  suitable  object 
present  in  the  mind's  view,  not  by  an  act  of  the  will  soUciting  or 
requiring  it. 

2.  Volition.,  in  this  restricted  sense,  is  the  consequence  of 
affection.  All  the  volitions  or  active  choices  of  a  holy  being 
respecting  God,  are  the  effect  of  his  supreme  love  to  God  ;  and 
the  direction  of  his  voluntary  agency  in  respect  to  other  beings 
arises  from  his  love  to  them.  The  particular  volitions  or  active 
choices  of  the  selfish  and  Avorldly  arise  from  their  selfish  and 
worldly  affections.  They  choose  to  do  such  and  such  things, 
because  they  have  such  and  such  dispositions  and  desires.  Now 
as  the  affections  are  the  source  of  particular  volitions,  we  should 
naturally  conclude  that  the  affections  themselves  are  blame- 
worthy as  really  as  the  volitions  which  flow  from  them. 

3.  Suppose  the  affections  to  be  in  some  way  produced  by 
previous  volitions ;  still  what  is  there  in  those  volitions  which 
should  make  us  answerable  for  them,  more  than  for  the  affections 
which  are  supposed  to  be  thus  connected  with  them  ?  What  is 
there  either  in  the  nature  or  circumstances  of  those  acts  of  the 
mind,  which  should  render  us  praise-worthy  or  blame-worthy  for 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  301 

them,  more  than  for  these  ?  It  cannot  be  said  that  we  have  less 
agency  in  the  affections  than  in  what  are  more  appropriately  called 
volitions.  Nothing  can  be  conceived  in  which  our  minds  are 
more  truly  active,  or  active  in  a  higher  degree,  than  in  love, 
desire,  hatred,  and  other  affections.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the 
volitions  are  more  volimtary  than  the  affections.  The  word 
voluntary  is  most  properly  applied  to  that  which  is  the  effect  of 
choice,  or  which  takes  place  in  consequence  of  a  volition.  Now 
in  this  sense  the  affections  are  not  strictly  voluntary  ;  i.  e.  they  do 
not  take  place  as  the  immediate  effects  or  consequences  of 
vohtion  ;  they  do  not  rise  in  the  mind  in  direct  obedience  to  an 
act  of  the  will.  When  writers  call  the  affections  voluntary,  it  is 
because  they  do  not  make  the  distinction  above  noticed  between 
the  affections  and  volitions,  but  regard  them  all  as  acts  of  the  will. 
Accordingly  when  they  call  the  affections  voluntary,  they  do  not 
mean  to  imply  that  they  are  consequent  upon  an  act  of  the  will, 
but  that  they  are  themselves  acts  of  the  will.  If  regarded  in 
this  light,  the  affections  are  as  voluntary  as  vohtions,  both  being 
acts  of  the  will.  Volitions  are  not  voluntary  in  the  other  sense, 
which  I  consider  the  more  exact  sense  of  the  word ;  i.  e.  they 
do  not  flow  from  a  previous  act  of  the  will,  but  from  the  influence 
of  those  inducements  or  motives  under  which  the  mind  is  placed. 
Taking  the  word  therefore,  in  either  sense,  we  find  the  affections 
as  voluntary  as  the  volitions.  Why  then  are  we  not  responsible 
for  them  ?  I  say  this  with  reference  to  those  who  call  every 
thing  for  which  we  are  accountable,  voluntary. 

I  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  expose  the  opinion  we  have 
been  considering,  as  Edwards  does,  in  his  work  on  the  Will,  by 
showing  that,  if  adopted,  it  would  exclude  all  virtue  and  vice 
from  the  world.  His  reasoning  on  this  subject  is  a  very  strikmg 
example  of  the  reduetio  ad  absurdum.  No  one  can  resist  the 
force  of  his  argument  in  any  other  way  than  by  refusing  to  con- 
sider it. 

But  I  have  still  another  inquiry.  Is  not  the  mind  as  much  the 
author  of  the  affections,  as  of  the  volitions  ?  Does  it  not  as  truly 
originate  them  ?     I  introduce  this  question  for  the  sake  of  those 

VOL.  II.  26 


302  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

who  dwell  much  upon  the  idea  that  a  man  must  be  the  author  of 
his  own  actions  in  order  to  be  accountable. 

The  question  maj  be  quickly  answered.  If  bj  being  the 
author  or  originator  of  its  affections,  is  meant .  that  the  mind 
really  exercises  them,  or  that  they  are  truly  and  2)erfectly  the  acts 
of  the  mind ;  then  the  mind  is  evidently  the  author  or  originator 
of  all  its  affections,  as  well  as  its  volitions.  But  if  by  originating 
our  affections  or  volitions,  is  meant  that  we  produce  them,  or  bring 
them  into  being  by  any  thing  in  the  mind  distinct  from  its  affec- 
tions or  volitions ;  then  I  contend  that  we  cannot  derive  from  our 
consciousness,  or  from  any  other  source,  the  least  evidence  that  we 
do  originate  our  aflfections  or  volitions.  We  are  conscious  of  the 
acts  of  the  mind  and  of  nothing  else.  These  acts  of  the  mind 
have  indeed  important  mutual  relations  ;  but  as  to  the  affections, 
it  is  not  a"  fact  that  they  are  properly  produced  or  originated 
by  any  other  mental  acts.  The  mind,  in  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  is  placed,  exercises  or  puts  forth  its  affections ;  in  view 
of  suitable  objects  or  motives  it  acts  in  the  way  of  loving,  hating, 
etc.  This  is  the  whole  history  of  the  case.  The  mind  exists  as 
an  agent,  rational,  free,  moral.  Under  the  influence  of  circum- 
stances, that  is,  with  various  objects  or  inducements  presented 
before  it,  it  acts  as  it  does.  This  is  all  that  any  man  ever  obser- 
ved in  himself,  or  witnessed  in  others,  or  read  in  history  ;  and  all 
which  any  man  can  conceive. 

We  have  now  examined  the  position  of  Dr.  John  Taylor,  Dr. 
Ware  and  others,  that  the  first  existence  of  sin  must  be  the  result 
of  previous  voluntary  determinations  or  acts  of  the  will,  and  ac- 
cordingly that  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  sin  that  it  should 
exist  at  the  beginning  of  our  moral  existence  ;  and  we  have  found 
this  position  liable  to  objections  in  every  point  of  \dew.  The  fact 
is,  that  moral  good  and  evil,  virtue  and  vice,  he  in  the  affections  or 
mental  acts  themselves,  considered  in  their  own  nature.  It  were 
easy  to  prove  that  this  is  the  case,  and  that  on  any  other  prin- 
ciple there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  virtue  or  vice,  holiness  or  sin, 
in  the  universe.  But  this  has  been  so  fully  proved  by  Edwards 
and  others,  and  is  indeed  so  perfectly  obvious  to  our  own  con- 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  30^ 

sciences,  that  it  may  properly  be  taken  as  a  settled  matter. 
Here  then  we  come  to  the  conclusion  of  our  reasoning  on  this 
point.  As  soon  as  a  rational  being  has  a  disposition  or  affection 
■which  is  of  a  moral  nature,  he  is  holy  or  sinful.  Whatever  may 
be  the  antecedents  or  circumstances,  the  occasions  or  excite- 
ments of  affection,  he  is  worthy  of  praise  or  blame  as  soon  as  he 
has  it.  At  its  very  first  existence  it  is  in  itself  right  or  wrong. 
If  it  is  love  to  God  or  benevolence  to  man,  it  is  right,  and  he  who 
has  it,  is  virtuous  and  praise- worthy.  If  it  is  enmity  to  God,  or 
selfishness,  it  is  wrong,  and  he  who  has  it  is  culpable.  And  a 
person  is  as  truly  worthy  of  praise  or  blame  for  the  first  moral 
disposition  or  affection,  as  he  can  be  for  any  subsequent  one ; 
because  it  is  of  the  same  nature.  Subsequent  affections  may  be 
increased  or  diminished  in  strength,  and  circumstances  may  at- 
tend them  which  render  them  culpable  in  a  higher  or  lower  de- 
gree. But  the  first  affection,  being  of  the  same  nature,  is  as  truly 
culpable  as  any  following  affections.  The  fact  of  its  .being  first 
makes  no  alteration  in  regard  to  its  desert.  So  that  the  doctrine 
of  our  native  depravity,  or  our  sinfulness  from  the  beginning  of 
our  moral  existence,  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of 
sin,  or  with  our  free,  moral,  and  accountable  agency. 


LE  CTURE    LX  VII. 


EXERCISES    OF    DEPRAVED    AFFECTION    COMMENCE    EARLY. 

Men  of  a  speculative  turn  of  mind  frequently  increase  the 
difficulties  attending  the  subject  of  native  depravity  by  their 
injudicious  attempts  to  remove  them.  They  aspire  to  be  wise 
above  that  which  is  written.  They  frame  theories,  which  shed 
darkness  rather  than  light  upon  the  revealed  doctrine  ;  —  theories 
which  instead  of  explaining  the  fact  of  our  degenerate  state,  or 
strengthening  our  belief  of  it,  cause  the  fact  itself  to  be  doubted, 
or  at  least  render  the  behef  of  it  less  productive  of  good.  If 
we  find  this  to  be  the  effect  of  any  hypothesis,  if,  in  consequence 
of  our  regarding  it  with  favor  we  are  less  affected  with  the  fear- 
ful fact  of  our  fallen  and  ruined  state  ;  we  ought  at  once  to  dis- 
miss the  hypothesis,  by  whomsoever  recommended,  and  to  con- 
tent ourselves  with  the  serious  belief  of  the  simple  truth  made 
known  by  Scripture  and  experience,  applying  ourselves  earnestly 
to  the  appointed  means  of  deliverance  from  the  evils  of  our 
apostasy. 

Some  of  the  philosophical  theories  which  have  been  adopted  for 
the  purpose  of  explaining  the  fact  of  our  natural  depravity,  have 
more  appearance  of  truth  than  others.  But  even  as  to  those 
which  have  most  to  recommend  them,  long  experience  has  taught 
me  the  following  lessons  :  —  1 ;  not  to  maintain  any  philosophical 
or  metaphysical  theory  too  confidently,  as  all  such  theories  are  of 
human  origin,  and  therefore  fallible  ;  2 ;  not  to  contend  for  any 
one  of  them  as  though  it  were  exclusively  entitled  to  our  consid- 
eration inasmuch  as  it  may  be  no  more  entitled  to  consideration 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.  305 

than  some  others  ;  and  3  ;  not  to  set  myself  against  any  philoso- 
phical theories  too  absolutely,  as  no  one  of  them  can  be  found, 
which  does  not  contain  a  portion  of  truth.  —  Happy,  thrice  hap- 
py shall  we  be,  when  we  arrive  at  that  better  world,  where  the 
labor  of  forming  theories  and  opposing  errors  shall  be  end- 
ed, and  where  all  the  truths  now  held  by  the  different  classes  of 
Christians  or  contained  in  different  systems,  and  other  truths  too 
sublime  to  be  discovered  in  the  present  state,  shall  come  before  us 
in  all  their  harmony  and  lustre,  and  shall  unceasingly  illuminate 
our  enlarged  and  perfected  minds. 

But  in  perfect  consistency  with  the  precautions  which  have 
been  suggested,  I  think  I  may  safely  lay  down  the  following  prop- 
ositions, not  as  hypotheses,  but  as  matters  of  fact ;  namely,  first, 
that  children  begin  very  early  to  exercise  their  intellectual  and 
moral  faculties,  and  that  among  the  earliest  things  which  we  can 
observe  in  them  or  recollect  in  ourselves,  are  incipient  exercises  of 
Avrong  affection  ;  and  secondly,  that  wrong  affection  must  be  sup- 
posed to  commence  in  children  before  they  are  capable  of  clearly 
manifesting  it  by  outboard  signs.  Or  to  express  it  all  summarily  ; 
children  manifest  wrong  feehng  very  early  ;  and  it  is  but  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  they  begin  to  exercise  it  in  their  hearts  before 
they  are  capable  of  manifesting  it. 

I  do  not  take  upon  me  to  determine  how  early  children  begin 
to  show  sinful  feelings  by  outward  signs  ;  for  all  appearances 
indicate,  that  there  is  in  this  respect  a  great  difference  among 
them.  And  I  am  far  from  taking  upon  me  to  detennine  how 
long  sinful  feehng  exists  within  them  before  they  manifest  it  out- 
wardly ;  for  in  this  respect  too,  they  doubtless  differ  from  each 
other  ;  and  in  regard  to  any  of  them  at  the  period  referred  to, 
Avc  have  no  means  of  discovering  the  incipient,  elementary  actings 
of  sinful  affection  in  the  recesses  of  the  heart,  where  the  eye  of 
God  sees  the  essence  of  all  sin.  All  that  I  venture  to  affirm  is, 
the  reasonableness  of  supposing  that  sinful  feeling  exists,  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  time,  prior  to  its  distinct  manifestation. 

Do  you  ask  why  I  attach  special  importance  to  this  view  of  the 
subject  ?     I  answer,   generally,   that   it   is   on   many   accounts, 

26* 


306  EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION. 

desirable  to  have  a  right  conception  of  the  facts  pertaining  to  our 
apostate,  ruined  state.  It  is  desirable  that  we  should  know  the 
truth.  But  I  have  a  more  particular  reason,  for  attaching  impor- 
tance to  this  view  of  the  subject,  namely,  that  it  has  an  obvious 
bearing  upon  the  justice  and  equity  of  the  divine  administra- 
tion. For  if  it  is  admitted  to  be  a  fact  that  children  exercise 
wrong  feeling  very  early ;  if  they  inwardly  transgress  the  law 
written  on  their  hearts  by  wrong  affections  before  they  are  capa- 
ble of  showing  those  affections  by  external  signs ;  then  the  evils 
which  come  upon  those  children  who  fall  under  this  description, 
are  as  manifestly  consistent  with  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  as 
those  which  come  upon  adult  transgressors.  The  evidence  that 
the  penal  evil  which  is  inflicted  upon  the  subjects  of  God's 
government  is  consistent  and  equitable,  does  not  depend  upon  the 
degree  or  the  form  of  their  guilt,  but  upon  its  existence.  If  at  a 
period  not  far  distant  from  their  birth,  transgression  of  moral  law 
is  in  any  way  found  in  them ;  if  while  it  is  hidden  from  the  eye 
of  their  fellow  men,  and  while  it  comes  not  within  the  reach  of 
their  own  effjrts  at  recollection  in  subsequent  life,  it  is  still  seen 
in  its  essential  deformity  by  the  eye  of  Omniscience  ;  then  moral 
law  extends  its  rightful  authority  over  them,  and  its  penalty  holds 
them  in  its  grasp.  And  you  can  no  more  question  the  justice  of 
penal  infliction  here,  than  in  any  other  case  of  transgression.  As 
soon  as  those  who  have  a  moral  nature,  begin  to  be  the  subjects 
of  unholy  affection,  however  ignorant  we  may  be  of  the  fact ;  so 
soon  do  they  fall  under  the  just  penalty  of  the  law,  although  they 
have  "  not  sinned  after  the  simiUtude  of  Adam's  transgression," 
nor  after  the  exact  similitude  of  the  transgression  of  any  adult 
person.  Sin,  wherever  it  takes  place,  and  whatever  its  form  or 
degree,  incurs  a  just  punishment,  the  nature  and  measure  of  the 
punishment  being  always  determined  by  the  infallible  judgment 
of  the  Supreme  Legislator. 

,     The  remarks  I  have  made,  you  will  observe,  have  no  relation  to 

[children  before  they  are  in  God's  view  chargeable  with  the  begin- 

/  Diing  of  moral  evil,  —  before  sin  in  some  form  and  in  some  degree 

exists  in  their  hearts.     If  we  refer  to  others,  and  would  account 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.  307 

for  it  that  those  suffer  pain  and  death,  in  whom  God  sees  nothing 
■which  has  the  nature  of  sin,  nothing  which  his  unerring  justice 
can  regard  as  a  transgression  of  moral  law  ;  we  must  resort 
to  some  other  principle.  According  to  the  Apostle, "  death  comes 
by  sin."  And  if  it  does  not  come  by  the  sin  of  those  who  suffer 
death,  it  must  come  by  the  sin  of  some  other  person  to  whom 
they  stand  in  an  important  relation.  This  however  cannot  be  par- 
ticularly considered  at  present. 

My  object  now  is,  to  obviate  objections  which  may  seem  to  lie 
against  the  proposition  laid  down  above  respecting  children  in 
early  life,  and  to  suggest  some  reasons  in  its  support. 

There  is  certainly  nothing  strange  or  unreasonable  in  the  sup- 
position that  children  have  feelings  which  are  morally  wrong,  be- 
fore they  are  able  to  make  them  known  to  others,  either  by  words 
or  by  other  outward  signs.  They  cannot  do  this  before  they  have 
attained  to  a  considerable  degree  of  strength  and  activity,  both 
bodily  and  mental ;  and  this  requires  time.  But  how  soon  the 
necessary  strength  and  activity  are  attained,  we  have  no  direct 
means  of  knowing.  We  cannot  look  into  their  minds  so  as  to 
discern  exactly  what  their  condition  is,  or  when  they  begin  to  be 
capable  of  those  mental  acts  which  are  the  elementary  principles 
of  a  sinful  character.  Hence  in  forming  a  judgment  on  this 
point,  aside  from  the  general  teachings  of  Scripture,  we  must  dil- 
igently use  the  scanty  means  of  knowledge  which  we  possess, 
humbly  seeking  the  truth,  if  haply  we  may  feel  after  it  and 
find  it. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  a  little  child  often  makes  an  effort  to  ex- 
press to  others  some  strong  feelings  which  struggle  within  him, 
before  he  has  learned  the  use  of  external  signs,  so  as  to  be 
able  intelligibly  to  express  those  feelings  to  others.  The  fact  that 
the  feelings  cannot  at  present  be  distinctly  expressed  is  certainly 
no  proof  that  they  do  not  exist. 

Nor  is  the  incapacity  of  a  child  to  receive  particular  instruction 
from  parents  and  others  respecting  moral  and  religious  subjects, 
any  certain  proof  that  he  is  incapable  of  moral  feelings.  The 
very  constitution  of  his  mind,  the  "  law  written  on  his  heart," 


308      EAELT   EXERCISES    OF   DEPRAVED   AFFECTION. 

may,  without  instruction  from  others,  early  render  him  capable 
of  moral  feeling.  Without  any  particular  instruction,  there  may 
be  something  external  or  internal,  which  will  elicit  emotions  ;  and 
these  emotions,  though  existing  only  in  their  incipient  state  and  in 
an  exceedingly  low  degree,  may  be  the  original  elements  of  char- 
acter. No  one  is  authorized  to  say  that  the  mind  cannot  have 
such  emotions  before  it  is  capable  of  instruction  from  without. 
Indeed  the  elements  of  knowledge  must  of  necessity  exist  in  the 
mind,  before  it  can  receive  instruction.  Instruction  on  intellect- 
ual subjects  does  not  originate  the  first  intellectual  acts,  but  pre- 
supposes them,  refers  to  them,  and  makes  use  of  them.  The 
same  is  true  of  moral  instruction.  It  does  not  originate  the  first 
moral  emotions,  nor  communicate  the  first  moral  perceptions ;  but 
evidently  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  they  have  already  be- 
gun to  exist.  And  it  is  of  no  small  consequence  that  we  should 
remember  this,  and  should  well  consider  what  place  our  agency 
holds  in  the  instruction  we  give  in  early  life.  Much  is  done  in 
the  mind  before  our  work  can  begin.  There  must  be  various 
intellectual  and  moral  acts  as  elements  of  knowledge,  and  as 
materials  for  us  to  operate  u-pon.  Surely  then  we  cannot  prove 
that  a  little  child  has  no  moral  emotions,  because  he  is  incapable 
of  receiving  instruction  from  human  teachers.  He  has  not  yet 
learned  the  meaning  of  words  and  other  signs,  which  must  be 
used  by  teachers  as  the  means  of  giving  instruction.  But  his 
mind  itself,  though  not  capable  of  receiving  instruction  in  these 
ways,  may  be  capable  of  perceptions,  and  moral  emotions ;  and  as 
these  perceptions  are  the  incipient  elements  of  knowledge,  the 
moral  emotions  attending  them  are  the  incipient  elements  of 
moral  character. 

Again  our  7iot  being  able  in  after  life  to  recollect  that  we  had 
moral  affections  so  early,  is  no  certain  proof  that  we  had  none. 
The  recollection  of  those  acts  of  our  mind  which  took  place  in 
past  time,  depends  much  on  the  strength  v/hich  our  mental  facul- 
ties had  at  the  time  when  the  acts  took  place,  and  on  the  degree 
of  attention  we  gave  to  those  mental  acts.  The  mind  must  make 
considerable  improvement,  before  it  can  retain  the  impression  of 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.  309 

its  thoughts  and  feelings  for  any  length  of  time.  A  little  child 
often  has  a  memory  sufficient  to  recall  his  mental  acts  for  a  few 
minutes  or  hours ;  and  yet  those  acts  may  afterwards  entirely 
escape  his  recollection.  Who  can  count  up  the  number  of 
thoughts  and  feelings  which  a  child  evidently  has  in  that  early 
period  of  life,  to  which  liis  memory  afterwards  can  never  reach  ? 
Certainly  it  can  be  no  sufficient  proof  of  our  not  having  had  moral 
affi3ctions  in  early  childhood,  that  we  cannot  now  recollect  them. 
"Who  will  say  that  this  want  of  recollection  is  a  proof  that  we  had 
no  moral  aflfections  during  the  two  or  three  first  years  of  our  life  ? 
Generally  we  can  no  more  recollect  what  took  place  in  our  minds 
when  we  were  two  years  old,  than  what  took  place  six  or  twelve 
months  earlier.  Evidently  then  we  may  have  had  moral  affec- 
tions in  our  early  childhood,  notwithstanding  our  inabihty  to 
recall  them.  When  we  had  them,  our  consciousness  of  them  was 
in  proportion  to  their  strength.  But  now  we  can  recollect  neither 
that  consciousness,  nor  the  affections  to  which  it  related. 

The  circumstance  that  a  young  child  has  no  explicit,  formal 
hnowledge  of  CrOiVs  law,  is  no  proof  that  he  is  incapable  of  moral 
affections.  A  child  is  without  such  knowledge  till  he  becomes 
capable  of  receiving  religious  instruction.  But  how  can  he  receive 
instruction  before  he  has  learned  the  use  of  language  and  other 
signs  through  which  instruction  is  communicated  ?  No  one  can 
suppose  that  a  child  ordinarily  obtains  any  definite  and  correct 
ideas  of  God  and  his  law  during  the  first  two  or  three  years  of  his 
life.  But  it  cannot  surely  be  thought  that  a  child  ordinarily  hves 
two  or  three  years  without  any  wrong  feelings.  It  is  often  the 
case  that  the  minds  of  children  are  wholly  neglected,  and  that 
they  continue  for  a  long  time  in  ignorance  of  the  character  and 
law  of  God  ;  or  if  they  have  any  impressions  made  on  their  minds 
respecting  these  subjects,  the  impressions  are  generally  erroneous. 
But  who  supposes  that  children  and  youth,  during  all  the  years 
of  their  ignorance  and  error,  are  incapable  of  any  feelings  either 
right  or  wrong  ?  And  how  is  it  with  those  who  are  brought  up 
in  heathen  darkness,  and  have  no  proper  conceptions  of  God  and 
his  law  ?     The  Apostle  tells  us,  "  they  are  a  law  to  themselves," 


310     EARLY   EXERCISES    OF   DEPRAVED    AFFECTION. 

that  "  they  have  the  law  written  on  their  hearts,"  i.  e.  they  have 
the  principles  of  law  imprinted  on  their  minds  ;  they  have  moral 
faculties  and  moral  perceptions.  Possessed  as  they  are  of  a  moral 
nature,  their  being  destitute  of  any  such  explicit  and  formal 
knowledge  of  God's  law  as  right  instruction  gives,  does  not  render 
them  incapable  of  good  and  evil.  When  converts  among  the 
heathen  review  their  former  lives,  they  see  many  of  their  feelings 
and  actions  to  have  been  sinful,  though  in  their  heathenish  state 
they  thought  nothing  of  them.  In  view  of  these  things,  who  is 
authorized  to  say  that  the  mind  of  a  young  child  is  incapable  of 
moral  feehngs,  because  it  is  without  any  explicit  knowledge  of 
God  and  his  law  ?  Accordingly  those  passages  of  Scripture 
which  speak  of  little  children  as  having  no  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil,  furnish  no  conclusive  proof  that  they  are  incapable  of  moral 
aflfections  ;  because  such  passages  may  be  understood  to  speak  of 
children  in  that  comparative  sense  which  is  common  in  the  word 
of  God.  Even  some  adult  persons,  who  are  evidently  sinners, 
and  are  spoken  of  as  deserving  a  degree  of  punishment,  ("  few 
stripes,")  are  still  represented  as  not  knowing  their  Lord's  will. 
They  have  no  such  knowledge  as  others  have,  —  no  clear,  definite, 
formal  knowledge,  which  comes  from  correct  religious  instruction. 
And  if  this  may  be  the  case  with  adult  persons,  who  are  acknowl- 
edged to  be  capable,  though  in  a  lower  degree  than  others,  of 
sinful  feelings,  why  may  it  not  be  the  case  with  little  children  ? 
How  can  their  being  represented  as  having  no  knowledge,  cer- 
tainly prove  that  this  is  not  the  case  with  them  ?  It  must  how- 
ever be  kept  in  mind  that,  as  they  are  in  such  a  state  of  igno- 
rance, they  are  capable  of  moral  afiection  only  in  a  low  degree. 
Their  emotions  must  be  regarded  as  only  incipient  and  elementary, 
having  indeed  the  nature,  but  far  from  having  the  form  or  the 
strength,  of  the  emotions  belonging  to  adult  years.  So  the  first 
little  shoot  Avhich  arises  from  the  opening  seed,  is  in  nature  the 
same  vegetable  substance  and  has  the  same  vegetable  life  with 
the  stately  oak  which  it  afterwards  becomes. 

The  above  are  the  considerations  which  have  occurred  to  me 
against  the  position  that  the  mind  in  early  childhood  is  capable  of 


EARLY   EXERCISES    OF   DEPRAVED   AFFECTION.     311 

moral  feelings.  Few  will  think  that  such  considerations  amount 
to  a  valid  and  conclusive  objection.  And  if  they  do  not  amount 
to  a  valid  objection,  then  no  one  has  a  right  to  assume  that  a 
little  child  is  incapable  of  emotions  ■which  are  of  a  moral  nature, 
and  no  one  has  a  right  to  proceed  on  the  ground  of  such  an  as- 
sumption, either  in  pursuing  a  course  of  reasoning,  or  in  interpret- 
ing the  word  of  God.  If  a  man  comes  to  those  passages  of 
Scripture  which  teach  that  all  are  sinners,  he  cannot  properly 
assume  that  all  little  children  must  be  excepted  on  account  of 
their  supposed  incapacity  to  have  affections  morally  wrong.  To 
reason  in  this  way  would  be  to  assume  that  which  is  not  self- 
evident,  and  which  cannot  be  proved. 

This  then  is  the  position  which  I  would  maintain,  namely,  that 
no  man  can  take  it  for  granted,  that  children  in  early  life  are  in- 
capable of  emotions  which  are  of  a  moral  nature.  I  pretend  not 
to  defend  my  position  by  direct  and  positive  proof.  Let  me 
however  remind  you  that  there  are  various  declarations  of  Scrip- 
ture as  to  the  universality  of  sin  and  its  consequences,  which 
cannot  be  understood  to  exclude  all  children.  But  it  may 
answer  a  good  purpose,  to  advert  more  particularly  to  some  con- 
siderations in  favor  of  .my  position,  that  children  are  very  early 
capable  of  the  beginning  of  moral  emotions  ;  still  not  attempting  to 
do  what  no  man  is  able  to  do,  that  is,  to  decide  liow  early  this 
capability  of  moral  emotions  exists. 

1.  A  child  is  considered  by  all  sober  men  as  having  at  a  very 
early  period  a  rational  and  immortal  soul,  a  mind  endued  with 
intellectual  and  moral  powers.  Such  a  mind,  from  its  very  nature 
must  soon  be  capable  of  intelligence  and  moral  affection  ?  Besides 
this,  the  little  child  possesses  those  bodily  organs  which  are  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  mind,  and  which  under  the  present 
constitution  of  things,  are  always  concerned  m  the  exercise  of 
thought  and  feeling.  Now  the  fact  that  a  child  is  from  the  be- 
ginning possessed  of  a  mind,  together  with  the  organs  of  thought 
and  feeling,  would  seem  to  imply  that  he  must,  not  long  after  the 
commencement  of  life,  be  capable  of  thought  and  feeling,  capable 
of  it,  I  mean  in  some  small  degree.     As  a  mind  exists  with  its 


312   EARLY  EXERCISES  OP  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION. 

proper  bodily  organs,  who  can  suppose  that  there  is  any  thing 
which  will  necessarily  prevent  its  powers  from  beginning  to  unfold 
themselves  at  a  very  early  poriod  ?  They  must  begin  to  do  this 
sometime.  And  why  not  near  the  commencement  of  life  ?  Is 
it  quite  reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  thing  of  so  active  a  nature 
as  the  mind,  with  all  its  faculties  and  its  bodily  organs,  though  in 
a  very  feeble  state,  should  remain  perfectly  dormant,  not  only 
for  months,  but  for  years ;  especially  when  it  is  considered  that 
there  are  very  early  in  life,  various  bodily  sensations  which  are 
suited  to  rouse  the  mind  to  action  ? 

2.  It  agrees  best  with  common  analogy  to  suppose  that  feeling 
in  so  low  a  degree  as  to  be  imperceptible  to  others,  begins  very 
early.  The  development  of  all  our  corporeal  and  mental  powers 
begins  in  this  manner.  And  the  same  gradual  and  at  the  time 
imperceptible  development  takes  place  in  the  vegetable  and  ani- 
mal world. 

3.  But  a  very  short  time  passes  after  the  commencement  of 
life,  before  a  child  becomes  capable  of  showing  evident  signs  of 

♦feeling.  And  have  we  not  reason  to  suppose  that  feeling,  as  well 
as  thought,  exists  still  earher  ?  A  child  gives  indications  of 
various  feehngs  and  strives  to  utter  them,  long  before  he  is  able 
to  do  it  in  the  usual  way.  And  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
the  very  first  feehngs  which  exist  in  the  mind,  have  the  same 
degree  of  strength  with  those  which  are  first  plainly  indicated  by 
outward  signs  ?  Is  it  not  rather  probable  that  the  first  emotions 
of  the  heart,  the  first  buddings  of  afiection,  take  place  some  time 
previously  to  their  manifestation,  and  that  by  a  gradual  process 
they  acquire  an  abifity  to  express  themselves  by  intelligible 
signs  ? 

4.  To  suppose  that  children  are  in  some  small  degree  moral 
agents  and  have  incipient  moral  emotions  very  early,  agrees  best 
with  the  general  representations  of  Scripture  and  the  general  as- 
pect of  things  in  divine  providence  ;  both  of  which  indicate  that 
the  ofispring  of  human  parents  are  human  beings,  endued  with 
the  same  nature,  belonging  to  the  same  race,  and  under  the  same 
moral  administration  with  their  parents,  and  early  possessing  the 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.   313 

elements  of  the  same  character.  All  these  indications  of  the  word 
and  providence  of  God  would  seem  incongruous,  if  human  beings, 
for  a  long  time  after  the  commencement  of  their  life,  were  totally 
destitute  of  moral  affections  and  moral  (qualities,  and  of  all  actual 
relation  to  a  moral  government.  But  if  they  are  considered  as 
having,  very  early,  some  feeble  beginnings  of  moral  affection,  and 
of  course  some  elements  of  moral  character  ;  it  would  help  to 
make  the  representations  of  Scripture  and  the  conduct  of  Provi- 
dence appear  consistent  and  just.  This  view  of  the  subject  would 
do  something  towards  relieving  a  difficulty  which  is  generally 
thought  to  attend  the  fact  that  children  suffer  and  die.  Some 
suppose  they  suffer  and  die  as  irrational  animals  do,  without  any 
reference  to  a  moral  constitution,  or  the  principles  of  a  moral 
government.  A  strange  supposition  indeed,  that  human  beings 
should  for  a  considerable  time  be  ranked  with  brute  animals  !  Chil- 
dren are  represented  in  a  very  different  light  in  the  word  of  God. 
Now  this  strange  supposition  is  made  on  the  assumption,  that  ht- 
tle  children  are  capable  of  no  wrong  feelings,  that  they  have  noth- 
ing in  any  degree  of  the  nature  of  moral  evil.  For  if  they  have 
this  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  —  if  the  eye  of  God  sees  in  them 
any  emotions,  however  feeble,  which  are  in  their  nature  wrong, 
and  so  are  the  commencement  of  a  sinful  character  ;  then  they 
do  not  suffer  as  innocent,  sinless  beings.  And  we  are  to  under- 
stand the  affirmations  of  the  Apostle  that  "  by  the  offence  of  one 
all  are  constituted  sinners,"  and  that  "  death  comes  upon  all  men 
because  that  all  have  sinned,"  as  applicable  to  the  human  race  at 
large.  In  like  manner  we  are  to  understand  the  declaration,  that 
men  are  "  by  nature  children  of  wrath,"  and  that  "  no  one  can  see 
the  kingdom  of  heaven  without  being  born  again,"  as  relating  to  all 
mankind  —  no  exception  being  made  by  us,  where  none  is  made 
by  the  word  of  God.  If  we  admit  that  children  have  a  degree 
of  personal  sinfulness  as  soon  as  they  are  intelligent,  moral 
beings,  and  that  they  begin  to  be  intelligent  moral  beings  at  a 
very  early  period  ;  then  they  evidently  need  the  regenerating 
Spirit  of  God,  as  really  as  others  do,  to  make  them  holy.  And 
so  they  come  clearly  and  fully  under  the  dispensation,  in  which 
VOL  II.  27 


314       EARLY    EXERCISES    OF    DEPRAVED    AFFECTION. 

Christ  is  exhibited  as  dying  for  sinners,  and  saving  that  which 
was  lost ;  and  prayer  may  be  offered  up  for  their  renewal  by  the 
Spirit  with  as  much  propriety  as  for  the  renewal  of  those  who 
have  come  to  maturity. 

Thus  far  we  have  confined  our  remarks  to  children  who  are  in 
some  degree  the  subjects  of  inward  exercises  which  are  corrupt 
and  sinful,  and  are  in  the  sight  of  God  really  transgressors  of 
moral  law.  In  respect  to  God's  treatment  of  this  class  of  human 
beings,  we  have  found  no  more  difficulty,  than  in  his  treatment  of 
adult  sinners.  They  are  all  transgressors  of  the  divine  law,  and 
are  all  subjected  to  its  righteous  penalty. 
f  But  you  ask  how  we  are  to  regard  infant  children  before  they 
are  in  any  way  transgressors  of  moral  law  ? 

I  acknowledge  that  aside  from  the  teachings  of  God's  word 
and  providence  I  should  be  totally  unable  to  give  any  satisfactory 
reply  to  such  a  question.  Reason  unenlightened  from  above, 
could  never  solve  the  difficulties  by  which  the  subject  is  encom- 
passed. And  whenever,  from  an  over-weening  confidence  in 
our  own  intellectual  faculties,  we  push  our  inquiries  a  single  step 
beyond-  the  plain  truths  which  we  learn  from  revelation  and  ex- 
perience, we  involve  ourselves  in  darkness  and  perplexity.  If  we 
would  maintain  the  character  of  consistent  Christians,  we  must 
avoid  all  conjectures  and  unwarrantable  speculations,  and  be  con- 
tent Avith  the  knowledge  which  God  has  given  us,  and  must  in 
our  faith  and  practice  conform  exactly  to  his  word,  neither  falling 
short  of  it,  nor  attempting  to  go  beyond  it. 

It  is  clear  that  if  infant  children  are  for  a  time  entirely  free 
/from  all  moral  affections  which  are  sinful,  they  do  not  during  that 
j  time  suffer  pain  and  death  as  a  token  of  God's  displeasure  against 
I  them.  Their  suffering  evil  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  just  recom- 
pense for  what  they  have  done,  inasmuch  as  they  have  done  noth- 
ing. It  is  clear  then  that  if  their  suffering  is  to  be  regarded  as 
punishment,  it  must  be  for  the  sin  of  some  other  person ;  and  if  so, 
it  must  doubtless  be,  according  to  Rom.  5  :  12-19,  for  the  sin  of 
Adam.  It  is  easy  to  see,  that  the  pain  and  death  of  child- 
ren may  be  the  punishment  of  a  parent  for  his  sin.      It  is  often 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.  315 

and  very  justly  regarded  in  this  light  in  the  common  course  of 
providence.  And  the  ruin  of  Adam's  posterity  might  be  meant 
as  a  righteous  judgment  of  God  for  his  offence'-.  He  must  have 
felt  it  to  be  so,  and  so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  there  certainly 
was  no  injustice.  He  deserved  punishment ;  and  he  could  not 
complain  if  it  came  upon  him  in  the  way  of  sorrow  and  distress 
for  the  suflferings  of  his  descendants. 

A  respectable  English  writer  says,  that  "  God's  inflicting  such 
evils  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  Adam,  is  calculated  to  serve  pur- 
poses of  the  very  highest  magnitude.    What  event  in  the  whole  uni- 
verse, if  we  except  the  death  of  the  Redeemer,  is  more  calculated 
to  display  the  Almighty's  hatred  of  sin,  than  his  inflicting  for  one 
sin  of  one  man,  calamities  so  tremendous  ?    And  what  event  in  the 
whole  universe,  if  we  again  except  the  death  of  the  Redeemer,  is 
more  calculated  to  display  the  glory  of  his  character,  than  his 
doing  this  in  perfect  consistency  with  the  strictest  rules  of  moral 
equity  ?"     But  how  is  this  proceeding  just  to  Adam's  posterity  ? 
What  have  they  done  before  they  commit  sin,  to  merit  pain  and 
death,  —  what  have  they  done  to  merit  the  evil  of  existing  with- 
out original  righteousness  and  with  a  nature  prone  to  sin  ?     Here 
our  wisdom  fails.    We  apply  in  vain  to  human  reason  or  to  human 
consciousness  for  an  answer.     AVe  are  perplexed  and  confounded, 
and  find  no  resting  place  until  we  seize  the  sublime  truth,  that 
God's  ways  are  not  our  ways  nor  his  thoughts  our  thoughts,  and 
that  all  his  acts  and  all  his  appointments  are  right.     Were  we, 
in  the  exercise   of  our  own  reason,  independently  of  revelation, 
to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  question,  whether  the  posterity  of  Adam 
shall  be  brought  into  a  state  of  sin  and  misery  by  his  oflence,  we 
should  certainly  decide  in  the  negative.     And  so  many  do  de- 
cide.    But  God  has  not  made  us  judges.     The  case  Ues  wholly 
out  of  our  province.     Our  duty  is  not  to  direct  the  great  con- 
cerns of  the  creation,  but  to  acquiesce  in  God,  and  to  believe 
with  all  the  heart,  that  whatever  he  does  is  perfectly  right,  and 
not  less  right,  because   contrary  to  the  dictates   of  our  fallible 
minds.     And  while  in  the  Hght  of  revelation  we  know  that  our 
being  brought  into  a  state  of  sin  and  misery  by  the  ofiFence  of 


316  EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION. 

our  federal  head  is  just  and  right  on  God's  part,  we  know  also 
that  it  is  nowise  unjust  to  us.  Although  in  our  ignorance,  we 
might  think  it  a  hard  and  oppressive  condition  of  our  existence, 
that  we  should  be,  from  the  first,  in  a  depraved  and  suffering 
state ;  still,  in  the  light  of  divine  truth,  we  are  sure  that  our  being 
in  such  a  state  is  so  under  the  holy  and  benevolent  superinten- 
dence of  God,  as  not  to  interfere  in  the  least  with  any  of  his  at- 
tributes, or  with  any  of  the  principles  of  a  righteous  probation,  or 
a  righteous  retribution.  There  is  nothing  in  our  probation  which 
can  be  a  matter  of  reasonable  complaint,  and  there  will  be  noth- 
ing in  the  coming  state  of  retribution,  which  our  own  consciences 
will  not  pronounce  to  be  perfectly  consistent  with  justice  and 
equity. 

Thus  while  in  the  mere  use  of  our  own  reason  we  find  the 
depths  of  divine  providence  unfathomable,  we  are  taught  as 
Christians,  to  confide  unconditionally  in  the  authority  of  God's 
word,  and  quietly  to  acquiesce  in  his  sovereign  wisdom. 

This  then  shall  be  our  inquiry,  namely,  what  has  God  taught 
^us  respecting  the  state  of  infant  children  before  actual  sin  com- 
mences ?     AVhat  are  the  revealed  facts  in  the  case  ? 

For  the  present,  let  us  see  what  light  is  cast  on  the  subject  by 
that  excellent  compend  of  religious  truth,  the  Assembly's  Shorter 
Catechism.  Here  we  are  taught,  as  we  are  also  in  Romans,  5 ; 
12  — 19,  that  "  the  fall  brought  mankind  into  a  state  of  sin  and 
misery  ; "  in  other  words,  that  human  beings,  without  exception, 
are  in  a  state  of  sin  and  misery  in  consequence  of  the  fall.  Had 
not  Adam  fallen,  his  posterity  would  not  have  been  in  such  a 
state.  It  is  through  his  offence  that  this  evil  comes  upon  them. 
The  manner  in  which  this  fallen  state  of  mankind  is  related  to 
the  fall  of  Adam,  is  thus  set  forth  in  the  Catechism.  "  All  man- 
kind descending  from  him  by  ordinary  generation,  sinned  in  Mm 
and  fell  with  him  in  his  first  transgression."  To  this  statement 
many  objections  are  made  ;  and  human  reason,  turning  away  from 
the  instructions  of  God's  word,  may  make  objections  to  any  state- 
ment however  scriptural,  on  this  or  any  other  subject.  But  does 
not   the   statement,    candidly  interpreted,   convey  an  important 


EARLY  EXERCISES  OF  DEPRAVED  AFFECTION.  317 

truth  ?  The  language  is  indeed  free  and  artless,  and  should  be 
met  with  candor  and  liberality.  And  the  same  is  true  of  many 
expressions  of  Holy  Writ.  And  if,  instead  of  treating  the 
sacred  volume  with  due  reverence  and  fairness,  we  labor,  as  infi- 
•  dels  do,  to  put  the  worst  possible  construction  upon  it,  we  may 
think  we  discover  in  it  many  principles  totally  false  and  per- 
nicious, and  totally  adverse  to  justice  and  goodness. 

Take  for  example,  Hebrews  7  :  9,  10.  The  writer  says,  that 
Levi  the  son  of  Jacob,  that  is,  the  tribe,  of  Levi,  which  contained 
the  Priesthood,  '''■paid  tithes  in  Abraham  J'  What!  paid  tithes 
before  he  was  born  ?  Yes,  he  paid  tithes  long  before  he  began  to 
live.  The  explanation  which  the  inspired  writer  gives  of  the 
matter  is,  that  Levi  was  in  the  loins  of  his  great-grandfather, 
Abraham,  when  he  paid  tithes  to  Melchizedec.  In  other  words, 
he  was  a  descendant  of  Abraham,  and  because  he  stood  in  that 
relation,  it  is  said  that  "  he  paid  tithes  in  Abraham.' '  Here  the 
principle  of  representation  is  plainly  brought  before  us  by  the  sure 
word  of  God.  In  the  matter  of  paying  tithes  to  Melchizedec 
Abraham  was  the  representative  of  Le\d,  and  hence  of  the  tribe 
of  Le\i.  As  Abraham's  paying  tithes  to  Melchizedec  was  a 
manifest  acknowledgment  of  inferiority ;  so  the  tribe  of  Levi, 
descending  from  Abraham  and  consecrated  to  the  priestly  office, 
was  inferior  to  our  great  High  Priest,  who  was  particularly  pi-e- 
figured  by  Melchizedec.  Levi,  containing  the  Jewish  Priesthood, 
was  in  this  way  shown  to  be  in  a  state  of  inferiority  to  the  Priest 
typified  by  Melchizedec,  just  as  though  he  himself  had  paid  tithes 
to  that  superior  personage.  He  paid  tithes  in  Abraham  virtually. 
Abraham  in  that  affair,  acted  for  him.  On  the  principle  of  repre- 
sentation, Abraham's  act  was  his.  It  was  not  strictly  his  personal 
act,  but  it  was  as  if  it  had  been  his  ;  —  it  was  his  by  imputation  ; 
it  was  reckoned  to  him.  You  will  particularly  notice  the  language 
here  used  by  the  inspired  writer.  He  does  not  express  himself 
roundly,  as  though  he  was  declaring  what  was  hterally  and 
strictly  true.  His  language  is, —  "  And  as  I  may  so  say,  Levi 
also,  who  receiveth  tithes,  paid  tithes  in  Abraham  ;  for  he  was  yet 
in  the  loins  of  his  father,  when  Melchizedec  met  him."  —  As  I 

27* 


818     EARLY    EXERCISES    OF    DEPRAVED    AFFECTION. 

may  so  say^  —  It  softens  the  expression,  and  shows  that  it  is  to 
be  construed  reasonably,  and  not  to  be  pressed  too  far.  But, 
construed  reasonably,  it  conveys  an  important  truth.  The  conse- 
quence of  what  Abraham  did  in  paying  tithes,  reached  Levi. 
Abraham's  art  was  imputed  to  him,  that  is,  reckoned  to  his  ac- 
count. In  relation  to  the  object  of  the  sacred  writer,  it  was  as 
though  Levi  himself  had  done  the  significant  act  which  Abraham 
did  in  paying  tithes.  Speaking  freely,  we  say,  Levi  did  it,  "  He 
paid  tithes  in  Abraham.'''' 

Now  the  phraseology  in  the  Catechism  is  exactly  like  that 
which  has  just  been  quoted  from  Scripture,  and  is  to  be  under- 
stood in  the  same  manner.  Adam  was  the  father  and  the  consti- 
tuted head  of  all  mankind.  According  to  the  language  of  the 
inspired  writer,  they  were  in  the  loins  of  their  father  when  he 
transgressed  ;  that  is,  they  are  the  descendants  of  sinning  Adam. 
And  as  he  was  their  federal  head  and  representative,  they  virtvh 
ally,  or  in  effect,  did  what  he  did.  — "  As  ive  may  so  say^'* 
"  they  sinned  in  him,  and  fell  with  him  in  his  first  transgression." 
So  the  Scripture  expresses  it ;  "  through  the  offence  of  one, 
the  many  die  ;  "  and"through  that  one  offence  judgment  came 
upon  all  men  to  condemnation."  When  our  first  father  sinned, 
he  lost  the  image  and  favor  of  God,  and  incurred  the  penalty 
of  the  law.  And  his  posterity  share  with  him  in  these  penal  con- 
sequences of  his  offence.  They  partake  of  the  "  guilt  "  of  his 
first  sin  ;  that  is,  they  are  subject  to  the  evils  which  he  incurred 
by  sin ;  through  the  righteous  judgment  of  God,  they  are  destitute 
of  original  righteousness,  and  their  whole  nature  is  corrupt.  And 
in  the  result  they  are  actually  sinners  ;  sinners  as  really  and  cer- 
tainly, as  though  they  had  existed  with  Adam,  and  had  sinned 
when  he  sinned.  They  experienced  the  evil  consequences  of 
what  he  did.  Thus  "  the  fall  brought  mankind  into  a  state  of  sin 
and  misery."  TJirougJi  the  offence  of  one  they  were  all  constituted 
miners  J  and  judgment  came  upon  them,  as  sinnejs,  to  condemnor- 
tion. 


LECTURE    LXVIII. 


INNATE    DISPOSITION   OR  PROPENSITY   TO   SIN. 

The  particular  view  of  young  children  presented  in  the  last 
Lecture,  covers  only  a  part  of  the  ground  to  be  surveyed.  The 
question  remains,  ivliat  is  the  state  of  the  infant  mind  previously 
to  the  commenceynent  of  sinful  affection. 

In  the  treatment  of  this  subject,  I  shall  avoid  strong  aflSrma- 
tions,  and  the  announcement  of  over-confident  opinions.  The 
subject  is  abstruse  and  difficult,  lying,  as  it  does  in  many  respects, 
beyond  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge.  We  have  neither  the 
means  of  understanding  it  perfectly,  nor  the  necessary  capacity 
for  this,  whatever  means  might  be  afforded  us.  On  such  a  sub- 
ject our  best  conceptions  will  be  likely  to  be  mingled  with  error, 
and  the  conclusions  which  may  now  appear  to  us  most  certain, 
may  be  found  on  further  enquiry,  to  result  from  premises  which 
are  partly  or  wholly  false.  I  would  remember  these  remarks 
myself ;  and  instead  of  appearing  before  the  public  as  a  strenuous 
advocate  of  any  one  philosophical  theory,  exclusively  of  every 
other,  I  would  treat  the  opinions  of  all  wise  and  good  men  with 
respect.  And  though  I  have  been  considering  the  subject  before 
us  for  a  long  time,  I  would  still  place  myself  in  company  with 
those  who  are  inquirers  after  the  truth,  who  are  aspiring  after 
a  better  understanding  of  Scripture,  and  a  clearer  hght  than  has 
yet  shone  upon  the  minds  of  Christians. 

The  depravity  of  man  has  commonly  been  considered  as  con- 


320  INNATE     DISPOSITION. 

sisting  originally  in  a  ivrong  disposition^  or  a  corrupt  natiirCy 
which  is  antecedent  to  any  sinful  emotions,  and  from  which,  as 
an  inward  source,  all  sinful  emotions  and  actions  proceed. 

It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  many  considerations  in  favor  of 
this  opinion. 

We  have  evident  occasion  for  the  use  of  such  words  as  disposi- 
tion, inclination,  propensity,  nature.  Were  there  no  such  words 
in  our  language,  we  should  be  sensible  of  the  deficiency,  and,  for 
the  purpose  of  reasoning  and  common  discourse,  should  be  compel- 
led to  introduce  them.  Without  words  of  such  import,  how  could 
you  express  what  you  often  wish  to  express,  as  to  the  habitual 
character  of  an  intelligent  being  ?  You  say,  such  a  man  is  ava- 
ricious. But  it  may  be  that  he  is  not  now  putting  forth  avaricious 
acts  of  mind.  For  though  he  is  a  very  avaricious  man,  he  may 
at  present  be  wholly  occupied  with  thoughts  and  feelings  of  an- 
other kind.  But  who  considers  this  as  a  reason  for  not  calling 
him  an  avaricious  man  ?  What  then  is  your  meaning,  when  you 
call  a  man  avaricious,  while  his  mind  is  engrossed  with  other 
objects,  and  is  at  present  free  from  all  avaricious  thoughts  and 
feelings  ?  Do  you  mean  merely,  that  he  has  indulged  avaricious 
desires  and  followed  avaricious  practices  in  times  past  ?  But  this 
alone  would  not  be  a  conclusive  reason  for  calling  him  avaricious 
now ;  because  he  may  have  reformed,  and  may  now  possess  a 
better  spirit.  By  calling  the  man  avaricious,  do  you  then  mean, 
that  he  will  certainly  have  avaricious  feelings  hereafter,  when  the 
objects  of  avaricious  desire  shall  come  before  his  mind  ?  But 
the  mere  fact,  however  certain,  that  he  will  have  such  feelings  at 
a  future  time  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  for  calling  him  avaricious 
now ;  because  those  future  feelings  may  come  in  consequence  of 
a  change  in  his  character.  It  was  certain  that  Adam,  though  at 
first  holy,  would  become  a  sinner.  But  this  surely  was  no  reason 
for  calling  him  a  sinner  while  he  remained  holy.  It  is  also  cer- 
tain, that  some  who  are  at  present  impenitent  sinners,  will  here- 
after become  Christians.  But  shall  we  therefore  count  them 
among  Christians  now  ?  If  a  man  is  with  propriety  called  ava- 
ricious, it  must  be  on  account  of  something  which  belongs  to  him 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  321 

at  present.  He  must  either  have  avaricious  feelings  at  the 
present  time,  or  must  have  that  in  his  mind  from  which  avaricious 
feehngs  -will  naturally  arise.  There  must  be  in  the  state  of  his 
mind  an  aptitude  to  such  feelings,  a  foundation  for  such  exercises. 
This  aptitude  or  foundation  is  the  very  thing  which  is  commonly 
called  disposition,  propensity,  inclination,  or  principle  of  action. 
Edwards  calls  it  a  "  principle  of  nature ;"  which  he  explains  to 
be,  "  that  foundation  which  is  laid  in  nature  for  any  particular 
kind  of  exercises,  —  so  that  for  a  man  to  exert  the  faculties  of 
his  mind  in  that  kind  of  exercises  may  be  said  to  be  his  nature." 
Dr.  Dwight  calls  it  "  a  cause  of  moral  action  in  intelhgent  beings," 
—  "a  cause,  which  to  us  is  wholly  unknown,  except  that  its  ex- 
istence is  proved  by  its  effects."  — "  We  speak  of  human  nature 
as  sinful,''^  he  says,  "  intending,  not  the  actual  commission  of  sin, 
but  a  general  characteristic  of  man,  under  the  influence  of  which 
he  has  committed  sins  heretofore,  and  is  prepared  and  prone  to 
commit  others."  —  "With  the  same  meaning  in  our  minds,  we 
use  the  phrases,  sinful  propensity,  cornqyt  heart,  depraved  mind, 
and  the  contrary  ones."  —  "  When  we  use  these  kinds  of  phrase- 
ology, we  intend  that  a  reason  really  exists  why  one  mind  will  be 
the  subject  of  holy  volitions,  and  another  of  sinful  ones.  We  do 
not  intend  to  assert  that  any  one  or  any  number  of  the  volitions 
has  been  or  will  be,  holy  or  sinful,  —  nor  do  we  refer  immediately 
to  actual  volitions  at  all.  Instead  of  this,  we  mean  to  indicate  a 
state  of  mind,  out  of  which  holy  volitions  in  one  case  may  be 
fairly  expected  to  arise,  and  sinful  ones  in  another :  such  a  state, 
as  that,  if  it  were  to  be  changed,  and  the  existing  state  of  a  holy 
mind  were  to  become  the  same  with  that  of  a  sinful  mind,  its  vo- 
litions would  henceforth  be  sinful,  and  vice  versa.  This  state  is 
the  cause  which  I  have  mentioned,  a  cause  the  existence  of  which 
must  be  admitted,  unless  we  acknowledge  it  to  be  a  perfect 
causality  that  any  volition  is  sinful  rather  than  holy."  It  will  be 
seen  that  Dwight  uses  the  word  volitions  in  the  large  sense,  in- 
cluding the  affections  or  emotions. 

To  return  to  the  case  of  the  avaricious  man.     Most  certainly 
it  cannot  be  proper  to  attribute  this  character  to  him,  except  for 


322  INNATE     DISPOSITION. 

that  which  really  belongs  to  him  7ioiv,  —  a  present  quality  or  state 
of  his  mind.  Whatever  avaricious  feelings  may  hereafter  be 
excited  in  his  mind  ;  still  if  they  do  not  arise  from  something 
wrong  in  the  present  state  of  his  heart,  —  if  he  is  now  entirely 
free  from  all  propensity  or  aptitude  to  such  feelings  ;  there  would 
be  no  justice  in  calhng  him  avaricious.  The  man  whom  you 
call  avaricious,  envious,  or  revengeful,  may  not  now  exhibit  avoi- 
rice,  envy,  or  revenge,  in  any  acts  of  mind  ;  why  then  do  you 
represent  him  as  sustaining  such  a  character  ?  What  do  your 
thoughts  fix  upon,  as  a  reason  for  applying  these  epithets  to  him  ? 
Is  it  not  that  very  thing,  Avhich  is  commonly  called  propensiti/, 
disposition,  or  state  of  mind?  Though  he  is  not  the  subject 
of  any  present  feelings  of  avarice,  envy,  or  revenge,  his  attention 
being  occupied  with  other  things ;  he  has  an  invariable  propensity 
towards  them,  and  will  at  once  exercise  them,  when  a  favorable 
opportunity  occurs.  This  disposition  or  aptitude  of  mind  is  that 
which  is  commonly  regarded  as  the  foundation  of  a  man's  char- 
acter. 

Now  we  have  abundant  evidence  that  a  disposition  or  pro- 
pensity to  sin,  understood  as  above,  exists  in  the  human  mind 
from  the  beginning.  Some,  who  do  not  fully  agree  with  Dr. 
Dwight  and  other  Orthodox  divines  in  their  reasoning  on  this 
point,  still  hold  that  man's  nature  since  the  fall  is  such,  that 
he  certainly  will  sin,  and  that  his  nature  is  the  cause  or  reason 
of  his  sinning.  By  nature  I  suppose  they  mean  the  same  as  is 
commonly  meant  by  disposition,  propensity/,  or  tendency/  to  sin. 
It  has  been  the  common  doctrine  of  Orthodox  churches  in  this 
country  and  in  Europe,  that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  the 
subjects  of  natural  depraviti/,  or  depravity  of  nature,  or  an 
innate  tendency  or  bias  to  sin.  This  quality  or  state  of  mind 
clearly  belongs  to  man  from  the  commencement  of  his  being ; 
and  this  is  what  is  more  generally  intended  by  original  sin ; 
although  this  phrase  is  meant  also  to  include  the  fact,  that 
depravity  and  ruin  come  upon  us  as  the  consequence  of  Adam's 
sin.  But  the  particular  question  with  which  we  are  now  con- 
cerned is,  whether  this  settled,   universal  propensity  to  sin  in 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  323 

the  posterity  of  Adam  may  not  be  a  reason  for  their  being  de-\ 
nominated  sinners.  Here  let  us  advert  to  the  principles  already 
laid  doAvn.  If  a  man  shows  a  disposition  to  covetous  feelings 
and  practices,  we  call  him  a  covetous  man.  And  if  we  could 
know,  at  the  beginning  of  his  life,  that  he  has  such  a  dispo- 
sition,—  a  disposition  which  will  uniformly  and  certainly  develop 
itself  in  covetous  desires  and  practices ;  we  should  say,  he  has 
the  grand  element  of  a  covetous  character ;  he  is  a  young  miser. 
And  if  we  knew  that  any  man  had  a  decided  disposition  to 
commit  murder,  whether  he  had  ever  acted  it  out  or  not ;  we 
should  not  hesitate  to  ascribe  to  him  the  character  of  a  murderer. 
We  should  say,  he  is  a  murderer  in  heart,  and  a  murderer  in  the 
sight  of  God.  And  if  we  had  evidence  that  the  whole  race  of 
man  were  born  with  a  disposition  to  this  particular  crime,  that 
they  were  universally  inclined  to  commit  murder ;  we  should 
speak  of  them  as  universally  a  race  of  murderers ;  and  we 
should  regard  tliem  as  murderers  virtually,  not  only  before  they 
had  perpetrated  any  murderous  deed,  but  before  they  had  con- 
ceived any  direct,  formal  purpose  to  do  it.  Their  having  an 
inclination  or  prope^isity  to  such  a  deed  of  wickedness  would  be 
all  that  the  case  required.  The  same  might  be  said  of  other 
forms  of  moral  evil.  Now  there  is  evidently  in  every  human 
being,  a  disposition  to  sin,  a  state  of  mind  from  the  beginning 
of  Ufe,  which  will  certainly  and  uniformly  lead  him  to  transgress 
the  divine  law,  whatever  his  outward  circumstances  may  be,  and 
whatever  causes  may  operate  upon  him,  either  exten:ial  or  inter- 
nal, except  the  regenerating  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  And 
the  existence  from  the  first  of  such  a  disposition  in  man  has 
generally  been  thought  sufficient  to  justify  us  in  representing  him 
as  by  nature  depraved,  sinful,  and  lost,  and,  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  his  existence,  needing  regeneration,  and  all  the  blessings 
of  redemption.  This  view  of  the  subject  shows  regeneration  to 
be  substantially  the  same  thing,  at  whatever  period  of  life  it  may 
take  place.  It  is  the  giving  of  a  new  heart.  Man's  unrenewed 
heart  is,  from  the  beginning,  depraved,  unholy,  prone  to  sin. 
This  is  his  natural  character.      The  child  Jesus  was  never  in 


324  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

any  degree  prone  to  sin.  He  had  never  any  disposition  or  state 
of  mind  that  tended  to  sin  in  any  of  its  forms.  He  had  "  no 
evil  principle,"  —  "  was  not  at  all  under  the  influence  of  any 
native  depravity."  For  any  other  child  to  be  regenerated,  is 
to  be  so  changed  in  his  disposition  or  moral  nature  by  the  divine 
Spirit,  as  to  become,  in  a  measure,  like  the  child  Jesus.  The 
same  divine  power  which  gave  the  son  of  Mary  a  holy  nature  or 
disposition  at  his  first  birth,  can  make  any  other  child  of  a  holy 
nature  or  disposition  by  a  new  birth.  This  every  child  of  Adam 
needs  ;  and  without  it  no  one  can  be  saved.  And  when  any  one 
is  renewed  in  infancy,  the  change  will  early  show  itself  in  the  love 
of  truth,  fear  of  sin,  desire  of  religious  instruction,  aspiring  after 
God,  and  other  holy  exercises. 

That  such  a  propensity  to  sin  as  I  have  described,  exists  in  all 
men  from  the  beginning  of  their  life,  and  that  this  constitutes  the 
essence  of  depravity,  has  been  maintained  almost  universally  by 
men  who  have  embraced  the  other  doctrines  of  the  orthodox 
faith.  It  was  held  by  the  ancient  Fathers,  except  the  Pela- 
gians. It  was  and  is  contained  in  all  the  creeds  of  the  Reformed 
churches  in  Europe  and  America.  It  was  held  by  Arminius, 
and  is  now  maintained  by  the  Wesleyan  Methodists.  Even 
those  in  our  country  who  object  to  some  of  the  expressions  and 
modes  of  reasoning  used  by  the  older  Calvinists,  still  believe  it 
to  be  a  fact,  that  a  disposition  or  propensity  to  sin  exists  in  man 
from  the  beginning.  Dr.  Hopkins,  whose  views  on  most  subjects 
are  sober  and  scriptural,  speaks  of  man's  being  sinful  as  soon  as  he 
exists.  He  holds  that  our  moral  corruption  takes  place  "  as  soon 
as  we  become  the  children  of  Adam,"  i.  e.  "  at  the  beginning 
of  our  existence."  He  speaks,  too,  of  our  being  inclined  to  sin 
from  the  first.  Dr.  Dwight  maintains  that  all  men  "  are  born 
sinners  ;  "  — "  that  infants  are  contaminated  in  their  moral 
nature,  and  born  in  the  likeness  of  apostate  Adam ; "  and 
speaks  of  this  as  what  precedes  moral  action  :  and  with  him 
agree  Smalle3\  Hart,  Backus,  and  other  ministers  generally,  who 
were  his  contemporaries.  And  Dr.  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor  has 
pubUshed  it  as  his  belief  "  that  all  mankind,  in  consequence  of 


INNATE     DISPOSITION.  325 

Adam's  fall,  are  horn  destitute  of  holiness,  and  are  by  nature 
totally  depraved.'^  Other  expressions  of  his  on  this  subject  may 
explain  what  he  means  bj  being  bom  destitute  of  holiness,  and 
being  by  nature  totally  depraved.  Speaking  of  mankind  in  their 
present  fiiUen  state,  he  sajs  :  "  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind,  that  it  becomes  the  occasion  of  sin  in  men  in  all  the 
appropriate  circumstances  of  their  existence."  According  to 
him,  then,  it  is  something  in  the  mind  itself,  in  the  verj  nature 
of  the  mind,  which  proves  the  occasion  of  sm.  He  calls  thia 
"  a  tendency  to  sin,"  and  a  tendency  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
mind. 

Various  passages  are  found  in  Stuart's  Commentary  on  the 
Romans,  which  assert  the  same  doctrine.  He  says: — "Men 
are  born  destitute  of  all  disposition  to  holiness."  He  speaks 
often  of  the  "  fallen  nature  and  degenerate  condition  of  Adam's 
posterity."  Of  infants  he  says  ;  —  "  that  their  natural,  unregen- 
erate  state,  is  a  state  of  alienation  from  God,  and  one  which 
needs  the  regenerating  influence  of  the  di\ane  Spirit ;  that  if  they 
are  saved,"  (which  he  hopes  will  be  the  case)  they  must  have  "  a 
taste  "  or  "  relish  for  the  holy  joys  of  heaven  implanted  in  their 
souls."  And  he  asks:  —  "  Is  there  nothing  then  which  Christ  by 
his  Spirit  can  do  for  midguts,  m  implanting  such  a  taste  ?^^  He 
speaks  of  those  who  die  before  they  contract  actual  guilt  in  their 
own  persons,  and  says  ;  "  they  still  need  a  new  heart  and  a  right 
spirit,^''  —  (just  what  all  sinners  need,)  not  prospectively,  but 
now.  And  after  making,  perhaps  inadvertently,  some  free 
remarks,  which  have  commonly  been  understood  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  common  doctrine,  he  takes  special  care  to  inform  us^ 
that  he  beheves  all  Adam's  posterity  to  be  born  into  the  degene- 
rate state  above  described,  and  that  he  has  meant  to  advance 
nothing  at  variance  wth  this  doctrine. 

You  see  how  general  is  the  belief,  that  mankind  are  naturally 
inclined  to  sin,  that  they  are  born  with  a  tendency  to  sin,  a  ten- 
dency existing  in  their  very  nature,  previously  to  moral  action ; 
and  that  this  disposition  or  tendency  constitutes  their  native  state. 
The  question  noAv  is,  whether  it  may  not  be,  partly,  at  Least,  on 

VOL.  n.  28 


326  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

account  of  this  degenerate  nature  of  Adam's  posterity,  that  God 
speaks  of  them,  and  in  his  government  treats  them,  as  sinyiers, 
from  the  very  beginning  of  their  personal  existence,  and  previous- 
ly to  any  actual  transgression.  This  view  of  the  subject  Dr. 
Dwight  particularlj^  maintains  in  his  system  of  Theology.  He 
rejects  the  idea  that  God  inflicts  such  sufferings  as  infants  endure, 
"  on  moral  beings  who  are  perfectly  innocent,"  and  argues  from 
the  sufferings  and  death  of  infants,  "  that  they  are  contaminated 
in  their  moral  nature,  and  born  in  the  likeness  of  apostate 
Adam  ;  "  —  "a  fact,"  he  says,  "  irresistibly  proved,  so  far  as  the 
most  unexceptionable  analogy  can  prove  any  thing,  by  the  de- 
praved moral  conduct  of  every  infant  who  lives  so  long  as  to  be 
capable  of  moral  action." 

This  opinion,  which  has  generally  been  maintained  by  evangeli- 
cal writers,  I  bring  forward  here  as  an  opinion  which  is  not  to  be 
hastily  dismissed  on  account  of  any  speculative  difiBculties.  The 
opinion  may  he  true.  In  our  very  nature,  in  the  state  of  our 
minds  from  the  beginning  of  our  existence,  God  may  see  a  moral 
contamination,  a  corrupt  propensity,  which,  connected  as  it  is  with 
the  first  offence  of  Adam,  renders  it,  in  his  infallible  judgment,  just 
and  right  for  him  to  treat  us  as  sinners.  In  the  native  character 
of  Adam's  posterity,  there  may  be  that  which  is  of  the  nature  of 
moral  evil,  —  essentially  the  same  moral  evil  in  God's  view,  with 
that  which  is  afterwards  made  visible  to  us  by  its  developments. 
And  may  it  not  be  that  infants  suffer  and  die  on  this  account,  as 
well  as  on  account  of  the  one  offence  of  Adam,  according  to 
Rom.  5:  12-19? 

But  there  are  some  who  object  to  calling  any  thing  si7iful,  or 
morally  corrupt,  except  actual  transgression.  They  admit  that 
man  has  a  dispOfsition  or  propensity  to  sin  before  moral  action  com- 
mences ;  but  they  deny  that  such  propensity  is  to  be  denominated 
sinful,  or  to  be  regarded  as  of  a  moral  nature. 

This  point  was  particularly  considered  in  the  controversy  be- 
tween Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Edwards.  In  his  treatise  on  Original 
Sin,  Edwards  makes  a  particular  statement  of  the  points  in  which 
he  and  Taylor  were  agreed.     He  first  lays  down  the  general 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  327 

proposition,  that  mankind  are  all  naturally  in  such  a  state,  that 
they  universally  run  into  that  ichich  is  in  effect  their  own  utter, 
eternal  perdition.  Then  he  presents  it  in  two  parts:  1.  That  all 
men  come  into  the  world  in  such  a  state,  that  they  certainly  and 
universally  commit  sin ;  and  2.  That  all  sin  exposes  to  utter  de- 
struction, and  would  end  in  it,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  of 
divine  grace.  In  these  points,  Taylor  and  Edwards  were  agreed, 
as  Edwards  clearly  shows.  What  then  was  the  grand  point  at 
issue  ?  It  was  the  doctrine  of  innate  depravity.  The  greater 
part  of  Taylor's  book  on  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  original  sin, 
is  against  the  doctrine  of  innate  depravity.  And  Taylor  speaks 
of  the  conveyance  of  a  corrupt  and  sinful  nature  to  Adam's  pos- 
terity, as  the  grand  point  to  be  proved  by  the  maintainors  of  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin.  That  all  men  have  from  the  first  a  cor- 
rupt and  sinful  nature,  is  what  Edwards  undertakes  to  prove  in 
opposition  to  the  system  of  Dr.  John  Taylor.  I  mention  this  as 
a  historical  fact.  And  if  any  one  wishes  to  get  a  just  and  ade- 
quate view  of  the  controversy  which  has  at  different  times  shown 
itself  on  this  subject,  he  will  find  it  specially  important  to  make 
himself  familiar  with  the  writings  of  Edwards  and  Dr.  John  Tay- 
lor on  the  same  subject ;  and  he  can  hardly  stop  without  tracing 
the  controversy  back  to  the  days  of  Augustine  and  Pelagius.  Of 
all  the  books  which  have  ever  been  written  against  the  doctrine  of 
native  depravity  and  in  support  of  the  Pelagian  scheme,  that  of 
Dr.  John  Taylor  exhibits  the  greatest  adroitness,  and  the  most 
taking  plausibility.  Other  things  which  have  been  brought  out 
since,  are  either  a  repetition  of  what  he  wrote,  or  they  hold  forth 
the  substance  of  his  reasoning  in  different  forms.  And  in  my 
view,  no  recent  opposer  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  and  native 
depravity,  has  added  any  thing  to  the  number  or  strength  of  the 
arguments  contained  in  the  writings  of  Dr.  John  Taylor. 

Tlie  subject  now  introduced,  is  one  which  I  cannot  discuss  at 
large,  without  going  far  beyond  my  limits.  I  must  content  my- 
self, therefore,  with  suggesting  a  few  things  on  the  question  at 
issue,  for  the  sake  of  aiding  your  contemplations. 

In  my  judgment,  the  positions  of  Edwards  in  opposition  to  Dr. 


328  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

John  Taylor,  interpreted  hj  common  sense,  and  especially  by  the 
current  representations  of  Scripture  and  by  Christian  experience, 
contain  truths  which  are  essential  to  the  religion  of  the  Gospel. 
What  doctrine  of  natural  religion,  or  of  revelation,  rests  upon 
more  solid  and  more  various  evidence,  than  the  doctrine,  that  all 
men  are  sinners  and  that  from  the  beginning  of  their  existence, 
even  before  they  are  the  subjects  of  any  degree  of  actual  trans- 
gression, they  have  a  depraved  nature,  an  innate  disposition  to  sin? 
Without  a  full  belief  of  this  doctrine,  the  instructions  of  Scripture 
respecting  the  mission  of  Christ  and  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
would  be  strange  and  inconsistent,  and  the  confessions  and 
prayers  of  the  saints,  ancient  and  modern,  would  appear  extrav- 
agant and  unintelhgible.  But  this  doctrine,  which,  as  it  is  set 
forth  in  the  word  of  God,  is  preeminently  plain  and  practical, 
may  be,  and  often  has  been  made  a  subject  of  abstract,  metaphys- 
ical discussion.  And  when  this  is  done,  it  is  no  difficult  task 
for  the  subtlely  of  human  reason  to  urge  very  plausible  arguments 
against  the  common  doctrine  of  man's  innate  moral  depravity. 
But  so  far  as  the  doctrine  is  taught  us  by  the  inspired  writers, 
it  is  our  duty  to  hold  it  fast,  however  unable  we  may  be  to  sus- 
tain it  by  metaphysical  reasoning,  or  to  remove  the  objections 
which  unsanctified  philosophy  may  set  in  array  against  it.  It 
is  a  doctrine  which  is  not  to  be  brought  for  trial  to  the  bar  of 
human  reason.  Mere  natural  reason,  mere  philosophical  or 
metaphysical  sagacity  transcends  its  just  bounds  and  commits  a 
heinous  sacrilege,  when  it  attacks  this  primary  article  of  our 
faith,  and  labors  to  distort  it,  to  undermine  it,  or  to  expose  its 
truth  or  its  importance  to  distrust. 

There  are  however  some  objections  to  the  doctrine  that  man  is 
from  the  first,  the  subject  of  a  corrupt  nature,  an  evil  disposition, 
or  sinful  bias,  which  cannot  be  passed  over  without  notice.  And 
although  the  objections  are  of  such  a  nature  that  I  may  not  be 
able,  directly  and  fully,  to  obviate  them,  I  think  my  remarks  will 
be  sufficient  to  show  that  they  do  by  no  means  disprove  the  truth 
of  the  doctrine,  and  that  those  who  are  enlightened  and  guided 
by  revelation  must  give  to  the  doctrine  their  serious  and  unques- 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  329 

tioning  faith,  notwithstanding  any  objections  or  difficulties  which 
have  been  or  may  be  engendered  by  the  wisdom  of  the  world. 
These  then  are  the  objections  which  I  shall  particularly  notice. 

1.  The  common  doctrine  is  said  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
obvious  import  of  the  divine  law,  which  requires  nothing  but  right 
exerciac  or  action,  and  forbids  nothing  but  the  contrary.  An 
Apostle  describes  shi  to  be  a  transgression  of  the  law.  This,  and 
this  only  can  be  called  moral  evil,  or  sin. 

2.  The  doctrine  that  we  are  the  subjects  of  a  native  propensity 
which  is  morally  corrupt,  and  which  deserves  to  be  called  sinful, 
is  said  by  the  objector  to  be  contrary  to  the  suggestions  of  our 
own  consciousness.  How  can  we  regard  any  thing  as  really  sin- 
ful but  that  of  which  we  are  conscious  ;  and  how  can  we  be  con- 
scious of  any  thing  but  the  exercises  of  our  own  mind  ? 

3.  It  is  said  also,  that  nothing  is  morally  wrong  or  sinful  but  that 
which  is  volant arg  ;  and  that,  as  the  propensity  or  bias  referred 
to,  precedes  all  voluntary  action,  it  cannot  be  considered  as  sinful. 

From  the  following  remarks,  it  w^ill,  I  think,  be  seen,  that  the 
force  of  these  objections  is  liable  to  serious  abatements,  and  can- 
not be  deemed  sufficient  to  overthrow  a  doctrine  clearly  taught 
by  Scripture,  and  confirmed  by  the  history  of  man. 

1.  When  the  Apostle  John  describes  sin  to  be,  as  it  is  rendered 
in  the  common  version,  "  a  transgression  of  the  law,"  he  uses  the 
word  dvofiia,  which  has  not  so  exclusively  an  active  sense,  as  is 
sometimes  thought.  It  may  mean  not  only  actual,  positive  trans- 
gression of  law,  but,  as  our  Catechism  well  expresses  it,  "a  want 
of  conformity  to  law."  If  we  are  destitute  of  any  thing  which 
we  should  have  in  a  state  of  perfect  conformity  with  the  law,  we 
are  chargeable  with  avofiia.  Now  what  is  the  meaning  of  the 
expression,  almost  universally  adopted  by  Christian  divines,  that 
man  is  born  destitute  of  holiness  ?  Holiness  is  conformity  to  the 
law.  And  if  man  is  naturally  destitute  of  holiness,  he  is  destitute 
of  conformity  to  the  law.  But  this  cannot  with  any  propriety  be 
said  of  one  who  is  not  in  any  sense  under  law.  And  if  one  is  un- 
der law,  and  is  destitute  of  conformity  to  law,  he  is  avofiog,  a  sin- 
ner.    Now  is  not  a  disposition  to  holiness  something  which  be- 

28* 


330  INNATE     DISPOSITION. 

longs  to  man  in  a  state  of  moral  rectitude  ?  Did  it  not  belong 
to  Adam  at  the  beginning  of  his  existence  ?  Did  it  not  belong 
to  Jesus  from  the  first  ?  No  intelligent  moral  being  can  be  desti- 
tute of  such  a  disposition  without  being  morally  depraved, — 
without  being  virtually  a  sinner.  It  is  the  united  opinion 
of  the  great  body  of  Christian  commentators  and  divines,  from 
the  Reformation  to  the  present  time,  that  men  come  into  the 
world  in  a  state  of  moral  pollution.  Barnes,  in  his  commentary 
on  Romans,  speaks  familiarly  of  our  "  being  born  with  a  corrupt 
disposition,"  and  of  our  "  nature "  as  being  "  corrupt."  Un- 
questionably he  means  to  speak  of  a  moral,  and  not  of  a  physical 
corruption.  Such  a  moral  cormption  seems  to  be  naturally  im- 
plied in  the  language  of  all  those  who  represent  men  at  the  be- 
ginning of  their  existence  as  destitute  of  holiness,  as  born  destitute 
of  all  disposition  to  holiness,  and  as  the  subjects  of  &  fallen  nature. 
This  destitution  of  holiness  in  moral  beings,  in  other  words,  this 
wa7it  of  conformity  to  the  law,  may,  it  is  thought,  be  fairly  includ- 
ed in  the  word  dvofii'a,  which  the  Apostle  uses  to  describe  sin. 

2.  It  may  be  a  serious  question,  whether  consciousness  does 
not,  in  some  sense,  extend  further  than  to  intellectual  and  moral 
exercise.  Who  doubts  that  we  are  conscious  of  existence  f  And 
yet  is  not  our  existence  something  different  from  exercise  or 
action  ?  Does  it  not  precede  action  ?  How  then  do  we  become 
conscious  of  existence  ?  We  become  conscious  of  it,  only  as  it 
is  developed  in  action.  Who  doubts  that  we  are  conscious  of 
the  faculty  of  thinking,  remembering,  loving,  willing  ?  And  yet 
it  is  manifest  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  these  faculties,  except 
as  they  are  brought  to  view  by  their  exercise.  It  is  very  common 
to  speak  of  our  having  a  consciousness  of  a  poiver  or  ability  to 
do  this  or  that ;  though  we  are  conscious  of  having  the  power 
only  by  its  exercise.  We  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  conscious- 
ness in  such  a  case,  though  it  is  not  immediate  or  direct  con- 
sciousness. And  why  should  consciousness  be  thought  any  the 
less  real,  because  i-t  is  indirect  and  because  we  come  to  have  it 
by  means  of  exercise  ? 

It  is  customary  to  use  the  word  consciousness  in  relation  to  the 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  331 

present  subject.  We  say  a  man  is  conscious  of  a  revengeful 
disposition,  or  of  a  benevolent,  compassionate  disposition,  or 
of  a  propensity  to  covetousness,  though  he  cannot  be  conscious 
of  one  or  the  other,  except  as  it  is  developed  in  the  feelings  and 
acts  of  his  mind.  Now  if  a  man  is  in  this  way  conscious  of  a 
disposition  to  benevolence,  does  not  a  sentiment  of  self-approval 
arise  within  him  ?  And  if  he  is  conscious  of  a  propensity  to 
covetousness  or  revenge,  does  not  a  sentiment  of  self-disapproval 
arise  ?  Men  generally  regard  a  settled  disposition  in  regard  to 
moral  objects,  as  the  substance  of  all  that  they  mean  by  character, 
whether  good  or  bad. 

If  then  we  are  conscious,  in  the  manner  just  stated,  of  what 
we  call  a  disposition  or  propensity,  and  if  we  do  really  ascribe 
this  to  ourselves,  as  virtually  containing  whatever  goes  to  consti- 
tute character ;  may  it  not  be  true,  that  in  some  analogous  sense, 
the  original  disposition  or  native  propensity  of  man  to  sin,  is  to 
be  regarded  as  the  basis  or  chief  element  of  his  character  ? 
May  we  not,  in  our  reflections,  trace  back  the  sinful  feelings 
and  actions  of  our  childhood  and  youth  to  this  native  disposition, 
and  thus  become,  in  the  manner  above  described,  conscious  of 
such  a  disposition  ?  And  may  not  this  disposition,  developed 
and  made  visible  to  consciousness  by  subsequent  sinful  action,  be 
as  properly  considered  to  be  morally  wrong,  as  a  disposition  to 
covetousness  or  revenge  which  any  adult  person  now  has,  and 
which  he  will  hereafter  develop  in  action  ?  In  other  words,  may 
not  the  original  native  disposition  to  sin  be  essentially  of  the 
same  nature,  though  not  existing  in  the  same  degree  of  strength, 
with  the  disposition  to  sin  which  a  man  has  at  any  time  in  after 
life  when  he  is  not  actually  sinning  ? 

The  view  which  has  now  been  presented  is  the  one  which  has 
been  generally  entertained  by  Orthodox  divines.  And  does  it 
not  agree  with  plain  common  sense  ?  Ask  any  one,  who  has 
learnt  the  use  of  language,  and  who  judges  of  things  naturally, 
whether  a  disposition  to  do  wrong  is  not  a  wrong  disposition'? 
InijUire  what  he  means  when  he  says,  a  man  has  a  had  dispo- 
aition ;  and  you  will  find  his  meaning  to  be,  that  the  man  has 


332  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

a  disposition  to  do  had  actions.  The  disposition  is  characterized 
by  the  actions  to  which  it  leads.  You  maj  saj,  the  character 
then  belongs  to  the  disposition  only  in  a  relative  sense.  Be  it  so. 
A  relative  sense  may  be  a  yqvj  proper  and  important  sense.  If 
you  object  to -expressions,  because  they  contain  words  which  have 
only  a  relative  sense,  you  would  object  to  a  great  part  of  the 
expressions  in  common  use. 

The  application  of  epithets  denoting  a  moral  quality,  to  the 
disposition  or  propensity  which  originally  belongs  to  man,  is  ana- 
logous to  our  usual  practice  in  other  cases  similar  to  this.  A 
disposition  to  benevolent  acts,  though  not  now  in  exercise,  is 
called  a  benevolent  disposition  ;  a  disposition  to  revenge,  a  re- 
vengeful disposition ;  a  disposition  to  honesty,  an  honest  disposi- 
tion ;  and  a  disposition  to  feelings  of  envy,  an  envious  disposition. 
In  these  and  various  other  instances,  epithets  denoting  moral 
qualities  are  familiarly  applied  to  the  dispositions  of  men,  although 
it  is  understood  that  those  dispositions  are  not  at  the  time  devel- 
oped in  any  kind  of  action.  And  if  every  other  disposition  may 
properly  be  characterized  from  the  feelings  and  actions  to  which 
it  leads  ;  why  may  not  a  disposition  to  sin  f  And  if  a  disposition 
to  sin  in  one  period  of  our  life  may  be  called  a  sinful  disposition, 
why  not  in  another  period  ?  If  in  after  life,  why  not  in  the  begin- 
ning of  life  ? 

See  how  the  case  would  stand,  if  we  should  take  the  opposite 
ground :  And  this,  you  are  sensible,  is  one  of  the  approved 
methods  of  coming  at  a  right  conclusion.  Say,  then,  a  man  has 
a  disposition  to  do  wrong,  but  his  disjwsitiori  is  7iot  tvrong ;  a 
disposition  to  envy,  but  his  disposition  is  not  envious  ;  a  disposition 
to  revenge,  but  his  disposition  is  not  revengeful ;  a  disposition  to 
commit  tlieft,  but  his  disposition  is  not  at  all  thievish  j  a  disposi- 
tion to  acts  Q)i piety,  but  his  disposition  is  not  pious  ; — and  finally, 
a  disposition  to  commit  sin,  but  his  disposition  is  not  at  all  sinful. 
The  same  in  regard  to  the  word  propensity,  inclination,  heart,  or 
nature.  Thus  a  man  has  a  strong  propensity  to  avarice,  but  not 
an  avaricious  propensity ;  an  inclination  to  do  wrong,  but  not  a 
tvrong  inclination  ;  a  heart  to  disobey  God,  but  not  a  disobedient 


INNATE     DISPOSITION.  333 

heart ;  a  nature  to  sin,  but  not  a  sinful  nature.  Who  docs  not 
see  all  this  to  be  a  series  of  self-contradictions  ? 

On  this  subject  the  Scriptures  fully  justify  the  common  modes 
of  speech.  They  represent  the  tree  that  bears  good  fruit  to  be 
a  good  tree  ;  and  the  tree  that  bears  corrupt  fruit  to  be  a  corrupt 
tree.  They  speak  of  a  heart  which  devises  liberal  things,  or 
leads  to  acts  of  liberality,  as  a  "  liberal  heart ;  "  of  a  heart  from 
which  feelings  and  acts  of  purity  proceed,  as  a  "  'pure  heart ; " 
of  a  heart  which  leads  to  evil  deeds,  as  an  "  evil  heart ;  "  of  a 
heart  which  receives  the  truth  and  puts  forth  honest  and  good 
desires  and  purposes,  as  "  an  honest  and  good  heart  ;^^  and  of 
the  heart  of  man  generally,  which  prompts  to  deceitful  and  wicked 
exercises  and  practices,  as  a  "  deceitful  and  wicked  heart."  They 
represent  that  treasure  of  the  heart  from  which  good  things  are 
brought  forth,  to  be  a  "  good  treasure  ;  "  and  that  treasure  from 
which  evil  things  are  brought  forth,  to  be  an  "  evil  treasure." 
That  heart  means  something  which  precedes  moral  exercises,  is 
evident  from  Matt.  15 :  19 ;  in  which  moral  exercises,  even 
"  thoughts,''^  are  said  to  come  forth  out  of  the  heart.  "  For  out 
of  the  heart  proceed  evil  thoughts,  murders,  adulteries,  etc." 
Now  the  heart  from  which  "  evil  thoughts  "  and  these  various 
forms  of  wickedness  come  forth,  is  the  heart  which  in  Scripture 
is  called  wicked,  deceitful,  unclean.  On  the  same  ground,  that  is 
called  a  "  carnal  mind,"  from  which  carnal  thoughts  and  desires 
proceed. 

In  all  the  cases  above  mentioned,  and  in  others  of  like  kind, 
common  use  sanctions  the  propriety  of  characterizing  the  dispo- 
sition, inclination,  propensity,  heart,  from  those  feelings  and  actions 
which  naturally  proceed  from  it.  If  those  feelings  and  actions  are 
right,  the  disposition  which  leads  to  them  is  right ;  if  wrong,  the 
disposition  is  wrong. 

I  might  show  that  the  same  mode  of  applying  epithets  is  found 
in  the  Bible  and  in  common  discourse,  respecting  other  subjects. 
Thus  the  law,  which  requires  holy  actions,  is  a  holy  law  ;  and  a 
law  which  leads  to  unjust  and  cruel  actions,  is  an  unjust  and 
cruel  law.    Now  the  divine  laiv  is  not  action,  and  yet  it  is  a  moral 


334  INNATE     DISPOSITION. 

law,  and  is  holy  and  good,  and  deserves  our  approbation.  An 
unjust  law  is  not  action  ;  still  we  say,  it  is  unjust,  and  deserves 
our  disapprobation.  Such  is  the  common  mode  of  speaking, 
and  such  it  will  be.  If  you  say  the  words  holy,  unjust,  etc., 
in  such  cases,  are  used  in  a  relative  sense  ;  I  have  only  to  reply, 
that  the  sense  is  indeed  relative,  but  none  the  less  real  or  im- 
portant. 

But  is  there  not  a  difference  between  what  we  call  disposition 
in  a  person  of  adult  years,  whose  state  of  mind  is  the  result  of 
repeated  moral  acts,  and  what  we  call  disposition,  before  moral 
action  has  commenced  ?  Undoubtedly  there  is  a  difference  as  to 
the  degree  of  strength,  and  as  to  the  degree  in  which  moral 
qualities  may  properly  be  predicated  of  it,  or  rather  of  the  person 
who  possesses  it.  There  may  be  a  difference  as  to  other  circum- 
stances also.  But  in  some  respects  there  is  a  manifest  similarity. 
In  both  cases,  the  disposition  equally  precedes  action.  In  both 
cases,  it  equally  ijroduces  action  and  develops  itself  in  action. 
In  both  cases,  therefore,  it  has  the  same  relation  to  action. 
Accordingly  it  has,  in  both  cases,  the  same  bearing  upon  the 
position,  that  nothing  but  action  can  be  denominated  morally 
good  or  bad.  There  is,  then,  a  similarity  as  to  the  main  points. 
Now  if  it  is  proper  to  attribute  moral  qualities  to  disposition  as  it 
exists  in  an  adult  agent,  who  is  not  at  the  time  developing  his 
disposition  in  action  ;  why  is  it  not  proper  to  attribute  moral 
qualities  to  disposition,  as  it  exists  in  the  mind  before  moral  action 
has  commenced  ?  In  both  cases  it  is  equally  distinct  from  moral 
action,  and  equally  develops  itself  in  moral  action.  In  both  cases 
it  has,  of  course,  the  same  kind  of  relation  to  the  exercises  wliich 
arise  from  it. 

Such  considerations  as  these  have  occurred  to  me  in  favor  of 
the  common  opinion.  And  there  is  one  more  consideration,  which 
is  of  superior  importance  to  any  other ;  namely,  that  the  opposite 
opinion  has  a  manifest  tendency  to  prevent  a  just  impression  of 
the  evil  of  sin.  If  men  beUeve  that  a  disposition  to  transgress 
is  not  morally  wrong,  they  Avill  be  very  likely  to  infer,  that  trans- 
gression itself  is  not  morally  wrong.     For  who  can  think  that  an 


INNATE     DISPOSITION.  335 

act  is  wrong,  when  the  disposition  from  \Yhich  it  proceeds  is  not 
wrong?  that  an  act  is  criminal,  when  a  propensity  to  that  act 
is  perfectly  innocent  ?  How  utterly  abhorrent  would  it  be  to 
conscience,  common  sense,  and  piety,  to  tell  men,  that  their  pro- 
pensity to  lie,  and  steal,  and  murder  has  nothing  in  it  which  is  in 
the  least  degree  faulty !  that  their  disposition  to  forget  God  and 
disobey  his  law,  is  not  at  all  sinful,  and  cannot  be  looked  upon 
with  any  disapprobation !  What  would  be  the  natural  influence 
of  this  view  of  the  subject  upon  the  minds  of  men  ?  Would  it 
be  hkely  to  produce  in  them  a  deep  conviction  of  sin,  such  as 
David  expressed  in  the  51st  Psalm,  and  Paul  in  the  5th  and  7th 
chapters  of  his  epistle  to  the  Romans  ?  Would  it  make  them  feel 
the  inexpressible  evil  of  a  "  carnal  mind,"  and  a  "  heart  of 
stone,"  and  the  necessity  of  its  being  taken  away  by  the  regen- 
erating power  of  God  ?  Would  it  lead  them  fervently  to  pray, 
that  God  would  create  in  them  a  new  heart  and  a  right  spirit  ? 
Who  will  labor  most  to  resist  and  overcome  his  propensity  to 
•\vicked  courses,  —  he  that  regards  it  as  innocent,  or  he  that 
regards  it  as  criminal  and  hateful  ?  Will  it  not  be  very  natural 
for  any  one  to  say  ;  if  my  disposition  to  transgress  the  divine  law 
has  nothing  sinful  in  it,  why  should  I  be  solicitous  to  be  rid  of  it  ? 
Can  I  be  bound  in  duty  to  take  pains  to  subdue  that,  which  has 
nothing  wrong  in  it  ?  Can  I  be  blamed  for  having  a  propensity 
which  is  not  blame-worthy  ?  There  would  be  very  good  reason 
why  I  should  earnestly  pray  God  to  subdue  a  disposition,  which  I 
felt  to  be  morally  wrong  and  culpable.  But  why  should  I  be 
earnest  in  prayer  to  God,  that  he  would  subdue  a  disposition 
which  is  not  wrong  ?  On  the  whole,  what  kind  of  advantage  can 
there  be  in  the  sentiment,  that  a  disposition  to  do  wrong  is  not  of 
a  moral  nature  ?  Will  sinners  be  more  likely  to  repent,  and  to 
get  rid  of  the  propensity  of  their  hearts  to  sin,  because  you  call 
that  propensity  by  a  soft  name  ?  The  existence  of  such  a  propen- 
sity in  the  heart  is  a  hateful  and  dangerous  thing.  Will  you  make 
it  any  the  less  so  by  calling  it  innocent  ? 

I  have  endeavored  to  point  out  what  would  be  the  natural 
result  of  the  opinion,  that  a  propensity  to  sin  is  not  sinful.     If 


336  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

any  who  advance  this  opinion,  have  a  meaning  in  their  own  minds 
which  would  not  lead  to  such  a  result,  that  meaning  is  too  recon- 
dite for  common  apprehension.  It  ia  certain  that  all  the  usual 
modes  of  speech  in  relation  to  this  subject  imply,  that  a  i^ropen- 
sity  partakes  of  the  same  moral  quality  with  the  acts  which  pro- 
ceed from  it ;  that  a  disposition  is  wrong,  if  it  prompts  to  wrong 
conduct,  and  because  it  does  so  ;  in  other  words,  that  the 
nature  of  the  disposition  is  determined  from  the  7iature  of  the 
exercises  and  actions  to  which  it  leads.  This  is  all  implied  in 
the  common  forms  of  speech,  and  in  the  common  forms  of 
thought.  And  it  is  a  well-known  fact,  that  the  more  men's 
understanding  becomes  enlightened  by  divine  truth,  and  the 
more  their  conscience  is  awakened  to  do  its  oflfice,  the  more 
thoroughly  are  they  convinced  of  the  sinfulness  of  their  disposi- 
tion to  depart  from  God,  and  the  more  desirous  are  they  of  an 
influence  from  above  to  remove  it.  "When  men  are  taught  of 
God,  their  minds  in  general  are  first  occupied  with  their  overt 
acts  of  \Yickedness.  But  they  come  in  the  end  to  a  deep  and 
humbling  conviction  of  the  moral  turpitude  of  that  constant  dis- 
position, which  they  find  within  them,  to  forsake  the  way  of 
holiness  and  pursue  forbidden  objects.  Once,  in  a  state  of  moral 
insensibility,  they  saw  httle  or  no  evil  in  their  disposition  to  forget 
God  and  transgress  his  law  ;  perhaps  they  justified  it.  Now 
they  look  upon  it  as  the  essence  of  moral  evil.  It  is  on  account 
of  this  urgent  propensity  to  do  wrong,  this  sin  which  dwelleth  in 
them,  that  they  most  heartily  abhor  themselves.  And  they  pray 
to  God  most  importunately,  that  they  may  be  deUvered  from  this 
"  law  of  sin,"  this  "  carnal  mind,"  this  "  body  of  death,"  this 
sum  of  all  that  is  vile  and  hateful.  Now  if  any  one  comes 
forward  and  advances  the  opinion,  that  a  disposition  or  propensity 
to  sin  is  not  in  its  own  nature  sinful,  does  he  not  set  himself,  how- 
ever unintentionally,  in  opposition  to  the  most  spiritual  convictions 
of  Christians  ?  And  does  he  not  teach  that  which  the  worst  men 
wish  to  be  true,  and  which,  if  they  can  believe  it  to  be  true,  wiU 
do  much  towards  keeping  their  consciences  quiet  in  an  unregen- 
erate  state  ?     In  a  word,  whatever  else  such  a  man  may  teach 


INNATE     DISPOSITION.  33T 

and  do  to  benefit  the  souls  of  men,  will  not  this  opinion  have  a 
fearful  influence  to  hinder  the  conviction  and  conversion  of  sin- 
ners ? 

Let  us  take  one  more  view  of  the  subject. 

It  has  been  the  common  belief  of  orthodox  Christians,  that 
one  of  the  most  important  things  which  the  regenerating  influence 
of  the  Spirit  accomplishes,  is,  to  take  away  man's  natural  pro- 
pemity  to  sin,  and  to  give  him  a  disposition  to  love  and  obey 
God.  Now  if  a  uniform  and  predominant  propensity  to  sin  is 
not  sinful,  then  why  should  we  suppose  that  regeneration  takes  it 
away  ?  Regeneration,  it  would  seem,  must  act  upon  man  as  a 
moral  being,  and  remove  that  which  is  morally  ivrong.  The  rest 
may  be  left  as  it  was.  But  according  to  the  opinion  upon  which 
I  have  animadverted,  a  sinner  may  be  regenerated,  and  still  have 
the  same  propensity  to  sin  as  before  ;  and  his  sanctification,  relat- 
ing as  it  does  to  what  is  moral,  may  go  on,  and  he  may  become 
perfect  in  holiness,  and  still  uniformly  retain  his  sinless  disposition 
to  commit  sin.  Why  not  ?  Surely  holiness  cannot  be  supposed 
incompatible  with  any  of  our  innocent  propensities. 

But  who  can  doubt  that  the  natural  propensity  which  men  have 
to  sin  must  be  subdued,  and  finally  taken  away,  by  the  sanctifying 
influence  of  the  Spirit  ?  And  the  reason  why  certain  writers  do 
not  represent  the  removal  of  man's  propensity  to  sin  as  an  essen- 
tial part  of  regeneration,  is,  I  suppose,  that  they  first  adopt  the 
principle,  that  nothing  is  morally  good  or  evil,  but  action,  (mental 
action,)  and  then  as  regeneration  is  a  moral  change,  conclude  that 
it  can  relate  onl}'  to  action,  and  can  have  nothing  to  do  with  any 
thing  in  the  mind  which  precedes  action,  and  which  is  not  action, 
lest  somehow  it  should  come  to  be  a  physical  change.  But  who 
does  not  see  that  regeneration  would  be  of  little  worth,  should  it 
leave  the  regenerated  person  still  under  the  influence  of  his  natu- 
ral and  predominant  inclination  to  sin  ?  and  those  who  say  that 
this  propensity  to  sin  is  not  morally  wrong,  must  still  so  shape  the 
matter,  that  regeneration,  though  relating,  as  they  think,  only  to 
action,  shall,  in  some  way  or  other,  remove  the  naivivdl  propensity . 
And  of  course  they  must  hold,  that  regeneration  is,  in  part  at 

VOL.  n.  29 


338  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

least,  a  physical  change,  inasmuch  as  it  removes  a  propensity 
which  they  say  is  of  a  physical,  not  of  a  moral  nature.  But  it  ia 
very  certain  that  the  renewing  influence  of  the  Spirit,  whether 
called  moral  or  physical,  tmist  take  away  a  man's  governing  pro- 
pensity to  sin,  or  he  would  need  to  be  changed  again  by  some 
other  influence,  in  order  that  he  might  be  prepared  to  obey  God, 
—  unless  indeed  a  man  can  truly  obey  God,  while  he  has  a  uni- 
form and  governing  propensity  to  disobey.  I  repeat  it,  man's  nat- 
ural propensity  to  sin  must  he  removed  ;  —  yes,  however  that  pro- 
pensity may  be  covered  over  by  gentle  epithets,  it  is  a  great  and 
destructive  evil,  and  must  be  removed  by  the  renewing  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  or  it  will  bring  ruin  upon  the  soul.  And  if  any  one 
should  still  represent,  that  the  great  and  only  thing  that  is  neces- 
sary is,  that  the  actions  should  be  made  right,  and  that  it  is  solely 
for  this  end  that  we  need  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost ;  such 
a  representation  would  require  that  the  words  of  our  Saviour,  — 
"  Make  the  tree  good  and  \hQ  fruit  will  be  good  also,"  should  be  so 
altered  as  to  read  thus: — make  the  fruit  good,  "  and  the  fruit 
tvill  be  good."  — The  fruit  would  no  longer  show  what  the  tree  is. 
For  though  the  fruit  might  be  good,  the  tree  might  still  be  bad. 
And  the  badness  of  the  tree,  would  on  this  ground  be  no  evil, 
and  might  very  safely  remain,  there  being  no  kind  of  necessity 
either  first  or  last,  to  make  the  tree  good  in  order  to  have  good 
fruit. 

In  the  extended  remarks  which  I  have  made  on  this  subject, 
I  have  wished  to  follow  the  dictates  of  justice  and  candor.  The 
theory  which  I  have  attempted  to  defend  is  generally  regarded  as 
different  from  that  which  only  represents  man  as  responsible  for 
his  actions.  In  some  respects  it  is  different.  But  we  know  that, 
in  many  cases,  two  theories  which  are  in  some  respects  different, 
and  which  are  often  supposed  to  be  opposite  to  each  other,  will 
on  thorough  examination  be  found  to  be  not  only  consistent  with 
each  other,  but  to  be  merely  different  views  of  one  and  the  same 
thing.  I  may  survey  an  object  from  one  position,  and  see  it  on 
one  side,  while  you  survey  it  from  another  position,  and  see  it  on 
another   side.      Confining   ourselves   respectively   to   these   first 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  339 

views,  we  may  charge  each  other  with  mistake  ;  and  you  may 
contend  for  your  own  particular  view,  and  I  for  mine,  as  exclu- 
sively true.  And  exclusively  true  it  might  really  be,  if  the  object 
before  us  had  no  other  side  but  that  which  you  survey,  or  that 
which  I  survey.  But  if  jou  and  I  should  change  positions  and 
turn  our  eye  towards  the  same  object  on  different  sides,  we 
should  come  to  a  different  conclusion.  We  might  not  indeed  give 
up  our  former  views  as  false.  But  we  should  add  other  views, 
and  should  modify  our  former  views,  so  far  as  our  additional  views 
required.  We  should  at  least,  correct  one  great  mistake,  that  is, 
our  supposing  that  the  object  had  only  one  side,  and  that  the  par- 
ticular view  we  respectively  took  of  it,  was  the  only  one  which 
could  be  taken.  The  final  result  would  be,  that  by  a  farther  ex- 
amination, —  by  going  beyond  our  former  partial  views,  and  en- 
larging our  knowledge,  we  should  be  satisfied,  that  each  of  the 
different  views  which  we  first  took  of  the  subject,  had  a  portion 
of  truth  ;  that  those  views  which  once  seemed  to  clash  with  each 
other,  are  perfectly  consistent ;  that  our  opposition  to  each  other 
arose  from  our  limited  knowledge  ;  and  that  our  examination  of 
other  parts  of  the  subject  has  not  only  increased  our  knowledge, 
but  has  given  greater  clearness  and  correctness  to  the  particular 
views  which  we  first  had.  Locke,  speaking  of  "  three  mis- 
carriages "  that  men  are  chargeable  wuth  in  reference  to  the  use 
of  their  reason,  says :  "  The  third  sort  is  of  those  who  sincerely 
follow  reason,  but  for  want  of  that  which  one  may  call  large^ 
sound,  round-about  sense,  have  not  a  full  view  of  all  that  relates 
to  the  question.  We  are  all  short-sighted,  and  very  often  see  but 
one  side  of  a  matter ;  our  views  are  not  extended  to  all  that  has 
connection  with  it.  We  see  but  in  part ;  —  and  therefore  it  is 
no  wonder  we  conclude  not  right  from  our  partial  views.  This 
might  instruct  the  proudest  esteemer  of  his  own  parts,  how  useful 
it  is  to  talk  and  consult  with  others.  For  since  no  one  sees  all, 
and  we  generally  have  difierent  prospects  of  the  same  thing  ac- 
cording to  our  different  positions,  —  it  is  not  beneath  any  man  to 
try  whether  another  may  not  have  notions  of  things  which  have 
escaped  him  and  which  his  reason  wo\ild  make  use  of  if  they  came 
into  his  mind." 


340  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

In  regard  to  the  subject  under  consideration,  that  view,  which 
seems  most  nearly  to  accord  with  Scripture,  and  with  our  own 
consciousness,  and  which  will  be  most  likely  in  the  end  to  be 
generally  adopted,  is,  I  think,  one  which  substantially  unites  the 
two  theories  that  have  been  considered.     Let  us  look  at  it. 

The  moral  nature  or  disposition  of  man,  though  it  may  be  con- 
templated as  distinct  from  action,  mental  as  well  as  bodily,  and 
though  it  is  evidently  pre-supposed  in  action,  does  not  exist  in  such 
a  manner,  that  it  can  be  really  regarded  and  treated  as  in  fact 
exclusive  of  action.  What  I  mean  is,  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  a  moral  being  ivho  is  actually  treated  as  a  subject  of  retribu- 
tion, while  his  moral  natuj-e  is  not  in  some  way  developed  in  holy 
or  unholy  action.  The  very  idea  of  a  moral  agent  receiving  ret- 
ribution, imphes  the  exercise  of  his  moral  faculties,  the  acting  out 
of  his  disposition.  That  any  one  can,  as  a  rational  being,  enjoy 
good,  or  suffer  evil,  without  mental  action  is  inconceivable.  I 
say,  then,  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  reward  or  punish- 
ment actually  dispensed  to  a  moral  being,  whose  moral  nature  is 
not  developed  in  some  kind  of  exercise.  The  disposition,  the  in- 
telUgent  nature  does  indeed  exist ;  it  is  a  reality  ;  and  God  is  per- 
fectly acquainted  with  it,  before  it  is  made  known  by  action. 
But  it  cannot  be  known  to  created  beings,  not  even  to  him  who 
is  the  subject  of  it,  except  as  manifested  by  internal  or  external 
action.  It  cannot  in  any  other  way  become  a  matter  of  direct 
consciousness.  And  as  it  cannot  be  known,  it  cannot  be  visibly 
recompensed,  aside  from  its  outgoings  in  action. 
r  But  here  a  question  arises,  which  it  is  more  easy  to  propose, 
than  to  answer ;  to  wit ;  what  will  become  of  human  beings,  who 
Idie  before  their  moral  nature  is  in  any  way  developed  in  action? 

The  most  proper  reply  to  this  inquiry  is,  to  say  frankly,  that  it 
is  a  subject  which  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  our  intelligence. 
Neither  our  own  reason  nor  the  word  of  God  furnishes  us  with 
any  adequate  information.  All  that  we  learn  from  Scripture 
respecting  a  future  retribution  relates  to  those  who  acted  right  or 
wrong  m  a  state  of  probation,  and  who  are  to  be  rewarded  "  ac- 
cording to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body."     Respectuig  any  other 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  341 

retribution  than  this,  we  are  left  in  ignorance.  It  cannot  be 
doubted,  that  those  who  die  before  they  have  done  good  or  evil, 
and  before  they  have  had  any  mental  action,  either  holy  or  sinful, 
will  exist  in  a  future  world.  But  they  cannot  in  any  conceivable 
sense  be  regarded  as  moral  agents  who  have  passed  through  a 
state  of  trial.  They  cannot  "  receive  according  to  w^hat  they 
have  done,"  as,  by  the  very  supposition,  they  have  done  nothing. 
None  of  our  ordinary  conceptions  respecting  a  just  retribution 
can  apply  to  them.  There  is  a  veil  over  the  particulars  of  their 
future  state,  except  that  the  word  of  God  contains  some  most 
pleasing  intimations  that  divine  grace  will  sanctify  them,  and 
that  they  will  belong  to  the  Redeemer's  kingdom.  I  am  not 
aware  that  any  intelligent  Christian  can  be  found,  who  main- 
tains the  unauthorized  and  appalling  position,  that  infant  child- 
ren who  are  not  guilty  of  any  actual  sin  either  outwardly  or 
inwardly,  will  be  doomed  to  misery  in  the  world  to  come. 
It  is  much  more  in  accordance  with  what  we  are  taught  of 
the  expansive  benevolence  of  God  and  the  reign  of  grace,  to 
cherish  the  idea  that  through  the  operation  of  the  divine  Spirit 
they  will  be  born  again,  and  so  be  delivered  from  their  evil  bias, 
and  be  brought  to  possess  a  state  of  mind  which  will  prepare 
them  to  love  and  obey  God  as  soon  as  they  are  capable  of  moral 
exercises.  And  as  by  the  supposition  they  are  not  capable  of 
this  in  the  present  world,  it  follows  of  course  that  the  first  devel- 
opment of  their  moral  nature  must  take  place  after  death.  If 
they  were  to  be  left  in  their  unrenewed  state,  with  their  natural 
propensity  to  sin,  their  character  would  then  be  exhibited  in  sin- 
ful feelings  and  actions.  But  if  regeneration,  which  we  know  to 
be  indispensable  to  salvation,  takes  place  in  those  who  die  in 
infancy,  as  we  trust  it  will,  then,  as  soon  as  they  have  opportunity 
in  the  coming  world,  they  will  act  out  their  renewed  nature  in 
spontaneously  loving  what  is  holy,  and  their  condition  will  be 
fixed  according  to  the  first  development  of  their  moral  state  in 
moral  action. 

You  wUl  perceive  that  what  I  have  now  stated  is  not  what  the 

Scriptures  teach  as  to  a  futui-e  retribution.     Their  instructions, 

29* 


342  INNATE     DISPOSITION. 

on  this  subject,  relate  to  those  -vvho  have  done  good  or  evil  in  this 
life,  and  cannot  be  applied  to  those  -who  have  done  neither.  What 
the  word  of  God  reveals  as  the  rule  of  the  final  judgment,  will  most 
certainly  be  the  universal  rule  in  relation  to  those  to  whom  it  can 
apply.  In  what  manner  others  will  be  treated,  is  one  of  the 
secret  things  which  belong  to  God,  All  that  we  know  is,  that 
God  reigns,  that  his  ways  are  just  and  right,  that  his  mercy  in 
redemption  will  abound  above  our  highest  conceptions,  and  that 
his  proceedings  in  the  world  to  come  towards  infant  children,  as 
well  as  towards  all  others,  will  most  clearly  manifest  his  perfec- 
tions, and  especially  his  infinite  love. 

I  am  not  confident  that  the  remarks  which  I  have  made  are  ex- 
actly conformed  to  truth.  I  would  only  recommend  them  to  a  care- 
ful consideration.  I  have  said,  that  the  native  disposition  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  actually  standing  alone.  While  any  one  exists 
and  continues  to  exist  with  a  disposition  or  propensity,  which  has 
not  in  any  way  been  manifested  by  action,  how  can  he  be  treated 
as  a  subject  of  retribution  ?  Though  his  disposition  is  wrong,  — 
j(wrong  as  a  dispositmi)  he  must  ultimately  be  treated  according 
(to  his  actions,  they  being  the  true  expression  of  his  disposition. 
His  being  treated  according  to  his  actions  seems  thus  to  amount 
to  the  same  thing  as  being  treated  according  to  his  disposition. 
The  former  is  made  the  express  rule  of  the  divine  conduct  towards 
man  for  the  obvious  reason,  that  actions  are  directly  visible  to 
conscience,  and  can  be  compared  with  law  by  the  subjects  of  law, 
and  so  are  the  proper  grounds  of  recompense.  In  the  divine 
government,  then,  disposition  is  in  fact  treated  as  morally  wrong, 
only  as  developed  in  action,  and  as  thus  made  visible  to  those 
who  are  the  subjects  of  that  government.  A  government  which 
is  addressed  to  conscience,  must  be  administered  in  this  manner. 
And  if  any  one  speaks  of  our  natural  pravity  as  deserving  the 
divine  displeasure,  he  must  intend  to  speak  of  it  as  developed  in 
moral  action. 

The  two  views  which  have  been  taken  of  the  subject  need  not, 
then,  be  regarded  as  opposite  and  clashing  views.  They  are  only 
different  views  of  the  same  subject,  contemplated  under  different 


INNATE    DISPOSITION.  343 

aspects.  Man,  at  the  commencement  of  his  existence,  is,  accord- 
ing to  one  view,  characterized  from  his  disposition,  and  is  regarded 
as  sinful  as  soon  as  he  is  born,  on  account  of  his  invariable  pro- 
pensity to  sin.  But  then,  according  to  the  other  view,  this  pro- 
pensity to  sin  is  really  connected  with  sinful  emotion,  and  is 
certainly  followed  by  it.  Man,  considered  in  one  point  of  view, 
is  judged  according  to  his  actions;  in  another  point  of  view, 
according  to  his  disposition  as  developed  in  actions.  If  the  dis- 
position is  pronounced  to  be  sinful,  it  is  pronounced  to  be  so 
relatively  to  the  action  to  which  it  leads.  And  if  the  action  is 
pronounced  sinful,  it  is  relatively  to  the  mind,  and  the  disposition 
of  the  mind,  from  which  it  proceeds.  Each  is  invariably  related 
to  the  other,  and  in  our  sober  contemplations,  and  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  each  is  involved  in  the  other.  If  any  one  regards 
moral  quahties  as  belonging  to  either  as  though  it  were  entirely 
separate  from  the  other,  he  is  mistaken.  He  does  not  conform  to 
the  nature  of  things.  And  if  any  one  confines  his  attention  to 
either,  exclusively  of  the  other,  does  he  not  betray  the  want  of 
enlargement  in  his  habits  of  thinking  ?  And  let  me  add,  if  any 
one  forgets  that  all  moral  attributes  and  qualities  do,  in  strict 
propriety,  belong  to  the  intelhgent  person,  the  agent  himself,  and 
are  to  be  ascribed  to  him,  and  to  him  only,  he  forgets  an  obvious 
and  essential  truth  ;  and  forgets  it,  I  apprehend,  for  no  other 
reason,  than  because  it  is  so  obvious.  Most  clearly  it  is  the 
mind,  or  rather  the  man  himself,  that  is  depraved  and  sinful. 
This  sinful  being  acts  ;  and  being  sinful  himself,  he  acts  sinfully. 
This  is  the  sum  of  the  whole  matter. 

And  now  if  you  find  that  I  have  in  any  instance  advanced 
positions  which,  taken  by  themselves,  appear  to  be  erroneous  or 
defective  ;  let  the  general  current  of  thought,  as  far  as  may  be, 
help  to  correct  the  error,  or  supply  the  defect.  Some  parts  of 
the  subject  which  I  have  presumed  to  discuss,  are  evidently  in- 
volved in  great  obscurity,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to  say  anything 
respecting  them,  without  the  danger  of  falhng  into  some  mistake 
ourselves,  or  of  being  misapprehended  by  others.  I  am  as  liable 
as  other  men,  to  take  different  and  seemingly  opposite  views  of  a 


344  INNATE    DISPOSITION. 

subject,  in  consequence  of  contemplating  it  from  different  posi- 
tions, or  in  different  relations.  In  such  cases  you  will,  I  hope, 
endeavor  to  find  out  a  candid  and  fair  construction  of  what  is 
said,  such  as  you  would  think  due  to  yourselves  in  like  circum- 
stances. But  be  sure  to  guard,  with  the  utmost  watchfulness, 
against  error,  and  against  whatever  might  tend  to  error.  It 
would  be  inexcusable  presumption  in  me  to  think  myself  free  from 
mistakes.  The  subject  which  has  been  brought  forward  is  encom- 
passed with  difficulties  which  I  pretend  not  to  be  able  to  solve. 
Objections  will  doubtless  arise  in  your  mind,  against  what  I  have 
written.  I  could  urge  objections  myself;  and  would  gladly  take 
my  place  at  the  feet  of  any  man,  who  could  satisfactorily  answer 
them.  We  ought  always  to  approach  this  subject  with  a  humble 
mind,  remembering  that  the  natural  and  total  depravity  of  which 
we  speak,  belongs  to  us,  and  striving  with  all  diligence  to  be  rid 
of  that  prejudice  against  the  truth,  which  is  one  of  the  most 
common  inmates  of  the  depraved  heart.  What  becomes  us  in 
these  circumstances  is,  not  dispute  and  strife,  but  serious,  earnest 
inquiry  after  the  truth,  pursued  with  patient,  persevering  labor, 
with  kindness  towards  those  who  differ  from  us,  with  a  cordial 
readiness  to  be  convinced,  and  with  prayer  to  God  for  the  guid- 
ance of  his  Spirit.  If  we  inquire  after  the  truth  in  this 
manner,  we  shall  obtain  good  to  ourselves,  and  shall  contribute  to 
the  good  of  others,  though  our  inquiries  may  for  the  present  fail 
of  complete  success.  We  have  the  comfort  to  believe,  that  the 
knowledge  which  Christians  have  of  divine  truth  is  progressive. 
It  will  undoubtedly  be  growing  in  clearness  and  comprehensive- 
ness to  the  end  of  time,  and  forever.  When  Christians  come  to 
associate  profound  humility,  unquenchable  zeal  for  improvement, 
and  the  spirit  of  prayer,  with  the  exercise  of  their  mental  powers, 
they  will  gradually  outgrow  their  errors  and  their  intellectual  and 
moral  littleness,  and  will  speed  their  way  towards  a  state  of  perfec- 
tion. And  if,  even  after  attaining  to  the  perfection  of  that 
higher  state  to  which  they  now  aspire,  they  find,  as  they  doubtless 
will,  that  some  subjects  or  parts  of  subjects  lie  beyond  the  reach 
of  their  intelligence  ;  their  very  perfection  will  teach  them  to 
acquiesce  in  their  ignorance. 


LECTURE    LXIX. 


BEMAKKS    OX    THE    WORDS    INNATE,    TRANSMITTED,    HEREDITARY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL,    IMPUTED. 

It  would  accord  best  with  my  views  of  what  is  proper  and 
useful,  to  confine  my  remarks  and  reasonings  to  the  doctrine  of 
human  depravity,  just  as  it  stands  in  the  Bible,  and  to  its  prac- 
tical uses,  avoiding  altogether  the  discussion  of  the  abstruse,  meta- 
physical questions  which  are  everywhere  agitated  at  the  present 
day.  I  cannot  but  approve  the  sentiment  of  Howe  in  the  follow- 
ing passage,  taken  from  his  Living  Temple.  "  As  for  them  that 
could  never  have  the  gospel,  or  infants  incapable  of  receiving  it, 
we  must  consider  the  Holy  Scriptures  were  written  for  those  that 
could  use  them,  not  for  those  that  could  not ;  therefore  to  have 
inserted  in  them  an  account  of  God's  methods  of  dispensation 
towards  such,  had  only  served  to  gratify  the  curious  and  uncon- 
cerned, not  to  instruct  and  benefit  such  as  were  concerned.  And 
it  well  became  hereupon  the  accurate  wisdom  of  God,  not  herein 
to  indulge  the  vanity  and  folly  of  men."  But  as  men  cannot  be 
kept  from  agitating  questions  of  an  abstruse  nature  on  this  sub- 
ject, and  as  many  of  the  opinions  which  have  been  entertained, 
are,  in  my  apprehension,  not  only  erroneous,  but  of  hurtful  ten- 
dency ;  I  have  thought  it  expedient  for  a  time,  to  look  at  these 
speculative  matters,  and  to  endeavor  to  show,  that  there  is  nothing 
in  the  results  of  thorough  philosophical  investigation,  which  is  in 
the  least  degree  unfavorable  to  the  commonly  received  doctrme  of 
original  sin. 


346  INNATE.      HEREDITARY. 

Here  I  shall  make  a  few  remarks  on  the  meaning  of  several 
words  in  common  use,  and  on  the  propriety  of  applying  them  to 
the  present  subjects. 

The  word  innate,  together  with  the  words  which  Johnson  uses 
to  explain  it,  are  applied  as  freely  to  the  qualities  of  the  mind,  as 
to  anything  which  pertains  to  the  body.  Thus  writers  speak  of 
innate  integrity,  innate  eloquence,  inborn  passions,  inborn  worth, 
inhred  affection.  Innate  is  opposed  to  the  word  superadded, 
which  in  this  case  would  denote  something  which  does  not  arise 
from  Avhat  belongs  to  man's  nature,  or  from  what  he  is  by  birth. 
If  depravity  belongs  to  man  in  the  state  in  which  he  is  born ;  if 
a  foundation  is  laid  for  his  sinning  in  his  very  nature  ;  it  is  per- 
fectly suitable  to  call  his  depravity  innate.  To  say  that  man  is 
born  destitute  of  holiness,  and  with  a  propensity  to  sin,  is  the 
same  as  to  say,  that  man's  destitution  of  holiness,  or  his  propensity 
to  sin,  is  innate :  in  other  words,  that  it  is  natural. 

The  word  connate  is  seldom  used  at  the  present  day ;  although 
there  would  seem  to  be  no  special  objection  against  it.  For  how 
can  man's  depravity,  or  propensity  to  sin,  be  innate,  that  is,  born 
in  him,  without  being  connate,  that  is,  born  with  him  ? 

Hereditary  means,  descended  from  an  ancestor  ;  transmitted 
from  a  parent  to  a  child.  Now  is  it  not  a  plain  matter  of  fact, 
that  a  depraved  nature,  a  propensitj'  to  sin,  is  transmitted  from 
parent  to  child,  and  has  descended  from  the  common  ancestor  of 
our  race  to  all  his  posterity  ?  Are  we  not  "  degenerate  plants  of 
a  strange  vine  ?  "  And  if  depravity  comes  in  this  way,  what  im- 
propriety is  there  in  calling  it  hereditary  ? 

I  beg  leave  in  this  place  to  advert  once  more  to  what  has 
already  been  before  us,  and  to  offer  a  few  additional  remarks  on 
the  doctrine  maintained  by  the  orthodox,  namely,  tltat  loe  are 
depraved  and  lost  in  consequence  of  the  offence  of  Adam.  In 
what  way  did  Adam's  apostasy  produce  such  an  effect  upon  his 
posterity  ? 

Was  his  transgression  so  charged  to  his  posterity,  that  they  are 
subjected  to  suffering  on  account  of  it,  ivhile  they  themselves  have 
nothing  sinful,  at  most,  nothing  which  is  the  ground  of  their  suf- 


IMPUTED.  847 

ferings  ?  My  reasoning  here,  again,  -will  relate  exclusively  to 
thajt  period  of  life  which  precedes  any  sinful  exercises.  Because 
so  soon  as  we  have  exercises,  which  constitute  actual  sin,  no  one 
can  reasonably  suppose  that  we  suffer  solely  on  account  of  Adam's 
sin.  In  regard  to  the  first  period  of  our  infancy,  two  suppositions 
may  be  made ;  one  is,  that  we  have  a  sinful  nature^  a  corrupt 
moral  jyi'opensity ;  the  other,  that  we  have  nothing  which  is  in 
any  respect  or  in  any  degree  of  the  nature  of  sin  ;  that  we  are 
free  from  moral  depravity.  Those  who  believe  in  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  in  the  strictest  sense,  still  hold  that  we  have 
from  the  beginning  a  vitiosity  of  nature.  Now  what  reason  can 
there  be  to  suppose,  that  in  the  infliction  of  evil  upon  us  in 
infancy,  God  has  no  respect  whatever  to  our  moral  corruption  ? 
Can  we  be  sure,  that  our  depravity  is  of  no  consideration  with 
God  in  respect  to  our  sufferings  at  the  beginning  of  life,  and  that 
he  brings  them  upon  us  on  account  of  Adam's  sin,  and  on  that 
account  exclusively?  It  may  indeed  be  true  that  we  sufler  on 
account  of  the  offence  of  him  who  was  the  head  and  the  represen- 
tative of  our  race.  And  it  may  also  be  true,  that  our  moral 
corruption  has  a  bearing  upon  our  suffei-ings.  God  may  have 
respect  to  each  of  these  in  the  evils  to  which  he  subjects  us  in 
early  infancy.  He  may  have  respect  to  one  as  the  original,  pri- 
mary reason,  and  to  the  other  as  the  secondary,  subordinate 
reason.  Or  he  may  have  respect  to  both,  as  coordinate  and 
equal  reasons.  Doubtless  he  has  respect  to  something  as  a  reason 
for  so  important  a  proceeding  in  his  government.  And  if  we 
judge  from  the  Bible,  and  from  observation,  we  shall,  I  think,  be 
satisfied  that  either  Adam's  offence,  or  our  native  sinfulness,  or 
both  together,  must  constitute  the  reason.  Considering  what 
the  Apostle  so  plainly  teaches  in  Romans  6.,  how  can  we  set  aside 
Adam's  sin,  and  say,  that  it  is  not  at  all  on  that  account,  that 
suffering  and  death  come  upon  infants  ?  And  admitting  the  fact, 
that  we  have  from  the  first  a  sinful  nature,  how  can  we  set  aside 
this,  and  say  with  confidence,  that  it  is  not  with  any  reference  to 
this,  but  wholly  and  exclusively  on  account  of  Adam's  offence, 
that  sufiering  comes  upon  infants  ?  Can  we  separate  what  divine 
truth  has  joined  together  ? 


348  IMPUTED. 

« 

Consider  then  the  other  supposition  above  named,  —  that  at 
the  hegiyining  of  life,  we  are  free  from  moral  depravity,  —  that 
we  have  nothing  which  can  in  any  sense  be  called  sinful.  Chil- 
dren at  the 'beginning  of  life  are  subjected  to  various  sufferings; 
and  all  must  agree,  that  they  are  subjected  to  these  sufferings  for 
some  reason.  But  what  is  that  reason  ?  On  what  account  do 
they  suffer,  if  they  are  entirely  free  from  moral  pollution  ?  Is 
suffering  brought  upon  them  in  the  way  of  moral  discipline,  for 
their  benefit  ?  But  how  can  this  be,  when,  according  to  the 
supposition,  they  are  not  intelligent,  moral  agents,  and  of  course 
are  not  capable  of  moral  discipline  ?  Is  suffering  brought  upon 
them,  then,  by  way  of  anticipation,  on  account  of  the  sins  which 
they  will  commit,  when  they  become  moral  agents  ?  In  other 
words,  is  it  a  punishment  for  sin  prospectively?  Let  any  man 
judge  whether  this  can  be  made  consistent  with  our  ideas  of  law 
or  justice  ?  —  Is  suffering,  then,  brought  upon  infant  children,  as 
a  preventive  of  sin  ?  But  if  this  were  the  design  of  it,  should  we 
not  suppose  that  in  some  instances  it  would  actually  he  a  preven- 
tive ?  —  Does  the  Bible  then  give  us  any  instruction,  does  it  bring 
out  any  principle,  which  can  aid  our  inquiries  on  this  subject,  and 
show  us  why  it  is  that  suffering  comes  upon  infant  children  ? 
Now  I  find  that  God  lays  it  down  in  the  decalogue,  as  a  standing 
principle,  that  he  "  visits  the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  upon  the 
children."  And  the  history  of  the  divine  dispensations  clearly 
shows  that,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  he  does  in  his  providence 
act  on  this  principle.  And  I  find  something  which  appears  to  be 
still  more  directly  to  the  purpose  in  Romans,  chap.  5.  Here  I  am 
told,  that  it  is  through  the  offence  of  Adam  that  his  posterity  die  ; 
that  hy  one  mmi's  offence  death  reigns  over  the  human  family  ; 
that  this  judgment  was  by  one  to  condemnation.  If  I  were  now  for 
the  first  time  to  read  this  part  of  Scripture,  I  should  verily  think 
that  I  had  found  an  answer  to  the  inquiry,  why  it  is  that  at  the 
beginning  of  life  we  are  subjected  to  suffering.  I  am  here 
taught  by  the  word  of  God,  that  death,  with  its  attendant  evils, 
is  brought  upon  all  human  beings  without  exception,  and  of  course 
upon  human  beings  in  early  infancy,  "  hy  the  offence  of  one,"  that 
is,  Adam. 


WHY    DO     INFANTS     SUFFER?  349 

If  an  objection  is  made  against  such  a  proceeding,  as  incon- 
sistent with  the  moral  attributes  of  God ;  I  ask,  who  knows  that 
it  is  inconsistent  ?  I  ask,  too,  what  other  view  of  the  case  would 
be  more  consistent  ?  It  is  clear  that  infants  suffer.  According 
to  the  present  supposition,  they  are  free  from  shi,  and  therefore 
cannot  suffer  on  account  of  any  moral  evil  in  themselves.  I 
cannot  think  they  suffer  on  account  of  sins  which  they  will  after- 
wards commit ;  or  that  they  suffer  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
sin  in  after  life.  And  I  here  give  up  the  opinion  that  they 
suffer  either  on  account  of  being  born  in  sin,  or  on  account  of  the 
sm  of  Adam.  How,  then,  shall  I  account  for  the  fact  that  they 
suffer  ?  Suppose  I  try  this  position  ;  that  is,  —  from  a  dislike  to 
the  doctrine  of  our  native  sinfulness,  and  the  doctrine  of  imputa- 
tion, and  for  the  sake  of  being  totally  rid  of  both,  I  cut  off  the 
whole  race  of  man  during  the  interesting  period  of  their  early 
infancy,  from  their  relation  to  Adam,  degrade  them  from  the 
dignity  of  human  beings,  and  put  them  in  the  rank  of  brute 
animals,  and  say,  they  suffer  as  the  brutes  do.  But  this  would  be 
the  worst  of  all  theories,  —  the  farthest  off  from  Scripture  and 
reason,  and  the  most  revolting  to  all  the  noble  sensibihties  of 
man.  And  then  the  question  comes  up ;  why  I  should  adopt 
such  an  opinion  ?  I  find  that  I  have  no  reason  for  it  but  this. 
I  first  deny  man's  native  sinfulness,  and  of  course,  I  deny  that 
infants  suffer  on  any  such  account.  Next,  I  say,  the  doctrine  of 
imputation  is,  in  every  possible  form,  unreasonable  and  absurd, 
and  notwithstanding  what  the  Apostle  teaches  as  to  the  effect  of 
Adam's  sin,  I  cannot  admit  the  idea  that  infants  suffer,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  on  that  account.  Now  if  I  regard  infants  as  belonging 
to  the  family  of  human  beings,  and  as  treated  on  any  principles 
which  are  apphcable  to  such  beings,  I  find  myself  in  a  strait, — 
having  set  aside  the  common,  obvious  reason  why  human  beings 
suffer  and  die,  that  is,  their  own  sinfulness,  and  the  special  reason 
which  the  Apostle  suggests  in  Romans  5,  that  is,  their  relation  to 
apostate  Adam,  and  every  other  reason,  and  finding  myself  unable 
to  give  any  kind  of  reply  to  the  question,  why  infants  suffer  and 
die.     Unwilling,  therefore,  to  bear  the  pressure  of  this  question, 

VOL.  II.  30 


350  WHY    DO   INFANTS     SUFFER? 

which  is  so  hard  to  be  answered,  I  resolve  to  rid  myself  of  it  at 
once,  and  saj,  children  in  early  infancy  are  not  to  be  regarded 
as  belonging  to  the  human  race ;  they  are  not  treated  as  human 
beings,  but  as  brute  animals  ;  and  so  the  evils  which  they  suffer, 
do  not  come  upon  them  either  because  they  have  any  moral 
depravity,  or  on  account  of  the  sin  of  Adam  and  their  rela- 
tion to  him  as  the  head  of  the  human  race,  or  on  account  of 
anything  else  which  appertains  to  beings  possessed  of  a  moral 
nature. 

I  have  here  put  myself  in  the  place  of  one  who  denies  native 
depravity,  and  the  fatal  influence  of  Adam's  disobedience  upon  his 
posterity,  and  who  thus  forces  himself  to  invent  an  hypothesis 
which  so  ill  accords  with  Scripture  and  Christian  feeling.  The  fair 
result  of  the  whole  seems  to  be  this.  As  there  are  only  two 
things  mentioned  in  the  Bible,  which  can  be  supposed  to  bring 
suffering  and  death  upon  the  human  race,  the  apostasy  of  Adam, 
and  their  own  personal  sin ;  if  we  deny  the  native  sinfulness  of 
man,  or  if  we  deny  that  infants  are  in  any  sense  subjected  to 
suffering  on  that  account,  we  are  shut  up  to  the  conclusion,  that 
they  suffer  exclusively  on  account  of  Adam's  sin,  and  so  that  the 
often  repeated  declaration  of  the  Apostle,  that  death  comes  upon 
all  hy  the  offence  of  one,  is  to  be  understood  in  the  most  obvious 
and  unqualified  sense  ;  or  else  that  infants  suffer  and  die  without 
any  assignable  reason  whatever. 

But  there  are  other  ways  in  which  Adam's  sin  has  been  sup- 
posed to  have  an  influence,  upon  his  posterity.  I  inquire  then 
whether  that  influence  is  to  be  understood  in  this  way ;  namely, 
that  Adam's  sin  teas  the  occasion  of  bringing  his  posterity  irito  life 
in  such  circumstances  of  weakness  and  temptation,  that  although 
they  are  born  without  any  wrong  bias,  or  any  tendency  to  sin,  they 
will,  after  a  while,  be  corrupted  and  fall  into  sin.  This  opinion, 
which  is  defended  by  few  at  the  present  day  except  Unitarians, 
has  been  substantially  considered  in  previous  Lectures.  I  shall 
only  say  here,  that  it  leaves  wholly  untouched  the  question,  on 
what  account  do  human  beings  suffer  before  they  commit  actual 
sin  ?  and  that  it  requires  a  most  unnatural  and  forced  construe- 


EFFECT    OP    ADAM'S     SIN.  351 

tion  to  be  put  upon  the  whole  representation  of  the  Apostle  in 
Rom.  5. 

Again ;  I  inquire  -whether  Adam's  sin  affects  his  posterity  in 
this  way  ;  namely  ;  that  hy  a  special  divine  constitution,  they  are, 
in  consequence  of  his  fall,  horn  in  a  state  of  moral  depravity  lead- 
ing to  certain  ruin ;  or  that,  according  to  the  common  law  of  de- 
scent, they  are  partakers  of  a  corrupt  nature,  the  offspring  being 
like  the  parent ;  and  that  suffoing  and  death  come  upon  them  as 
the  effect  of  Adam''s  offence,  they  being  still  not  innocent  and 
pure,  but  depraved  and  sinful. 

This  is  the  view  of  the  subject  which  I  consider  as  more  con- 
formable to  the  word  of  God  and  to  facts,  than  any  other.  As 
to  those  who  deny  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  and  the 
doctrine  of  imputation,  and  the  doctrine  of  John  Taylor  and  the 
Unitarians,  and  yet  profess  to  believe  that  we  are  depraved  and 
ruined  in  consequence  of  Adam's  sin,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  what 
their  belief  amounts  to.  They  say,  Adam's  sin  had  an  influence  ; 
but  they  deny  all  the  conceivable  ways  in  which  it  could  have 
an  influence,  and  particularly  the  ways  which  are  most  clearly 
brought  to  view  in  Rom.  5,  and  in  other  parts  of  Scripture. 
Their  belief  seems  to  be  merely  negative. 

If  I  am  asked  whether  I  hold  the  doctrine  of  imputation  ;  my 

reply  will  depend  on  the  meaning  you  give  to  the  word.     Just 

make  the  question  definite  by  substituting  the  explanation  for  the 

word,  and  an   answer   will   be  easy.     Do   you  then   mean   what 

Stapfer  and  Edwards  and   many  others  mean,  namely,  that  for 

Grod  to  give  Adam  a  posterity  like  himself,   is  one  and  the  same 

as   to  impute   his  sin  to  them  f     Then  my  answer  is,  that  God  did 

in  this  sense,  impute  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity.     This  is  the 

very  thing  implied  in  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity.     By  the 

doctrine  of  imputation,   do  you  mean,  that  Adam's  sin  was  the 

occasion  of  our  ruin  ;  that  it  was  the  distant,  but  real   cause   of 

our  condemnation  and  death  ?      I   consider   the    doctrine,   thus 

understood,  to  be  according  to  Scripture.     Do  you  mean  that 

we  are  guilty,  that  is,  (according  to  the   true,  original  import  of 

the  word,)  exposed  to  suffering  on  account  of  Adam's  sin  ?     In  , 

J 


352  EFFECTS     OF    ADAM'S     SIN. 

this  view  too  I  think  the  doctrine  Scriptural.  Do  you  mean,  that 
God  visits  the  iniquity  of  our  common  father  upon  his  children, 
through  all  generations  ?  This  too  accords  with  the  truth.  But 
if  the  doctrine  of  imputation  means,  that  Adam's  posterity  are 
literally  and  personally  chargeable  with  his  sin  and  that  God  in- 
flicts the  penalty  of  the  law  upon  them  for  his  offence  alone,  they 
themselves  being  hi  all  respects  perfectly  sinless,  then  the  doctrine, 
in  my  view,  wants  proof.  There  appears  to  be  no  place  for  such 
a  doctrine,  seeing  all  Adam's  posterity  are  in  fact  morally  deprav- 
ed.* And  if  they  are  so,  I  know  not  why  any  one  should  tliink 
that  God  has  no  reference  to  their  depravity  in  the  sufferings 
which  he  brings  upon  them.  The  Apostle  does  not  use  the  word 
impute  in  relation  to  the  subject ;  but  he  does  teach,  in  the  plain- 
est manner,  that  the  fall  of  Adam  spread  depravity  and  destruc- 
tion through  the  whole  human  race.  The  particular  word  which 
shall  be  used  to  express  this  doctrine  is  not  essential ;  and  as  the 
sacred  writers  do  not  express  it  by  imputation,  we  should  not  be 
over-strenuous  for  that  particular  word.  Nevertheless,  as  it  is 
the  name  which  has  generally  been  given  to  the  doctrine  in  ortho- 
dox creeds  and  systems  of  divinity,  and  as  the  word  is  used  in 
an  analogous  sense  in  Romans,  4 :  6  ;  I  can  see  no  reason  for 
rejecting  it.  Properly  explained,  it  is  well  adapted  to  the  subject. 
Were  it  not  so,  we  can  hardly  account  for  it  that  Calvin  and  Ed-, 
wards  and  all  the  most  distinguished  orthodox  divines  have  used 
it.  The  great  object  is  to  get  a  right  understanding  of  the  doc- 
trine itself,  as  set  forth  in  the  word  of  God,  and  to  express  it  in 
a  just  and  impressive  manner. 

If  you  ask,  whether  depravity  is  propagated ;  my  answer  is, 
that  human  beings  are  propagated,  and  are  propagated  as  they 
are,  fallen,  corrup)t.  "  Adam  begat  a  son  in  his  own  likeness." 
This  contains  the  whole  doctrine,  if  likeness  includes,  as  it  undoubt- 
edly does,  likeness  in  regard  to  moral  disposition  and  character. 
The  word  propagated  is  not  generally  applied  to  depravity,  and  is 
not  so  well  suited  to  the  subject,  as  natural,  or  native.  But  it  is 
neither  uncommon  nor  unscriptural  to  speak  of  depravity  as  com- 
ing in  the  way  of  natural  generation,  or  natural  descent. 


PROPAGATED    AND    CONSTITUTIONAL.  353 

Is  the  depravity  of  man  constitutional?     The  chief  objection 
against  the  use  of  this  word  in  relation  to  the  subject  before  us, 
seems  to  rest  on  the  assumption,  that  the  word  means  nearly  the 
same  2iB  physical ;  or  at  least  something  opposite  to  moral.     But 
this  assumption   is  unfounded.      The   word,  constitutional^  may 
relate  either  to  the  constitution  or  appointment  of  God,  or  to  the 
nature  or  constitution  of  man.     Now  was  it  not  the  constitution 
of  God,  that  is,  the  principle  or  'plan  which  he  established,  that 
the  posterity  of  Adam  should  bear  his  moral  image  ?      Is  there 
not,  in  fact,  such  a  connection  between  him  and  them,  that  con- 
demnation and  death  were  brought  upon  them  by  his  one  offence  ? 
And  did  not  God  constitute  this  connection  ?     Was  it  not  his  ap- 
pointment, that  "  by  one  man's  disobedience  the  many  were  con- 
stituted sinners?  "     And  is  it  not  the  established  order  of  things, 
that  children,  from  generation  to  generation,  shall  resemble  their 
parents  as  to  the  substance  of  moral  character  ?     Evidently,  then, 
the  depravity  of  man  takes  place  accordinr/  to  the  divine  constitu- 
tion, and  so  may  be  called  constitutional.     And  is  not  this  a  very 
obvious  and  proper  sense  of  the  word  ?     But  the  word  may  also 
relate  to  the  nature  or  constitution  of  men.     And  if  their  deprav-: 
ity  is  founded  in  their  nature  or  constitution,  may  it  not  properly 
be  called  constitutional?     I  do  not  now  speak  of  their  bodily  con- 
stitution, but  of  the  constitution  of  their  mind,  their  moral  con- 
stitution, their  nature  as  moral  beings.     Now  if  depravity  lies  in 
our  moral  constitution.,  or  directly  and  certainly  flows  from  it ; 
we  may  in  this  sense  call  it  constitutional, — just  as  we -call  it 
natural,  because  it  is  founded  in  our  moral  nature,  or  flows  from 
it.     The  word  however  is  not  so  frequently  used  by  the  orthodox, 
as  by  those  who  differ  from  them.     To  discredit  our  doctrine  of 
native  depravity,  they  say  that  we  hold  to  a  constitutional  deprav- 
ity.    Be  it  so.     Do  not  they  hold  to  the  same  ?     The  most  re- 
spectable of  them  maintain,  that  the  cause  of  sin  lies  in  the  na- 
ture of  man,  not  in  his  circumstances.     And  what  is  the  differ- 
ence between  the  nature  of  man,  and  his  constitution,  whether 
taken  physically,  or  morally  ?      And  what  is  the   difference  be- 
tween calling  depravity  natural,  meaning  that  it  results  not  from 

30* 


354  CONSTITUTIONAL. 

man's  circumstances  but  from  his  nature,  and  calling  it  constitu- 
tional, meaning  that  it  results  from  man's  moral  constitution  ?  If 
there  are  objections  against  this,  there  are  against  that.  But 
there  is  no  need  of  logomachy.  Those  who  believe  human  de- 
pravity to  be  native,  do  not  generally  think  it  best  to  call  it  con- 
stitutional, because  the  word  is  liable  to  be  misunderstood.  They 
are  better  pleased  with  the  language  of  Scripture,  or  with  that 
which  is  evidently  conformed  to  it. 

On  the  whole,  it  is  evident,  that  the  words  native,  innate,  he- 
reditary, etc.  may  all  be  used  to  designate  some  quality  or  cir- 
cumstance of  man's  depravity,  with  as  much  propriety  as  they 
can  be  used  in  relation  to  any  thing  else.  They  should,  however, 
be  well  explained,  and  most  of  them  should  be  chiefly  confined 
to  systematic  theology.  The  language  best  suited  to  the  purposes 
of  popular  instruction  and  devotion,  is  that  which  is  most  Scrip- 
tural. But  there  can  be  no  reasonable  objection  against  the  mod- 
erate use  of  technical  or  scientific  terms  in  the  more  elaborate 
theological  treatises.  I  know  indeed,  that  an  opposer  of  the  com- 
mon doctrine  may  collect  together  all  the  epithets  which  have 
ever  been  used  by  orthodox  writers,  and,  by  making  them  up 
into  one  overloaded  sentence,  and  by  contriving  to  give  them 
a  gross  and  offensive  signification,  may  excite  prejudices  against 
the  doctrine,  and  thus  prevent  many  from  learning  what  the 
Scriptures  teach.  In  like  manner,  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of 
election  have  often  labored  to  make  it  odious,  by  drawing  out  in 
fearful  array  a  great  variety  of  words  which  have  sometimes 
been  applied  to  it,  and  so  managing  the  matter  as  to  give  the 
words  a  meaning  not  at  all  suited  to  the  nature  of  the  subject. 
But  Christian  divines  and  philosophers  will  easily  see  the  differ- 
ence between  argument,  and  declamation ;  between  appeals  to 
reason  and  piety,  and  appeals  to  passion  and  prejudice.  What 
we  want  on  such  a  subject,  is  candid,  sober,  thorough  discussion, 
based  upon  sound  principles  of  reason,  and  upon  the  infallible 
word  of  God. 


LE  CTURE    LXX. 


EVERY    OTHER    THEORY    AS    MUCH    ENCUMBERED    WITH   DIFFICUL- 
TIES  AS   THE   ORTHODOX. 

It  -will  help  you  to  form  a  right  estimate  of  the  speculative 
objections  which  have  been  urged  against  the  common  doctrine  of 
native  depravity,  if  you  j&nd  that  all  the  other  views  which  have 
been  entertained  of  the  state  of  man  are  liable  to  objections  of 
equal  weight,  and  some  of  them  to  objections  of  still  greater 
weight.  I  think  it  no  dijEcult  task  to  make  this  appear.  You 
will  find  on  careful  inquiry,  that  the  various  schemes  which  have 
been  maintained  by  different  writers  as  to  the  apostasy  of  man,  are 
as  really  open  to  the  pressure  of  speculative  objections  and  diffi- 
culties, as  the  orthodox  doctrine.  And  if  this  is  the  case,  then 
it  must  be  a  fruitless  thing  for  any  one  to  attempt  to  rid  himself 
of  difficulties  by  shifting  off  the  orthodox  doctrine,  and  adopting 
some  other  in  its  stead.  And  it  will  evidently  be  the  dictate  of 
true  wisdom  to  inquire,  not  what  doctrine  is  free  from  difficulties, 
but  what  doctrine  is  supported  by  the  word  of  God  and  by  the 
results  of  experience.  We  shall  perceive  this  to  be  a  matter  of 
gi-eat  practical  importance,  when  we  consider  that  the  principal 
reason  why  so  many  intelligent  men  have  rejected  the  doctrine 
of  native  depravity,  has  been  the  force  of  speculative  objections, 
particularly  those  which  arise  from  a  consideration  of  the  moral 
attributes  of  God ;  and  that  the  principal  efibrt  of  such  men  has 
been  to  find  out  some  scheme,  which  would  not  be  open  to  objec- 


356  ALL    THEORIES 

tions  —  an  effort  which  we  shall  see  has  entirely  failed  of 
success. 

I  shall  now  advert  to  several  of  the  prominent  theories  which 
have  been  maintained  respecting  human  depravity,  by  those  who 
have  denied  the  common  orthodox  doctrine. 

One  of  these  is,  that  there  is  in  the  character  of  man  a  mixture 
of  moral  good  and  evil ;  and  that  this  mixture  commences  early, 
and  continues  through  life. 

This  may  be  thought  to  be  a  rational  and  liberal  view  of  the 
subject ;  and  as  those  who  adopt  it  escape  some  of  the  diflEicul- 
ties  which  respect  the  theory  of  native  and  total  depravity,  they 
seem  to  think  that  they  are  free  from  difficulties  altogether.  But 
is  it  so  ?  Are  they  not  met  by  various  texts  of  Scripture  which 
plainly  teach  that  the  unrenewed  heart  is  entirely  destitute  of 
holiness  ?  And  do  not  these  texts  stand  as  difficulties  in  their 
way  ?  They  have  also  to  encounter  the  difficulty  arising  from  the 
testimony  of  the  most  intelligent  and  pious  men,  whose  experience 
and  deep  inward  consciousness  confirm  the  common  doctrine  of 
depravity.  And  finally,  their  scheme  is  exposed  to  as  real  a 
difficulty  as  the  common  doctrine,  in  relation  to  the  infinite  benev- 
olence of  God.  For  if  it  is  inconsistent  with  his  benevolence, 
that  a  race  of  intelligent  beings,  who  are  wholly  dependent  on 
his  will,  should  exist  from  the  beginning  of  life  in  a  state  of  total 
depravity ;  is  it  not  also  inconsistent  with  his  benevolence,  that 
they  should  be  found  in  a  state  of  partial  depravity  ?  Is  it 
thought  that  a  God  of  infinite  power  and  goodness  must  guard  his 
offspring  against  total  depravity  ?  Why  then  must  he  not  guard 
them  against  being  depraved  at  all  ?  Any  degree  of  depravity 
is  a  great  and  destructive  evil.  And  how  can  we  suppose  that 
God  will  suffer  so  destructive  an  evil  to  take  place,  when  he  is 
able  to  prevent  it  ?  Is  there  no  difficulty  here  ?  And  if  you 
take  upon  you  to  say,  that  God  is  not  able  to  prevent  the  partial 
depravity  of  men ;  is  there  no  difficulty  in  this,  —  that  the  God 
of  heaven  and  earth  is  unable  to  keep  men  pure  from  sin,  when 
he  is  infinitely  wise  and  powerful,  and  has  the  hearts  of  all  men 
in  his  hand,  and  can   effectually  guard  them  against  whatever 


ATTENDED    WITH    DIFFICULTIES.  357 

■would  have  any  tendency  to  corrupt  them  ?  And  may  you  not  as 
well  say,  that  God  is  unable  to  prevent  the  total  depravity  of 
man,  as  that  he  is  unable  to  prevent  their  2)(i7'tial  depravity  ? 

You  cannot  avoid  difficulties  by  adopting  the  opinion  that  the 
sinfulness  of  man,  whether  partial  or  total,  commences  at  a  later 
period,  than  what  the  common  doctrine  implies.  For  if  we  have 
reason  to  conclude  that  the  goodness  of  God  will  certainly  pre- 
serve us  from  being  sinners  at  the  hegiiining  of  life  ;  why  may  we 
not  conclude  that  it  will  preserve  us  from  being  sinners  after- 
wards? Besides  this,  you  will  have  to  encounter  another  dif- 
ficulty ;  that  is,  you  must  contend  with  the  sacred  writers,  who 
teach  with  great  clearness,  that  all  men,  whatever  their  age,  are 
sinful,  and  need  the  grace  of  Christ  to  sanctify  and  save  them. 

Do  you  object  to  the  common  doctrine  that  sinners  turn  it  into 
an  apology  for  sin,  saying,  if  God  has  brought  us  into  existence 
in  such  a  state,  how  can  we  be  culpable  ?  — And  may  not  the 
ground  which  you  take  furnish  an  equal  occasion  to  sinners  to 
exculpate  themselves  ?  May  they  not  say,  if  our  Almighty 
Maker  has  so  formed  us,  and  so  ordered  our  circumstances,  that 
we  shall  at  some  period  of  our  life,  certainly  fall  into  sin ;  then 
how  are  we  to  blame  ? 

Say  then,  if  you  will,  with  Dr.  Taylor,  that  the  consequence 
of  Adam's  fall  is  only  this,  that  we  are  placed  in  circumstances 
which  particularly  expose  us  to  sin,  and  which  render  obedience 
difficult ;  and  that  we  are  corrupted  by  the  influence  of  bad 
example.  The  objector  is  still  ready  with  his  questions.  Why 
did  the  Author  of  our  being,  and  the  disposer  of  all  our  circum- 
stances, place  us  in  such  a  state  of  temptation  and  exposure  ?  If 
he  wished  us  to  be  obedient,  why  did  he  take  pains  to  render 
obedience  so  difficult?  If  he  wished  to  preserve  us  from  sin,  why 
did  he  voluntarily  expose  us  to  it,  especially  at  that  early  period, 
when  we  are  incapable  of  enduring  severe  exposures,  and  when 
he  knew  how  unhappy  would  be  the  result  ?  What  kind  father 
would  willingly  subject  his  children,  in  the  tenderness  of  childhood, 
to  trials  and  dangers  for  which  they  are  not  prepared,  and  which 
he  knows  will  be  too  great  for  them  to  endure  ?     Is  not  God  kind- 


358  ALL     THEORIES 

er  than  the  kindest  of  earthly  parents  ?  And  will  he  so  consti- 
tute the  whole  race  of  man,  and  so  expose  them  to  the  pernicious 
mfluence  of  bad  example,  and  other  corrupting  circumstances, 
that  certain  ruin  will  ensue  ? 

Thus  if  the  common  doctrine  of  native  depravity  opens  a  door 
for  speculative  objections  and  cavils,  you  will  also  find  that  a  host 
of  them  may  be  arrayed  against  every  opinion  which  you  are  able 
to  substitute  in  its  place.  The  fact  is,  that  there  is  no  truth  in 
morals  or  theology,  which  will  not  be  swept  away,  if  the  objections 
which  are  urged  by  speculative  men  and  cavillers,  are  allowed  to 
be  valid. 

There  is  a  theory,  which  was  partly  advanced  by  John  Taylor, 
and  which  has  been  the  subject  of  some  discussion  in  our  religious 
community.  Those  who  adopt  this  theory,  deny  that  man  has 
any  native  siiifulness,  any  origmal  evil  propensity,  or  innate 
depravity.  They  maintain,  however,  that  we  come  into  the  world 
with  various  appetites  and  propensities,  which,  though  not  sinful^ 
are  the  occasions  of  sin  ;  that  these  appetites  and  propensities 
gain  strength  by  early  indulgence,  and  become  predominant, 
before  any  sense  of  right  and  wrong  can  have  entered  our  minds ; 
and  that,  when  our  moral  agency  commences,  they  are  an  over- 
match for  our  reason  and  conscience,  and  in  every  instance  cer- 
tainly lead  us  into  sin.  They  hold  that  we  are  born  destitute  of 
holiness,  and  of  all  disposition  to  holiness,  and  that  we  have  in 
our  own  nature  a  ground  of  certainty  that  our  first  moral  acts, 
and  all  that  follow,  will  be  sinful,  unless  we  are  born  again  ;  and 
finally  that  we  are  brought  into  these  circumstances  in  consequence 
of  the  offence  of  Adam. 

My  sole  object  is  to  show  that  this  scheme  is  exposed  to  objec- 
tions and  difficulties  of  nearly  the  same  kind  and  degree,  with 
those  which  have  been  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  Calvinists. 
And  if  this  is  indeed  the  case,  then  any  one  who  adopts  this 
scheme  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  difficulties,  will  find  himself  dis- 
appouited. 

In  the  way  of  objection  to  the  common  doctrine,  it  is  said, 
that  the  Apostle  does  indeed  teach  that  there  is  a  connection 


ATTENDED     WITH    DIFFICULTIES.  359 

between  Adam  and  his  posteritj,  and  that  his  oflFence  brought 
ruin  upon  them  ;  but  he  does  not  teach  what  the  connection  was, 
nor  how  it  produced  such  an  effect.  He  does  not  tell  us  that  a 
sinful  nature  is  propagated,  or  that  we  inherit  it  from  Adam,  or 
that  his  sin  is  imputed  to  us.  —  Now  if  it  be  true,  that  the 
Apostle  does  not  teach  in  tvhat  manner  Adam's  sin  produced  this 
woful  effect  upon  us ;  surely  he  does  not  teach  that  it  did  it  in 
the  particular  mamier  which  this  theory  implies.  The  advocates 
of  this  theory  ask,  where  the  Bible  asserts  that,  on  account  of 
Adam's  fall,  a  sinful  nature  is  communicated  to  us  at  the  begin- 
ninji  of  our  existence  ?  And  I  ask,  where  it  asserts  that  Adam's 
fall  affected  us  in  the  manner  which  they  describe,  that  is,  by 
bringing  us  into  being  with  such  appetites,  and  in  such  circum- 
stances, as  will  certainly  lead  into  sin  as  soon  as  we  are  moral 
agents  ?  If  they  say,  the  Bible  does  not  tell  how  it  was  that 
Adam's  sin  affected  us ;  then  why  do  they  undertake  to  tell  how 
it  was  ?  Are  they  authorized  more  than  others  are,  to  go  beyond 
what  is  written,  and  to  point  out  the  manner  in  which  Adam's  sin 
had  an  influence  upon  us  ? 

But  they  make  another  objection  to  the  common  doctrine, 
namely,  that  it  is  incompatible  with  the  justice  as  well  as  good- 
ness of  God  to  bring  moral  corruption  and  ruin  upon  the  whole 
human  race,  merely  on  account  of  one  offence  of  their  common 
progenitor,  and  without  any  fault  of  theirs. 

And  is  there  not  just  as  much  reason  to  urge  this  objection 
against  the  theory  just  named  ?  Its  advocates  hold  that  God 
brings  the  whole  human  race  into  existence  without  holiness,  and 
with  such  propensities  and  in  such  circumstances  as  will  certainly 
lead  them  into  sin  ;  and  that  he  brings  them  into  this  fearful 
condition  in  consequence  of  the  sin  of  their  first  father  without 
any  fault  of  their  own.  Now  as  far  as  the  divine  justice  or  good- 
ness is  concerned,  what  great  difference  is  there  between  our 
being  depraved  at  first,  and  being  in  such  circumstances  as  will 
certainly  lead  to  depravity  the  moment  moral  action  begins  ? 
Will  not  the  latter  as  infallibly  bring  about  our  destruction  as  the 
former  ?     And  how  is  it  more  compatible  with  the  justice  or  the 


ALL     THEORIES 

goodness  of  God  to  put  us  into  one  of  these  conditions,  than  into 
the  other,  when  they  are  both  equally  fatal  ?  It  is  said  that  our 
natural  appetites  and  propensities  and  our  outward  c-ircumstances 
do  not  lead  us  into  sin  bj  any  absolute  or  physical  necessity. 
But  they  do  in  all  cases  certainly  lead  us  into  sin,  and  God 
knows  that  they  will  when  he  appoints  them  for  us.  Now  how 
can  our  merciful  Father  voluntarily  place  us,  while  feeble,  help- 
less infants,  in  such  circumstances,  as  he  knows  beforehand  will  be 
the  certain  occasion  of  our  sin  and  ruin  ?  Those  who  advocate 
this  scheme,  say  it  is  our  own  fault,  if  we  sin.  True.  And  it  is 
equally  so  according  to  the  common  doctrine.  But  the  question 
for  them  to  answer  is,  why  God,  Avho  desires  our  holiness  and 
happiness,  places  us  in  circumstances,  which  will  not  only  expose 
us  to  this  fault,  but  which  he  knows  will  most  certainly  involve  us 
in  it,  and  so  end  in  our  destruction  ?  They  say,  the  doctrine  of 
a  depraved  nature,  as  held  by  Edwards  and  other  Calvuiists, 
makes  God  the  author  of  sin.  Even  if  this  were  so,  (which 
however  I  by  no  means  admit ;)  still  how  does  their  theory  help 
the  matter  ?  What  difference  does  it  make,  either  as  to  God's 
character  or  the  result  of  his  proceedings,  whether  he  constitutes 
us  sinners  at  first,  or  knowingly  places  us  in  such  circumstances, 
that  we  shall  certainly  become  sinners,  and  that  very  soon  ? 
Must  not  God's  design  as  to  our  being  sinners  be  the  same  in  one 
case,  as  in  the  other  ?  And  must  not  the  final  result  be  the 
same  ?  Is  not  one  of  these  states  of  mankind  fraught  with  as 
many  and  as  gi-eat  evils  as  the  other  ?  What  ground  of  prefer- 
ence then  would  any  man  have  ?  Suppose  half  of  the  human 
race  should  be  born  in  a  depraved,  sinful  state  ;  and  the  other 
half,  without  holiness,  and  with  such  appetites  and  propensities  as 
will  be  too  powerful  for  reason  and  conscience  to  control,  and  so 
will  certainly  bring  them  into  a  depraved,  sinful  state,  and  that 
so  speedily,  that  they  never  exist  a  single  moment,  as  moral 
agents,  in  any  other  state.  Would  these  last  have  any  advantage 
over  the  former  ?  And  if  the  two  states  supposed  are  equally 
calamitous  and  destructive,  then  how  is  it  more  consistent  for  God 
to  bring  men  into  one  of  them,  than  into  the  other  ?     And  how 


ATTENDED     WITH     DIFFICULTIES.  361 

can  it  more  easily  be  reconciled  with  his  goodness  that  he  should 
bring  death  and  condemnation  on  Adam's  posterity  on  account  of 
his  sin,  in  the  way  which  is  here  supposed,  than  in  the  way  which 
Calvinists  suppose  ?  Let  intelligent,  candid  men,  who  do  not 
believe  either  of  these  schemes,  say,  whether  one  of  them  is  not 
open  to  as  many  objections,  as  the  other  ?  It  is  said  that  all  the 
feelings  of  our  hearts  revolt  at  the  idea,  that  God  gives  us  a 
depraved,  sinful  nature  at  our  birth,  and  that  no  man  can  believe 
this  without  resisting  and  overcoming  his  most  amiable  sensibili- 
ties. And  do  not  our  moral  feelings  equally  revolt  at  the  idea, 
that  God  creates  us  without  holiness,  and  gives  us  at  our  birth 
such  appetites  and  propensities,  as  he  knows  will  forthwith  bring 
us  into  a  state  of  depravity  ?  And  have  we  not  as  much  occasion 
to  resist  and  overcome  our  amiable  sensibilities  in  this  case,  as  in 
the  other  ?  When  they  hold  that  God  has  so  ordered  things  that 
we  come  into  existence  destitute  of  holiness,  and  with  natural 
appetites  which  will  always  get  the  start  of  reason,  and  will  be  quite 
an  overmatch  for  it  when  moral  agency  begins  and  which  will 
certainly  involve  us  in  sin  and  ruin  ;  —  when  they  hold  all  this, 
are  they  not  obliged  to  set  aside  their  amiable  sensibilities  and  all 
the  natural  feelings  of  their  hearts,  as  unsafe  guides  in  such  a 
matter  as  this,  —  are  they  not  obliged  to  overcome  these  natural 
feelings  as  really  in  maintaining  their  scheme,  as  others  are  in 
maintaining  the  common  Calvinistic  scheme  ?  Prompted  by  these 
natural  sensibilities,  they  make  an  outcry  against  the  common 
doctrine,  as  though  it  implied  something  hard  and  injurious  in 
God's  treatment  of  his  creatures.  Whose  act  is  it,  they  say,  that 
gave  us  this  sinful  nature  ?  And  how  are  we  to  blame  for  that 
nature  which  God  created  ?  And  whose  act  is  it,  I  ask,  that 
brings  us  into  existence  destitute  of  holiness,  and  with  appetites 
and  passions  which  certainly  lead  to  sin  ?  And  how  are  we  to 
blame  for  that  which,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  human  mind, 
invariably  and  certainly  follows  from  an  act  of  God,  or  from 
that  state  in  Avhich  he  places  us  without  any  concurrence  of  our 
own  ? 

Do  they  say  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  implies  a  phydeal  deprav- 

VOL  n.  31 


802  ALL     THEORIES 

ity  ?  But  is  not  their  doctrine  much  more  liable  to  this  chai'ge  ? 
Calvinists  hold  that  depravity  originally  and  essentially  lies  in  our 
moral  nature.  But  they  hold  that  it  arises  altogether  from  those 
appetites  and  propensities  which  are  not  moral,  but  pht/sicaL 
Thus  they  trace  depravity  to  a  physical  source.  They  make  the 
fatal  danger  of  our  condition  he  originally  in  physical  appetites. 
But  they  may  perhaps  think  that  they  can  avoid  the  difficulties 
of  the  Calvinistic  theory  by  alleging,  that  sin  comes  not  in  reality 
from  our  natural  appetites,  nor  from  any  external  circumstances, 
as  its  proper  cause,  but  from  our  free  tvill,  and  that  the  acts  of 
this  free  will  are  entirely  our  own,  and  that  we  are  justly  respon- 
sible for  them.  But  on  the  principle  which  they  have  sanctioned 
by  their  objections  against  the  Calvinistic  theory,  I  ask ;  who 
gave  us  our  free  will  f  And  who  gave  us  uicli  a  free  will,  as 
would  uniformly  and  certainly  choose  sin  ?  Why  did  not  God 
make  our  free  will  such,  or  at  least  place  it  imder  the  influence  of 
such  circumstances,  that  its  choices  should  be  right  instead  of 
wrong  ?  Might  not  God  do  this  without  interfering  at  all  with 
the  nature  of  a  free  will  ?  Did  he  not  give  to  the  elect  angels 
such  a  free  will,  and  place  it  under  such  influences,  that  its 
choices  would  certainly  be  right  ?  And  does  he  not  so  renew  the 
will  of  sinful  men  by  his  Spirit,  and  so  direct  the  causes  which 
act  upon  it,  that  it  shall  now  begin  to  put  forth  exercises  which 
are  right,  and  shall  finally  put  forth  those  which  will  be  per- 
fectly right,  and  that  certainly  and  forever  ?  And  has  not  God 
done  all  this,  and  is  he  not  continually  doing  all  this,  without 
interfering  with  the  nature  of  free  will  ?  Why  then,  if  God 
desires  our  holiness,  does  he  not  give  us  such  a  will,  as  shall 
freely  conform  to  his  law  ?  Has  not  God  a  free  will  in  directing 
this  afikir  ?  And  is  not  his  free  will  attended  with  omnipotence  ? 
And  if  he  had  chosen  to  give  us  a  will  to  put  forth  right  voli- 
tions, could  he  not  have  done  it  ?  Why  then  did  he  not  give  us 
such  a  will  ?  And  if  he  has  given  us  a  different  will,  —  a  will 
that  certainly  acts  wrong ;  how  does  he  show  his  desire  for 
our  holiness  ?  And  how  are  we  culpable  for  the  acts  of  such  a 
will,  more  than  a  comet  is  for  its  erratic  motions  ?  Who  gave  us 
this  erratic  will  ? 


ATTENDED     WITH     DIFFICULTIES.  363 

Thus  it  is,  as  Whately  says  ;  "  The  difficulty  is  not  peculiar 
to  any  one  hypothesis,  but  bears  equally  on  all !  "  And  yet  I 
hold  that  the  difficulty  is  of  no  avail,  and  proves  nothing  at  all, 
except  our  ignorance. 

Some  have  attempted  to  avoid  the  objection  urged  against  the 
common  scheme  that  it  makes  God  the  author  of  a  moral  nature 
which  is  polluted,  by  supposing  that  God  creates  the  soul  pure, 
but  unites  it  with  a  polluted  body  —  a  body  which  tends  to  pol- 
lute the  soul.  Dr.  John  Taylor  says,  this  supposition  is  "  too 
gross  to  be  admitted.  For  who  infused  the  soul  into  the  body  ? 
And  if  it  is  polluted  by  being  infused  into  the  body,  who  is  the 
cause  of  its  pollution  ?  And  who  created  the  body  ?"  Edwards 
turns  these  sensible  remarks  of  Taylor  against  himself.  He  held 
that  God  creates  the  soul  pure,  but  places  it  in  a  polluting  tvorld. 
"Here,"  says  Edwards,  "I  may  cry  out,  —  who  placed  the  soul 
here  in  this  world  ?  And  if  the  world  be  so  constituted  as  natu- 
rally and  infallibly  to  pollute  the  soul  with  sin,  who  is  the  cause 
of  this  pollution  ?     And  who  created  the  world  ?" 

I  shall  briefly  notice  one  more  supposition  by  which  an  attempt 
has  been  made  to  avoid  speculative  difficulties,  and,  to  account 
satisfactorily  for  the  depravity  of  man.  The  supposition  is,  that 
human  beings  existed  as  intelligent,  moral  beings,  in  a  state 
previous  to  the  present  life ;  that  in  that  pre-existent  state  they 
all  committed  sin  ;  and  that  they  are  now  brought  into  the  world 
with  a  depraved,  sinful  nature,  as  a  just  punishment  for  the  sin 
which  they  committed  in  their  former  life,  long  before  their  present 
existence. 

This  theory  is  suggested  in  a  philosophical  manner  by  JuHus 
Miiller,  Professor  of  Theology  in  Halle  University.  In  order, 
he  says,  that  man  may  be  accounted  guilty  for  the  sin  which  is 
in  him,  it  is  necessary  that  he  be  its  author.  But  man  finds  him- 
self in  a  condition  of  sinfulness  from  the  beginning  of  his  earthly 
life.  Let  him  go  back  as  far  as  he  may  in  self-recollection,  he 
cannot  bring  to  mind  his  first  sin,  and  the  earliest  sinful  act  which 
presents  itself  to  his  consciousness,  does  not  appear  as  the  in- 
coming of  an  altogether  new  element  into  the  youthful  life,  but 


364  ALL    THEORIES 

rather  as  a  development  and  manifestation  of  a  hidden  agency, 
the  awakening  of  a  power  that  had  been  slumbering  in  the  deep. 

After  asserting  thus  explicitly  the  doctrine  of  our  innate  sinful- 
ness, he  proceeds  to  say  :  —  Since,  however,  to  originate  one's 
own  character  is  an  essential  condition  of  personality,  and  since 
from  the  very  beginning  of  this  life  man's  character  is  already  de- 
termined, we  are  obliged  to  step  over  the  hounds  of  time,  to  find 
that  jjotver  of  original  choice,  which  precedes  and  p'econditions  all 
sinful  decisions  in  time.  (Biblioth.  Sacra,  vol.  vi.  pp.  253,  4.) 

Moreover,  sin  is  a  universal  characteristic  of  the  human 
race.  There  is  in  all  men  an  innate  sinfulness  ;  and  yet  wherev- 
er sin  is,  there  is  guilt,  i.  e.  each  individual  is  by  his  own  self- 
determination  the  author  of  his  sin.  This  would  be  a  manifest 
contradiction,  if  there  were  not  preceding  our  earthly  development 
in  time,  an  existence  of  our  personality  as  the  sphere  of  that 
self-determination  hy  which  our  moral  coiidition  from  birth  is  af- 
fected. Ibid.  p.  265. 

This  supposition  of  our  having  existed  and  sinned  in  a  state 
preceding  our  present  life,  is  open  to  various  objections. 

The  first  objection  is,  that  it  is  destitute  of  proof.  There  is  no 
indication  of  a  pre-existent  state  in  our  own  memory  or  conscious- 
ness. If  Ave  question  our  own  minds  on  this  matter  ever  so  care- 
fully, we  shall  meet  with  no  response.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence 
in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  from  the  word  of  God.  In  regard  to 
the  man  who  was  born  blind,  our  Saviour  expressly  declares  that 
this  calamity  did  not  come  upon  him  on  account  of  any  sin  of  his, 
that  is,  as  seems  to  be  implied,  on  account  of  his  having  sinned 
in  a  previous  state,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  Pythagoras. 
And  if  native  blindness  did  not  come  upon  him  for  any  offence 
previous  to  his  birth,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
the  greater  evil  of  moral  depravity  came  upon  him  on  this  ac- 
count. But  I  would  not  insist  upon  this.  It  is  sufficient  to  say, 
that  the  notion  of  our  having  lived  and  transgressed  the  divine 
law  in  a  pre-existent  state,  and  of  our  being  born  in  sin  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  that  antecedent  transgression,  is  entirely  destitute  of 
proof.     And  if  we  should  try  to  make  out  by  reasoning,  that 


ATTENDED    WITH    DIFFICULTIES.  365 

something  like  this  must  be  supposed  in  order  to  account  for  the 
fact  of  our  depravity  consistently  with  the  justice  of  God  ;  our 
reasoning  instead  of  proving  the  fact  of  a  pre-existent  state, 
would  only  prove  our  ignorance  and  presumption.  This  hypothe- 
sis, even  if  admitted  to  be  true,  would  still  fail  of  answering  the 
purpose  intended.  Although  it  might  furnish  some  plausible  ac- 
count of  our  innate  depravity,  it  would  cast  no  light  on  the  fact 
of  our  having  sinned  in  a  previous  state,  and  so  would  leave  the 
great  difficulty  untouched.  Why  moral  evil  should  ever  be  suffer- 
ed to  exist  in  beings  who  are  entirely  dependent  on  God  and  under 
his  control,  and  how  its  existence  can  be  accounted  for  consistent- 
ly with  the  infinite  perfections  of  God,  is  a  question  to  which  hu- 
man wisdom,  untaught  from  above,  can  give  no  satisfactory 
answer. 

Besides,  if  God  meant  our  native  sinfulness  as  a  righteous  pun- 
ishment for  the  sin  we  committed  in  a  previous  state  of  trial,  we 
should  suppose  he  would  awaken  in  us  some  recollection,  some 
definite  consciousness  of  our  previous  offence,  so  that  it  might  be 
possible  for  us  to  see  and  acknowledge  our  guilt,  and  the  justice 
of  his  visiting  us  with  such  a  calamity.  But  nothing  like  this  has 
he  ever  done. 

But  there  is  one  more  objection  to  this  theory,  and  one  which 
has  more  weight  with  me,  than  any  other ;  namely,  that  the 
Apostle  Paul  undertakes  to  account  for  our  existing  in  a  fallen, 
sinful  state,  and  expressly  traces  it  to  the  offence  of  our  original 
father.  He  says,  we  are  constituted  sinners,  not  by  any  offence 
of  ours  in  a  pre-existent  state,  but  by  the  offence  of  our  common 
progenitor.  Now  if  the  theory  under  consideration  be  admitted 
to  be  true,  it  must  also  be  admitted  that  the  inspired  Apostle  was 
ignorant  of  it.  For  had  such  a  fact  been  known  to  him,  how 
natural  would  it  have  been  for  him  to  bring  it  into  view,  when  it 
would  have  been  so  appropi-iate  and  so  satisfactory.  But  his 
statement  in  Romans  5,  is  not  only  different  from  this  Pythago- 
rean hypothesis,  but  is  opposed  to  it.  If  Paul's  account  of  the 
matter  is  true,  this  hypothesis  is  false. 

I  must  think  then,  that  any  one  who  adopts  this  hypothesis 

31* 


366  ALL    THEORIES 

does  it  without  proof,  and  exposes  himself  to  a  far  greater  pres- 
sure of  objections  and  difBculties,  than  what  he  aims  to  shun. 

It  will  be  evident  I  think  from  all  which  has  been  said,  that 
the  speculative  objections,  which  have  been  urged  by  John  Taylor 
and  others,  against  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  our  native  depravity, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  of  any  decisive  weight.  The  spirit,  from 
which  they  originate,  would,  if  permitted  to  prevail,  demolish  the 
whole  fabric  of  religion.  With  those  who  indulge  this  spirit,  just 
and  sober  reasoning  has  no  influence,  and  truth  becomes  a  dream. 
Let  Christians  then,  take  care  not  to  give  any  countenance  to  it. 
It  belongs  not  to  them.  Its  proper  residence  is,  the  carnal  mind 
which  receives  not  the  truth  in  love. 

Be  it  then  our  watchful  care,  to  guard  against  that  spirit  of 
mind,  which  shows  itself  in  objections  and  cavils  against  the  doc- 
trines of  God's  holy  word.  How  sharply  did  the  sacred  writers 
rebuke  this  spirit !  They  saw  in  their  day,  that  "  the  thing 
formed  "  proudly  rose  up,  and  said  to  liim  that  formed  it,  "  why 
hast  thou  made  me  thus  ?  "  The  Apostle  regarded  this  question 
as  the  utterance  of  an  impious,  rebellious  heart.  A  man  who 
has  this  spirit  of  objection,  may  pretend  to  feel  a  respect  for  the 
perfections  of  God.  But  in  reality  he  denies  them.  He  takes 
a  matter  of  fact,  a  well  known  principle  in;  the  divine  administra- 
tion, and  says,  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  Crod''s  moral  attributes  ; 
—  which  is  the  same  as  to  say,  that  G-od  camiot  be  a  just  and 
good  Being  in  doing  what  he  actually  does.  This  is  the  radical 
fault  of  the  objector  in  the  present  case.  He  ought  to  learn 
what  is  just  and  right,  by  learning  what  Grod  does.  Whereas 
he  takes  vipon  him  to  determine  what  God  can  or  cannot  con- 
sistently do,  by  his  own  mistaken  notion  of  what  is  just  and  right, 
vainly  assuming  that  God  is  altogether  such  an  one  as  himself. 
A  man  who  acts  on  this  principle,  is  at  war  with  the  divme  char- 
acter and  the  divine  administration. 

I  am  aware  that  some  make  an  objection  of  a  more  practical 
kind  against  the  common  theory,  namely,  that  it  tends  to  stupefy 
conscience,  and  to  prevent  a  proper  sense  of  the  evil  of  sin.  But 
in  truth,  who  will  be  most  likely  to  be  deeply  affected  with  the 


ATTENDED    WITH    DIFFICULTIES.  867 

evil  of  sin,  —  he  that  considers  it  as  arising  from  the  innocent 
appetites  and  propensities  of  our  physical  nature,  or  he  that  con- 
siders it  as  originating  in  a  corrupt  disposition,  —  in  the  sinfulness 
of  the  heart  ?  What  do  facts  show  ?  Had  not  Calvin,  Owen, 
Watts,  Edwards,  Brainerd,  and  others  of  hke  sentiments  with 
them,  as  wakeful  a  conscience,  as  deep  a  sense  of  the  hatefulness 
and  incxcusableness  of  sin,  and  as  active  and  successful  a  zeal 
in  opposing  it,  as  those  who  have  denied  our  native  sinfulness  ? 

I  have  another  suggestion.  Would  you  test  the  truth  of  the 
diiferent  theories  which  are  held  on  the  subject  of  our  depravity  ? 
Inquire  then,  which  of  those  theories  most  naturally  leads  its  ad- 
vocates to  fall  in  with  the  current  language  of  Scripture,  and  to 
speak  just  as  the  sacred  writers  do  in  respect  to  the  native  state 
of  man,  and  the  necessity  of  his  being  renewed  by  the  divine 
Spirit  ?  Which  theory  leads  its  advocates  to  quote  most  freely 
and  feelingly,  the  affecting  representations  of  the  Bible  as  to  the 
deplorable  state  in  which  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  born,  to  give 
to  those  representations  the  most  obvious  sense,  and  to  dwell 
upon  them  with  the  greatest  earnestness  ?  To  which  of  the 
theories  is  the  solemn,  impressive  language  of  inspiration  most 
manifestly  and  perfectly  adapted  ?  This  test  of  truth  may,  in 
many  instances,  turn  to  great  account. 

In  closing  this  Lecture,  I  shall  just  touch  upon  the  proper, 
practical  tendency  of  the  doctrine  which  I  have  endeavored  to 
defend.  This  can  be  satisfactorily  ascertained  by  finding  what 
its  influence  is,  not  upon  the  minds  of  those  who  discard  the  doc- 
trine, but  upon  those  w^ho  seriously  embrace  it  as  a  docti'ine  of 
revelation.  Go  then  to  one  of  this  number,  to  one  who  is  intelli- 
gent and  devout  and  given  to  reflection,  and  inquire  what  is  his 
manner  of  thinking  on  this  subject,  and  the  effect  which  the  doc- 
trine has  upon  his  feelings  ;  and  let  him  speak  for  himself. 

There  was  a  time,  he  will  probably  say,  —  and  I  remember  it 
with  shame  and  sorrow,  when  my  heart  was  full  of  objections 
against  the  doctrine  of  our  native  and  entire  sinfulness.  The 
thought,,  that  God  brings  us  into  being  in  a  fallen,  ruined  state, 
gave  me  great  uneasiness.     And  my  inward  disturbance  contin- 


368  ALL    THEORIES 

ued,  until  the  Spirit  of  God,  as  I  humbly  trust,  subdued  my  pride, 
and  inclined  me  no  longer  to  confide  in  my  own  understanding, 
but  to  submit  implicitly  to  the  wisdom  of  God.  First  of  all,  I 
adopted  it  as  my  maxim  to  believe  whatever  Cfod  makes  known  in 
his  word,  and  to  be  satisfied  with  whatever  he  does  in  his  provi- 
dence. I  determined  to  reject  no  truth,  because  it  transcends  my 
intellectual  powers,  or  because  it  is  attended  with  speculative 
difficulties  which  I  cannot  solve.  I  soon  saw  that  the  doctrine  of 
man's  native  and  total  sinfulness  is  taught  in  the  Bible,  and  is 
confirmed  by  experience  and  observation.  The  habit  which  I 
formed  of  contemplating  the  doctrine  itself,  just  as  it  is  set  forth 
in  the  word  of  God,  gradually  enabled  me  to  dispose  of  the  diffi- 
culties attending  it  very  satisfactorily.  I  have  been  brought  to 
look  upon  sin,  whether  in  disposition  or  in  act,  upon  sin  itself, 
wherever  found,  and  in  whatever  form,  and  however  occasioned,  as 
an  evil  and  bitter  thing,  altogether  blame-worthy  and  hateful. 

Considering  myself  as  the  subject  of  this  evil  from  the  beginning 
of  my  life,  as  born  in  siti,  and  contemplating  the  outgoings  of  my 
depraved,  sinful  heart  in  sinful  actions,  I  abhor  myself,  and  re- 
pent in  dust  and  ashes.  A  deep  conviction  of  sin  has  withdrawn 
my  mind  from  the  influence  of  philosophical  speculations  and 
questions  of  controversy.  My  first  concern  is  to  obtain  deliver- 
ance from  the  power  of  sin,  and  to  be  made  holy,  as  God  is  holy. 
I  offer  daily  and  fervent  prayer  to  God,  that  he  would  sanctify 
me  wholly ;  that  he  would  increase  my  faith,  and  work  in  me  all 
the  good  pleasure  of  his  goodness.  The  belief  which  I  have, 
that  sin  is  natural  to  man,  and  that  it  extends  its  deleterious  influ- 
ence through  all  his  faculties,  excites  me  to  great  watchfulness 
and  unceasing  efforts  against  its  subtle  and  powerful  operations, 
and  to  a  humble  reliance  on  the  help  of  divine  grace.  Viewing 
myself  as  by  nature  a  child  of  wrath,  and  as  deserving  the  whole 
penalty  of  the  violated  law,  I  am  led  to  exalt  the  infinite  grace  of 
God  in  redemption,  and  to  give  glory  to  the  Saviour  who  bestows 
eternal  life  on  sinners.  And  when  I  come  to  consider,  that  this 
utter  ruin  is  brought  upon  the  human  family  by  the  offence  of 
Adam,  their  federal  head,  I  bow  before  that  righteous  Sovereign, 


ATTENDED     WITH    DIFFICULTIES.  369 

wliose  judgments  are  unsearchable,  with  a  full  persuasion,  that 
all  his  ways,  though  past  finding  out,  are  perfectly  holy,  just,  and 
good,  and  that  sin  belongs  wholly  and  exclusively  to  man.  With- 
out the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  I  believe  that  what  God  does  in  con- 
stituting us  sinners  in  consequence  of  the  offence  of  Adam,  he 
does  in  perfect  consistency  with  his  infinite  holiness  and  goodness, 
and  without  the  least  infringement  of  our  moral  agency.  I  have 
done  with  the  impious  question,  tvhy  doth  he  yet  find  fault  ?  or, 
why  has  he  made  me  thus  ?  Who  am  I  that  I  should  sit  in  judg- 
ment on  the  attributes  of  God,  or  call  in  question  the  wisdom  or 
the  rectitude  of  his  conduct  ?  In  a  word,  when  I  consider  that 
I  belong  to  a  race  of  transgressors,  that  I  am  "  the  degenerate 
plant  of  a  strange  vine,"  and  that  the  heart  of  every  man  is  like 
my  own,  I  see  that  all  the  world  is  guilty  before  God,  that  no 
flesh  can  glory  in  his  presence,  and  that  salvation  is  wholly  of 
grace. 

Such  are  the  thoughts  and  feelings  which  naturally  arise  in  the 
mind  of  a  Christian,  who  is  led  by  the  holy  Scriptures,  and  by 
his  own  spiritual  convictions,  cordially  to  embrace  the  doctrine  of 
native  depravity,  and  to  make  it  a  subject  of  devout  meditation, 
and  who  rises  above  his  speculative  difficulties,  not  by  a  mere  intel- 
lectual process,  but  by  the  power  of  holy  affection.  It  seems  to 
me  exceedingly  manifest,  that  whatever  objectors  may  say,  the 
proper  tendency  of  the  doctrine,  when  rightly  received,  is  to  ex- 
alt God,  to  humble  man,  and  to  mahe  the  Saviour  precious. 
And  happy  shall  I  feel  myself  to  be,  if  I  have  been  enabled  so  to 
treat  the  subject,  as  to  contribute  to  this  most  desirable  effect. 


LE  CTURE    LXXI 


REMARKS    ON    COLERIDGE  S   VIEWS    OF   ORIGINAL   SIN. 

Although  I  have  dwelt  so  long  on  the  subject  of  human 
depravity,  I  have  thought  that  it  may  be  of  use,  before  closing, 
to  turn  your  attention  to  one  of  the  recent  authors  who  have 
given  their  views  on  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin. 

Everything  which  comes  from  Coleridge  is  marked  with  pecu- 
liarity. His  habit  of  thinking  and  his  style  of  writing  are  sui 
generis.  Even  where  he  really  agrees  with  others,  it  often  seems 
to  his  readers,  and  to  himself,  that  he  differs  from  them.  He 
evidently  loves  to  differ.  He  aspires  after  originality.  In  him 
this  is  probably  no  affectation  ;  but  seems  to  result  from  the  sin- 
gular structure  of  his  mind.  But  in  most  of  those  who  copy 
after  him,  it  is  affectation,  and  frequently  of  the  most  offensive 
kind  and  the  most  injurious  tendency.  For,  as  is  common  in 
such  a  case,  they  copy  his  excellencies  far  less  than  his  faults. 

t  Scarcely  any  writer  has  done  so  much  as  Coleridge  to  vitiate 
and  deform  the  English  language.  Of  this  any  man  of  classical 
taste  will  be  satisfied,  who  reads  his  philosophical  and  theological 
works.  He  is  the  farthest  of  all  writers  from  being  a  safe  pat- 
tern. The  movements  of  his  mind  are  all  eccentric.  There  is 
nothing  like  regularity,  order,  or  system,  in  any  of  the  produc- 
tions of  his  pen.     He  can  hardly  confine  himself  to  one  subject 

(^through  a  single  paragraph.  If  he  enters  on  a  serious  discussion 
of  an  important  point,  he  can  proceed  but  a  little  way  without 


Coleridge's   views   of  original   sin.       371 

digressions.  It  is  indeed  true,  that  after  a  while  he  returns  to 
his  main  point.  But  it  is,  in  general,  only  to  touch  upon  it,  and 
ramble  again.  He  gives  you  no  such  thing  as  a  regular,  finished 
discussion  of  any  subject,  or  any  branch  of  a  subject.  You  will 
find  nothing  like  unity  in  any  of  his  prose  writings.  And  if  you 
wish  to  discover  his  opinion  on  any  point,  you  must  pick  it  up,  a 
little  in  one  place  and  a  little  in  another.  It  is  not  his  practice 
at  any  time  to  make  a  direct,  clear,  and  full  announcement 
of  his  belief  on  important  subjects,  and  then  to  state  the 
reasons  on  which  it  is  founded.  His  manner  is  everywhere  mis- 
cellaneous and  rambling.  —  And  yet  you  will  find  in  his  writings 
new  and  interesting  ideas,  very  forcibly  expressed.  You  will 
everywhere  find  indications  of  a  fertile  and  original  mind,  —  a 
mind  capable  of  accomplishing  much  for  the  cause  of  truth,  had 
it  been  guarded  against  eccentricities,  and  formed  to  a  habit  of 
clear,  orderly  thinking. 

Coleridge  introduces  the  subject  of  original  sin  by  a  quotation 
from  Jeremy  Taylor.  Taylor  says  :  "  Is  there  any  such  thing  as 
Original  Sin  ?  That,"  he  says,  "  is  not  the  question.  For  it  is 
a  fact  acknowledged  on  all  hands  almost,  and  even  those  who  wiU 
not  confess  it  in  Avords,  confess  it  in  their  complaints.  For  my 
part,  I  cannot  but  confess  that  to  be,  which  I  feel  and  groan 
under,  and  by  which  all  the  world  is  miserable." 

"  Adam,"  he  says,  "  turned  his  back  upon  the  sun,  and  dwelt 
in  the  dark.  He  sinned,  and  brought  evil  into  his  supernatural 
endowments,  and  lost  the  sacrament  and  instrument  of  immor- 
tality. —  His  sin  left  him  to  his  nature  ;  and  by  nature,  whoever 
was  to  be  born  at  all,  was  to  be  born  a  child,  and  to  do  before  he 
could  understand,  and  to  be  bred  under  laws  to  which  he  was 
always  bound,  but  which  could  not  be  always  exacted ;  and  he 
was  to  choose,  when  he  could  not  reason,  and  had  passions  most 
strong,  when  he  had  his  understanding  most  weak  :  and  the  more 
need  he  had  of  a  curb,  the  less  strength  had  he  to  use  it !  And 
this  being  the  case  of  all  the  world,  what  was  every  man's  evil, 
became  all  men's  greater  evil."  After  mentioning  several  cir- 
cumstances which  excite  men  to  sin,  and  which  produce  a  great 


372       Coleridge's   views   of  original  sin. 

increase  of  offences,  he  finally  says  ;  "  By  these  and  ten  thou- 
sand other  concurrent  causes,  man  is  made  more  than  most 
miserable." 

Coleridge  begins  his  remarks  by  saying,  and  that  very  justly, 
that  "  Taylor's  meaning  is  not  quite  clear."  Coleridge  seems  to 
think  that  Taylor  ascribes  sin  to  the  influence  of  circumstances. 
In  opposition  to  this  idea,  he  says :  "  Sin  is  an  evil  which  has 
its  ground  or  origin  in  the  agent,  and  not  in  the  compulsion  of 
circumstances."  On  this  I  remark,  that  in  the  case  of  Adam's 
sin,  and  the  sin  of  David,  of  Peter,  and  Pilate,  and  others 
mentioned  in  history,  there  were  circumstances  which  acted  upon 
the  transgressors  as  temptations.  And  the  language  of  the  his- 
torian implies,  what  their  own  consciousness  made  certain,  that 
those  circumstances  of  temptation  had  an  influence,  a  real  and 
prevailing  iiifluence  ovel*  them.  And  it  is  a  saying  which  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  pronounces  to  be  true,  that  those  cir- 
cumstances led  them  to  sin,  or  drew  them  into  sin.  We  call  such 
circumstances  the  occasions  of  sin,  or  motives  to  sin,  —  meaning 
motives  or  occasions  external  to  the  mind,  and  acting  upon  the 
mind  from  without.  But  it  is  well  known,  that  outward  motives 
acquire  their  influence  by  coming  into  contact  with  what  is  in  the 
mind,  its  passions,  inclinations,  or  desires.  These  are  motives  in 
a  higher  sense.  The  Apostle  James  says  ;  "  A  man  is  tempted 
when  he  is  drawn  away  of  his^own  lust  and  enticed."  A  man's 
affections  and  desires  move  him  to  act  in  view  of  outward  objects. 
Both  the  outward  and  the  inward  motives  have  an  influence. 
The  outward  cannot  act  without  the  inward,  nor  the  inward  with- 
out the  outward. 

The  manner  in  which  motives,  whether  outward  or  inward, 
influence  to  action,  is  what  every  man  knows  by  his  own  expe- 
rience. But  one  thing  is  clear,  namely,  that  circumstances  or 
motives  do  not  influence  a  moral  agent  in  the  way  of  compulsion. 
That  is,  they  do  not  influence  him  contrary  to  his  inclination  or 
choice,  or  without  his  inclination  or  choice.  They  do  not  super- 
sede the  complete  action  of  the  Avill,  or  any  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties.    They  do  not  compel,  but  persuade.     It  is  not  force,  unless 


Coleridge's   views    of   original   sin.       373 

that  -word  denotes  the  power  of  considerations  addressed  to  the 
mind,  or  the  power  of  affections  and  desires  within  the  mind 
itself.  Motives  no  more  compel  volition,  than  volition  compels 
action.  If  a  good  man  comes  to  you,  and  successfully  endeavors 
to  induce  you  to  avoid  what  is  wrong,  or  to  do  what  is  right ;  he 
does  not  compel  you.  Though  his  arguments  may  be  powerful  in 
the  highest  degree,  so  that  you  might  say,  they  are  irresistible ; 
still  you  do  not  call  their  influence  compulsion.  And  if  an  artful 
tempter  comes  to  you,  and  labors  by  earnest  persuasions  to  draw 
you  into  sin,  and  prevails ;  however  powerful  the  influence  he 
exerts  over  you,  you  do  not  call  that  influence  compulsion.  And 
however  urgent  your  inward  inclinations,  how  great  soever  the 
strength  of  your  affections  or  desires,  in  favor  of  good  or  evil ; 
still  you  do  not  feel  yourself  compelled.  The  greatest  and  most 
effectual  influence  of  outward  and  inward  motives  combined  does 
not  interfere  with  our  moral  and  accountable  agency.  I  think, 
therefore,  that  the  pains  which  Coleridge  takes  to  exclude  the 
influence  of  motives  or  circumstances  from  the  act  of  the  sinner, 
and  to  prove  that  sin  is  the  independent,  self-originated  act  of  the 
■will,  turns  to  no  good  account.  For  it  is  a  fact,  that  the  moment 
you  attempt  to  conceive  of  an  exercise  of  holiness  or  sin  in  a 
moral  agent,  without  the  influence  of  motives,  you  attempt  to 
conceive  of  a  nonentity.  The  influence  of  motives  is  involved  in 
the  very  nature  of  rational,  free,  moral  action. 

"We  must  infer,  however,  from  the  good  sense  of  Coleridge,  and 
from  other  parts  of  his  writings,  that  his  object  was  not  to  exclude 
the  influence  of  motives  entirely ;  but  to  show  that  sin,  whether 
consisthig  in  a  mental  state  or  mental  action,  belongs  to  the  person 
himself,  —  exists  in  his  mind,  —  and  is  strictly  Ms  own  act  or 
8tate,  in  contradistinction  to  the  idea,  that  it  lies  in  the  influence 
of  circumstances,  or  in  anything  which  may  be  regarded  as  a 
cause  or  occasion  of  sin.  In  this  he  is  doubtless  right.  For 
nothing  is  more  certain,  than  that  sin,  considered  either  as  a 
quality  or  an  action,  must  be  predicated  of  the  agent  himself. 
It  is  he  only  that  sins ;  he  only  that  is  sinful.  Moral  good  or 
evil  lies  in  the  person  himself.     When  we  predicate  it  even  of  his 

VOL.  n.  32 


374       Coleridge's    views    of   original    sin. 

action,  internal  or  external,  we  still  predicate  it  of  1dm  as  the 
actor.  When  we  say  his  love  to  God  is  praise-worthy,  or  his 
enmity  to  God  is  blame-worthy,  our  real  meaning  is,  that  he,  the 
pergonal  agent,  is  praise-worthy  as  a  friend  to  God,  or  blame- 
worthy as  an  enemy.  This  is  true,  whatever  may  be  the  motives 
which  influence  him.  In  strictness  of  speech,  neither  holiness 
nor  sin  can  be  predicated  of  any  faculty  or  poiver  or  affection  of 
the  mind.  If  we  say  good  or  evil  lies  in  the  will,  our  meaning 
must  be,  it  lies  in  the  person  who  has  the  will.  If  we  say  it  lies 
in  the  affections,  we  mean  that  it  lies  in  the  -person  who  exercises 
the  affections.  For  the  sake  of  convenience,  we  may  say,  that  a 
man's  tvill,  or  his  heart  is  obedient  or  holy  ;  and  no  mistake  is 
likely  to  arise,  because  we  are  understood  to  mean,  that  the  man 
himself  is  obedient  or  holy.  The  command  to  obey  and  to  be 
holy  is  given  to  the  man,  the  person,  not,  strictly  speaking,  to  his 
will  or  his  affections.  God  does  not  speak  to  a  man's  will  or  heart, 
saying,  thou  will,  thou  heart,  shalt  love  God  :  for  the  will  or  heart 
is  not  the  responsible  person.  The  command  is  to  the  man,  — 
thx)u,  0  man,  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God.  This  being  kept  in 
mind,  we  shall  easily  avoid  a  variety  of  misapprehensions  to  which 
we  are  liable  when  speaking  of  such  subjects. 

So  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  Coleridge  nearly  agrees  with  the 
old  writers  generally  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  ivill.  The 
word  is  now  most  frequently  used  to  denote  the  power  of  the 
_mind  to  put  forth  what  are  called  executive  volitions.  But  Cole- 
ridge uses  it  to  denote  the  whole  moral  faculty  or  moral  nature 
of  the  man,  and  so  considers  all  the  affections,  dispositions  and 
emotions  of  the  mind,  as  aifections,  dispositions  and  emotions  of 
the  will.  Indeed  it  is  the  ivill,  according  to  his  understanding  of 
it,  that  constitutes  the  responsible  agent,  the  person,  the  I  and 
the  me,  as  he  speaks.  This  he  asserts  and  maintains  with  great 
zeal.  And  I  am  not  disposed  to  call  in  question  the  correctness 
of  the  real  opinion  which  I  suppose  he  entertains,  and  means  to 
express.  But  if  any  one  who  uses  such  language,  means  to  sig- 
nify that  the  will,  by  itself,  constitutes  the  personal,  responsible 
agent,  or  that  it  is  an}^  more  essential  to  the  existence  of  such  an 


Coleridge's   views   of   original   sin.        375 

agent,  than  other  faculties  of  the  mind  ;  our  judgment  and  con-  \ 
sciousness  at  once  decide  against  him.  For  we  cannot  doubt  that 
reason  and  memory  are  as  necessary  to  constitute  a  responsible 
person,  as  free  will.  When  I  speak  of  myself,  and  of  my  obliga- 
tion and  accountability,  I  refer  as  much  to  other  attributes  of  my 
nature,  as  to  the  will.  And  it  is  just  as  proper  to  say,  that 
reason  constitutes  a  personal,  responsible  agent,  as  that  free  will 
does  it.  Not  only  free  will,  but  reason,  and  otlier  mental  attri- 
butes, belong  essentially  to  a  moral  agent.  And  not  only  the 
possession  of  reason,  but  the  use  of  it,  is  implied  in  every  exer- 
cise of  free  will.  Coleridge  says,  "  Reason  is  the  condition,  the 
sine  qua  non  of  a  free  will."  Of  course,  the  will  is  not  absolutely 
free  and  independent.  Freedom  is  a  relative  term,  when  applied 
to  the  will,  as  well  as  when  applied  to  anything  else.  When  we 
say,  the  will  is  free^  we  do  not  mean  that  it  is  free  in  all  respects, 
—  absolutely  free.  If  reason  is  the  condition,  the  sine  qua  non 
of  a  free  will,  then  a  free  will  is  not  free  from  reason  ;  and  the 
exercise  of  a  free  will  is  not  free  from  the  exercise  of  reason. 
Now  reason  has  to  do  with  rational  considerations,  or  motives. 
Motives  then  of  some  sort  are  the  essential  condition  of  all  the 
acts  of  free  will.  And  this  is  the  same  as  to  say,  that  the  will, 
free  as  it  is,  cannot  act  Avithout  motives.  The  position  then  of 
Coleridge,  that  reason  is  the  necessary  condition  of  a  free  will, 
really  contains  the  very  doctrine  of  Edwards.  A  striking  though 
not  an  unfrequent  instance  of  one,  who  denounces  the  theory  of 
Edwards,  and  yet  holds,  as  he  cannot  help  holding,  to  all  the 
essential  principles  which  Edwards  maintains.  The  principles  of 
Edwards  are  the  principles  Avhich  we  are  led  to  adopt  by  common 
sense,  experience,  and  consciousness.  You  may  attempt  to  set 
these  principles  aside,  but  you  cannot.  And  if  you  think  you  do 
set  them  aside,  your  experience  and  consciousness  will  soon  show 
your  mistake.  For  you  will  find,  that  in  all  instances  of  choice 
and  voluntary  action,  you  are  in  fact  influenced  by  motives,  and 
that  you  cannot  choose  and  act  without  motives. 

I  have  said,  that  the  will  is  not  free  from  the  influence  of 
motives.     I  add,  that  it  is  not  free  from  established  laws  or  prin- 


376        Coleridge's   views   of   original   sin. 

ci'ples  of  action.  This  has  been  shown  by  various  writers,  but  by 
none  so  particulariy  and  fully  as  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Upham.  If 
you  would  see  the  proof  of  this  point  carried  to  perfect  demonstra- 
tion, read  his  work  on  the  Will.  What  the  laws  of  volition  are  is 
ascertained  by  experience,  in  the  same  manner  with  the  other 
laws  of  the  mind.  Whenever  the  will  acts,  or,  more  properly, 
whenever  man  acts  in  the  way  of  willing,  it  is  and  must  be  in 
conformity  with  these  laws.  Say,  if  you  please,  the  will  is  its 
oivn  law.  So  be  it.  Still  the  law  is  fixed  and  uniform.  It  lies 
in  the  very  nature  or  the  essential  properties  of  the  will ;  and  is 
as  unalterable  as  they  are.  The  will  is  of  such  a  nature,  that  it 
does  and  must  put  forth  its  determinations  or  choices  under  the 
influence  of  motives.  This  is  the  law  of  the  ivill,  —  or,  if  you 
choose,  this  is  the  will.  From  this  law  the  will  is  not  free  ;  for  it 
is  not  free  from  itself. 

Again ;  the  will,  or  the  mind  in  willing,  is  not  free  from  the 
divine  control.  He  that  created  the  mind  with  all  its  faculties, 
has  dominion  over  it,  and,  in  a  way  suited  to  its  nature,  directs 
all  its  actions.  It  is  on  this  principle,  and  on  this  principle 
only,  that  God  governs  the  world,  and  carries  his  purposes  into 
effect. 

If  then  the  will  is  not  free  from  the  influence  of  motives,  nor 
from  those  uniform  laAvs  which  arise  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  will,  and  which  are  ascertained  by  experience,  nor  from 
the  divine  control ;  from  what  is  it  free  ?  Experience  and  con- 
sciousness furnish  the  answer.  The  will  of  a  rational,  moral 
being,  or  a  rational,  moral  being  in  willini/,  is  free  from  brute 
force,  or  what  is  called  compulsion.  The  mind  in  willing  is  not 
influenced  by  the  power  of  gravitation,  or  steam,  or  the  magnet, 
or  by  muscular  strength.  From  all  such  influence  it  is  and  must 
be  free,  because  it  is  a  will,  or  a  mind  willing.  Just  as  we  say, 
i^ptrit  is  free  from  matter,  and  from  all  the  properties  of  matter. 
Which  is  only  saying,  it  is  spirit.  So  the  u'ill,  or  the  mind  in 
willing,  is  free  from  physical  laws  and  physical  influences.  It 
does  not  act  like  anything  in  the  physical  or  material  creation. 
It  does  not  come  under  the  law  of  physical  cause  and  effect. 


Coleridge's  views   of  original  sin.       377 

Cause  and  effect  can  belong  to  the  mind  and  the  will  only  in 
a  higher  sense,  that  is,  in  a  rational^  moral,  spiritual  sense. 
And  this  is  only  saying,  that  the  mind  is  a  rational,  moral,  spirit- 
ual agent,  and  acts  in  a  rational,  moral,  spiritual  manner.  It  has 
a  manner  of  acting,  but  that  manner  is  as  distinct  and  different 
from  the  manner  in  ■which  anything  in  the  material  world  acts,  as 
mind  is  distinct  and  different  from  matter.  Nothing  else  is  like 
it,  and  nothing  else  acts  like  it.  And  although  we  do  and  must 
speak  of  the  mind  and  its  acts  in  language  borrowed  from  the 
natural  world  ;  the  language  in  that  higher  application  has 
another  and  higher  sense,  —  a  sense,  so  far  analogous  to  the 
primary  sense,  as  to  justify  the  language,  but  still  as  different  as 
the  subject  to  which  it  relates.  And  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  this 
is  nearly  the  view  which  Coleridge  really  means  to  express. 
And  here  you  may  see  in  a  moment  the  sophistry  of  certain 
writers,  in  their  inference  from  Edwards's  theory  of  the  will. 
Cause  and  effect  in  the  physical  world  have  nothing  to  do  with 
moral  agency  ;  they  exclude  it.  But  because  the  operation  of 
physical  causes  excludes  moral  agency,  how  does  it  follow  that 
the  operation  of  causes  of  an  entirely  different  nature,  exclude 
it  ?  We  cannot  logically  draw  the  same  conclusion  in  the  two 
cases,  unless  the  premises  are  the  same,  —  the  same  not  only  in 
the  words  which  express  them,  but  in  their  nature.  Now  in  the 
case  before  us,  although  the  words  cause  and  effect,  and  other 
words  derived  from  things  in  the  natural  world,  are  applied  to  the 
acts  of  the  mivid,  they  are  applied  in  a  very  different  sense,  and 
denote  what  is  of  a  very  different  nature.  Because,  then,  a  cer- 
tain proposition  is  true  of  the  physical  objects  denoted  by  the 
words  ;  it  does  not  follow  that  the  same  is  true  of  the  spiritual 
objects  denoted  by  the  same  words.  Because  Edwards  holds 
that  the  mind  is  subject  to  a  moral  necessity,  he  cannot  be  charged 
with  holding  that  it  is  subject  to  a  physical  necessity.  And  as 
moral  necessity  is  entirely  different  in  its  nature  from  p>hysieal 
necessity  ;  none  of  the  peculiar  consequences  which  follow  from 
physical  necessity,  can  be  considered  as  following  from  moral 
necessity. 

32* 


378        Coleridge's   views   of   original   sin. 

To  return  now  to  our  subject.  Coleridge  sajs,  and  says  truly, 
that  sin  is  a  spiritual  evil,  and  that  it  originates  in  spirit ;  not  in 
(rocZ,  but  in  some  spirit.  Nothing  is  more  certain  than  this. 
Sin,  that  is,  human  sin,  originates  or  has  its  origin,  —  begins  or 
has  its  beginning,  in  the  spirit  of  man.  It  exists  there  at  first, 
and  it  continues  to  exist  there.  Coleridge  says,  it  originates  in 
the  ivill.  He  uses  the  word  will  to  signify  the  moral  nature  of 
man,  —  or  the  mind  as  possessed  of  a  moral  nature  ;  and  under 
the  acts  of  the  will  he  includes  all  the  affections,  as  well  as  what 
are  more  strictly  called  vohtions.  The  will  being  used  in  this 
wide  sense,  sin  doubtless  originates  there.  It  originates  or  begins 
in  man's  spiritual  nature.  Coleridge  speaks  of  "■  that  state  and 
constitution  of  the  will  which  is  the  ground,  condition,  and  com- 
mon cause  of  all  sins."  I  understand  him  to  mean,  the  state  of 
the  heart,  or  the  state  of  man's  moral  nature.  This  he  represents 
as  "  the  ground,  condition,  and  common  cause  of  all  particular 
sins."  I  suppose  he  means  to  express,  in  his  own  language,  the 
same  as  our  Saviour  expresses,  Avhen  he  says,  "  Out  of  the  heart 
proceed  evil  thoughts,  murders,  adulteries,  fornications,  thefts, 
false  witness,  blasphemies."  This  is  very  plain.  All  the  parti- 
cular forms  of  sin,  whether  acted  out  or  not,  '■'■  proceed  from  the 
heart, ^^  —  Coleridge  says,  from  "  the  corrupt  nature  of  the  will ; " 
OT  "  the  state  and  constitution  of  the  will."  If  by  this  he  means 
the  same  as  Christ  means  by  the  heart,  he  is  on  the  line  of  truth. 
If  not,  his  philosophy  has  led  him  astra3^ 

When  Coleridge  represents  "  that  the  corrupt  nature  of  the 
will  must,  in  some  sense  or  other,  be  considered  as  its  own  ac^," 
his  meaning  is  not  easily  discovered.  If  he  had  said  that  the 
corrupt  nature  of  the  will  resulted  from  an  act  of  the  will,  or  that 
the  wrong  act  of  the  will  resulted  from  the  corrupt  nature  of  the 
will,  the  meaning  might  be  intelhgiblc.  But  how  the  corrupt 
nature  of  the  will  is  itself  the  act  of  the  wull,  I  know  not.  When 
he  teaches  "  that  the  state  and  constitution  of  the  will,  is  the 
ground  and  common  cause  of  all "  its  sinful  acts  ;  he  speaks 
plainly.  But  to  say  that  this  state  of  the  will,  —  that  its  corrupt 
nature  is  its  own  act,  seems  not  a  little  foggy.     He  says,  too,  that 


Coleridge's   views    of   original   sin.       379 

the  corruption  of  the  will  must  have  been  self-originated.  We 
know  what  it  is  for  one  thing  to  originate  another,  as  for  a  man  to 
originate  an  argument,  or  the  plan  of  a  house  ;  but  what  is  it  for 
a  thing  either  in  the  mind  or  out  of  the  mind  to  originate  itself? 
It  would  seem  to  be  the  same  as  for  a  thing  to  be  the  cause  of 
itself,  the  ground  or  source  of  its  own  existence.  But  here  comes 
a  difficulty.  To  originate  a  thing  is  to  exert  a  power  or  energy, 
or  put  forth  an  act,  from  which  something  results.  Now  a  thing 
must  he,  before  it  can  act  in  the  way  of  originating  anything. 
But  here  is  a  thing  which  originates  itself.  It  does  an  act  before 
it  exists,  and  from  that  act  its  existence  flows.  The  expression, 
that  the  corruption  of  the  will  or  anything  else  is  self-originated, 
is,  strictly  understood,  an  absurdity ;  or,  if  not  an  absurdity,  it  is 
poetry.  Coleridge  thinks  this  corruption  of  the  will,  this  spiritual 
evil  and  the  source  of  all  evil,  because  self-originated,  may  prop- 
erly be  called  original  sin.  But  what  need  of  resorting  to  thia 
notion  in  order  to  justify  the  language  ?  Why  may  it  not  be 
called  original  sin,  because  it  is  found  in  every  man  from  the 
beginning  of  liis  moral  existence,  and  is  the  consequence  of  that 
sin  of  our  primeval  parents,  which  was  the  first  human  sin,  and 
from  which  the  sinful  character  and  state  of  his  posterity  result  ? 

It  will  be  seen  that  Coleridge  has  his  eye  upon  the  ninth  Arti- 
cle of  the  Church  of  England,  and  justly  objects  to  Jeremy 
Taylor,  because  he  does  not  come  up  to  the  full  meaning  of  the 
Article.  That  Article,  which  expresses  the  opinion  of  Luther, 
and  Calvin,  and  even  Arrainius,  and  all  the  Churches  of  the 
Reformation,  and  indeed  of  all  the  Churches  of  Christendom, 
except  Pelagians  and  Socinians,  is  as  follows  :  — "  Original  sin 
standeth  not  in  the  following  of  Adam,  (as  the  Pelagians  do  vainly 
talk,)  but  it  is  the  fault  and  corruption  of  the  nature  of  every 
man,  that  naturally  is  engendered  of  the  offspring  of  Adam, 
whereby  man  is  very  far  gone  from  original  ]-ighteousness,  and 
is  of  his  own  nature  inclined  to  evil."  The  Westminster  Divines 
in  like  manner  consider  original  sin  to  be  "  the  want  of  original 
righteousness,  and  the  corruption  of  our  whole  nature,"  resulting 
from  the  one  offence  of  Adam. 


380        Coleridge's   views   op  original  sin. 

After  speaking  of  the  corrupt  nature  of  the  will,  Coleridge 
says  ;  "  The  admission  of  a  nature  into  a  spiritual  essence  by  its 
own  act,  is  a  corruption."  What  now  can  be  the  meaning  of  this  ? 
By  "  spiritual  essence,"  he  means  the  will.  But  has  not  the  will 
a  nature  ?  Has  it  not  a  nature  as  soon  as  it  exists  ?  Not  in  the 
view  of  our  author.  The  spirit,  the  will  he  denominates  super- 
natural;  and  our  Transcendentalists  do  the  same.  A  flagrant 
violation  of  the  usus  loquendi !  Nothing  is  more  common  than  to 
speak  of  the  nature  of  mind  or  spirit,  the  nature  of  angels,  and 
even  the  nature  of  God.  But  here  the  spirit,  the  will,  which 
Coleridge  thinks  has  no  nature,  admits  a  nature  into  itself.  If  he 
had  said,  admits  a  corrupt  nature,  it  would  be  less  difficult  to 
understand  him.  But  it  admits  a  nature!  Before,  it  had  no 
nature  ! 

Our  author  speaks  of  "  the  admission  of  a  nature  into  a  spirit- 
ual essence  hy  its  oivn  acty  This  spiritual  essence,  the  will, 
before  it  has  a  nature  of  any  kind,  acts  in  admitting  a  nature. 
This  is  surely  very  abstruse  language  !  The  idea  seems  to  be, 
that  a  nature,  I  suppose  he  means  a  corrupt  nature,  comes  and  of- 
fers itself  to  the'  spiritual  essence  or  will,  which  has  no  nature,  and 
the  will,  by  its  own  act,  admits  that  nature.  Not  content  to  be 
without  a  nature,  it  wickedly  opens  itself  to  receive  the  nature 
oflered.  He  does  not  say,  whether  he  or  any  other  man  was  ever 
conscious  of  such  a  process  as  this  ;  or  whether  he  is  compelled  by 
his  philosophy  to  imagine  something  like  it. 

But  we  have  not  come  to  the  bottom  yet.  Coleridge  says, 
"  the  admission  of  a  nature  into  a  spiritual  essence  by  its  own  act, 
is  a  corruptioti.^'  The  admission  of  it,  i.  e.  the  act  of  admitting 
it,  is  a  corruption.  We  should  think  he  means,  that  it  is  a  corrupt 
act;  that  is,  a  sin.  He  elsewhere  says,  that  the  state  and 
constitution  of  the  will  is  the  ground  and  common  cause  of  all 
sins.  But  here  the  act  of  admitting  a  nature  into  the  will,  is  a 
corruption  ;  the  corruption  of  the  will  not  being  the  ground  of 
this  act.  But  the  author  solves  this  difficulty  by  resorting  to 
something  else  no  less  difficult,  that  is,  his  notion  that  the  corrup- 
tion of  the  will  is  self-originated. 


Coleridge's  views  of  original  sin.        381 

The  statement  which  Coleridge  finally  makes  of  original  sin, 
corresponds  very  nearly  with  the  doctrine  of  Calvinistic  Divines. 
It  is  this,  that  an  evil  inherent  in  the  will,  that  is,  in  the  moral 
nature  of  man,  belongs  to  all  men ;  that  this  corruption  belongs  to 
each  individual,  not  because  he  has  committed  this  or  that  crime, 
but  simply  because  he  is  a  man.  This  evil,  which  is  common  to 
all,  must,  he  says,  have  a  common  ground.  And  this  evil  ground, 
he  refers  to  the  ^viU  of  man  ;  or,  as  I  generally  express  it,  to  man 
as  a  moral  being,  or  to  his  moral  nature.  This  evil,  which  is 
inherent  in  all  men  at  every  period  of  their  existence,  and  is  the 
ground  of  all  the  forms  of  transgression,  is  what  he  calls  original 
sin.  He  says,  it  is  a  mystery  ;  by  which  he  means,  that  it  is  "  a 
fact  Avhich  we  see,  but  cannot  explain;"  —  and  he  says  "the 
doctrine  is  a  truth  which  we  apprehend,  but  can  neither  compre- 
hend nor  communicate."  But  though  he  says  this,  yet  he  tries 
hard  to  explain  it,  and  to  communicate  it,  that  is,  to  communicate 
the  idea  of  it. 

One  more  remark.  Coleridge  says ;  "  In  respect  of  original 
sin,  every  man  is  the  adequate  representative  of  all  men."  He 
considers  that  Adam  is  taken  as  the  diagram,  i.  e.  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  whole  race,  merely  because  he  came  first  in  time, 
not  because  his  sin  had  any  more  influence  upon  the  race  than  the 
sin  of  any  other  man.  No  other  means  of  exposing  the  utter 
fallacy  of  this  notion  is  necessary,  than  to  attend  to  the  Apostle's 
language  in  Rom  5.  If  every  other  man  stands  in  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  race,  and  has  the  same  influence  upon  them,  as  Adam, 
then  you  may  substitute  any  other  man,  say  Cain,  or  Esau,  or 
David,  in  the  place  of  Adam,  and  read  it  thus,  by  the  offence  of 
Cain  judgment  came  upon  all  men  to  condemnation ;  by  David's 
disobedience  the  many  that  succeeded  him  were  made  sinners ; 
by  one  man,  that  is,  by  Cain,  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and 
death  by  sin  ;  and  so  on.  The  Apostle  most  evidently  meant  to 
teach,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  had  a  real  and  fatal  influence,  and 
was  the  cause,  the  real  though  remote  cause,  of  the  sin  and  misery 
of  all  mankind. 


382  DIRECTIONS     HOW    TO     TEACH 


I  shall  now  close  my  Lectures  on  the  moral  depravity  of  man, 
by  offering  a  few  hints  as  to  the  proper  manner  of  teaching  the 
doctrine. 

And  here  I  should  feel  myself  guilty  of  a  great  fault,  if  I  did 
not  refer  you  at  once  to  the  inspired  writers,  as  the  only  safe  and 
infallible  patterns  for  Christian  ministers.  Human  sinfulness  was 
a  very  prominent  subject  with  prophets  and  apostles,  and  with 
Christ  himself.  And  as  they  were  guided  by  infallible  wisdom,  we 
must  conclude  that  they  treated  this,  as  well  as  every  other  subject, 
in  the  wisest  and  best  manner.  It  is  then  of  the  first  importance 
that  you  should  apply  yourselves  to  the  study  of  the  Scriptures, 
for  the  purpose  of  learning  how  to  address  men  in  regard  to 
their  character  and  conduct  as  sinners.  See  how  inspired  teachers 
treated  this  subject.  See  how  they  addressed  individual  trans- 
gressors, and  how  they  addressed  bodies  of  men.  See  how  God 
himself  spoke  to  the  first  ofienders  and  those  in  subsequent  periods 
of  time,  with  a  view  to  impress  them  with  the  evil  of  their  con- 
duct. See  in  what  manner  Moses  from  time  to  time  spoke  to 
those  who  sinned  ;  and  particularly  in  his  farewell  discourse  just 
before  he  died,  contained  in  the  book  of  Deuteronom3^  Attend 
to  the  faithful  addresses  of  Elijah,  Nathan  and  others  to  indi- 
vidual sinners,  and  of  Isaiah,  Jeremiah,  Ezekiel,  etc.,  to  the  people 
at  large.  But  you  will  derive  the  greatest  benefit  from  the  teach- 
ing of  Christ,  who  spake  as  never  man  spake.  Make  yourselves 
familiar  with  his  various  modes  of  address,  and  learn  of  him. 
Notice  also  the  various  instances  mentioned  in  the  Acts,  of  the 
preaching  of  the  apostles,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  writers  of 
the  Epistles  labored  to  convince  men  of  sin.  Give  yourselves  to 
the  study  of  the  Scriptures,  and  make  yourselves  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  thoughts  and  the  language  of  the  sacred 
writers  ;  and  make  them  your  guides.  See  u'ltat  they  did  in 
teaching  human  guilt,  and  hoiv  they  did  it ;  and  see  also  what 
they  did  not  do. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    DEPRAVITY.  883 

If  you  give  a  diligent  attention  to  the  Scriptures,  you  will  par- 
ticularly notice  the  following  things. 

1.  You  will  notice  that  the  inspired  writers  in  their  endeavors 
to  convince  men  of  their  depravity  and  guilt,  never  make  use  of 
metaphysical  or  psychological  arguments,  and  never  introduce  any 
metaphysical  or  philosophical  theory,  or  any  terms  peculiar  to 
such  a  theory.  For  example,  you  find  nothing  in  the  Scriptures 
like  the  theory  which  Coleridge  and  those  of  his  stamp  so  often 
thrust  upon  their  readers,  and  nothing  of  the  phraseology  by 
which  that  theory  is  expressed.  Where  do  the  inspired  writers 
tell  you  that  depravity  is  self-originated ;  that  the  corruption  of 
the  will  which  belongs  to  every  human  being  from  the  beginning 
of  life,  is  admitted  into  the  will  by  an  act  of  the  will,  and  that 
every  act  of  the  responsible  will  is  self-determined  ?  I  only  ask, 
whether  the  inspired  writers  ever  make  use  of  such  a  theory  to 
impress  the  evil  of  sin. 

There  is  a  class  of  preachers  and  writers,  who  continually  refer 
to  the  metaphysical  notion  of  ability  in  order  to  impress  men  with 
a  sense  of  obligation,  and  the  blame-worthiness  of  sin.  They  urge 
sinners  to  repent,  because  they  are  able  to  repent ;  to  love  God,  be- 
cause they  can  love  him  ;  and  to  obey  his  commands,  because  they 
have  full  and  sufficient  ability  to  do  it.  And  they  are  always  say- 
ing that  men  are  culpable  for  committing  sin,  because  they  are  able 
to  avoid  it.  Now  what  I  have  to  say  is,  that  how  much  soever  of 
metaphysical  truth  there  may  be  in  this  notion  of  ability,  it  is  what 
neither  the  prophets,  nor  Christ,  nor  the  apostles,  ever  mention. 
I  have  referred  to  these  speculative  theories  as  specimens.  I 
might  go  over  all  the  metaphysical  schemes  of  different  sects,  in 
regard  to  the  introduction  of  sin,  and  the  native  character  of 
man,  and  show  that  the  sacred  writers  have  nothing  to  do  with 
any  of  them.  They  may  teach  the  very  truths  which  are  meant 
to  be  contained  in  these  metaphysical  theories.  But  they  never 
teach  them  in  the  form  of  metaphysical  theories.  They  never 
use  the  peculiar  terms  of  such  theories  ;  and  they  never  fall  into 
the  particular  modes  of  thinking  and  reasoning,  which  such 
theories  disclose.     Such  theories,  and  such  modes    of  thinking, 


I 


384  DIRECTIONS    HOW    TO     TEACH 

reasoning  and  speaking,  are  not  adapted  to  the  object  -which  the 
sacred  writers  had  in  view,  that  is,  to  promote  the  spiritual  good 
of  common  people.     The  sacred  writers,  having  a  just  impression 
of  the  character  and  wants  of  human  beings,  and  an  ardent  desire 
for  their  salvation,  avoided   as  altogether  unsuitable  and  incon- 
gruous, everything  which  approached  to  the  form  of  philosophizing 
on  the  abstract  nature  of  sin  ;  just  as  enhghtened  legislators  and 
judges  do.    The  inference  from  this  is  manifest.     Christian  teach- 
ers should  imitate  the  sacred  writers.     As  Knapp  says  :  "  None 
of  the   profound  and  learned  investigations  of  philosophers  and 
theologians  respecting  the  nature  of  human  depravity,  the  mode 
of  its  propagation,  etc.,  should  have   any  place  in  the  practical 
and  popular  exhibition  of  this  doctrine."     You  cannot  introduce 
any  of  these  investigations  into  the  pulpit  without  perplexing  or 
misleading  the  common  people,  and  occasioning  great  loss  to  their 
souls.     Remember  this,  I  beseech  you,  and  address  yourselves  to 
men  on  the  subject  of  their  depravity  and  guilt,  not  in  the  man- 
ner of  philosophical  theories,  but  in   the  plain,  serious,   earnest, 
practical  manner  of  the  great  Teacher,  and  his  inspired  prophets 
and  apostles. 

2.  You  will  notice,  that  when  the  sacred  teachers  would  im- 
press men  with  their  sinfulness  and  guilt,  they  generally  set  forth 
the  particular  si7is  both  outward  and  inward,  of  which  they  are 
guilty.  They  charge  men  with  actual  transgressions  of  the  divine 
law ;  with  ingratitude,  idolatry,  rebellion,  and  obstinacy ;  with 
profaneness,  Sabbath-breaking,  and  disobedience  to  parents  ;  with 
actual  murder,  or  with  hatred  in  their  hearts  ;  Avith  fornication, 
adultery,  and  impure  desire  ;  with  evil  speaking,  falsehood,  and 
perjury  ;  with  covetousness,  dishonesty,  and  fraud  ;  with  forgetting 
God,  with  enmity  against  God,  with  pride,  unbelief,  hardness  of 
heart,  and  hypocrisy.  They  charge  men  with  these  and  other 
sins  directly  and  fearlessly.  And  they  point  out  the  circum- 
stances which  go  to  aggravate  their  guilt,  as  the  great  goodness 
of  God  which  they  despise,  the  righteousness  of  the  law  which 
they  transgress,  the  excellence  and  glory  of  the  Saviour  from 
whom   they  turn   away,  the   greatness   and   preciousness  of   his 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    DEPRAVITY.  385 

salvation  Avhich  they  neglect,  the  dictates  of  conscience  which  they 
violate,  the  clear  light  of  the  gospel  against  which  they  shut  their 
eyes,  its  gracious  calls  and  warnings  which  they  will  not  hear. 
The  sacred  writers  take  off  the  covering  by  which  men  attempt 
to  conceal  their  guilt  from  others,  and  from  themselves,  and  bring 
out  their  evil  deeds  and  evil  affections  to  open  view.  In  all  this 
the  sacred  teachers  have  set  us  an  example  that  we  should  follow 
their  steps. 

3.  You  will  notice  that  Christ  and  the  prophets  and  apostles 
taught  men  not  only  to  look  at  the  particular  transgressions,  open 
and  secret,  of  which  they  are  guilty,  but  to  trace  these  sinful  acts 
to  a  depraved  nature,  to  an  evil,  wicked  heart,  just  as  they  trace 
the  badness  of  fruit  to  the  badness  of  the  tree.  The  inspired 
writers  teach  that  the  heart  is  deceitful  and  desperately  wicked  ; 
that  out  of  it  proceed  evil  thoughts,  and  every  kind  of  sin  ;  that 
the  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God ;  that  men  are  by 
nature  children  of  wrath.  In  all  this  the  inspired  teachers  are 
patterns  for  our  imitation. 

4.  The  sacred  writers  assert,  and  take  pains  to  show,  that 
sinners  are  without  excuse.  We  should  do  the  same.  We 
should  search  diligently  to  find  out  what  are  the  excuses,  the 
plausible  pretences  or  pleas,  by  which  sinners  try  to  justify  them- 
selves, or  to  palhate  their  guilt,  and  we  should  labor  to  show  the 
utter  futility  of  all  such  pleas  and  excuses,  and  to  make  sin  ap- 
pear as  it  is,  utterly  indefensible,  and  "  exceedingly  sinful." 

5.  You  will  notice  that  the  sacred  teachers  labor  to  persuade 
men  to  repent  and  beheve,  and  to  obey  the  divine  commands,  by 
various  considerations.  They  do  not  always  insist  upon  one  and 
the  same  motive,  but  urge  a  great  variety  of  motives.  They 
often  appeal  directly  to  the  moral  sense,  or  conscience,  requiring 
men  to  do  what  they  know  to  be  right  and  to  avoid  what  they 
know  to  be  wrong.  They  very  often  announce  the  di\ane  com- 
mand merely,  without  saying  any  thing  to  enforce  it,  relying 
upon  the  obvious  reasonableness  and  goodness  of  the  command, 
and  upon  the  authority  of  God,  as  a  sufficient  enforcement. 
Sometimes  they  labor  to  persuade  sinners  to  repent  and  obey  the 

VOL  n.  33 


383  DIRECTIONS    HOW    TO     TEACH 

gospel,  by  the  forbearance  and  goodness  of  God,  and  the  wonders 
of  his  wrace  in  the  redemption  of  the  world.  Sometimes  they 
hold  up  the  terrors  of  the  Lord,  the  destruction  coming  upon  the 
impenitent,  the  loss  of  the  soul ;  and  sometimes,  the  blessings  of 
salvation,  pardon,  peace,  and  the  indescribable  joys  of  the  heavenly 
world.  They  appeal  to  all  the  principles  of  action  properly 
belonging  to  the  mind  of  man,  —  to  conscience,  to  reason,  to  fear, 
to  hope,  to  love  of  happiness,  to  gratitude.  —  We  should  do  the 
same,  making  use  of  one  method  or  different  methods,  just  as 
occasion  requires. 

6.  You  will  notice  that  the  inspired  writers  represent  the 
evil  of  sin  in  a  variety  of  ways,  or  hold  it  up  in  various  lights. 
Some  Divines  always  insist  that  sin,  all  sin  consists  in  selfishness 
or  a  supreme  love  of  our  private,  personal  good.  I  do  not  by 
any  means  say,  that  this  theory  of  sin  is  untrue.  But  you  will 
notice,  that  self-love,  or  selfishness  is  only  one  of  the  many  forms 
of  moral  evil  of  which  the  sacred  writers  speak.  For  the  most 
part  they  present  it  in  other  forms  and  give  it  other  names.  And 
this  they  do  with  evident  propriety.  For  who  does  not  at  once  see 
the  evil  of  enmity  against  God,  of  disobedience  to  God,  of  in- 
gratitude, profaneness,  falsehood,  pride,  malice  and  revenge  ;  — 
who  does  not  at  once  see  the  evil  of  these  sins,  without  our  under- 
taking to  reduce  them  to  the  form  of  selfishness  ?  You  might 
perhaps  more  properly  illustrate  the  evil  of  selfishness  by  showing 
that  it  is  in  opposition  to  reason  and  truth,  and  is  a  violation  of 
God's  holy  law.  But  my  direction  is,  study  the  Bible,  and  see 
how  the  inspired  writers  represent  sin,  and  what  terms  they  use 
to  designate  it.  Their  method  is  plain,  intelligible,  adapted  to 
common  sense,  and  suited  to  promote  the  welfare  of  all. 

Here  accept  a  general  remark,  namely ;  that  if  you  cherish  in 
your  heart  a  serious,  solemn  feeling  of  the  guilt  and  danger  of 
sinners,  and  an  ardent  desire  for  their  salvation ;  you  will  be  led, 
by  this  very  state  of  mind,  to  a  right  mode  of  address.  A  warm, 
tender,  pious  heart  will  prompt  to  suitable  argiiments  and  suitable 
language.  Add  to  this,  a  deep  sense  of  the  presence  of  God,  the 
love  of  Christ,  and  the  value  of  the  blessings  he  confers,  and  a 


THE    DOCTRINE    OP    DEPRAVITY.  387 

firm  belief  of  the  coming  judgment.  The  more  jou  feel  as  Christ 
and  the  apostles  did,  the  more  naturally  will  you  fall  into  their 
manner  of  teaching. 

Finally,  while  you  take  care  not  to  go  beyond  the  teach- 
ing of  the  Bible,  you  should  take  equal  care  not  to  fall  short 
of  it.  All  that  the  Scriptures  contain  on  the  subject  of  hu- 
man sin  is  intended  for  our  benefit.  It  is  all  suited  to  profit  the 
souls  of  men,  and  so  is  proper  to  be  introduced  into  discourses  from 
the  pulpit.  The  whole  truth  on  this  as  well  as  every  other  subject, 
is  better  than  a  part.  If  you  beUeve  only  a  part,  your  mind  will 
have  an  unnecessary  contractedness.  Your  capacity  is  laro-e 
enough  to  receive  a  great  amount  of  truth  ;  and  the  more  you 
receive,  the  larger  your  capacity  will  be,  and  the  stronger 
will  be  your  understanding.  Some  keep  their  understanding 
weak,  and  their  faith  weak,  by  receiving  so  small  a  portion  of 
truth.  Truth  is  food  to  the  soul.  And  there  is  truth  enough  in 
the  Scriptures  to  nourish  and  strengthen  you,  to  satisfy  all  your 
lawful  cravings,  and  cause  you  to  grow  up  to  the  stature  of 
perfect  men  m  Christ  Jesus.  Why  should  you  stint  the  growth 
of  your  immortal  minds  and  the  immortal  minds  of  others,  by  de- 
priving them  of  any  portion  of  their  proper  nutriment  ?  Some 
men  tell  us  that  their  creed  extends  no  further  than  this  ;  that  all 
men  are  miners.  But  the  creed  of  the  inspired  writers  extended 
further.  What  do  the  Scriptures  teach  as  to  the  origin  of  de- 
pravity in  every  child  of  Adam,  in  John  3 :  6  and  Ps.  5:5? 
What  does  Paul  teach  in  Rom.  5,  as  to  the  influence  of  Adam's 
sin  upon  the  character  and  state  of  his  posterity  ?  And  what  do 
inspired  men  teach  in  other  places  ?  If  you  believe  in  the  divine 
authority  of  the  whole  Bible,  why  should  you  hmit  yourselves  and 
those  you  teach  to  a  part  of  it  ?  Why  deprive  yourselves  of  the 
power  to  say  in  review  of  your  ministry,  as  the  Apostle  did,  / 
have  not  shunned  to  declare  all  the  counsel  of  Grod? 


LECTURE  LXXII. 


THE  ATONEMENT  A  SUBJECT  OP  PURE  REVELATION. 

We  now  proceed  to  a  more  pleasing  topic,  namely,  the  redemp- 
tion of  the  world  by  the  death  of  a  Mediator. 

Jesus  Christ  came  into  the  world  to  save  sinners.  Thus  the 
connection  of  human  apostasy  with  the  mission  of  Christ  is  very 
obvious.  Had  not  mankind  transgressed  the  divine  law,  there 
would  have  been  no  need  of  a  Saviour.  But  as  the  whole  race 
are  transgressors,  they  must  all  have  suffered  the  penalty  of  the 
violated  law,  had  not  a  Saviour  been  provided.  Human  sin  ren- 
dered redemption  necessary.  And  the  design  of  redemption  was 
to  remove  the  evil  consequences  of  sin. 

The  doctrine  of  salvation  by  Christ  is  preeminently  a  doctrine 
of  the  gospel.  It  holds  the  highest  place  in  the  Christian  system ; 
and  its  practical  results  are  inexpressibly  important.  But  this 
subject  has  been  sometimes  treated  so  obscurely,  sometimes  so 
defectively,  and  sometimes  so  erroneously,  —  it  has  by  one  class 
of  writers  been  mingled  with  so  many  faulty  speculations,  and  by 
another  class  opposed  with  so  much  art  and  even  malignity,  that 
it  becomes  necessary  to  apply  ourselves  to  the  examination  of  it 
with  special  care,  and  with  persevering  diligence.  And -if  we 
would  avoid  all  misconceptions  and  perplexing  diflBculties,  and 
arrive  at  a  clear  and  correct  view  of  the  truth  in  relation  to  this 
momentous  subject,  it  is  indispensible  that  we  should  pursue  the 
investigation  on  right  principles,  and  under  the  guidance  of  proper 
rules. 


THE    ATONEMENT,    ETC.  389 

It  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  right  reasoning  in  regard  to  the 
work  of  redemption,  that  it  is  a  subject  of  pure  revelation.  This 
I  am  aware  is  generally  acknowledged.  But  how  few  strictly 
adhere  to  it.  When  men  of  a  certain  habit  of  mind  come  to 
examine  the  subject,  they  forget  that  all  their  knowledge  respect- 
ing it  is  to  be  derived  from  the  Scriptures,  and  that  all  their 
views  arc  to  be  regulated  by  what  the  Scriptures  contain  ;  and 
they  proceed  as  though  they  were  able,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to 
draw  out  the  truth  by  the  mere  exercise  of  their  own  intellectual 
powers,  just  as  they  do  in  mathematics.  Their  inquiry  is,  not 
what  does  the  Bible  teach,  or  what  views  did  the  inspired  writers 
entertain,  but  to  what  conclusions  are  we  conducted  by  specula- 
tive reason, —  each  one  of  course  relying  upon  his  own  reason. 
It  is  not  unfrequently  the  case,  that  while  men  derive  the  general 
doctrine  of  atonement  from  revelation,  they  do  not  rely  upon 
revelation  to  give  the  doctrine  its  proper  form,  and  to  show  its 
particular  relations  and  uses.  They  undertake  to  settle  all  these 
points  by  reasoning.  Whereas  the  proper  form  of  the  doctrine 
and  its  particular  relations  and  uses  are  as  really  beyond  the  dis- 
covery of  human  reason,  as  the  doctrine  itself.  Indeed  they  are 
to  be  considered  as  making  a  part  of  the  doctrine. 

The  principle  above  stated  is  to  be  taken  in  its  widest  sense. 
The  doctrine  of  atonement  in  a  general  view,  to ff ether  tvith  its  par- 
ticular form,  and  all  its  relations,  circumstances  and  results,  is  to 
be  considered  as  a  sxd>ject  of  pure  revelation. 

To  illustrate  this  principle  I  remark,  first,  that  human  reason, 
untaught  by  revelation,  could  never  have  known  that  (rod  would  in 
any  ivay  provide  salvation  for  our  apostate  race. 

What  is  there  in  the  state  of  human  transgressors,  which  could 
move  God  to  exercise  mercy  towards  them,  rather  than  towards 
the  apostate  angels  ?  We  have  violated  as  good  a  law  as  they 
did.  We  are  as  really  without  excuse  and  as  justly  condemned, 
as  they.  And  no  created  mind,  looking  at  their  condition,  and  at 
ours,  could  have  discovered  any  reason  why  a  distinction  should 
be  made,  and  why  salvation  should  be  provided  for  us  and  not  for 
them.     Nor  would  it  have  been  possible  for  human  reason,  un- 

33* 


390  THE     ATONEMENT 

taught  by  revelation,  to  take  such  a  comprehensive  view  of  God's 
attributes,  and  of  the  interests  of  his  vast  empire,  as  to  authorize 
the  least  expectation,  that  those  attributes  and  those  interests 
would  lead  to  our  salvation,  or  even  admit  of  it.  Let  anj  one 
think  of  man  as  a  transgressor  of  God's  perfect  law  and  as 
exposed  to  its  righteous  penalty  ;  let  him  consider  too  how  im- 
portant it  must  be  to  the  welfare  of  a  moral  kingdom  that  a  wise 
and  good  law  should  be  carried  into  execution ;  and,  if  destitute 
of  light  from  above,  how  could  he  suppose  that  the  just  penalty 
of  that  law  would  be  remitted  and  the  transgressor  restored  to 
the  divine  favor  ?  All  our  reasoning  from  the  character  of  the 
Supreme  Legislator  and  Judge,  and  from  the  order  and  happiness 
of  that  kingdom  over  which  he  presides,  must  have  ended  in  the 
conviction,  that  the  punishment  of  the  transgressor  is  inevitable. 
This  is  the  view  which  intelligent  Christians  generally  have  enter- 
tained. They  have  considered  the  salvation  of  sinners  as  an 
event  which  the  heart  of  man  could  never  have  conceived,  and  as 
exclusively  the  contrivance  of  infinite  wisdom.  Without  revela- 
tion, we  should  have  had  no  data  on  which  to  ground  any  hope  for 
man,  and  our  fearful  conclusion  would  have  been,  that  the  sinner 
must  die. 

Secondly.  On  supposition  that  we  had  the  knowledge  of  God's 
general  purpose  to  save  sinners,  and  nothing  more,  it  would  he 
beyond  the  potver  of  reason  to  discover  in  ivhat  way  or  hy  what 
means  he  would  do  this.  Unenlightened  by  revelation,  how  could 
we  imagine  such  a  thing,  as  that  God  would  provide  a  sacrifice  for 
sin,  and  that  the  sacrifice  would  be  no  other  than  his  own  beloved 
Son?  Without  revelation  we  could  never  have  known  that  God 
had  a  Son,  and  much  less  that  that  Son  would  die  for  us.  How 
could  we,  especially  in  this  childhood  of  our  being,  attain  to  such 
a  knowledge  of  the  attributes  of  the  incomprehensible  God,  of 
the  principles  of  his  government,  and  the  interests  of  his  ever- 
lasting kingdom,  that  we  could  determine,  or  even  conjecture, 
that  any  sacrifice  for  sin  would  be  admissible,  or  if  any,  what 
sacrifice  it  would  be,  and  what  influence  it  would  have  in  making 
an  atonement  and  preparing  the  way  for  the  forgiveness  of  trans- 
gressors. 


A    SUBJECT    OF    PURE    REVELATION.  391 

Thirdly.  Suppose  we  had  information  from  God's  word,  that 
he  had  provided  salvation  for  sinners  and  had  done  it  by  means 
of  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  and  suppose  the  information  from  God's 
word  extended  no  farther  than  this,  we  should  still  he  unable  to 
determine  what  would  be  the  results  of  such  a  provision.  We 
might  suppose,  and  probably  we  should  suppose,  that  the  infinite 
goodness  of  God  which  made  the  gracious  provision,  would  send 
the  offer  of  it  to  every  human  being,  and  would  cause  every  human 
being  to  accept  it.  But  such  a  supposition  would  be  a  matter  of 
mere  conjecture,  and  would  prove  to  be  very  wide  of  the  truth. 
From  what  principles  of  reasoning,  aside  from  revelation  and  fact, 
could  we  ever  know  that  the  sacrifice  of  atonement  would  be 
postponed  for  four  thousand  years  from  the  fall  of  man,  and  that 
for  near  two  thousand  years  after  it  was  made,  the  knowledge  of 
it  would  be  communicated  to  only  a  small  pai-t  of  the  human  race, 
and  that  only  a  part  of  those  to  whom  it  would  be  communicated, 
would  be  induced  to  accept  it  ?  After  all  the  instruction  which 
God  has  actually  given  us,  we  are  prone  to  think  very  erroneously 
on  these  subjects,  and  we  find  great  labor  and  caution  necessary 
to  bring  ourselves  to  adopt  conclusions  correspondent  with  the 
truth.  NoAV  if  the  tendency  of  our  natural  reason  is  so  erroneous, 
that  it  is  difficult  even  for  the  word  of  God  effectually  to  regulate 
it,  how  wild  and  extravagant  would  have  been  its  motions,  had  it 
been  left  without  the  influence  of  God's  word  ! 

I  am  sensible  that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult,  and  perhaps  impos- 
sible, to  conceive  what  would  have  been  the  state  of  our  minds, 
had  we  never  been  influenced  in  our  habits  of  thinking  by  the 
light  of  revelation.  And  if  we  go  to  the  heathen  for  the  purpose 
of  learning  what  is  the  state  of  the  human  mind  when  wholly 
uninfluenced  by  revelation,  we  are  still  liable  to  mistake.  Because 
it  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  with  certainty,  how  far  the 
opinions  which  are  almost  everywhere  found  among  them  respect- 
ing the  use  of  sacrifices  to  propitiate  the  gods,  are  to  be  traced 
back  to  an  original  revelation.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  know 
whether  either  the  reason  or  the  conscience  of  guilty  man,  inde- 
pendently of  revelation,  would  ever  have  suggested  the  propriety 


392  THE     ATONEMENT 

of  attempting  to  appease  the  divine  wrath  by  sacrifices.  Those 
divine  attributes,  and  those  principles  of  the  divine  government, 
from  which  the  work  of  redemption  flows,  lie  beyond  the  ken  of 
unenlightened  reason,  and  for  all  our  knowledge  of  them  we  are 
indebted  to  revelation.  Without  instruction  from  above,  we 
should  be  as  unable  to  judge  what  would  be  a  safe  and  proper 
method  for  God  to  adopt  in  sailing  transgressors,  as  a  little  child 
would  be  to  judge  what  would  be  a  proper  method  of  administer- 
ing the  affairs  of  an  extensive  empire.  No  one  can  judge  of  the 
wisest  and  best  mode  of  administration  in  any  government,  without 
knowing  perfectly  the  extent  of  the  empire,  its  external  relations, 
and  all  its  present  and  future  interests.  This  is  specially  true  in 
regard  to  the  divine  administration. 

The  conclusion  then  to  which  our  contemplations  conduct  us  is, 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  in  a  general  view,  together 
with  its  particular  form,  and  all  its  relations  and  circumstances,  is 
a  subject  of  supernatural  revelation.  The  human  mind,  untaught 
by  revelation,  could  not  know  that  God  would  in  any  way  pro- 
vide salvation  for  sinners.  Mere  reason  could  not  infer  this 
either  from  the  attributes  of  God,  or  from  the  principles  of  his 
government,  or  from  the  character  and  state  of  man.  All  these, 
so  far  as  we  could  understand  them  without  revelation,  would  lead 
us  to  conclude,  that  the  transgressor  cannot  escape  the  punishment 
he  deserves.  And  if  we  should  be  informed  of  the  general  fact, 
that  God  would  save  sinners,  and  of  this  only,  we  could  not,  by 
the  use  of  our  own  unenlightened  reason,  form  any  clear  concep- 
tion of  the  manner  in  which  he  would  do  it.  Certainly  we  could 
not  know  that  he  would  accomplish  the  salvation  of  sinners 
through  the  sacrifice  of  his  own  beloved  Son.  And  if  we  should 
be  informed  that  such  a  sacrifice  would  be  made,  we  could  not 
determine  what  effect  it  would  have  on  the  divine  administration, 
or  what  would  be  its  results,  —  whether  all  men,  or  only  a  part  of 
them,  would  be  actually  saved,  and  whether  those,  who  would  be 
lost,  would  ultimately  receive  any  benefit  from  the  gracious  provi- 
sion. The  whole  scheme,  with  all  its  circumstances  and  results, 
is  the  sole  contrivance  of  the  infinite  mind  of  God,  the  result  of 


A    SUBJECT    OF    PURE    REVELATION.  393 

his  unsearchable  perfections  ;  and  for  our  knowledge  of  it,  we  are 
wholly  indebted  to  his  word. 

But  this  conclusion  does  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  our  rea- 
son has  nothing  to  do  Avith  the  doctrine  of  redemption.  It  could 
not  indeed  have  discovered  that  doctrine  by  its  own  power,  any 
more  than  the  eye,  by  itself,  could  have  discovered  the  most  dis- 
tant object  which  has  been  made  visible  by  the  telescope.  But 
when  the  doctrine  is  brought  to  light  by  revelation,  then  we  can 
understand  it,  and  the  principles  which  it  involves.  We  can  see 
its  glory,  we  can  dwell  upon  it  in  our  meditations,  and  we  can 
make  it  a  subject  of  reasoning,  just  as  we  can  employ  our  reason 
about  those  celestial  bodies  which  have  been  brought  to  view  by 
the  power  of  the  telescope.  Though  we  could  never  have  discov- 
ered them,  and  cannot  now  perceive  them  by  the  naked  eye  ;  yet, 
as  they  are  by  other  means  made  visible,  we  can  reason  about 
their  situations,  their  motions,  and  their  mutual  relations,  and  also 
about  their  relations  to  those  objects  which  are  visible  to  the  naked 
eye  ;  and  we  can  lay  down  various  true  and  important  propositions 
respecting  them,  just  as  well  as  if  they  lay  within  the  reach  of 
our  senses.  The  doctrine  of  the  atonement  could  be  of  no  avail 
to  us,  were  we  not  by  the  proper  use  of  our  faculties  capable  of 
understanding  it,  of  believing  it,  of  forming  rational  propositions 
respecting  it,  and  of  making  it  a  motive  to  holiness,  and  a  means 
of  salvation. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  then,  that  our  reason  is  to  be  diligently 
employed  on  this  subject.  Indeed  it  is  a  subject  of  such  import- 
ance and  excellence,  that  we  shall  be  exceedingly  culpable  if  we 
do  not  apply  to  it  the  highest  efforts  of  our  rational  powers.  But 
if  we  do  this,  our  knowledge  of  its  nature,  and  of  its  relations  to 
God  and  his  kingdom,  particularly  to  man,  will  be  perpetually 
increasing.  After  we  have  studied  it  with  the  utmost  diligence 
for  ages,  we  shall  find  that  we  have  only  begun  to  understand  it, 
and  shall  be  prompted,  by  the  degree  of  knowledge  we  have 
acquired,  to  apply  ourselves  to  it  with  a  still  deeper  interest  in 
ages  to  come. 

There  is  one  part  of  the  general  subject,  to  the  consideration 


394  THE     ATONEMENT 

of  which  it  is  especially  suitable  that  we  should  apply  our  reason, 
namely,  the  effects  which  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  actually 
produces  in  the  minds  of  men.  This  may  properly  be  treated  as 
a  branch  of  mental  philosophy.  For  we  may  learn  the  nature  of 
the  mind  and  the  laws  according  to  which  it  acts,  by  considering 
how  it  is  affected  by  this  doctrine,  as  well  as  by  considering  any 
other  of  its  operations.  The  effects  of  this  doctrine  on  the  mind 
are  frequently  brought  to  view  in  the  Scriptures,  and  are  made 
known  very  clearly  by  Christian  experience.  And  being  thus 
made  known,  whether  by  Scripture  or  experience,  they  become 
the  proper  subject  of  reasoning,  and  the  ground  of  general  propo- 
sitions respecting  the  manner  in  which  our  moral  affections  are 
influenced.  And  these  propositions  become  important  helps  to  us 
in  our  attempts  to  excite  and  direct  the  affections  of  others.  On 
the  principles  which  these  propositions  involve,  the  art  of  Christian 
eloquence  and  persuasion  in  a  great  measure  depends. 

We  may  be  sure  then,  that  our  rational  faculties  have  much  to 
do  in  relation  to  the  subject  now  before  us.  Our  great  concern 
is,  that  these  faculties  may  be  rightly  employed.  How  this  is  to 
be  done,  —  how  we  shall  use  our  reason  on  this  subject  so  as  to 
find  the  truth,  and  secure  its  most  beneficial  influence,  —  is  a 
question  of  great  moment. 

The  general  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  we  should  labor 
with  assiduity,  in  the  use  of  proper  means,  to  get  a  clear  under- 
standing of  the  doctrine  itself,  and  of  all  the  circumstances  attend- 
ing it,  and  then  learn  to  present  it  to  the  minds  of  others,  as  well 
as  to  our  own  minds,  so  as  to  produce  the  proper  effects.  In  all 
this  our  rational  powers  are  to  be  diligently  employed.  Here 
reason  finds  its  best  work. 

But  to  be  more  specific  ;  our  first  and  great  business  is  to  apply 
our  reason  to  the  Holy  Scriptures,  for  the  single  purpose  of  dis- 
covering what  they  teach  on  the  subject  before  us.  I  shall  con- 
sider it  as  a  settled  point,  that  all  Scripture  is  given  by  inspiration 
of  God,  and  is  to  be  received  and  used  as  an  infallible  guide  to 
our  faith.  It  follows  then,  that  our  principal  inquiry  must  be, 
•what  does  the  inspired  volume  teach  ?     What  do  we  learn  from 


A    SUBJECT    OP    PURE    REVELATION.  395 

the  word  of  God  as  to  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  Jesus 
Christ  ?  Thus  the  great  business  which  devolves  upon  us  in  the 
exercise  of  our  rational  powera,  is  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  the 
Bible.  And  this  we  are  to  do  by  applying  to  it  the  proper  rules 
of  interpretation.  It  does  not  fall  within  my  design  to  show  par- 
ticularly what  these  rules  are.  I  will  only  say,  they  are  such  as 
are  suggested  by  experience,  and  approved  by  common  sense. 
The  general  object  to  be  aimed  at  is,  that  we  place  ourselves,  as 
far  as  may  be,  in  the  circumstances  of  those  who  wrote  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  of  those  to  whom  they  were  originally  addressed.  We 
are  particularly  to  consider  at  what  period  of  the  world  each  part 
was  written ;  what  was  the  condition  of  the  writer ;  what  were 
the  customs  and  other  circumstances  of  the  time  when  he  wrote, 
and  of  the  people  for  whom  he  wrote  ;  what  were  the  prevailing 
habits  of  thinking  and  of  speaking ;  what  were  the  errors  to  be  op- 
posed, etc.  Such  things  as  these  are  very  important  to  be  known, 
because  they  have  a  decided  influence  upon  our  understanding  of 
the  sense  which  the  writer  meant  to  express.  A  single  example 
will  suffice  to  show  the  value  of  this  principle  of  interpretation. 
The  Apostle  Paul  often  represents  Christ  as  sacrificed  for  us,  or 
as  a  sacrifice  for  sin.  To  know  what  he  meant  by  this  represent- 
ation, it  is  of  essential  consequence  to  consider,  that  he  was  a  Jew, 
that  he  was  deeply  versed  in  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  and  familiar 
with  the  Jewish  ritual,  and  that  he  represented  Christ  as  a  sacri- 
fice when  writing  to  those  who  were  well  acquainted  with  the 
sacrifices  enjoined  by  the  Mosaic  Law,  and  who  would  necessarily 
understand  him  as  speaking  with  reference  to  them,  and  in  lan- 
guage borrowed  from  them.  The  question  then  is,  not  what  a 
Hindoo  philosopher,  or  a  Hindoo  priest,  or  a  Roman  orator  means 
by  a  man's  being  made  a  sacrifice  foV  his  religion  or  his  country, 
but  what  a  Jeiv  means,  a  Jew  in  the  circumstances  of  the  Apostle, 
a  Jew  strenuously  maintaining  the  authority  of  the  Old  Testament, 
and  appealing  to  it  for  the  explanation  and  support  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  and  writing  for  the  instruction  of  those  who  knew 
him  to  be  a  Jew,  and  would  understand  him  as  s;  caking  on  such  a 
subject  according  to  the  sense  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures.  The 
question  is,  what  does  such  a  man  mean  hy  a  sin-offering,  or  a 


396  THE    ATONEMENT 

sacrifice  for  sin  ?  By  pursuing  this  inquiry,  wc  satisfy  ourselves 
what  must  be  the  meaning  of  the  Apostle  when  speaking  in  such  a 
manner  on  such  a  subject.  Here  our  work  is  ended.  We  have 
arrived  at  the  sense  expressed  by  an  inspired  writer.  We  see 
how  he  understood  the  subject ;  and  we  are  to  understand  it  in 
the  same  manner.  None  of  our  speculations,  none  of  our  contro- 
versies, none  of  our  particular  modes  of  thinking  are  to  be  brought 
in,  either  to  add  to  the  Apostle's  meaning,  or  to  take  from  it,  or 
in  any  way  to  alter  it.  The  sense  which  he  evidently  intended  to 
convey  must  be  received  as  an  established  principle,  an  ultimate 
truth  ;  and  then  whatever  becomes  of  the  opinions  of  the  world, 
or  of  our  own  previous  opinions,  this  must  be  maintained.  Our 
object  must  ever  be,  not  to  get  such  a  view  of  the  subject  as  we 
can  best  support  by  general  arguments,  or  can,  in  our  own  way, 
show  to  be  most  rational,  and  least  liable  to  the  objections  of  philo- 
sophers ;  but  to  think  with  the  Apostle,  —  to  receive  implicitly  the 
sense  of  inspiration. 

Suffer  me  here  to  suggest  a  few  hints,  which  may  prove  useful 
in  directing  your  inquiries  and  securing  you  from  mistakes. 

First.  Labor  for  the  increase  of  ^our  knowledge  in  relation  both 
to  the  ])articular  subject  under  consideration,  and  other  subjects 
related  to  it.  To  grow  in  knowledge  is  the  most  effectual  way  to 
free  the  mind  from  error.  Error  lives  and  thrives  most  where 
ignorance  prevails.  Every  addition  you  make  to  the  clearness 
and  definiteness  of  your  views,  and  to  the  extent  and  profoundness 
of  your  knowledge,  will  be  one  step  towards  the  entire  removal 
of  error.  If  a  man  so  directs  his  inquiries  as  to  ensure  a  constant 
enlargement  of  his  mind,  and  a  constant  improvement  of  his 
intellectual  powers,  his  erroneous  opinions  will  pass  away  of  course, 
as  the  darkness  of  the  night  does  before  the  rising  sun. 

Secondly.  Cultivate  right  affections.  Sinful  affections  are  op- 
posed to  divine  truth,  and  are  a  hinderance  to  a  right  faith  ;  but 
they  have  a  natural  and  close  alliance  with  error.  Sin  will  always 
act  according  to  its  own  nature.  Sometimes  openly  and  some- 
times covertly  it  will  make  resistance  against  the  Gospel,  and  par- 
ticularly against  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  —  a 
doctrine  which,  when  rightly  apprehended  and  cordially  received, 


A    SUBJECT    OF    PURE    REVELATION.  397 

has  an  extraordinary  efficacy  in  subduing  the  power  of  sin. 
Hence  it  is  that  men  under  the  influence  of  depraved  aifections, 
have  been  led  to  deny  or  to  evade  the  doctrine,  or  at  least  to 
misrepresent  it,  and  to  mix  it  with  error,  and  thus  to  take  away  its 
sanctifpng  power.  Men  who  are  proud  and  selfish,  yea,  all  the 
ungodly,  have  great  reason  to  suspect  the  correctness  of  the  views 
they  entertain  of  the  work  of  Christ.  The  spirit  of  their  minds  will 
more  or  less  influence  their  belief  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
atonement ;  and  if  it  cannot  entirely  prevent  their  receiving  the 
doctrine,  it  will  at  least  give  it  a  shape  at  variance  with  the  sim- 
plicity of  the  Gospel.  Now  if  we  would  free  ourselves  from  this 
exposure  to  error,  we  must  labor,  through  the  help  of  God,  to 
subdue  our  depraved  affections,  which  are  all  in  league  with  error. 
It  is  often  the  case  that  a  man  does  more  towards  obtaining  right 
views  of  an  important  Scripture  doctrine,  by  mortifying  one  sinful 
passion,  or  by  giving  up  one  sinful  indulgence,  than  he  could  do 
without  this,  by  the  most  laborious  study  for  months  or  years. 
If  then  you  would  be  sure  of  obtaining  such  views  of  redemption, 
as  shall  be  conformed  to  God's  holy  word,  take  care  to  be  rid  of 
sin,  that  mist  of  darkness  in  the  soul,  and  cherish  that  holiness 
which  has  both  an  eye  to  see  the  truth  and  a  heart  to  love  it.  Be 
pure  from  sin,  and  keep  yourselves  under  the  noon-day  light  of 
revelation,  and  it  will  be  no  difficult  task  for  you  to  understand 
the  great,  central  truth  now  before  you ;  nay,  I  was  ready  to  say, 
this  truth  will  come  to  you  of  its  dwn  accord,  and  will  delight- 
fully occupy  that  place  in  your  soul,  which  you  have  thus  pre- 
pared for  its  reception. 

Finally.  It  appears  indispensable  to  the  right  understanding 
of  what  the  Scriptures  teach  respecting  the  mediation  of  Christ, 
that  many  mistakes  should  be  corrected,  many  corrupt  affections 
subdued,  and  much  knowledge  of  God  and  of  man  obtained.  Now 
if  any  one,  instead  of  sitting  with  child-like  docihty  at  the  feet 
of  Jesus,  and  seeking  the  guidance  of  his  Spirit,  is  inclined  to  un- 
take  this  arduous  work  in  his  own  strength,  and  thinks  that,  by 
any  labors  or  struggles  of  his,  he  can  successfully  accomplish  it 
without  divine  guidance,  it  will  be  to  his  confusion. 

VOL.  n.  34 


LE  CTURE    LXXIll. 


TEXTS     WHICH     TEACH     THE     DOCTRINE     OF    ATONEMENT. 
FIRST     AND     SECOND     CLASSES. 

In  my  treatment  of  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  I  shall  endeav- 
or to  conform  to  the  great  principle  laid  down  in  the  last  Lecture, 
and  shall  make  it  my  constant  object  to  ascertain  what  the  Scrip- 
tures teach.  The  instructions  of  God's  word  on  this  subject  are, 
for  the  most  part,  so  intelligible  and  plain  that  no  attentive  and 
candid  reader  can  mistake  their  meaning. 

Some  writers  discuss  the  subject  of  redemption  on  the  general 
principles  of  moral  law  and  a  moral  administration;  that  is,  on  the 
principles  o^ Natural  Theology,  making  the  direct  teachings  of  reve- 
lation of  subordinate  use,  and  only  auxiliary  to  their  main  design. 
This  it  seems  to  me  is  far  from  being  the  proper  and  consistent  mode 
of  proceeding  for  those  who  receive  the  Scriptures  as  the  word  of 
God,  and  as  the  sufficient  and  only  infallible  guide  of  our  faith 
and  practice.  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  word  of  God,  from 
which  all  our  knowledge  on  the  present  subject  is  to  be  derived, 
should  first  of  all  be  consulted.  We  are  not  now  to  inquire,  what 
the  light  of  nature  aside  from  revelation  teaches,  nor  what  men 
destitute  of  the  Scriptures  might  be  led  to  conjecture  or  to  hope 
for  from  the  common  course  of  divine  providence.  If  it  is  true 
that  the  doctrine  of  atonement  in  a  general  view,  and  also  its 
particular  forjn,  its  circumstances  and  results  are  to  be  considered 
as  matters  of  pure  revelation ;  then  clearly  we  should  go  directly 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS     CLASSIFIED.  399 

to  the   inspired  volume,  and,  in  the  diligent  use  of  our  faculties, 
endeavor  to  learn  what  it  teaches  respecting  this  subject. 

My  design  is  to  lay  before  you  the  instructions  which  the 
Scriptures  give  respecting  this  subject  in  as  orderly  a  manner  as 
possible,  arranging  the  texts,  which  pertain  to  the  Avork  of  re- 
demption, in  distinct  classes,  first,  taking  those  which  are  more 
general,  and  then  proceeding  to  those  which  are  more  particular 
and  specific. 

The  first  class  I  shall  introduce  will  comprise  those  texts  which 
teach  the  general  truth,  that  Christ  is  the  Redeemer  and  Saviour 
of  sinners.  And  you  will  here  learn  that  Christ  is  a  Saviour  in  a 
peculiar  sense.  Of  the  numberless  passages  which  relate  to  this 
poin,\  I  shall  refer  to  only  a  few  of  the  most  explicit.  Matt.  1  : 
21 ;  "  And  thou  shalt  call  his  name  Jesus,  for  he  shall  save  his 
people  from  their  sins."  Matt.  18  :  11 ;  „The  Son  of  man  is  come 
to  save  that  which  was  lost."  Acts  5  :  31 ;  "  Him  hath  God  ex- 
alted to  be  "a  Prince  and  a  Saviour."  See  also  Acts  4 :  12. 
Gal.  3  :  13.  Tit.  2  :  13.  These  texts,  and  others  of  like  import, 
clearly  reveal  the  truth,  that  Christ  is  our  Redeemer  and  Saviour, 
and  that  he  is  so  hy  way  of  eminence  —  a  truth  of  inconceivable 
worth  to  all  the  posterity  of  Adam. 

Second  class  of  texts.  The  inspired  writers  not  only  teach  that 
Christ  is  our  Redeemer  and  Saviour,  ascribing  to  him  the  general 
work  of  salvation ;  but  they  inform  us  that  our  forgiveness  and 
salvation  are  effected  particularly  by  his  sufferings  and  death. 
Isa.  53.  "  He  was  wounded  for  our  transgressions ;  he  was 
bruised  for  our  iniquities."  "  He  made  his  soul  an  offering  for 
sin."  Christ  himself  declares,  that  he  came  to  give  his  life  a 
ransom  for  many ;  that  his  blood  is  shed  for  the  remission  of  sins  ; 
that  we  have  redemption  through  his  blood.  See  also  Heb.  1 : 
3,  and  Rev.  1 :  5.  Passages  which  are  of  the  same  general  im- 
port with  these  are  found  in  many  parts  of  the  New  Testament. 
From  them  we  learn,  that  the  special  end  of  Christ's  death  was 
the  forgiveness  and  salvation  of  men,  and  that  whenever  sinners 
are  forgiven  and  saved,  it  is  in  consequence  of  his  death.  His 
death  is  the  cause  or  means,  and  that  preeminently,  and  their 


400  ATONEMENT,       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

forgiveness  is  the  effect,  or  the  end  accomplished.  In  what 
specific  manner  Christ's  death  operates  as  a  cause  of  forgiveness, 
it  is  not  my  present  object  particularly  to  show.  But  the  texts 
quoted  establish  it  as  a  clear  and  certain  doctrine  of  the  gospel, 
that  the  forgiveness  of  sin  is,  in  a  high  and  special  sense,  owing 
to  Christ's  death,  or  that  his  death  is  by  wa}^  of  eminence  the 
cause  or  means  of  forgiveness.  This  is  taught  by  such  a  variety 
of  plain  and  unambiguous  expressions,  that  we  should  think  it 
impossible  for  any  believer  in  revelation  to  doubt  it. 

And  yet  some  who  profess  to  receive  the  Scriptures  as  the 
word  of  God,  do  in  fact  not  only  doubt,  but  deny  this  doctrine. 
The  most  plausible  and  weighty  reason  which  they  assign  for  this,  is 
the  fact,  that  various  passages  of  Scripture  represent  other  things, 
besides  the  death  of  Christ,  to  be  causes,  conditions  or  means 
of  forgiveness.     To  the  chief  of  these  passages  I  shall  now  refer. 

Forgiveness  and  salvation  are  often  ascribed  to  the  love  or 
grace  of  God.  "  By  grace  are  ye  saved."  According  to  other 
passages,  forgiveness  is  secured  hj  faith  and  repentance.  God 
requires  sinners  to  repent  and  believe,  that  their  sins  may  be 
blotted  out.  Sometimes  obedience  in  general,  or  a  particular  act 
of  obedience,  and  sometimes  prayer,  is  spoken  of  as  the  means  of 
procuring  forgiveness  and  salvation.  From  this  variety  of  repre- 
sentations, some  have  taken  occasion  to  deny  that  the  death  of 
Christ  is  in  any  special  sense  the  cause  of  our  forgiveness  —  to 
deny  indeed  that  it  is  so  in  any  sense,  except  as  it  is  a  means  of 
promoting  our  reformation.  Here  I  shall  suspend  the  main  busi- 
ness I  have  undertaken,  the  business  of  citing  in  order  the  various 
classes  of  texts  which  exhibit  the  doctrine  of  atonement  by  the 
death  of  Christ,  and  go  into  a  somewhat  particular  consideration 
of  the  argument  above  alluded  to  in  opposition  to  the  common 
orthodox  scheme.  My  wish  is  to  guard  you  against  error  on  one 
side,  and  on  the  other  against  losing  any  portion  of  divine  truth, 
and  to  show  exactly  what  the  word  of  God  teaches.  For  this 
purpose  I  offer  the  following  remarks. 

1.  Our  forgiveness  mag  have  a  connection  ivith  several  causes 
or  necessary  conditions.     Both  in  the  natural  and  in  the  moral 


ATONEMENT.        TEXTS     CLASSIFIED.  401 

world  there  is  a  complex  system  of  causes  and  effects,  a  wheel 
within  a  wheel ;  and  almost  every  principal  cause  has  collateral 
or  subservient  causes,  each  contributing  its  proper  share  of  influ- 
ence to  the  general  result.  This  is  the  case  in  regard  to  forgive- 
ness and  salvation.  And  the  word  of  God  would  fail  of  doing  full 
justice  to  the  subject,  did  it  not,  first  or  last,  bring  distinctly  to 
our  view  all  the  causes  or  conditions  with  which  forgiveness  is  con- 
nected. This  it  does  in  the  manner  already  stated.  It  repre- 
sents our  forgiveness  or  salvation  as  an  effect  of  the  grace  of  God, 
of  the  blood  of  Christ,  of  our  repentance,  our  faith,  our  prayers, 
and  our  obedience.  Accordingly  these  are  all  to  be  considered 
as  really  connected  with  our  salvation,  and  as  having  an  important 
influence  in  accomplishing  it. 

2.  The  particular  kind  of  connection  tvkicJi  these  things  severally 
have  with  our  forgiveness  and  salvation,  and  the  way  in  which  they 
contribute  to  it,  must  be  learnt  from  a  careful  consideration  of 
what  the  Scriptures  teach,  and  of  the  nature  and  circumstances  of 
the  case.  In  regard  to  this  subject,  the  Bible  furnishes  us  with  a 
variety  of  facts.  On  these  facts  we  are  to  employ  our  reason. 
We  must  consider  them  in  their  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  the 
subject  of  forgiveness,  and  endeavor  to  form  consistent  views  of 
the  whole  doctrine  revealed.  An  investigation  of  this  kind  will 
show  that,  while  the  love  of  God,  the  death  of  Christ,  faith,  re- 
pentance, prayer,  and  obedience,  all  have  a  real  relation  to  for- 
giveness, it  is  not  the  same  relation ;  that  each  one  has  a  relation 
of  its  own,  a  peculiar  relation,  and  a  peculiar  influence.  Nor  will 
it  be  difficult  for  any  man  who  is  qualified  for  such  an  investi- 
gation, to  satisfy  himself  what  that  peculiar  relation  is. 

Begin  with  the  divine  love.  How  is  this  connected  with  our 
forgiveness  ?  In  what  sense  is  it  the  cause  of  our  salvation  ?  In 
regard  to  this,  we  are  taught  that  God  is  the  Lawgiver,  Ruler, 
and  Judge  of  the  world,  that  men  are  all  sinners,  and  exposed  to 
suffer  the  penalty  of  the  law,  that  God,  being  infinitely  benevolent 
and  desirous  of  saving  them  from  the  punishment  they  deserve, 
provided  a  Saviour,  and  took  all  the  measures  which  he  saw  to  be 
necessary  to  secure  their  salvation.  He  so  loved  the  world  that 
34* 


402  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

he  gave  his  onlj-begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  beheveth  in  him 
should  not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life.  The  love  of  God 
then  was  the  original  cause  of  our  forgiveness,  the  spring  of  our 
salvation.  It  was  this  which  prompted  God  to  enter  on  the 
design  of  saving  sinners,  and  to  carry  the  gracious  design  into 
full  effect.  So  that  when  we  contemplate  the  salvation  of  behev- 
ers,  we  are  to  trace  it  back  to  the  infinite  love  and  benignity  of 
God,  as  the  source.  Salvation  and  all  the  means  of  effecting  it 
result  from  the  infinite  benevolence  and  compassion  of  God. 

Come  now  to  the  death  of  Christ.  How  is  this  connected  with 
our  forgiveness  ?  In  what  sense  is  it  the  cause  or  means  of  our 
salvation  ?  To  determine  this,  you  must  consider  the  nature  and 
circumstances  of  the  case.  We  had  transgressed  God's  law.  It 
was  an  essential  provision  of  that  law,  that  transgressors  should  be 
punished.  This  provision  of  the  law  then  occasioned  a  serious 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  our  being  saved.  The  penalty  of  the  law, 
which  disclosed  a  radical  and  unalterable  principle  of  the  divine 
administration,  presented  a  mighty  obstacle  to  our  enjoying  the 
favor  of  God.  It  was  absolutely  necessary  that  this  obstacle 
should  be  removed,  in  order  that  we  might  have  any  prospect  of 
eternal  life.  This  obstacle  Christ  removed  by  dying  for  us.  He 
redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law  by  being  made  a  curse  for 
us.  Thus  his  death  was,  in  a  peculiar  sense,  the  cause  of  our 
forgiveness.  It  removed  the  obstacle  which  had  been  put  in  the 
way  of  our  salvation  by  the  transgression  of  the  law  ;  and  so  was, 
in  a  peculiar  and  eminent  sense,  the  means  of  delivering  us  from 
the  wrath  to  come.     It  directly  procured  our  forgiveness. 

By  a  similar  process  of  thought,  we  ascertain  the  peculiar  rela- 
tion which  repentance,  and  faith,  and  prayer  have  to  forgiveness. 
The  obstacle  to  our  happiness  which  Christ's  death  removed,  arose 
from  the  penalty  of  the  law,  or  from  that  principle  of  a  just  moral 
government  which  was  made  known  by  the  penalty.  The  obstacle 
to  our  salvation  arising  from  our  sinful  character,  still  remains. 
And  while  this  remains,  neither  the  love  of  God  nor  the  death  of 
Christ  can  avail  us  anything.  To  enjoy  the  holy  happiness  of 
heaven  with  an  unholy  disposition,  is  an  impossibility.     Our  turn- 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  403 

ing  from  sin  and  becoming  holy  is  therefore  an  essential  condition 
of  our  enjoying  the  eternal  salvation  of  the  soul.  Though  that 
salvation  has  been  provided  for  us  by  the  death  of  Christ,  we  must 
be  prepared  to  enjoy  it  by  repentance,  and  must  by  faith,  receive 
the  good  which  divine  grace  has  provided  or  we  cannot  be  saved. 
Thus  by  repentance  and  faith  we  come  actually  to  enjoy  forgive- 
ness and  eternal  life.  Now  whether  you  call  repentance  and  faith 
causes  of  forgiveness,  or  means  of  securing  it,  or  conditions  on 
which  God  has  promised  it,  they  plainly  have  such  a  relation  as  I 
have  just  specified  to  our  eternal  life.  And  nothing  is  more 
evident  than  that  this  relation  is  entirely  another  and  a  different 
thing  from  the  relation  and  influence  which  Christ's  death  has. 

The  same  as  to  prayer.  God  has  promised  that  when,  in  the 
exercise  of  a  penitent  and  filial  spirit,  we  ask  him  to  forgive  our 
trespasses,  he  will  forgive  them.  Prayer  then  is  an  act  of  piety 
on  our  part,  to  which  God  has  promised  forgiveness,  or  it  is  an 
appointed  means  of  obtaining  salvation. 

Thus  we  learn  the  particular  relation  which  each  of  the  things 
mentioned  has  to  our  forgiveness.  And  we  might  take  the  same 
view  of  other  things  related  to  our  salvation. 

Thirdly.  It  is  manifest  that  the  relations  which  the  several 
things  above-mentioned  have  to  forgiveness,  or  the  different  senses 
in  Avhich  they  are  causes  or  conditions  of  salvation,  are  consistent 
with  each  other,  and  that  the  proper  influence  which  each  of  them 
has  is  not  in  the  least  diminished  by  the  influence  of  the  others. 

These  different  causes  of  forgiveness  are,  I  have  said,  consist- 
ent with  each  other.  Who  can  doubt  this  ?  Who  can  imagine 
any  inconsistency  between  the  fact  that  God,  in  the  exercise  of 
infinite  love,  purposed  the  salvation  of  sinners,  and  the  fact  that 
Christ,  in  compliance  with  God's  will,  and  to  secure  the  ends  of 
his  government,  suffered  and  died  for  our  salvation  ?  Instead  of 
being  inconsistent,  they  involve  each  other,  and  give  each  other 
support  and  efficacy.  The  strength  of  God's  love  was  manifested 
in  sending  his  Son  into  the  w^orld  and  appointing  his  death  as  a 
propitiation  for  sin.  And  what  Christ  did  was  only  carrying  into 
effect  the  gracious  design  of  God.     And  all  the  influence  which 


404  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED. 

Christ's  death  had  in  procuring  our  forgiveness,  be  that  influence 
ever  so  great,  was  just  what  a  benevolent  God  chose  that  it  should 
have.  If  it  is  the  cause  or  ground  of  our  forgiveness  in  a  very 
peculiar  sense,  and  by  way  of  eminence,  it  is  so  by  God's  gracious 
appointment.  The  influence  then  which  the  love  of  God  has  in 
accomplishing  our  salvation,  comes  through  the  death  of  Christ. 
It  shows  itself  and  secures  its  object  by  means  of  the  atonement. 
Accordingly  all  the  influence  which  the  death  of  Christ  has  in 
procuring  our  forgiveness  redounds  to  the  glory  of  God's  grace. 
And  so  it  is  often  represented  by  the  apostles. 

It  is  equally  obvious  that  the  powerful  influence  which  the 
Scriptures  attribute  to  Christ's  death,  is  consistent  with  the  influ- 
ence which  repentance  has  in  securing  forgiveness.  Had  there 
been  no  atonement,  repentance  would  never  have  existed  ;  or  if 
it  could  have  existed,  it  could  not  have  saved  us  from  merited 
punishment.  The  influence  of  Christ's  atonement  must  therefore 
be  pre-supposed  in  order  to  account  for  it  that  repentance  can 
exist,  and  can  have  any  influence  to  secure  salvation.  All  the 
influence  of  repentance  results  from  the  death  of  Christ.  Re- 
pentance is  a  means,  on  our  part,  of  obtaining  the  good  purchased 
by  Christ's  death.  The  influence  of  Christ's  death  is  therefore  so 
far  from  being  inconsistent  with  the  sure  influence  of  repentance, 
that  it  is  the  cause  of  it.  And  on  the  other  hand,  the  sure  influ- 
ence of  repentance  in  securing  forgiveness,  is  so  far  from  being 
inconsistent  with  the  influence  of  Christ's  death,  that  it  results 
from  it  and  shows  its  greatness. 

The  same  is  true  of  faith.  Faith  comes  to  the  Saviour  and  re- 
ceives him.  But  how  could  it  do  this,  if  no  Saviour  had  been 
provided  ?  Faith  receives  the  atonement.  It  accepts  the  offer 
of  forgiveness  ;  which  implies  that  an  atonement  has  been  made, 
and  that  forgiveness  through  Christ  is  offered  to  sinners.  It  is 
with  faith  then  as  it  is  with  repentance ;  its  operations  are 
grounded  on  the  death  of  Christ.  It  derives  all  its  influence 
from  the  atonement,  without  which  faith,  such  as  the  Gospel  calls 
us  to  exercise,  could  have  no  existence. 

This  elucidation  of  the  subject  must,  I  think,  be  sufficient  to 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  405 

satisfy  jour  minds  as  to  the  perFect  consistency  of  the  Scriptures, 
so  that  you  -will  have  no  further  reason  to  imagine  that  the  impor- 
tant influence  which  repentance  or  faith  is  represented  to  have  in 
procuring  our  forgiveness,  interferes  in  the  least  with  the  position 
that  the  death  of  Christ  is  the  cause  of  forgiveness  in  a  special 
sense,  and  by  way  of  eminence.  Nor  need  we  ever  be  apprehen- 
sive that  our  considering  Christ's  death  as  having  the  peculiar 
influence  which  the  Bible  ascribes  to  it  in  procuring  forgiveness, 
will  interfere  at  all  with  the  appropriate  effect  of  repentance  or 
faith,  prayer  or  obedience.  The  influence  which  each  of  these 
has  is  not  in  the  least  diminished  by  that  of  the  atonement.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  appropriate  influence  of  Christ's  death  is  not 
diminished  by  anything  else.  In  the  way  in  which  it  operates,  it 
neither  needs  nor  admits  of  any  additional  influence.  In  the  high 
and  peculiar  sense  in  which  it  is  the  cause  of  forgiveness,  it  is  the 
only  cause. 

Thus  we  exactly  meet  all  the  representations  of  God's  word  in 
relation  to  this  subject,  and  reconcile  them  with  each  other ;  and 
thus  we  entirely  rid  ourselves  of  one  of  the  most  plausible  objections 
against  the  common  doctrine  of  the  atonement.  Should  we  assert, 
in  universal  terms,  that  the  death  of  Christ  is  in  every  sense  the 
only  cause  of  our  forgiveness,  and  that  nothing  else,  either  as  a 
cause,  means,  or  condition,  has  anything  to  do  with  it,  we  should 
assert  what  would  be  contrary  to  various  parts  of  God's  word. 
For  it  is  frequently  represented  that  other  things,  besides  the 
atonement,  are  essential  to  forgiveness,  and  have  an  important 
influence  in  securing  its  benefits.  But  if  we  take  into  view  the 
peculiar  sense  in  which  Christ's  death  is  the  cause  of  forgiveness, 
and  the  specific  influence  which  it  has  in  procuring  it,  we  may 
then  safely  assert  that,  in  this  sense,  it  is  the  sole  cause,  and  that 
in  regard  to  an  influence  of  this  particular  kind,  nothing  else  is 
joined  with  it.  In  this  way  we  have  a  very  obvious  and  satisfac- 
tory explanation  of  a  variety  of  texts,  which  expressly  ascribe 
forgiveness  and  salvation  to  the  death  of  Christ,  and  to  that  alone. 
For  example,  we  are  taught  that  Christ's  blood  is  shed  for  the 
remission  of  sins,  and  that  we  have  redemption  through  his  blood, 


406  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

the  forgiveness  of  sins.  In  these  and  other  passages,  the  blood 
of  Christ,  and  that  only,  is  mentioned  as  the  cause  or  means  of 
forgiveness  ;  and  nothing  else  is  named  as  having  any  concern 
whatever  in  procuring  salvation.  And  according  to  the  views  we 
have  taken  of  the  subject,  nothing  else  has  any  concern  with  our 
forgiveness,  in  the  particular  sense  in  which  the  death  of  Christ 
is  concerned  with  it.  In  this  sense,  everything  else  is  excluded. 
And  the  Scriptures  speak  with  perfect  propriety  when,  with  refer- 
ence to  this  view  of  the  subject,  they  ascribe  forgiveness  to  the 
blood  of  Christ  alone. 

Now  if  our  information  on  the  subject  extended  no  further,  we 
should  be  in  possession  of  a  truth  of  everlasting  importance  to  all 
human  beings,  —  a  truth  relating  directly  to  our  salvation,  and 
suited  to  excite  our  moral  affections  to  the  highest  pitch  of  strength 
and  tenderness.  For  who  can  adequately  describe  or  conceive 
the  value  of  forgiveness,  or  the  height  and  depth  of  that  divine 
love  from  which  it  flows  ?  And  who  can  believe  that  our  forgive- 
ness and  salvation  are  procured  for  us  by  the  sufferings  and  death 
of  God's  only-begotten  Son  —  who  can  seriously  believe  this 
without  pious  astonishment,  gratitude,  and  joy  ?  In  the  heaven 
of  heavens  we  hope  better  to  imderstand  the  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  the  work  which  Christ  accomplished,  when  he  died  on  the 
cross  for  our  salvation. 


LECTURE    LXXIV. 


ATONEMENT.        THIRD,     FOURTH,     FIFTH,     SIXTH,     AND     SEVENTH 
CLASSES     OF     TEXTS. 

We  have  attended  to  those  texts  which  teach  that  Christ  is  the 
Saviour  of  sinners,  and  to  those  which  teach  that  he  effected 
our  salvation  specially  and  preeminently  by  his  death.  We  have 
also  considered  the  difficulty  which  has  been  thought  to  lie  in  the 
way  of  our  doctrine,  from  those  texts  which  ascribe  forgiveness  to 
other  things  besides  the  death  of  Christ. 

Some  respectable  writers  have  thought  that  our  knowledge  can 
be  extended  no  further  than  what  has  now  been  stated ;  that 
everything  beyond  the  general  truth,  that  Christ  is  our  Saviour 
and  that  his  death  is  in  some  way  the  means  of  procuring  our 
forgiveness,  lies  out  of  the  limits  of  our  intelligence  ;  that  this 
simple  truth  is  all  we  need  to  know,  or  can  know,  and  that  any 
attempt  to  push  our  inquiries  further  must  be  wholly  unsuccessful 
and  useless. 

My  own  opinion  is  very  different  from  this.  I  am  persuaded 
that,  by  a  proper  application  of  our  rational  and  moral  powers  to 
what  the  word  of  God  reveals,  we  may  know  more  than  the  sim- 
ple facts  above  mentioned  ;  that  we  may  obtain  some  more  par- 
ticular and  exact  views  of  the  influence  which  Christ's  death  had 
in  respect  to  our  salvation  ;  that  we  may  understand  the  reason- 
ableness, the  consistency,  and  the  excellence  of  the  doctrine 
which  the  Scriptures  teach,  and  may  present  it  to  our  own  minds 


408  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED. 

and  to  the  minds  of  others  in  a  manner  that  shall  he  suited  to 
excite  the  best  affections.  As  I  would  not  be  wise  above  what  is 
written,  so  neither  would  I  fall  short  of  it.  Without  a  clear 
apprehension  of  the  meaning  of  what  the  Bible  declares  as  to 
the  death  of  Christ,  how  can  we  experience  the  whole  of  the 
salutary  effect  which  the  doctrine  is  designed  to  produce  upon  us, 
and  which  it  evidently  did  produce  on  the  minds  of  the  apos- 
tles and  primitive  Christians.  Take  the  general  proposition,  that 
Christ  died  for  our  salvation.  This  indeed  is  a  proposition  of 
immense  importance,  understood  in  any  reasonable  sense.  But 
we  are  informed  that  the  apostles  also  suffered  and  even  died  for 
the  salvation  of  men.  Now  if  Jesus  died  for  the  salvation  of 
men  merely  as  the  apostles  did,  how  does  our  obligation  to  him 
differ  from  our  obligation  to  them  ?  And  how  could  the  consider- 
ation of  his  death  produce  those  peculiar  and  transcendent  effects, 
which  it  has  in  all  ages  produced  on  the  minds  of  Christians  ?  It 
seems  then  necessary,  that  we  should,  in  some  measure,  under- 
stand the  particular  sense  in  which  Christ  died  for  us  in  order 
that  we  may  experience  any  special  influence  from  the  Scripture 
doctrine  of  redemption.  Those  Christians  who  most  deeply  feel 
the  salutary  influence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  cross,  will  find  that 
this  influence  results  from  a  clear  apprehension  of  the  pecuhar 
relation  which  the  death  of  the  Mediator  had  to  the  divine  law, 
and  to  the  forgiveness  and  salvation  of  men.  To  say  that  we 
can  know  nothing  of  the  manner  in  which  the  death  of  Christ 
procured  forgiveness,  would  be  to  overlook  the  plainest  declara- 
tions of  Scripture, 

We  are  now  to  notice  another  class  of  texts  which  relate  to  the 
death  of  Christ,  and  which  will  enable  us  to  form  more  par- 
ticular and  definite  conceptions  of  the  design  of  that  momentous 
event. 

But  here  our  attention  is  arrested  by  the  circumstance,  that  the 
suffering,  dying  Saviour  was  perfectly  holy.  "  In  him  was  no 
sin."  "  He  was  holy,  harmless,  undefiled,  separate  from  sin- 
ners," "  a  lamb  without  blemish  and  without  spot."  Allegations 
were   indeed  made   against  him ;  but  they  were   all  groundless. 


ATONEMENT,     TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  409 

Neither  Herod  nor  Pilate  could  find  him  guilty  of  any  fault. 
Even  Judas,  who  had  been  so  intimately  acquainted  with  him, 
was  compelled  by  his  conscience  to  return  the  thirty  pieces  of 
silver,  and  to  confess  openly  that  he  had  betrayed  innocent  blood. 
We  have  besides  what  is  the  best  of  all  evidence,  the  direct  testi- 
mony of  God  the  Father,  who  repeatedly  declared  by  a  voice 
from  heaven  — "  This  is  my  beloved  Son,  in  whom  I  am  well 
pleased." 

This  remarkable  circumstance  distinguishes  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  from  those  of  any  other  being  whom  we  have  ever  known. 
The  world  has  in  all  ages  been  full  of  suffering.  And  yet  when 
did  any  intelligent,  moral  being  suffer,  except  as  a  sinner  ?  But 
here  is  a  sinless  sufferer.  How  shall  we  account  for  this  fact  ?  The 
principles  of  God's  law  as  really  ensure  the  safety  and  happiness 
of  the  obedient,  as  the  punishment  of  the  wicked.  The  Lawgiver 
sits  on  the  throne,  and  does  all  his  pleasure.  He  has  often  inter- 
posed to  rescue  his  servants  from  suffering  and  death,  though 
they  were  not  free  from  sin.  Why  did  he  not  prevent  the  death 
of  his  only  begotten  Son,  in  whom  he  had  perfect  complacency  ? 
But  it  is  not  only  true  that  God  permitted  the  death  of  Christ, 
but  that  it  took  place  according  to  his  special  design  and  arrange- 
ment, and  that  he  had  a  sovereign  agency  in  it.  Herod  and 
Pilate,  with  the  Gentiles  and  people  of  Israel,  "  did  Avhat  the 
hand  and  counsel  of  God  had  determined  before  to  be  done." 
And  Isaiah  says  expressly,  that  "  it  pleased  the  Lord  to  bruise 
him  and  to  put  him  to  grief." 

Behold  this  singular  and  marvellous  spectacle  !  The  Son  of 
God  suffering  and  dying,  though  entirely  innocent  and  holy, — 
never  having  violated  or  neglected  any  of  the  commands  of  God, 
—  every  thought  and  affection  of  his  heart  and  every  action  of 
his  life  having  been  perfectly  right,  —  his  character  adorned  with 
consummate  excellence  and  amiableness,  adored  of  angels,  and 
the  object  of  the  highest  love  and  complacency  of  God  !  Such  is 
the  character  of  him  whom  we  behold  in  a  state  of  long-continued 
and  indescribable  suffering,  and  at  last  dying  a  most  distressing 
and  ignominious  death !     And  all  this  comes  upon  him  by  the 

VOL.  II.  35 


410  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED. 

special  appointment  and  agency  of  God  !  What  shall  we  say  to 
all  this  ?  If  we  witness  the  voluntary  infliction  of  pain  upon  a 
moral  agent,  for  example,  upon  a  child  by  a  parent,  or  upon  a 
citizen  by  a  civil  officer,  we  cannot  avoid  the  impression,  that  it 
indicates  displeasure.  This  is  its  natural  meaning.  Is  it  said, 
that  we  sometimes  inflict  pain  upon  a  child  from  love,  for  his  im- 
provement and  welfare,  and  that,  in  such  a  case,  it  is  no  token  of 
displeasure  ?  I  reply,  that  we  may  sometimes  inflict  pain  in  this 
way,  as  a  remedy  for  lodily  disorder.  But  where  the  subject  is 
of  a  moral  nature,  where  a  rational  mind  is  concerned,  this  can 
never  be  the  case.  If  we  inflict  pain  upon  a  child  as  a  matter  of 
correction,  it  imphes  that  there  is  something  to  be  corrected, — 
some  fault  which  we  disapprove,  and  which  we  look  vipon  with 
displeasure.  If  we  do  not,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  why  we 
should  chastise  the  child.  In  our  penitentiaries,  where  reforma- 
tion is  the  object  directly  aimed  at  by  hard  labor  and  confinement, 
and  where  this  is  pursued  with  the  purest  benevolence,  it  ia 
always  the  case  that  those  who  are  subjected  to  this  species  of 
discipline,  have  faults  and  vices  to  be  reformed,  and  these  excite 
the  disapprobation  of  civil  government  and  of  the  community. 
But  Jesus  had  no  fault,  and  of  course  he  had  nothing  which 
needed  to  be  corrected  or  reformed.  The  peculiarity  of  the  case 
therefore  still  presses  upon  us.  God  inflicts  the  most  insupport- 
able evils  upon  one,  who  is  perfectly  holy,  who  has  nothing  faulty 
to  excite  disapprobation,  or  call  for  correction.  Upon  him  God 
inflicts  those  severe  sufferings,  which  we  cannot  but  regard  as 
expressions  of  high  displeasure.  And  yet  the  sufferer  himself  is 
the  object  of  God's  perfect  complacency  and  delight.  Here  are 
three  facts,  plain  and  certain.  First,  God  inflicts  evil  on  Christ ; 
second,  the  law  of  our  nature  requires  that  we  should  regard  the 
infliction  of  evil  upon  a  moral  agent,  as  indicating  the  displeasure 
of  him  who  inflicts  it ;  third,  Christ  who  suffered,  being  perfectly 
holy,  could  not  be  the  object  of  divine  displeasure.  These  facts 
cannot  be  set  aside  or  altered.  The  suffering  was  real ;  the  laws 
of  our  nature  are  fixed,  which  require  us  to  consider  suffering  in 
a  moral  agent  as  expressing  the  displeasure  of  him  who  inflicts 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  411 

it ;  and  the  perfect  innocence  and  holiness  of  Christ,  being  as  cer- 
tain as  eternal  truth  can  make  them,  must  forever  forbid  the 
thought,  that  he  could,  in  whole  or  in  part,  be  himself  the  object 
of  the  divine  displeasure. 

Here  then  we  are  brought  to  a  stand.  The  laws  of  our  nature 
and  the  general  principles  of  moral  government  would  lead  us  to 
think,  that  the  displeasure  expressed  by  suffering  must  always  be 
directed  against  the  one  who  suffers.  But  this  is  not  the  case 
here.  We  must  then  look  for  some  new  fact  or  circumstance, 
which  will  help  us  to  explain  the  singular  event  under  consider- 
ation. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  third  class  of  texts  which  relate  to 
the  death  of  Christ,  and  Avhich  make  known  the  all  important  cir- 
cumstance we  looked  for.  Christ,  who  was  perfectly  holy  and 
who  deserved  no  evil  at  the  hand  of  God,  died  for  our  sitis.  Isa. 
53 :  5,  6,  8 ;  "  He  was  wounded  for  our  transgressions,  he  was 
bruised  for  our  iniquities."  "  The  Lord  hath  laid  on  him  the 
iniquities  of  us  all."  "  For  the  transgression  of  my  people  was 
he  smitten."  The  apostles  taught  the  same.  Romans  4 :  25 ; 
"  Who  was  deUvered  for  our  offences."  1  Cor.  15  :  3  ;  "  Christ 
died  for  our  sins  according  to  the  Scriptures."  Gal.  1:4;  "  He 
gave  himself  for  our  sins."  1  Pet.  3 :  18  ;  "  Christ  also  hath 
once  suffered  for  sin." 

On  these  texts,  which  are  all  of  the  same  character  and  con- 
struction, it  might  seem  unnecessary  to  make  any  remarks,  as  it 
must  be  a  difficult  and  hopeless  undertaking  for  any  one  to  turn 
them  aside  from  their  true  and  obvious  meaning.  But  a  little 
examination  may  still  be  of  use.  If  there  is  the  least  ground  of 
doubt  as  to  the  sense  of  these  texts,  it  must  arise  from  the  variety 
of  significations  belonging  to  the  prepositions  dia,  vneg,  nsQi.  In 
the  text  Romans  4 :  25,  it  is  said  that  Christ  was  dehvered  for 
our  offences,  {dia  ra  naQanrm^iara  tjfiav?)  The  first  meaning 
which  the  best  lexicographers  give  of  the  preposition  8ia  with 
an  accusative  is,  on  account  of,  because  of,  in  consequence  of,  for 
the  sake  of.  Christ  was  delivered  to  death  on  account  of,  or 
because  of  our  sins.     In  1  Cor.  15  :  3  vnsQ  is  used.     Ctirist  died 


412  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED. 

v'ntQ  rojv  u^aQzioiv  Tjixav.  This  preposition  also  must  here  signify 
on  account  of,  or  because  of,  as  there  is  no  other  signification 
which  would  agree  at  all  with  the  scope  of  the  passage.  The 
same  remarks  apply  to  Gal.  1 :  4,  where  the  received  text  has 
vneg  and  Griesbach  negh  "He  gave  himself  for  our  sins  ;  "  that 
is,  on  account  of  our  sins. 

Now  what  instances  can  be  found,  in  which  dying  for  the  sins 
of  others  denotes,  as  the  Socinians  pretend,  dying  as  their  exam- 
ple, or  simply  for  their  improvement  ?  When  the  prophet  Ezekiel 
said  ;  "  The  son  shall  not  die  for  the  iniquity  of  his  father,"  who 
ever  supposed  the  meaning  to  be,  the  son  shall  not  die  for  the 
reformation  or  benefit  of  the  father  ?  We  might  just  as  well  sup- 
pose that,  when  it  is  said  a  man  shall  die  for  his  own  iniquity,  the 
meaning  is  that  he  shall  die  for  his  own  benefit.  When  we  say, 
a  man  dies  for  his  own  sins,  our  meaning  always  is,  that  he  dies 
on  account  of  his  sins,  dies  because  he  has  committed  an  act  of 
wickedness.  Accordingly,  when  it  is  said  that  a  man  dies  for  the 
sins  of  others,  the  meaning  must  be,  that  he  dies  on  account 
of  or  in  consequence  of  their  sins,  dies  because  they  have  done 
wickedly. 

The  texts  which  have  now  been  cited,  furnish  a  full  solution  of 
the  difficulty  which  met  us  in  regard  to  the  death  of  Christ.  He 
could  not  suffer  and  die  on  account  of  his  own  sins,  for  he  was 
perfectly  sinless.  He  could  not  die  as  an  expression  of  the  divine 
displeasure  against  himself  personally  ;  for  he  was  the  object  of 
God's  perfect  complacency.  The  simple  question  then  is,  why 
did  the  holy  Saviour  die  ?  The  Scriptures  answer ;  "  He  died 
for  our  sins.''"'  "  He  was  delivered  for  our  offencesJ^  Here  we 
have  one  of  the  peculiar  facts  which  revelation  makes  known,  and 
which  we  shall  now  consider  in  some  of  its  obvious  bearings. 

Christ  suffered  and  died  not  on  account  of  any  sin  in  himself, 
but  on  account  of  our  sins.  Our  sins,  that  is,  the  sins  of  men, 
were  the  reason  why  he  suffered.  It  is  implied,  that  his  sufferings 
had  substantially  the  same  relatio7i  to  our  sins,  as  our  oivn  sufferings 
would  have  had,  if  we  had  suffered  for  them  ourselves.  Now 
every  one  knows  the  relation  between  sin  and  suffering,  where 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  413 

the  sinner  himself  is  the  suiferer.  When  it  is  said  that  any  indi- 
viduals, as  Cain,  Pharaoh,  and  Jeroboam,  suffered  for  their  sins, 
the  sense  is  so  clear  that  we  cannot  mistake  it.  And  how  can  we 
mistake  the  sense  of  the  texts  which  declare,  that  Christ  suffered 
for  our  sins  ?  When  God  inflicts  evil  upon  men  for  their  own 
sins,  he  shows  his  righteous  displeasure  against  them  as  transgres- 
sors. He  shows  that  he  disapproves  of  their  sins,  and  disapproves 
of  them  as  sinners ;  that  he  regards  them  as  criminal  and  ill 
deser\nng.  The  same  must  be  implied  in  the  Scripture  declara- 
tion, that  CJirist  died  for  our  sins.  His  death  showed  the  holy 
displeasure  of  God,  not  against  him,  but  against  us.  It  showed 
that  God  regarded  not  ?dm,  but  us,  as  deserving  of  punishment. 
The  very  tenns  of  the  proposition  imply,  that  whatever  excited 
the  displeasure  of  God,  and  whatever  made  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  necessary  and  proper,  was  in  us.  You  see  the  holy  Jesus 
in  a  state  of  extreme  distress,  sinking  and  dying  under  the  insup- 
portable burden  Mhich  was  laid  upon  him.  If  Christ  had  been  a 
transgressor  like  one  of  us,  God's  treating  him  thus  would  have 
manifested  feelings  of  holy  displeasure  against  Mm.  But  as  God 
treats  him  thus  on  account  of  our  transgressions,  all  the  feelings 
of  displeasure  which  he  manifests  respect,  us.  The  Scripture 
does  as  much  as  to  say  ;  mistake  not  the  meaning  of  this  transac- 
tion. The  burden  of  suff'erings  laid  upon  Jesus  is  indeed  an 
expression  of  Grod's  high  displeasure ;  hut  it  is  not  against  the 
persoyi  who  suffers,  hut  against  those  for  whom  he  suffers. 

Now  if  we  would  enter  into  the  spirit  .of  revelation,  we  must 
consider  the  death  of  Christ  in  this  light.  When  we  contemplate 
his  sufferings  in  the  garden  and  on  the  cross,  we  must  consider 
them  as  manifesting  the  same  disapprobation  of  our  sins,  the 
same  just  displeasure  of  God  against  us,  as  would  have  been 
manifested  by  our  suffering  for  our  own  sins.  I  take  into  view 
the  whole  evil,  pi-esent  and  eternal,  which  sinners  deserve  accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  God,  and  then  ask  myself  what  impression 
would  be  made  of  the  character  of  God,  and  especially  of  the 
manner  in  which  he  regards  sin,  if  we  should  see  him  actually 
inflict  all  this  dreadful  evil  upon  transgressors.    The  same  impres- 

3o» 


414  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

sion  should  be  made  upon  us  by  the  suflFerings  of  Christ.  I  do 
not  mean,  that  this  is  all  the  impression  we  should  receive  from 
Christ's  sufferings.  Far  otherwise.  But  so  far  as  respects  the 
feelings  of  the  divine  mind  in  relation  to  the  evil  of  sin,  and  the 
ill  desert  of  sinners,  Christ's  suffering  for  the  sins  of  men  should 
make  the  same  impression  upon  us,  as  would  be  made  by  their 
suffering  for  their  own  sins  ;  —  the  same  as  if  we  should  stand  on 
the  borders  of  the  pit,  and  see  a  world  of  sinners  enduring  the 
penalty  of  the  violated  law.  All  this  is  plainly  implied  in  the 
simple  fact,  that  Christ  died  for  our  sins.  The  very  fact  that  it 
was  the  appointment  of  God  that  Christ  should  suffer  for  our  sins, 
would  naturally  lead  us  to  think,  that  his  holiness  and  justice 
would  be  as  highly  honored,  and  all  the  good  ends  of  punish- 
ment as  fully  answered  by  his  sufferings,  as  they  would  have  been 
by  ours. 

My  fourth  class  of  texts  will  include  those  which  teach  that 
Christ  died  for  sinners.  I  mtroduce  these  texts  under  a  distinct 
head,  because  they  teach  the  important  truth  just  exhibited  before 
you,  in  another  form,  and  so  confirm  the  sense  which  has  been 
given  of  the  texts  already  quoted.  This  is  a  mode  of  proceeding 
which  is  of  great  consequence  in  ascertaining  the  meaning 
of  revelation.  If  one  part  of  Scripture  leaves  a  subject  in- 
volved in  any  doubt,  we  go  to  the  other  parts  to  solve  that  doubt. 
If  one  class  of  texts  present  a  subject  in  only  one  point  of  view, 
we  go  to  other  classes  where  it  is  presented  in  other  points  of 
view.  And  when,  as  in  this  case,  texts  of  one  class  have  a  defi- 
nite sense,  and  furnish  us  with  views  of  a  subject  which  are  clear 
and  unquestionable,  it  gives  additional  satisfaction  to  find  that  the 
Scriptures  are  harmonious,  and  that  these  same  views  are,  by  other 
texts,  set  forth  with  equal  or  Superior  clearness. 

The  following  are  among  the  principal  texts  which  present  this 
subject  in  a  personal  light,  and  declare  that  Christ  died  for  sin- 
ners. Rom.  5  :  6  ;  "In  due  time  Christ  died  for  the  ungodly.''^ 
Rom.  5 :  8  ;  "  While  we  were  yet  sinners  Christ  died  for  us.''* 
Luke  22  :  19  ;  "  This  is  my  body  which  has  been  given /or  ?/om." 
John  10  :  15  ;  "I  lay  down  my  life  for  the  sheep.''^     1  Pet.  3  : 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  416 

18  ;  "  Christ  suffered,  the  just  for  the  mijust.^'  In  all  these 
passages  the  same  preposition  is  used,  that  is,  vnsg.  The  meaning 
of  this  preposition  is  various,  and  must  in  each  passage  be  learnt 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  In  the  passages  above 
quoted,  it  evidently  signifies,  not  merely  for  the  benefit  of,  but 
instead  ofy  in  the  place  of;  that  is,  it  denotes  that  Christ  was  our 
substitute,  or  that  his  sufferings  were  vicarious.  This  meaning  of 
the  word  vnsQ  is  demanded  by  the  circumstances.  Sinners  are 
condemned  to  die.  Christ  dies  for  them,  and  they  are  released. 
That  is,  he  dies  instead  of  their  dying.  This  is  what  is  meant 
by  Christ's  dying  as  our  substitute.  Storr  says  ;  "  When  substi- 
tution is  spoken  of,  it  is  of  course  not  meant,  that  the  punishment 
is  merited  by  the  substitute  himself.  Vicarious  or  substituted 
punishment  is  a  punishment  endured  on  condition  that  the  indi- 
vidual, who  would  otherwise  have  been  exposed  to  it,  shall  be 
released."  Take  now  some  of  the  texts  quoted,  and  see  whether 
they  do  not  clearly  convey  this  idea  of  substitution.  "  While  we 
were  yet  sinners,  Christ  died  for  us."  We  were  sinners  and 
must  have  died,  hd^d  not  Christ  died.  But  his  dying  procured 
our  release.  He  died,  and  in  consequence  of  it,  we  live.  He 
died  as  our  substitute.  I  do  not  here  go  into  any  reasoning  on 
the  subject  of  substitution.  My  present  aim  is  to  determine  the 
exact  sense  of  the  texts  above  quoted.  Take  the  passage  which 
informs  us,  that  David,  hearing  of  the  death  of  Absalom,  cried 
out,  "  Would  God  I  had  died  for  thee,  0  Absalom,  my  son,  my 
son."  Here  the  circumstances  of  the  case  show  that  he  meant 
to  express  a  wish,  not  that  he  had  died  for  the  benefit  of  Absalom, 
but  that  he  had  died  in  his  stead.  He  was  overwhelmed  with 
the  death  of  his  son,  and  under  the  influence  of  his  extreme 
affection  and  grief,  wished  that  he  himself  might  have  died  and  his 
son  lived. 

"  I  lay  down  my  life  for  the  sheep.^^  Jesus  here  presents  him- 
self before  us  in  the  character  of  a  shepherd.  The  sheep  are 
in  danger  of  being  destroyed  by  the  wolves.  The  good  shepherd 
interposes,  and  lays  down  his  life  to  save  theirs.  He  dies  in  their 
stead. 


416  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

"  Christ  died  for  the  ungodly y  The  ungodly  are  under  sen- 
tence of  death  from  the  divine  law.  Christ  dies  to  save  them 
from  dying.     He  dies  as  their  substitute. 

You  will  observe  that  I  derive  the  idea  of  substitution,  not 
chiefly  from  the  particular  preposition  v'tisq,  which  expresses  the 
relation  between  Christ  and  sinners  in  regard  to  suffering,  but 
from  the  nature  of  the  case.  Accordingly  my  conclusion  would 
be  the  same,  if  we  had  only  the  representation,  that  sinners  were 
under  sentence  of  death,  and  that  Christ  died  to  procure  their 
release. 

The  notion  of  substitution,  or  vicarious  suffering,  is,  I  have 
said,  derived  chiefly  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  not  from 
the  use  of  a  particular  word.  For  in  different  circumstances,  the 
same  word  conveys  a  different  sense.  For  example.  A  parent 
who  is  extremely  attached  to  his  children,  devotes  himself  to 
constant  labors  and  cares  for  their  benefit,  that  is,  to  feed  and 
clothe  them  and  provide  for  their  happiness,  and  pursues  this 
object  so  anxiously  and  incessantly,  and  with  so  little  regard  to  his 
own  health  or  life,  that  he  brings  upon  liimself  premature  infirmity 
and  death.  We  say,  such  a  parent  labored  and  suffered  and 
even  died  for  his  children,  that  is,  for  their  benefit.  Here  the 
circumstances  show,  that  it  was  not  in  their  stead,  because  they 
were  not  considered  as  particularly  exposed  to  death  ;  and  it  was 
not  to  save  them  from  dying  that  he  submitted  to  those  exertions 
which  proved  so  fatal  to  him.  Take  another  case  different  from 
this.  Acts  21 :  13 ;  Paul  said  "  I  am  willing  not  to  be  bound 
only,  but  also  to  die  at  Jerusalem  for  the  name  of  the  Lord 
Jesus.^'  Here  the  same  preposition  is  used,  v71?q  rov  ovofiaxog 
Tov  KvQinv  'Irjaov,  which  must  mean,  not  as  a  substitute  for  the 
name  of  Jesus,  but  for  the  sake  of  it,  or  for  the  honor  of  it. 

A  man  of  a  patriotic  spirit  voluntarily  exposes  himself  to  suf- 
fering and  death,  to  procure  for  his  country  the  blessings  of  lib- 
erty. He  dies  for  his  country,  not  in  his  country's  stead,  but  to 
secure  his  country's  liberty. 

In  such  cases  as  those  I  have  now  introduced,  the  circum- 
stances-make  it  obvious  that  substitution  is  not  intended. 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS     CLASSIFIED.  417 

But  now  suppose  a  father  is  doomed  to  death  by  the  sentence  of 
pubUc  justice,  and  the  day  fixed  for  his  punishment  is  come,  and 
he  is  led  out  for  execution.  But  his  son  comes  forward  to  the 
civil  authorities,  and  says  to  them  ;  I  offer  myself  to  die /or  my 
father.  Every  one  would  understand  him  to  mean,  that  he  was 
to  die  in  the  place  of  his  father,  or  as  his  substitute.  So  if  a  man 
was  sentenced  to  imprisonment,  and  his  friend  should  offer  to 
submit  to  imprisonment  for  him  ;  we  should  understand  it  to  be 
in  his  stead,  or  by  way  of  substitution.  Again.  Suppose  you 
read  in  history,  that  it  fell  to  the  lot  of  a  particular  soldier  to  go 
forward  in  the  face  of  danger,  and  make  an  onset  upon  the  enemy ; 
that  that  soldier  was  a  timid,  tender  youth,  unaccustomed  to  the 
field  of  battle,  and  that  his  brother,  skilled  in  war  and  fearless  of 
danger,  undertook  to  go  for  him.  You  understand  the  history  to 
mean,  that  he  undertook  to  go  in  his  stead,  or  as  his  substitute. 
We  see  then  what  the  principle  is.  When  any  persons  have  a 
danger  to  meet,  or  an  evil  to  endure,  and  another  person  meets 
the  danger  or  endures  the  evil /or  them,  and  in  consequence  of 
his  doing  it  they  are  exempt,  we  always  regard  it  as  a  case  of 
suhstitution. 

The  difficulties  attending  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  sufferings, 
and  the  cautions  necessary  to  be  observed  in  our  reasonings  about 
it,  will  be  particularly  considered  hereafter.  My  only  object  here 
is  to  show  that,  notwithstanding  the  various  senses  of  the  preposi- 
tion vnsQyfor,  its  proper  meaning  may  in  each  place  where  it  is 
used,  be  satisfactorily  ascertained  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
case. 

The  two  classes  of  texts  last  cited,  present  the  subject  under 
two  forms  of  speech.  But  as  we  have  seen,  the  two  are  in  re- 
ality one.  Christ's  suffering  was  substituted  for  ours.  But  suf- 
fering is  a.  personal  matter,  and  cannot  be  separated  from  the 
sufferer.  So  that  if  Christ's  suffering  was  substituted  for  the  suf- 
fering which  we  deserve,  then  Christ,  as  a  sufferer,  was  substitu- 
ted for  us.  Both  modes  of  speech  convey  the  same  sense.  For 
Christ's  sufferings  to  be  substituted  for  our  sufferings,  and  for  him, 
as  a  sufferer,  to  be  substituted  for  those  who  deserve  to  suffer,  is 
one  and  the  same  thing. 


418  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

We  come  now  to  the  fifth  class  of  texts.  In  tin  ce  passages, 
Christ  is  represented  as  a  ransom.  Matt.  20  :  28.  ]\Iark  10  :  45  ; 
"  The  son  of  man  came  not  to  be  ministered  unto,  but  to  minister, 
and  to  give  his  life  a  ransom,  Xvtqov,  for  many."  1  Tim.  2:6; 
"  Who  gave  himself  a  ransom  for  all,"  dvnXvTQov.  The  meaning 
of  these  words  is  the  same,  the  price  paid  for  the  redemption  of 
captives.  In  its  general  metaphorical  use,  it  means  that  by 
which  any  one  is  delivered  from  bondage,  or  from  any  state  of 
suffering.  As  applied  to  sinners,  it  is  the  means  by  which  they 
are  deUvered  from  the  power  and  punishment  of  sin.  Wahl  refers 
to  the  text  above  quoted,  1  Tim.  2 :  6,  and  says,  "  Christ  is  there 
represented  as  having,  by  his  death  paid  the  full  penalty  for 
human  transgressions,  and  as  having  thus  restored  men  to  liberty." 
The  words  Ivtqov,  avtiXviQov,  translated  "  ransom"  signify  the  real 
and  proper  cause  of  deliverance.  In  the  case  before  us,  Christ 
crucified  was  the  ransom. 

Sixth  class.  The  passage  Gal.  3 :  13  is  so  peculiar,  and  so 
full  of  meaning,  that  I  present  it  under  a  distinct  head.  "  Christ 
hath  redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made  a  curse 
for  us."  The  curse  of  the  law  is  the  penalty  of  the  law.  "  Curs- 
ed is  every  one  that  continueth  not  in  all  things  written  in  the 
book  of  the  law  to  do  them."  Christ  redeemed  us,  bought  us  off, 
from  this  curse  of  the  law,  by  being  made  a  curse  for  us,  that 
is,  by  being  made  an  accursed  person,  or  by  having  a  curse  in- 
flicted on  him.  If  Christ  had  not  been  made  a  curse  for  us,  we 
must  have  borne  the  curse  of  the  law  ourselves,  that  is,  we  must 
have  endured  the  punishment  due  to  us  for  sin.  But  by  being 
made  a  curse  for  us,  that  is,  by  suffering  and  dying  on  account  of 
our  sins,  or  in  our  place,  he  delivered  us  from  the  curse.  Which 
is  the  same  thing  as  to  say,  his  suffering  was  instead  of  ours,  or 
was  vicarious.  Storr  explains  this  passage  to  mean,  that  "  Christ 
in  our  stead  endured  the  p\;nishment  denounced  by  the  law." 

If  any  one  can  possibly  doubt  whether  this  is  the  same  idea,  as 
the  inspired  writer  meant  to  convey,  he  must,  I  should  think, 
have  his  doubt  solved  by  the  texts  which  follow,  in  which  it  is  ex- 
pressly said  that  Christ  actually  bore  our  sins,  or  that  our  sins 
were  laid  upon  him.     These  texts  constitute  the 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS     CLASSIFIED.  419 

Seventh  class.  Isa.  53  :  6,  12  ;  "  The  Lord  hath  laid  on  him 
the  iniquities  of  us  all."  "  He  bare  the  sin  of  many."  Heb.  9  : 
28  ;  "  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many."  1  Pet. 
2 :  24  ;  "  Who  his  own  self  bare  our  sins,  in  his  own  body  on  the 
tree."  When  it  is  said  that  men  bear  their  own  sins,  that  God 
lays  their  iniquities  upon  them,  we  know  the  meaning  to  be,  that 
they  bear  the  punishment  of  their  sins,  —  or  that  God  inflicts  the 
punishment  they  deserve.  When  therefore  it  is  said  that  Christ 
bare  our  sins,  the  meaning  evidently  is,  that  he  bare  the  punish- 
ment due  for  our  sins  ;  and  when  it  is  said,  that  God  laid  on  him 
the  iniquities  of  us  all,  the  meaning  is  that  God  laid  on  him 
the  punishment  of  our  iniquities.  This  is  a  free  way  of  speaking ; 
but  no  intelligent,  candid  man  can  fail  to  discern  the  meaning. 
Christ's  suffering  takes  the  place  of  the  punishment  of  our  sins, 
and  so  is  designated  by  the  same  word,  a  mode  of  speech  not  un- 
frequent  in  the  Scriptures. 

You  see  the  advantage  of  looking  at  these  two  modes  of  rep- 
resentation together.  In  the  first,  it  is  declared  that  Christ 
redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us. 
This  plainly  appears  to  mean,  that  for  the  sake  of  delivering  us 
from  the  penalty  of  the  law,  or  the  punishment  of  sin,  he  endured 
it  for  us.  But  to  learn  more  fully  whether  this  is  indeed  the 
meaning  of  the  passage,  we  go  to  those  passages  where  Christ  is 
said  expressly  to  bear  our  sins,  that  is,  the  punishment  of  them, 
and  where  God  is  said  to  lay  our  iniquities  upon  him.  that  is,  the 
punishment  due  on  account  of  our  iniquities.  Here  we  have 
strong  confirmation  of  the  sense  we  gave  to  the  other  passages. 
And  if  we  should  compare  all  the  texts  Avhich  relate  to  this  sub- 
ject, we  should  find  them  harmonious  in  sense,  and  conspiring  to 
teach  the  same  great  doctrine,  that  Christ  delivered  sinners  from 
the  wrath  to  come,  by  suffering  and  dying  in  their  stead.  This 
is  what  the  word  of  God  teaches,  and  what  the  church  of  Christ 
in  all  ages  has  received.  How  we  can  make  it  harmonize  with 
the  philosophical  speculations  which  are  abroad  in  the  world,  is  not 
our  concern.  The  workings  of  human  reason  may  be  right,  or  they 
may  be  wrong.  It  is  enough  for  us  that  our  doctrine  is  taught 
by  those,  who  "  spake  as  they  were  moved   by  the  Holy  Ghost." 


LECTURE  LXXV. 


ATONEMENT,  EIGHTH,  NINTH,  TENTH  AND  ELEVENTH  CLASSES  OF 
TEXTS,  CONSIDERATION  OF  A  DIFFICULTY  AS  TO  THE  DIFFER- 
ENT ENDS    OF    CHKIST'S  DEATH. 

In  the  eighth,  class  of  texts  I  include  those  which  represent 
Christ  as  taking  away  our  sin.  John  1 :  29  ;  "  Behold  the  Lamb 
of  God  which  taketh  away  the  sin  of  the  world."  1  John 
3:5;  "Ye  know  that  he  was  manifested  to  take  away  our 
sins,  and  in  him  was  no  sin."  According  to  the  best  philolo- 
gists and  expositors  the  verb  aiqoj  which  the  common  version  in 
both  these  passages  renders  take  away,  signifies  to  hear,  to  take 
upon  one's  self,  or,  metaphorically,  to  expiate.  "  Behold  the 
Lamb  of  God,"  the  Lamb  consecrated  to  God,  that  is,  the  sacri- 
ficial Lamb,  which  takes  upon  itself  the  sin  of  the  world,  a 
representation  like  the  one  so  often  made,  that  Christ  bare  our 
sins.  Storr  and  Flatt  support  this  rendering.  The  word  aiQm 
sometimes  means  to  bear  or  carry,  as  to  bear  or  carry  a  cross. 
Sometimes  it  is  used  to  express  the  taking  up  and  carrying  away 
of  a  couch  or  a  dead  body.  Schleusner,  Professor  Stuart  and 
others  understand  the  phrase  a'lQoav  xrjv  diiaqriav  as  signifying  to 
remove  sin  by  taking  it  upon  one's  self,  and  consider  the  expres- 
sion, "  Behold  the  Lamb  of  God,"  etc.,  as  taken  from  the  victims 
or  sacrifices  upon  which  the  sins  of  the  people  were  transferred 
by  the  Jewish  priests.     Behold  this  divine  or  consecrated  Lamb 


ATONEMENT.        TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  421 

How  could  a  lamb  take  away  sin  in  any  other  way,  than 
by  maldng  expiation  ?  The  same  as  to  the  other  passage, 
1  John,  3  :  5  ;  "  He  was  manifested  to  take  away  our  sins,"  — 
to  bear,  or  to  expiate  our  sins,  to  remove  them  by  taking 
them  upon  himself. 

JVifith  class.  The  texts  which  speak  of  Christ  as  being 
made  sin,  or  a  sin  offering.  2  Cor.  5  :  21  ;  "  For  he  hath 
made  him  who  knew  no  sin,  to  be  sin  for  k.s,"  vmQ  thiwv'  afiaQtiav. 
Wahl  renders  the  text  thus,  "  whom  for  our  sakes  he  regarded 
and  treated  as  a  sinner  ;"  —  Schleusner,  "  whom  on  our  ac- 
count he  punished  and  treated  as  a  sinner."  This  comes  to 
nearly  the  same  thing  with  the  meaning  given  by  other  philolo- 
gists, who  make  a^aQtla  signify  a  sin  offering.  It  is  very 
clear  that  the  word  afiagria  has  this  sense  in  Heb.  9  :  28, 
where  the  words  "  He  shall  appear  the  second  time  without 
sin,"  must  mean,  he  shall  appear  without  any  offering  for  sin  ; 
because  they  form  an  antithesis  to  what  is  said  just  before, 
"  that  Christ  had  once  appeared  to  put  away  sin  by  the  sacri- 
fice of  himself." 

There  are  various  other  passages  in  which  Christ  is  repre- 
sented as  a  sin  offering,  or  expiatory  sacrifice.  I  cite  only  the 
two  following.  Isa.  53  :  10  ;  "  Thou  shalt  make  his  soul  an 
offering  for  sin."  Eph.  5:2;  "  Christ  hath  —  given  himself 
for  us,  an  offering  and  a  sacrifice  to  God."  This  representa- 
tion agrees  perfectly  with  the  texts  before  considered.  "  When 
a  sin  offering  was  made,"  "  the  expiatory  victim  Avas,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  will  of  the  Lawgiver,  placed  in  the  stead  of  the 
sinner,  and  punishment,  though  not  precisely  the  same  which 
would  have  been  inflicted  on  the  sinner,  was  executed  on  it." 
And  the  point  of  resemblance  between  the  Jewish  sacrifices 
and  the  death  of  Christ,  evidently  consists  in  the  pardon  of 
offences  effected  by  vicarious  suffering. 

In  regard  to  all  these  representations,  the  apostles,  who  were 
Jews  and  who  addressed  themselves  to  Jews,  must  have  in- 
tended to  be  understood  in  conformity  with  those  views  of  the 
subject  which  were  set  forth  in   the  Jewish  Scriptures.     From 

VOL  n.  36 


422  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

those  Scriptures  it  appears  beyond  all  controversy  that  the  de- 
sign of  the  sin  offerings  was  to  procure  forgiveness  ;  that  is, 
to  save  from  merited  punishment  those  for  whom  the  oSferinga 
were  made.  Their  efficacy  consisted  in  this.  They  did  pro- 
cure forgiveness  ;  that  is,  to  a  certain  extent  they  prevented 
merited  punishment.  They  did  not  indeed  procure  forgiveness 
in  the  highest  sense.  Forgiveness  in  this  sense  is  what  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ  procured,  as  the  Apostle  to  the  Hebrews 
tells  us ;  and  it  was  this  which  distinguished  his  sacrifice  from 
all  the  sacrifices  for  sin  prescribed  in  the  Mosaic  law.  The 
Apostle  teaches  that,  however  important  and  necessary  those  sa- 
crifices were,  and  however  great  their  influence  for  the  time 
being  in  averting  various  merited  evils,  they  all  fell  short  of 
procuring  forgiveness  in  the  highest  sense,  that  they  had  no 
power  to  prevent  the  punishment  of  sin  in  a  future  world,  or 
to  secure  to  transgressors  the  special  favor  of  God  and  the 
enjoyment  of  spiritual  peace.  This  was  reserved  for  the  death 
of  Christ  to  do.  But  inasmuch  as  those  previous  sacrifices 
had  a  real,  though  a  limited  influence,  they  are  made  use  of 
to  set  forth  the  higher  influence  of  Christ's  death.  And  we 
learn  from  the  New  Testament  that  they  were  intended  for 
this  very  purpose,  and  that  the  influence  they  had  in  saving 
transgressors  from  particular  punishments,  aptly  represented 
and  was  designed  to  represent  the  influence  of  Christ's  sacri- 
fice to  save  sinners  from  eternal  death.  So  that  as  the  death 
of  the  animals  which  were  sacrificed  according  to  divine  ap- 
pointment to  make  expiation  for  sin,  was  to  a  certaui  extent 
accepted  by  God  instead  of  the  punishment  of  transgressors, 
and  so  to  the  same  extent  procured  remission ;  in  like  manner 
the  death  of  Christ  was,  in  the  most  perfect  sense,  accepted 
by  God  instead  of  the  punishment  of  sinners,  and  so  procured 
for  them  a  perfect  remission.  In  both  cases  alike  suSering 
was  inflicted  on  one  being  to  make  expiation  for  the  sins  of 
other  beings,  that  is,  to  save  them  from  the  sufferings  they 
deserved.  The  suffering  of  one  is  substituted  for  the  suffer- 
ing of  others, — the  death  of  one  for  the  death  of  others.     Thus 


ATONEMENT.        TEXTS      CLASSIFIED.  423 

the  sufferings  of  the  animals  that  were  offered  in  sacrifice,  and 
the  sufferings  of  Christ,  were  really  and  altogether  vicarious. 
By  divine  appointment  they  came  in  the  place  of  the  sufferings 
of  transgressors. 

Tenth  class.  Take  now  the  texts  in  which  Christ  is  called 
a  propitiation  for  sin,  as  Rom.  3  :  25,  1  John,  2:2  —  4  :  10, 
the  words  iXuar/jQiov,  iXaafioi,',  and  others  used  in  the  same  sense, 
correspond  perfectly  with  the  different  classes  of  texts  already 
cited.  They  present  Christ  as  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  a  sacri- 
fice which  expiates  sin,  and  procures  exemption  from  merited 
punishment.  In  other  words,  they  present  Christ  as  suffering 
and  dying  on  account  of  our  sins,  so  that  suffering  and  death 
might  not  come  upon  us.  For  a  satisfactory  criticism  on  the 
word  iXaan'iQiov  I  refer  you  to  Storr,  Bib.  Theol.  and  to 
Schleusner,  Wahl,  Robinson. 

The  eleventh  class  includes  those  texts  which  represent  Christ 
as  reconciling  us  to  Crod.  In  order  to  understand  the  true 
meaning  of  these  texts,  and  their  bearing  upon  the  subject  be- 
fore us,  we  must  consider  that  the  sense  frequently  affixed  to 
the  word  reconcile,  is  not  the  sense  it  has  in  Scripture.  In 
common  discourse,  when  sinners  are  spoken  of  as  reconciled  to 
God,  the  meaning  generally  intended  is,  that  they  cease  to  be 
enemies  to  God  and  become  his  friends  ;  whereas  the  Scripture 
declaration,  that  men  are  reconciled  to  God,  means  that  they 
obtain  divine  forgiveness  and  favor.  See  how  the  word  is 
used  in  Matt.  5  :  24  ;  "If  thou  bring  thy  gift  to  the  altar, 
and  there  remember  that  thy  brother  hath  aught  against  thee, 
first  be  reconciled  to  thy  brother,  diaV.dyrj&t,  and  then  come 
and  offer  thy  gift."  ''  First  be  reconciled  to  thy  brother." 
Thy  brother  is  offended ;  go  and  give  him  satisfaction,  and  ob- 
tain his  favor,  and  then  come  and  offer  thy  gift.  This  is  the 
only  sense  the  passage  will  bear.  When  we  have  committed 
an  offence  against  our  neighbor,  if  a  reconciliation  is  brought 
about,  it  must  consist  in  our  giving  him  satisfaction  and  ob- 
taining his  forgiveness.  It  was  said  of  David,  1  Sam.  29  :  4  ; 
"  Wherewith  shall  he  reconcile  himself,  or  be  reconciled  to  his 


424  ATONEMENT.        TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

master  ?" —  that  is,  to  Saul,  who  had  become  an  enemy  to 
David.  For  David  to  be  reconciled  to  Saul,  did  not  mean  for 
him  to  laj  aside  his  enmity  and  become  a  friend  to  Saul,  but 
for  David,  in  some  way,  to  satisfy  Saul,  and  induce  him  to 
lay  aside  his  enmity  and  become  a  friend. 

These  remarks,  which  accord  perfectly  with  the  views  of  the 
ablest  writers,  will  help  us  to  understand  the  meaning  of  those 
texts  in  which  Christ  is  set  forth  as  the  means  of  reconciling 
us  to  God.  Rom.  5  :  10  ;  "  If  w-hen  we  were  enemies,  we 
were  reconciled  to  God  by  the  death  of  his  son ;  much  more, 
being  reconciled,  we  shall  be  saved  by  his  life."  "  We  were 
reconciled  to  God  by  the  death  of  his  son  ;"  that  is,  we  were 
brought  to  enjoy  the  forgiveness  of  sin  and  the  favor  of  God 
by  the  death  of  Christ ;  his  death  procured  for  us  the  divine 
forgiveness  and  favor.  2  Cor.  5 :  18  ;  "  God  hath  reconciled 
us  to  himself  by  Jesus  Christ."  That  is,  God  hath  forgiven 
our  sins  and  received  us  to  favor  through  Jesus  Christ.  2  Cor. 
5  :  19  ;  "  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  unto  himself, 
not  imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them."  The  last  clause 
explains  the  former.  God  is  reconciling  the  world  unto  him- 
self—  he  is  showing  mercy  to  the  world,  not  imputing  their 
trespasses  unto  them,  that  is,  forgiving  their  trespasses  and 
receiving  them  to  favor  :  and  all  this  by  or  through  Christ,  — 
which  other  texts  show  to  be  by  his  death,  by  his  cross,  and  by 
his  blood.  I  shall  add  Rom.  5  :  11 ;  "  By  whom  we  have  now 
received  the  atonement,"  xaraXXayrjV,  reconciliation,  that  is,  for- 
giveness of  sin  and  restoration  of  the  divine  favor. 

If  we  examine  the  texts  in  the  Old  Testament,  which  speak 
of  an  atonement  made  by  the  sacrifice  of  animals,  or  those 
which  refer  to  the  atonement  made  by  Christ,  we  shall  come 
to  the  same  result.  For  they  all  point  out  an  expiation  for 
ein,  a  sacrifice  which  was  intended  to  procure  for  transgressors 
the  divine  forgiveness  and  favor. 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  425 

To  the  view  I  have  taken  of  the  end  of  Christ's  death  an  ob- 
jection has  been  urged,  which  may  properly  be  considered  in  this 
place.  The  objection  arises  from  those  texts  which  represent 
Christ's  death  as  designed  to  promote  other  ends,  particularly/  our 
mnctification.  It  is  on  these  texts  that  Dr.  John  Taylor,  with 
great  plausibility,  founds  his  opinion  of  the  atonement,  which  is 
the  same  in  substance  with  the  prevailing  system  of  Unitarians. 
As  the  texts  referred  to  declare  that  Christ  came  and  suffered  to 
save  his  people  from  their  sins,  to  wash  and  cleanse  them  from  sin, 
and  to  make  them  obedient  and  holy,  that  writer  considers  this  as 
the  great,  and,  I  may  say,  the  only  thing  effected  or  intended  to 
be  effected  by  the  death  of  Christ.  And  as  he  beUeves  that  our 
repentance  and  sanctification  can  be  effected  only  by  the  influence 
of  motives,  he  thinks  that  Christ's  death  was  designed  merely  to 
produce  such  an  influence  upon  our  minds ;  that  is,  to  lead  us  to 
repentance  ;  and  that  our  repentance,  not  the  death  of  Christ,  is 
the  real  and  immediate  cause  or  ground  of  our  forgiveness.  What 
unnatural  violence  he  practises  upon  all  those  texts  which  relate  to 
the  propitiation  which  Christ  made  for  sin,  any  one  may  see  by 
consulting  his  treatise  on  the  atonement. 

I  deem  it  unnecessary  to  go  into  a  particular  examination  of 
Dr.  Taylor's  reasoning  in  the  work  above  mentioned.  The  simple 
and  all-important  question  is,  what  do  the  Scriptures  teach  ?  To 
this  question  we  have  already  attended.  Now  when  we  find  that, 
on  any  subject,  views  differing  from  each  other  are  taught  in  the 
Scriptures,  our  proper  business  is  to  inquire  carefully  what  those 
different  views  are,  and  whether  there  is  any  satisfactory  method 
of  showing  that  they  are  consistent  with  each  other. 

In  regard  to  such  a  subject  as  this,  I  would  remind  you  of  the 
important  and  essential  principle,  that  as  "  all  Scripture  is  given 
by  inspiration  of  God,"  we  must  derive  our  religious  opinions,  not 
from  any  one  part  of  it,  but  from  the  whole.  And  when  the 
Scriptures  present  a  variety  of  views  of  the  same  subject,  our 
faith,  instead  of  fixing  exclusively  upon  one  of  those  ^dews,  must 
include  them  all.     Unless  it  does  this,  it  is  not  a  Scriptural  faith. 

36* 


426  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

Dr.  Taylor's  scheme  is  a  striking  instance  of  the  violation  of  this 
principle.  As  the  Scriptures  teach  that  Christ  suffered  and  died 
for  the  purpose  of  sanctifying  sinners,  he  concludes  that  this  was 
the  only  purpose  in  view.  Some  writers  commit  a  similar  mistake 
on  the  opposite  side.  As  there  are  many  passages  which  declare 
that  Christ  suffered  and  died  to  make  propitiation  and  procure 
forgiveness,  they  conclude  that  this  was  the  only  thing  intended, 
and  that  sanctification  and  eternal  happiness  were  not  procured 
by  his  death.  Kow  surely  the  different  representations  of  Scrip- 
ture as  to  the  design  and  the  effect  of  Christ's  death  ought  all  to 
be  attended  to,  and  to  have  their  proper  effect  upon  our  minds. 
Accordingly  we  ought  to  consider  Christ's  death  as  designed  to 
answer  several  important  ends,  one  of  them  primary,  and  others 
secondary  and  subordinate.  But  these  ends  are  perfectly  consist- 
ent with  each  other,  and  in  reality  imply  each  other.  The  per- 
fection of  our  faith  requires  that  we  should  properly  regard  all  the 
ends  exhibited  in  God's  word,  and  should  endeavor  to  form  clear 
apprehensions  of  their  respective  nature  and  importance,  and  of 
their  relation  to  each  other. 

Having  made  this  general  remark  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
we  ought  to  treat  the  Holy  Scriptures,  I  proceed  to  consider  the 
particular  difficulty  which  has  been  supposed  to  attend  the  com- 
mon doctrine  of  Christ's  death,  arising  from  those  texts  which 
teach  that  he  died  to  promote  our  sanctification. 

First.  Impartial  regard  to  the  word  of  God  requires  us  to  say 
that  several  of  those  texts  which  have  been  supposed  to  teach 
•this,  do  in  fact  convey  a  different  meaning,  —  a  meaning  which 
is  coincident  with  the  texts  already  adduced  to  show  the  special 
design  of  Christ's  death.  I  begin  with  1  John  1:7;  "  The  blood 
of  Jesus  Christ  his  Son  cleanseth  us  from  all  sin."  The  declara- 
tion that  hlood  cleanseth,  refers  to  the  sacrifice  of  animals  by  the 
appointment  of  God,  in  which  the  shedding  of  blood  procured  re- 
mission of  sin,  or  exemption  from  punishment.  This  is  the  only 
way  in  which  blood  could  cleanse.  I  remark  also  that  one  of  the 
senses  of  the  verb  na&aQi^ei,  cleanseth,  according  to  Schleusner 
and  others,  is,  to  expiate,  to  p-ocure  remission  of  sin,  or  as  Wahl 


ATONEMENT.        TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  427 

has  it,  "  to  jnirify  hy  an  expiatory  offeriny,'^  referring  to  this 
same  text,  and  to  Heb.  9 :  22,  where  it  is  said,  "  Ahnost  all 
things  are  by  the  law  (^xn&aQiXerai)  cleansed  by  blood  ;  and  with- 
out the  shedding  of  blood  is  no  remission."  The  last  phrase 
explains  the  former.  As  to  1  John  1:7,  the  connection  proves 
that  the  sense  I  have  given  is  the  true  sense.  "  The  blood  of 
Jesus  Christ  cleanseth  us  from  all  sin,"  that  is,  makes  expiation 
for  all  sin,  and  procures  complete  forgiveness.  The  Apostle  pro- 
ceeds directly  to  show  that  we  need  forgiveness,  and  how  we 
may  secure  it  to  ourselves.  "  If  we  say  we  have  no  sin,  we  de- 
ceive ourselves.  If  we  confess  our  sins,  he  is  faithful  and  just 
to  foryive  our  sins,  and  to  cleanse  us  from  all  unriyhteousness,'^ 
—  two  forms  of  expression  which  appear  to  mean  the  same  thing. 
Rev.  1:5;  "  Unto  him  that  loved  us,  and  washed  us  from  our 
sins  in  his  own  blood,"  etc.  Here  we  find  similar  phraseology, — 
"  washed  us  from  our  sins  in  his  own  blood."  The  word  here 
used  is  not  xa^«^tC<w,  but  Xovco.  The  metaphor  lies  in  this  word. 
Giving  the  word  the  sense  assigned  to  it  by  the  best  Lexico- 
graphers, which  is  indeed  nothing  more  than  taking  away  the 
metaphor,  we  may  express  the  meaning  of  the  passage  thus : 
"  Unto  him  who  loved  us,  and  made  expiation  for  our  sins,  and 
procured  our  forgiveness  by  his  own  blood,"  etc.  There  are  other 
texts  which  convey  the  same  sense,  as  Heb.  1-3  :  12 ;  "  Jesus, 
that  he  might  sanctify  the  people  with  his  own  blood,"  etc.,  mean- 
ing probably  that  he  might  make  exjyiation  for  sin  and  procure 
foryiveness.  Eph.  5 :  25  ;  "As  Christ  loved  the  Church  and 
gave  himself  for  it,  that  he  might  sanctify  it"  (^dyidari).  Accord- 
ing to  Schleusner,  that  he  might  free  the  church  from  the  penal 
consequences  of  sin.  Other  similar  texts  might  be  cited  to  which 
the  same  construction  may  be  given.  » 

But  far  be  it  from  me  to  suppress  or  to  pervert  any  text  which 
represents  it  as  an  object  of  Christ's  mission  and  death,  to  effect 
the  moral  reformation  of  men.  The  renovation  of  sinners  by  the 
Spirit  of  God  is  one  of  the  greatest  of  all  blessings.  It  is  abun- 
dantly evident  from  Scripture,  that  this  blessing  is  one  of  the 
effects  of  Christ's  mediation  and  death,  and  is  included  in  the 
great  salvation  which  he  procured  for  us. 


428  ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED. 

To  make  this  matter  perfectly  plain,  and  to  show  that  the  texts 
which  speak  of  sanctificatiou  as  an  end  of  Christ's  death,  present 
no  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  doctrine  which  has  been  supported 
in  these  Lectures,  I  invite  j^our  attention  to  the  following  remarks. 

First.  The  two  ends  which  have  been  brought  into  view  are 
perfectly  consistent.  The  one  does  not  in  the  least  degree  inter- 
fere with  the  other.  Admitting  that  the  primary  end  of  Christ's 
death  was  to  make  expiation  for  sin,  and  to  procure  forgiveness, 
we  may  also  consider  moral  purification  as  a  blessing  which  his 
death  was  intended  to  procure.  This  may  have  been  as  really  an 
end  of  his  death,  and  may  as  really  flow  from  it,  as  if  it  had  been 
the  only  end.  On  the  other  hand,  forgiveness  may  have  been 
the  end  and  the  primary  end  of  Christ's  death  as  really  as  if  this 
had  been  the  only  end  proposed.  If  any  one  denies  this,  he  must 
show  that  there  is  something  in  one  of  these  ends  which  makes  it 
inconsistent  with  the  other ;  that  is,*he  must  show  that  forgive- 
ness of  sin  is  a  thing  of  such  a  nature  that  it  cannot  consist  with 
sanctification.  He  must  show  that  a  pardoned  sinner  cannot  be 
sanctified,  and  that  a  sanctified  person  cannot  be  pardoned.  For 
if  pardon  and  sanctification  may  consist  together,  then  both  of 
them  may  have  been  secured  by  Christ's  death.  And  so  the 
texts  which  represent  one  of  these  as  the  end,  may  be  perfectly 
consistent  with  those  which  represent  the  other  as  the  end.  And 
we  may  very  properly  copy  after  the  inspired  writers,  and  say  at 
one  time  that  Christ  died  to  make  propitiation  and  procure  our  for- 
giveness, and  at  another  time  that  he  died  to  redeem  us  from  the 
power  of  sin  and  to  make  us  holy.  The  great  mistake  is,  to 
understand  either  of  these  as  the  end  exclusively  of  the  other. 

But  secondly.  One  of  these  ends,  that  is,  forgiveness,  is  not  only 
consistent  with  the  other,  that  is,  sanctification,  but  is  directly  pro- 
motive of  it.  Or  to  express  this  more  fully,  the  consideration  of 
Christ's  death  as  the  means  of  procuring  our  forgiveness  and 
restoring  us  to  the  divine  favor,  is  a  most  powerful  and  efficacious 
motive  to  holiness.  It  was  so  treated  by  the  apostles ;  and  it  is 
perfectly  evident  that  it  actually  produced  this  efiect  upon  them. 
It  is  every  way  suited  to  produce  this  effect.     If  we  go  through 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  429 

the  universe,  we  shall  find  no  motive  which,  in  point  of  eflficacy, 
can  be  compared  with  this.  Whatever  there  is  in  the  brightest 
displays  of  the  perfections  of  God,  especially  in  the  glory  of  his 
holiness,  in  the  terrors  of  his  justice  and  wrath,  and  in  the  riches 
of  his  love,  and  whatever  there  is  in  the  highest  vindication  of 
his  law  and  government,  and  in  the  clearest  demonstration  of  the 
worth  of  the  soul  and  the  value  of  eternal  life,  it  is  all  found  here. 
The  fact  of  Christ's  death  as  an  expiatory  sacrifice,  and  the  divine 
mercy  displayed  in  it,  has  reached  those  whom  nothing  else  could 
reach  ;  has  melted  hearts  of  adamant ;  has  constrained  the  chief 
of  sinners  to  repentance,  love,  and  obedience.  Now  sui*ely  if 
the  doctrine  of  Christ's  death,  as  designed  to  make  atonement  for 
sin  and  to  procure  our  forgiveness,  is  the  most  powerful  of  all 
means  to  promote  our  moral  purification,  it  must  be  proper  to 
represent  his  death  as  designed  also  to  promote  this  important 
object.  Indeed  the  first  end  could  not  be  made  known  to  us 
without  exerting  -a  powerful  influence  in  favor  of  the  last.  It 
must  exert  this  influence  while  the  laws  of  the  moral  world  remain 
as  they  are. 

If  I  were  to  undertake  a  full  discussion  of  the  subject,  I  should 
endeavor  to  show  how  superior  our  views  of  the  death  of  Christ 
are  to  those  of  Dr.  John  Taylor,  and  of  Unitarians  generally,  in 
respect  to  that  moral  reformation  of  man,  which  they  believe  to  be 
the  only  end  of  the  atonement.  All  experience  shows  that  this 
end  can  never  be  promoted  by  the  death  of  Christ,  if  regarded 
according  to  their  system,  with  half  the  success,  as  if  it  is  re- 
garded as  an  expiatory  sacrifice  for  sin.  So  that,  in  sober  truth, 
man's  moral  purification  is  an  end  which  Christ's  death  accom- 
plishes far  more  certainly  and  in  a  far  higher  degree  according 
to  our  system,  than  according  to  theirs. 

Thirdly.  I  must  go  further  and  say,  that  the  first  end  of  the 
atonement  above-mentioned  not  only  is  consistent  with  the  second, 
and  actually  promotive  of  it,  but  really  includes  it.  What  I  mean 
to  affirm  is,  that  the  expiatory  death  of  Christ  cannot  actually 
secure  our  forgiveness  in  the  largest  sense,  without  effecting  our 
sanctification.     For  what  is  forgiveness,  taken  in  the  large  and 


430  ATONEMENT.       TEXTS     CLASSIFIED. 

comprehensive  sense  intended  ?  It  is  the  removal  of  all  the  evils 
involved  in  the  penalty  of  the  l&yy  ;  of  all  the  evils  consequent 
upon  sin  in  regard  to  our  present  and  our  eternal  state.  And 
what  are  these  evils  ?  The  penalty  of  the  law  is  commonly  un- 
derstood to  involve  death  temporal,  spiritual,  and  eternal.  It 
involves  not  only  present  suffering  and  death,  but  the  evil  of  being 
for  ever  in  a  state  of  enmity  against  God,  and  the  misery  of  being 
under  his  wrath,  banished  from  his  presence,  and  excluded  from 
communion  with  him  and  from  the  fellowship  of  holy  beings. 
Now  to  be  saved  entirely  from  the  penalty  of  the  law,  is  to  be 
saved  from  all  those  evils  which  it  involves.  It  is  to  be  saved 
from  the  misery  of  being  under  the  wrath  of  God,  and  of  being 
banished  from  his  presence.  To  be  fully  pardoned  is  to  be  saved 
from  this  miserable  condition.  But  how  can  we  be  saved  from  the 
wrath  of  God  without  being  restored  to  his  favor  ?  And  how  can 
we  be  saved  from  the  evil  of  being  banished  from  God  without 
being  restored  to  the  presence  and  enjoyment  of  God  ?  And  how 
can  we  enjoy  God  and  be  happy  in  his  presence,  without  being 
holy  ?  And  how  can  we  be  happy  in  the  society  of  angels  and 
saints  in  heaven,  without  feelings  congenial  with  theirs  ?  The 
substance  of  what  I  would  say  on  this  point  is  this  ;  to  enjoy  God 
is  the  chief  happiness  of  man,  and  would  have  constituted  the 
chief  reward  of  perfect  obedience.  To  lose  the  enjoyment  of  God 
must  then  be  the  chief  misery  of  man,  and  the  chief  evil  involved 
in  the  penalty  for  disobedience.  Now  forgiveness  imphes  that  we 
are  delivered  from  this  evil.  And  being  delivered  from  the  loss 
of  anything,  implies  that  what  was  lost  is  restored.  Forgiveness 
then  in  the  large  sense,  complete  forgiveness,  implies  that  we 
are  restored  to  the  enjoyment  of  God  ;  and  this  implies  that 
we  are  possessed  of  the  disposition  of  mind  which  is  neces- 
sary to  such  enjoyment ;  and  this  disposition  is  holiness.  So  that 
complete  forgiveness,  that  is,  the  complete  removal  of  those  evil 
consequences  of  sin  which  are  indicated  by  the  penalty  of  the 
law,  necessarily  implies  that  we  enjoy  that  good  which  we  cannot 
enjoy  without  being  made  holy. 

These  considerations,  I  think,  are  sufficient  to  place  the  subject 


ATONEMENT.      TEXTS    CLASSIFIED.  431 

in  a  satisfactory  light,  and  to  evince  that  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
death  which  I  have  endeavored  to  defend,  is  encumbered  with  no 
real  difficulty.  The  texts  which  Dr.  Taylor  makes  the  foundation 
of  his  reasoning,  and  which  represent  it  as  an  end  of  Christ's 
mediation  that  he  might  sanctify  sinners,  are  obviously  and  per- 
fectly consistent  with  those  which  teach  that  he  died  to  make  ex- 
piation for  sin,  and  to  procure  our  forgiveness.  The  two  classes 
of  texts  are  consistent,  because  the  two  ends  which  they  bring 
into  view  are  consistent.  Christ  may  seek  and  accomplish  this 
end,  our  forgiveness,  consistently  with  his  seeking  and  accom- 
plishing the  other,  our  sanctification.  This  is  the  first  remark. 
The  second  is,  that  the  accomplishment  of  the  former  of  these,  as 
the  primary  end  of  his  death,  tends  directly  to  promote  the  latter. 
The  third  remark  is,  that  the  accomplishment  of  the  former  in  the 
largest  and  most  complete  sense,  necessarily  imphes  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  latter.  In  the  first  and  second  remarks,  I  speak 
of  the  two  as  distinct  ends  of  Christ's  death,  and  so  they  are  often 
represented  in  Scripture,  and  so  we  may  very  properly  represent 
them,  because  although  they  are  really  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
great  end,  that  is,  the  salvation  of  sinners,  they  easily  admit  of 
being  considered  distinctly ;  and  such  a  distinct  consideration  is 
sometimes  important  and  necessary.  The  last  remark  presents 
them  as  united  in  one  whole,  consisting  of  parts  which  are  in  their 
nature  inseparable.  Now  this  being  the  case,  it  seems  perfectly 
just  and  proper  that  the  inspired  writers  should  sometimes  speak 
of  one  of  them,  and  sometimes  of  the  other,  as  the  end  of  Christ's 
death,  and  sometimes  of  both  taken  together,  as  constituting  one 
comprehensive  end.  And  it  is  proper  for  us  to  imitate  them  in 
each  of  these  modes  of  representation,  as  circumstances  may 
require. 


LECTURE    LXXVI. 


DIFFERENT  VIEWS  OF  THE  END  OP  CHRIST'S  DEATH  HARMONIOUS. 
METAPHORICAL  LANGUAGE  USED  BY  THE  ORTHODOX  AND  BY 
THE  SACRED  WRITERS  RESPECTING  GOD  AS  A  JUST  MORAL 
GOVERNOR.       OBJECTIONS    AGAINST   IT    CONSIDERED. 

In  regard  to  the  end  of  Christ's  death,  the  opinion  which  now 
prevails  probably  to  the  greatest  extent  among  those  who  reject  the 
common  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  is,  that  he  died  to  declare  the 
mercy  of  God,  to  make  known  by  a  public  sign  his  readiness  to 
forgive,  and  so  to  encourage  and  influence  sinners  to  repent. 
Others  make  it  the  special  end  of  Christ's  death  to  bear  testimony 
to  the  truths  he  had  taught ;  to  manifest  his  own  fortitude  ;  or  to 
set  us  an  example  of  obedience  and  submission. 

Now  if  those,  who  entertain  these  different  views  of  the  end  of 
Christ's  death,  mean  to  assert  that  these  were  the  only  ends  of 
Christ's  death,  I  would  refer  them  to  those  numerous  texts  which 
show  that  he  died  for  another  purpose,  that  is,  to  make  propitiation 
for  sin.  If  they  assert  that  any  one  of  these  was  the  chief  end 
of  Christ's  death  ;  then  I  would  refer  to  the  texts  which  clearly 
give  the  other  end  a  peculiar  prominence,  and  which  admit  of  no 
fair  interpretation  which  does  not  place  that  end  above  all  others. 
But  if  any  assert  merely  that  these  are  real  ends  of  Christ's 
death  —  ends  in  a  subordinate,  consequential,  or  collateral  sense  ; 
to  this  I  agree.  Because,  although  the  Scriptures  may  nowhere 
distinctly  speak  of  all  of  them  as  objects  of  Christ's  death,  it  can 
be  satisfactorily  shown  that  they  are  either  involved  in  what  we 


LA:<fGUAGE    OF    SCRIPTURE,    ETC.  433 

consider  to  be  the  principal  end,  or  result  from  it.  And  it  can  be 
shown,  too,  that  Christ's  death,  considered  as  an  expiatory  sacri- 
fice for  sin,  conduces  much  more  powerfully  to  these  subordinate 
ends,  than  if  it  is  considered  in  any  other  light.  If  Christ  died 
to  make  propitiation  for  our  sins,  and  to  procure  our  forgiveness  ; 
then  surely,  as  this  event  was  the  appointment  of  God,  it  is  a 
manifestation  of  his  mercy,  and  of  his  readiness  to  forgive.  For 
if  he  were  not  merciful  and  ready  to  forgive,  why  should  he  give 
his  Son  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  exercise  of  his  mercy  in  for- 
giveness ?  And  finally,  there  is  no  view  of  Christ's  death,  which 
invests  it  with  so  much  power  to  lead  sinners  to  repentance,  and 
none  which  shows  the  fortitude  of  Christ  to  so  great  advantage, 
or  gives  his  example  such  influence  over  our  minds,  as  that  view 
which  we  have  taken  of  it.  When  the  inspired  writers  make  an 
attempt  to  display  most  clearly  the  mercy  of  God  and  his  readi- 
ness to  forgive,  or  to  move  sinners  to  repentance,  or  to  set  before 
us  the  personal  virtues  of  Christ,  or  to  persuade  us  to  copy  his 
example  ;  they  exhibit  in  one  form  or  another  the  extraordinary 
fact,  that  he  died  for  our  sins. 

In  previous  Lectures,  I  have  endeavored  to  bring  distinctly  to 
view  what  the  Bible  teaches  concerning  the  death  of  Christ,  and 
to  show  that  the  various  representations  wliich  it  makes  of  the 
design  of  that  event  perfectly  agree  among  themselves.  But  this 
important  subject  has  been  regarded  in  many  diflferent  lights,  and 
has  to  a  great  extent  been  made  a  subject  of  controversy.  And 
in  the  controversy,  all  the  objections  which  human  ingenuity  has 
been  able  to  invent,  have  been  arrayed  against  the  Scripture 
doctrine.  And  some  of  those  who  have  in  a  general  manner 
embraced  it,  and  have  made  use  of  it  for  important  practical 
purposes,  have  indulged  themselves  in  unscriptural  and  unwar- 
rantable speculations,  and  in  this  way  have  filled  th§  minds  of 
many,  both  among  the  unlearned  and  the  learned,  with  perplexity 
and  doubt.  So  that,  although  the  doctrine  of  atonement  is,  by  a 
great  number  of  ministers  and  private  Christians,  apprehended 
and  embraced  in  its  true  Scripture  sense  ;  and  although  it  has 
often  been  triumphantly  defended ;  and  although  it  is,  both  in 

37 


434  LANGUAGE    OF     SCRIPTURE 

Christian  and  pagan  countries,  producing  the  same  happy  and 
glorious  effects  as  it  produced  in  tlie  apostolic  age  ;  still  the 
public  mind  is  extensively  in  such  a  state,  as  renders  it  necessary 
for  ministers  of  Christ  to  give  exact  explanations  of  the  subject, 
to  present  clear,  definite,  intelligible  views  of  it,  and  to  treat  it 
in  such  a  manner,  that  all  sober,  candid  men  may  understand  it 
alike,  and  may  in  a  higher  degi-ee  than  heretofore,  experience  the 
effect  of  truth  unmingled  with  error. 

It  is  therefore  my  purpose,  in  the  further  consideration  of  the 
subject,  to  attend  carefully  to  those  inquiries  which  naturally  arise 
in  the  minds  of  thinking  men  at  the  present  day ;  to  give  neces- 
sary explanations  of  terms  and  phrases,  and  to  guard  as  effec- 
tually as  possible  against  mistakes  and  difficulties.  My  object 
is  not  so  much  to  trace  out  and  confute  particular  forms  of 
error,  as  to  point  out  its  sources,  and  the  means  of  its  confu- 
tation. 

I  shall  at  present  inquire,  how  far  the  language  of  Scripture 
and  of  common  religious  discourse  in  relation  to  the  subject  under 
consideration,  is  metaphorical ;  what  the  real  import  of  this  lan- 
guage is ;  what  mistakes  arise  from  not  understanding  this  import ; 
and  how  far  it  is  desirable  and  necessary  that  metaphorical  terms 
and  phrases  should  be  retained. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  great  part  of  our  language  relative  to 
moral  and  spiritual  subjects  was  originally  metaphorical.  Words 
were  taken  from  sensible  objects  and  applied  to  things  intellectual 
or  spiritual.  The  ground  of  this  application  is  always  some  real 
or  apprehended  resemblance  of  these  moral  or  spiritual  objects  to 
those  which  are  sensible.  When  David  says  "  The  Lord  is  my 
shepherd,"  no  man  could  understand  his  meaning,  if  there  were 
not  some  obvious  resemblance  between  God  and  a  shepherd. 
But  if  wQ  know  what  a  shepherd  was,  and  consider  that  David 
had  been  a  shepherd  ;  then,  as  soon  as  we  read  this  declaration 
of  his  ;  "  The  Lord  is  my  shepherd,"  we  are  struck  with  the 
care  and  kindness  and  vigilance  of  a  shepherd  in  regard  to  his 
sheep,  and  the  protection  he  affords  them,  and  understand  David 
as  signifying  that,  in  these  respects,  God  resembles  a  shepherd. 


AS    TO    god's    hatred    OF    SIN.  435 

The  analogy  implied  in  metaphors  often  relates  to  the  effects 
produced.  God  says,  "  I  will  be  as  dew  unto  Israel."  Dew 
gives  refreshment  to  the  earth  and  promotes  the  growth  of  vegeta- 
bles.* The  metaphor  implies  that  the  effects  of  God's  agency  in 
the  spiritual  world  have  a  resemblance  to  these  effects  of  dew 
upon  the  earth,  that  God  gives  refreshment  and  consolation  to 
the  souls  of  his  people,  and  causes  them  to  abound  in  holy  affec- 
tions and  works.  But  it  is  of  special  consequence  to  settle  it  in 
our  minds,  that  the  kind  and  degree  of  analogy  must  always  be 
determined  from  the  nature  of  the  subjects  and  the  obvious  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case.  Metaphorical  language  is  addressed  to 
those  who  possess  common  sense,  and  who  are  supposed  to  be  so 
well  acquainted  with  the  subject  to  which  the  metaphor  is  apphed, 
and  with  that  from  which  it  is  borrowed,  that  they  cannot  well 
mistake  its  meaning. 

Let  us  here  notice  some  of  the  metaphors  which  the  Scriptures 
apply  to  God,  as  a  Moral  Governor.  We  are  sometimes  accused 
of  representing  God  as  an  angry,  wrathful,  revengeful  being. 
But  does  not  this  accusation  lie  equally  against  the  inspired 
volume  ?  Just  consider  how  the  subject  is  treated  there.  Deut. 
29 :  20  ;  "  The  Lord  will  not  spare  him,"  that  is,  the  obstinate 
sinner,  "  but  the  anger  of  the  Lord  and  his  jealousy  shall  smoke 
against  that  man,"  etc.  Deut.  32  :  21,  22  ;  "  They  have  pro- 
voked me  to  anger.  A  fire  is  kindled  in  mine  anger,  that  shall 
burn  to  the  low^est  hell."  Ps.  7  :  11 ;  "  God  is  angry  with  the 
wicked  every  day."  Ps.  78  :  49  ;  "  He  cast  upon  them  the 
fierceness  of  his  anger,  wrath,  and  indignation."  Such  represen- 
tations as  these,  which  abound  in  the  Old  Testament,  are  also 
made  by  the  writers  of  the  New.  They  often  speak  of  God's 
anger,  wrath,  fiery  indignation,  and  vengeance  ;  and  they  speak 
too  of  Christ's  taking  vengeance.  They  speak  of  "  the  wrath  of 
the  Lamb."  Now  do  any  of  those  writers,  against  whom  the 
allegation  above  mentioned  is  urged,  exceed  the  holy  Scriptures 
in  the  dreadfulness  of  the  representations  they  make  of  the 
divine  anger  ?  Do  they  say  what  is  stronger  than  this,  that  God 
is  angry  with  sinners  every  day,  that  his  anger  and  jealousy  will 


436  LANGUAGE     OF     SCRIPTURE 

smoke  against  them,  that  the  fire  of  his  auger  will  burn  to  the 
lowest  hell  ?  Do  they  speak  of  anything  more  terrific,  than  the 
fierceness  of  God's  anger,  wrath,  and  indignation  ?  Do  they 
rise  above  the  spirit  of  the  New  Testament,  which  proclaims  the 
boundless  love  of  God,  and  exhibits  the  mild  attractions  of  re- 
deeming mercy,  but  which,  at  the  same  time,  declares  that  the 
wrath  of  God  abideth  on  unbelievers,  and  that  the  Saviour  him- 
self will  render  to  them  indignation  and  wrath,  and  which  takes 
special  care  to  teach  us  that  he  claims  vengeance  to  himself  as 
one  of  his  high  prerogatives  ?  Do  any  of  the  writers,  who  are 
complained  of  for  giving  unamiable,  repulsive,  and  terrific  views 
of  God,  go  beyond  these  representations,  which  so  abound  in  every 
part  of  Scripture  ? 

But  it  is  said,  the  inspired  writers  use  the  language  above 
quoted  in  a  metapliorical  sense.  This  is  true.  And  have  not  the 
■writers  and  preachers  who  imitate  them,  the  same  vindication  ? 
What  conception  must  that  man  have  of  revelation,  who  condemns 
us  for  using  the  very  same  metaphors  which  the  prophets  and 
apostles  used,  and  for  the  very  same  purpose  ?  With  prophets 
and  apostles,  this  metaphorical  language  was  the  language  of 
strong  emotion,  and  they  used  it  to  excite  emotion  in  the  minds 
of  others.  I  say  the  same  in  regard  to  those  Avho  imitate  them. 
And  I  say  also,  that  to  exclude  all  this  metaphorical  language 
from  religious  discourse,  and  to  confine  ourselves  to  that  which  is 
to  be  understood  in  the  hteral  sense,  and  which  is  logically  exact, 
would  be  not  only  to  dissent  from  the  sacred  writers,  but  to 
deprive  ourselves  of  the  best  means  of  impressing  truth  upon  the 
minds  of  men.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  utter  vivid  conceptions 
of  God's  displeasure  against  sin,  or  to  excite  vivid  conceptions  in 
the  minds  of  others,  without  the  use  of  metaphors.  And  who  will 
say  that  better  metaphors  could  be  chosen,  than  those  which  are 
so  freely  used  by  men  divinely  inspired  ? 

I  have  made  these  observations  to  show,  that  no  one  has  any 
right  to  condemn  us  for  using  such  metaphorical  language  as  we 
find  in  the  sacred  volume  in  relation  to  the  present  subject,  and 
indeed  that  we  cannot  avoid  the  use  of  it,  without  manifest  disre- 
spect to  the  word  of  God. 


AS    TO     god's    hatred    OF    SIN.  437 

The  meaning  of  the  metaphorical  language  which  I  have  cited, 
and  the  propriety  of  using  it,  can  be  very  easily  shown.  An 
angry,  revengeful  man  is  inclined  to  inflict  evil  upon  those  against 
whom  his  anger  is  directed.  And  the  more  violent  his  anger,  the 
more  dreadful  the  evil  he  wishes  to  inflict.  When,  therefore,  the 
inspired  writei-s  would  set  forth  the  evils  which  a  righteous  God 
will  inflict  upon  the  wicked,  they  represent  him  as  angry  and  full 
of  revenge  ;  and  to  make  it  appear,  that  the  evils  he  will  inflict 
as  the  just  punishment  of  sin,  are  unavoidable  and  dreadful,  they 
represent  him  as  having  the  fierceness  of  anger,  anger  that 
smokes  and  burns,  and  that  will  not  cease  before  it  has  destroyed 
those  who  are  its  objects.  Here  the  analogy  implied  in  the  meta- 
phor does  not  relate  to  the  nature  of  the  feeling  or  motive,  which 
prompts  to  the  infliction  of  evil.  In  this  respect  God  has  no 
resemblance  to  an  angry,  revengeful  man.  For  a  revengeful  man 
is  malevolent  and  wicked;  but  God  is  benevolent  and  holi/.  Nor 
is  any  analogy  intended  as  to  the  particular  kind  of  evil  to  be 
endured,  or  the  manner  in  which  it  is  to  be  inflicted.  But  as  to 
the  certainty,  as  to  the  greatness,  as  to  the  dreadfulness  of  the 
evil  which  is  to  come  upon  the  wicked,  and  God's  determination 
to  inflict  it,  there  is  a  striking  analogy.  And  this  is  the  analogy 
which  naturally  occurs  to  common  sense  and  an  awakened  con- 
science. Let  the  minds  of  men  be  free  from  wrong  bias,  and 
their  moral  faculties  aAvake,  and  then  let  it  be  represented  to 
them,  that  God  is  angry  with  the  Avicked,  that  his  wrath  burns 
against  them,  and  that  he  will  take  vengeance  upon  them  ;  and 
the  impression  they  will  receive  will  be  an  impression  of  God's 
holy  displeasure  against  sin,  and  of  the  just  and  dreadful  destruc- 
tion which  will  come  upon  the  impenitent.  The  impression  will 
be  conformable  to  truth.  The  language  is  indeed  metaphorical, 
but  it  is  perfectly  just  and  right,  and  perfectly  adapted  to  convey 
to  the  minds  of  men  the  very  conception  which  is  intended  to  be 
conveyed,  of  the  justice  and  hohness  of  God,  and  the  fearful 
consequences  of  sin.  In  w4iat  other  way  can  you  make  an  im- 
pi-ession  so  deep  and  salutary?  How  can  you  influence  those 
who  are  creatures  of  feeling,  without  exciting  feeUng  ?     And 

37* 


LANGUAGE     OF    SCRIPTURE 

how  can  you  excite  feeling,  without  using  the  language  of 
feeling  ? 

But  to  proceed.  If  the  displeasure  of  God  against  sin,  and 
his  determination  to  inflict  a  just  punishment,  is  represented 
under  the  image  of  anger  and  revenge  that  will  not  be  satisfied 
till  it  has  compassed  its  end  ;  then  God's  withholding  the  punish- 
ment due  to  offenders,  or  forgiving  them,  may  be  represented  as 
ceasing  to  be  angry,  as  restraining  the  fierceness  of  his  anger, 
etc.  And  if  anything  operates  as  a  means  of  preventing  the 
effects  of  the  divine  displeasure  and  procuring  divine  forgiveness, 
it  may  properly  be  spoken  of  as  a  means  of  turning  away  God's 
anger,  of  quenching  his  wrath,  etc.  This  mode  of  representing 
the  subject  is  sanctioned  not  only  by  the  authority  of  the  inspired 
writers,  but  by  the  common  practice  of  men,  when  they  speak 
and  write  without  shackles. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  remembered,  that  the  metaphorical  lan- 
guage above  mentioned  is,  as  I  have  said,  the  language  of  emo- 
tion, and  is  ordinarily  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  impression. 
To  calm  reasoning,  or  to  plain,  didactic  discourse,  it  is  not  spe- 
cially adapted.  But  in  sacred  poetry,  in  fervent  prayer,  and  in 
all  religious  discourse  which  is  intended  to  rouse  a  sleeping  con- 
science or  to  move  the  passions,  nothing  can  be  more  suitable. 
To  object  against  it  betrays  a  perverted  judgment  and  taste,  or 
apathy  of  moral  feeling. 

If  you  would  pursue  this  subject  further,  and  inquire  what  it  is 
in  God  which  produces  effects  resembling  the  effects  of  human 
anger  and  revenge,  in  other  words,  what  it  is  in  God  which  leads 
him  to  inflict  punishment  on  sinners,  the  inquiry  may  be  answered 
in  a  variety  of  ways.  I  may  say,  it  is  God's  infinite  holiness. 
If  he  is  holy  himself,  he  must  be  pleased  with  holiness  in  us. 
And  if  he  is  pleased  with  holiness,  he  must  be  displeased  with  the 
contrary,  which  is  sin.  And  if  he  is  displeased  with  sin,  he  must, 
to  be  consistent,  express  his  displeasure.  But  he  cannot  express 
his  displeasure,  without  doing  what  is  contrary  to  that  which  shows 
that  he  is  pleased ;  that  is,  without  the  infliction  of  evil.  It  thus 
plainly  results  from  the  holiness  of  God,  that  he  must  inflict  evil 
upon  the  unholy  and  disobedient. 


AS    TO    god's    hatred    OF    SIN.  439 

Or  I  may  say,  it  is  the  justice  of  God  that  leads  him  to  inflict 
evil  upon  sinners.  Those  who  transgress  the  moral  law,  which  is 
holy,  just,  and  good,  have  a  personal  demerit.  They  deserve  to 
suffer  punishment.  As  God  is  a  just  Ruler,  he  will  be  disposed 
to  inflict  punishment,  and  to  do  it  in  such  a  manner  and  in  such  a 
degree,  as  the  honor  of  his  law  and  the  ill  desert  of  trangressora 
shall  require. 

Or  I  may  say,  it  is  God's  benevolence  that  leads  him  to  punish 
sinners.  Certain  it  is,  that  the  benevolence  of  God,  who  is  the 
Former  and  the  supreme  Head  of  a  moral  empire,  must  lead  him  to 
desire  and  to  promote  its  order  and  happiness.  Benevolence  is 
wishing  well  to  others.  Benevolence  in  God  is  his  wishing  well  to 
his  inteUigent  universe.  And  as  he  wishes  well  to  the  universe, 
he  must  maintain  a  moral  government.  He  must  make  and  pub- 
lish laws,  and  must  encourage  obedience  by  rewards,  and  dis- 
courage disobedience  by  punishments.  There  is  no  other  con- 
ceivable way  of  promoting  the  welfare  of  intelligent,  moral  beings. 
,  I  say  then,  if  so  great  and  hurtful  an  evil*  as  sin  occurs  in  God's 
moral  kingdom,  a  benevolent  regard  to  the  happiness  of  that  king- 
dom must  lead  him  to  frown  upon  it,  and  by  suitable  punishments 
to  discountenance  it. 

You  see  it  comes  in  reahty  to  the  same  thing,  whether  we  con- 
sider the  punishment  of  sinners  as  resulting  from  the  holiness,  the 
justice,  or  the  benevolence  of  God.  It  is  his  infinite  perfection,  it 
is  the  consummate  excellence  of  his  character  as  moral  Governor, 
which  leads  him  to  punish  those  who  transgress  his  laws.  And  as 
transgression  is  an  evil  so  hateful  in  itself,  and  in  its  tendency  so 
ruinous  to  the  welfare  of  moral  beings,  it  is  obvious  that  a  just 
and  benevolent  God  must  manifest  his  justice  and  benevolence  by 
a  severe  and  dreadful  punishment  of  transgressors. 

It  appears  then,  that  what  is  familiarly  called  God's  anger,  his 
wrath,  his  fici'cc  wrath,  the  fire  of  his  wrath,  his  vengeance,  etc., 
is  so  far  from  implying  anything  faulty  or  unamiable  in  his  charac- 
ter, that  it  directly  results  from  his  supreme  excellence.  Should 
he  cease  to  feel  disapprobation  of  sin,  or  displeasure  against  it,  or 
should  he  cease  to  show  his  displeasure  by  inflicting  evils  adequate 


440  LANGUAGE    OP    SCRIPTURE 

to  the  ill-desert  of  sinners,  and  expressive  of  his  righteous  oppo- 
sition against  sin,  he  would  cease  to  be  a  God  of  holiness,  he 
would  cease  to  be  a  God  of  justice,  and  he  would  cease  to  be  a 
God  of  benevolence. 

What  then  becomes  of  the  objection,  so  frequently  and  so 
warmly  urged  by  Unitarians  against  the  common  methods  of 
representing  the  atonement,  and  the  eflfects  produced  by  it  ?  It 
is  said  we  give  the  most  repulsive  and  unamiable  views  of  the 
character  of  God  ;  that  our  doctrine  represents  him  as  wanting  in 
goodness,  as  the  subject  of  violent  and  wrathful  passion,  which  could 
be  appeased  in  no  other  way  than  by  the  blood  of  his  own  Son ; 
as  a  selfish  being  whose  favor  cannot  be  enjoyed  without  being 
purchased,  and  that  too  at  a  dear  rate.  It  is  said  that  our  doc- 
trine takes  away  the  freeness  of  divine  mercy,  and  that  by  cloth- 
ing God  with  the  attributes  of  a  tyrant,  it  excludes  the  possibility 
of  our  loving  him  ;  and  that  if  our  doctrine  were  true,  we  should 
feel  ourselves  chained  to  a  miserable  existence,  under  the  govern- 
ment of  a  God  omnipotent  only  in  malevolence  and  wrath.  This 
is  the  substance  of  the  objection  which  has  been  reiterated  against 
the  commonly  received  doctrine  of  the  atonement.  To  these 
objections,  which  are  so  much  relied  upon  by  Unitarians,  and 
which  are  made  so  prominent  and  so  plausible  in  their  writings,  I 
think  it  easy  to  reply. 

I  ask  then,  whether  our  representations  of  the  wrath  of  God 
against  sin,  of  his  determination  to  punish  sinners,  and  of  his 
requiring  so  much  to  be  done  by  Christ  in  order  to  their  forgive- 
ness, go  beyond  the  representations  of  Scripture  ?  Is  not  the 
language  of  God's  word  as  plain  and  as  strong  as  ours  ?  Is  not 
the  description  it  gives  of  his  feelings,  and  his  administration  to- 
wards sinners,  as  terrific  as  ours  ?  And  I  ask  too,  whether  our 
representations  in  regard  to  this  subject  are  variant  from  the 
standard  of  God's  word  ?  Do  we  present  views  in  any  way 
different  from  those  of  the  sacred  writers  ?  Every  candid  man 
who  examines  the  subject  thoroughly,  must  see  that  our  language 
does  not  rise  above  the  language  of  the  Bible,  and  does  not  ma- 
terially differ  from  it  in  one  way  or  another.     The  only  defence 


AS    TO    god's    hatred    OP    SIN.  441 

of  the  general  objection  which  can  be  of  any  avail  is,  that  the 
language  of  Scripture  is  figurative.  This  is  granted.  And  if  it 
was  proper  for  those  who  wrote  under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  to  set  forth  the  divine  character  and  administration  in 
figurative  language,  why  is  it  not  equally  proper  for  us  ?  Why 
should  complaints  be  brought  against  us  for  copying  after  that 
book  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  an  infallible  standard  ?  It  may 
be  pretended  that  the  metaphorical  language  above  mentioned, 
when  used  by  us,  conveys  a  different  sense  from  what  it  conveyed 
when  used  by  the  inspired  Avriters.  But  what  c\idence  is  there 
of  the  fact  ?  When  we  say  in  the  language  of  Scripture,  that 
God  is  angry  with  the  wicked,  that  his  wrath  abideth  on  them  and 
will  consume  them,  what  reason  is  there  to  think  that  we  are  not 
understood  to  mean  the  same  thing  as  the  sacred  writers  meant  ? 
The  most  respectable  authors  among  the  orthodox  have  taken 
pains  to  explain  clearly  the  figurative  language  in  common  use  on 
this  subject,  and  have  taught  that,  when  applied  to  God,  it  must 
not  be  understood  to  attribute  to  him  any  of  the  faults  or  imper- 
fections of  man ;  that  the  wrath  of  God  is  a  holy  wrath,  and 
his  vengeance  holy  vengeance,  perfectly  consistent  with  infinite 
righteousness  anid  benevolence,  and  flowing  from  them.  The  same 
is  true  of  other  figurative  language,  which  is  common  to  orthodox 
Christians  and  to  the  sacred  writers. 

But  I  must  ask  further,  whether  it  is  in  truth  a  fault  in  the 
character  of  God,  as  the  writings  of  our  opponents  imply,  that  he 
is  so  highly  displeased  with  sinners,  and  that  he  has  so  deep  and 
utter  an  abhorrence  of  all  sin.  Is  sin  indeed  so  small  an  evil  as 
to  deserve  httle  or  no  divine  wrath  ?  When  God's  anger  bums 
against  sinners  and  inflicts  heavy  punishments  upon  them,  when  it 
burns  long  and  inflicts  everlasting  punishment  upon  them,  does  it 
rise  above  what  is  just  ?  Does  it  go  beyond  the  desert  of  sin  ? 
Our  opponents  think  that  it  does ;  and  this,  I  apprehend,  is  at  the 
bottom  of  all  their  difficulties  respecting  the  language  under  con- 
sideration. For  if  they  only  had  a  suitable  sense  of  the  evil  of 
sin,  they  would  no  longer  think  that  any  degree  of  divine  dis- 
pleasure against  it  could  be  too  great.     If  i\\cj  wore  only  brought 


442  LANGUAGE    OF    SCRIPTUR.E 

to  see  and  feel  how  holy  God's  law  is,  and  how  righteous  its 
penalty,  and  how  criminal  and  inexcusable  sinners  are,  and  how 
great  their  guilt,  they  would  no  longer  deem  it  cruelty  or  unjust 
severity  for  God  to  punish  them,  according  to  his  word,  with  ever- 
lasting destruction.  Here  we  find  the  hinge  on  which  the  con- 
troversy chiefly  turns.  If  we  entertain  low  conceptions  of  the 
guilt  of  transgressors,  as  we  are  all  prone  to  do,  because  Ave  our- 
selves are  the  transgressors,  and  nothing  is  more  natural  for  us 
than  to  think  lightly  of  our  own  misconduct ;  if  we  entertain  these 
low  conceptions  of  the  evil  of  sin,  and  of  the  ill  desert  of  trans- 
gressors ;  when  God  comes  forth  in  his  word,  and  in  the  language 
of  terror  declares  his  wrath  against  them,  and  when  he  comes 
forth  in  his  holy  government,  and  actually  shows  his  wrath,  and 
utterly  destroys  them,  we  shall  feel  in  our  hearts  the  sentiment 
■which  our  opponents  are  sometimes  bold  enough  to  express,  that 
such  a  God  is  a  tyrant,  and  that  his  government  is  a  system  of 
cruelty  and  horror. 

I  have  one  more  remark.  In  urging  the  objection  above  stated, 
Unitarians  say,  that  we  divest  God  of  the  attribute  of  infinite 
goodness,  and  of  the  glory  of  exercising  free  mercy,  by  asserting 
that  he  refuses  to  forgive  his  erring  children,  unless  he  is  first 
rendered  propitious,  and  his  mercy  purchased  by  the  blood  of  his 
own  Son.  Now,  without  stopping  to  show  the  utter  injustice  and 
the  shocking  impiety  of  such  a  representation,  I  would  merely 
ask,  is  it  really  so,  that  God  shows  less  benevolence  in  proportion 
as  he  takes  more  pains  to  bestow  favors  ?  If  the  law  of  God  and 
its  penalty  have  any  meaning,  then  our  transgressing  the  law  pre- 
sents an  obstacle,  a  real  and  mighty  obstacle,  to  the  bestowment 
of  divine  favors  upon  us.  Now  when  God  turns  aside  from  the 
common  course  of  his  administration,  and,  instead  of  inflicting 
merited  punishment  upon  us,  adopts  the  most  extraordinary 
method  to  remove  the  obstacle  which  our  wickedness  had  thrown 
in  the  way  of  our  happiness,  and  thus  secures  our  eternal  life  ;  is 
this  unparalleled  effort  of  benevolence  to  be  turned  to  the  dis- 
credit of  benevolence  ?  Is  it  come  to  this,  that  we  are  to  con- 
sider the  mercy  of  God  less  free,  less  abundant,  and  less  glorious. 


AS    TO    god's    hatred    OF    SIN.  443 

in  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  work  which  it  accomplishes  to 
bring  salvation  to  our  door  ?  Such  appears  to  me  to  be  the  real, 
naked  sentiment  of  those  who  object  to  the  doctrine  of  the  atone- 
ment by  the  death  of  Christ,  as  diminishing  and  sullying  the  free 
goodness  and  grace  of  God.  No  words  can  express  my  astonish- 
ment, that  any  one  who  enjoys  the  hght  of  the  gospel  should 
entertain  a  sentiment  so  dishonorable  to  God,  and  so  totally  con- 
trary to  his  word.  It  is  one  of  the  plainest  representations  of 
Scripture,  that  the  benevolence  of  God  is  the  most  highly  honored, 
and  glorified,  not  by  granting  pardon  and  salvation  directly  and 
absolutely,  in  the  way  of  mere  sovereignty,  but  by  providing  an 
atonement,  that  is,  by  sending  his  Son  to  die  for  our  sins.  "  God 
80  loved -the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only-begotten  Son."  "  Herein 
is  love,  that  God  gave  his  Son  to  die  for  us."  "  God  commendeth 
his  love  towards  us  in  that  while  we  were  yet  sinners,  Christ  died 
for  us."  If  any  human  friend  should  interpose,  and,  to  deUver 
U8  from  extreme  danger  and  suffering  should  put  forth  an  effort  of 
love  a  thousandth  part  as  great  and  wonderful  as  this,  we  should 
think  he  ought  to  be  loved  and  honored  for  ever. 


LECTUHE  LXXVII. 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  THE  ATONEMENT  ARGUED  FROM  VARIOUS 
CONSIDERATIONS. 

The  question,  whether  an  atonement  was  necessary,  has  been 
treated  in  a  great  variety  of  ways  by  those  who  have  received 
the  general  doctrine  of  Christ's  death.  My  design  is  not  to 
pursue  the  question  through  the  labyrinth  of  abstruse  and  doubt- 
fiil  investigation,  but  to  give,  in  the  simplest  manner  possible,  the 
reasons  which  satisfy  my  own  mind  of  the  necessity  of  an  atone- 
ment by  the  death  of  Christ. 

When  we  ask,  whether  an  atonement  by  the  death  of  Christ 
was  necessary,  our  inquiry  is  not,  whether  in  the  literal  sense, 
God  had  poiver  to  forgive  and  save  sinners  without  the  death  of 
Christ,  if  it  had  seemed  good  in  his  sight ;  but  whether  he  could 
do  it  consistently  with  Ids  moral  attributes,  and  with  the  essential 
principles  of  his  administration;  in  other  words,  whether  an 
atonement  was  necessary  in  order  that  sinners  might  be  pardoned 
and  saved  consistently  with  the  divine  perfections  and  the  divine 
law. 

My  first  argument  in  proof  of  the  necessity  of  an  atonement 
flows  from  the  fact,  that  through  the  appointment  of  God,  an 
atonement  has  actually  been  made.  Jesus  died  that  we  might  be 
saved.  He  was  made  a  curse  for  us,  that  we  might  be  delivered 
from  the  curse.  Now  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  God  always 
acts  wisely  ;  that  whenever  he  adopts  any  measure  in  his  govern- 
ment, he  has  good  reason  for  it.     "VVe  cannot  doubt  this  in  regard 


ATONEMENT.       ITS    NECESSITY.  445 

to  anything  he  docs,  whether  it  he  of  greater  or  less  consequence. 
In  all  his  operations,  he  has  wise  and  holy  ends  in  view  ;  and 
who  can  suppose  that  he  ever  acts,  except  for  the  accomplishment 
of  those  ends  ?  How  unable  soever  we  may  be,  in  particular  cases, 
to  understand  the  reasons  of  what  God  does,  we  can  never  doubt 
that  he  has  reasons.  The  wisest  of  all  beings  can  never  act 
without  wisdom.  And  as  we  must  believe  that  God  had  reasons 
in  his  own  mind  for  all  that  he  does,  we  must  believe  this  espe- 
cially in  regard  to  the  higher  and  more  conspicuous  acts  of  his 
government.  When  we  consider  the  whole  creation,  and  the  form 
of  it,  as  necessary,  in  one  way  or  another,  to  the  perfect  accom- 
plishment of  the  ends  which  God  sought,  then  in  the  whole  work 
of  creation  he  seems  to  have  acted  in  a  manner  most  worthy  of 
his  infinite  wisdom  and  love.  With  the  views  which  we  entertain 
of  God,  we  cannot  doubt  that  he  had  important  reasons  for  such  a 
work,  and  that  he  regarded  it  as  necessary  to  the  accomplishment 
of  his  benevolent  desires. 

But  if  we  may  generally  infer  from  the  fact  of  God's  per- 
forming any  work,  that  he  had  good  reasons  for  it,  and  that  he 
regarded  it  as  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  object ;  we 
may  with  special  propriety  make  the  inference  in  the  case  under 
consideration.  In  other  cases  of  divine  operation  there  is  or- 
dinarily nothing  in  the  work  itself,  which  can  be  considered  as 
disagreeable  to  the  mind  of  God  —  nothing  to  which  we  can  sup- 
pose him  to  feel  any  reluctance.  For  example,  we  can  see  no 
reason  why  God  should  in  any  respect  feel  a  reluctance  to  create 
a  w^orld,  or  to  put  forth  any  exertion  of  his  power,  which  does  not 
involve  the  infliction  of  pain  or  the  destruction  of  happiness. 
But  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive,  that  a  God  of  perfect 
benevolence  should  take  pleasure  in  the  misery  of  any  intelligent 
beings,  in  itself  considered.  He  assures  us  that  he  has  no  plea- 
sure in  the  death  even  of  sinners,  ill  deserving  as  they  are.  We 
cannot  but  conceive,  that  God  feels  a  reluctance  to  inflict  pain 
which  would  always  prevent  him  from  doing  it,  had  he  not  impor- 
tant ends  in  view  which  require  such  infliction.  A  God  of  infinite 
benevolence  and  compassion  could  not  have  taken  pleasure  in  the 

VOL.  II.  38 


446  ATONEMENT.       ITS    NECESSITY. 

destruction  of  the  world  by  a  deluge,  or  of  Sodom  by  Rre,  con- 
sidered in  itself;  and  he  never  would  have  caused  such  suffering 
amouT  his  creatures,  had  not  their  sins  rendered  it  necessary. 
So, we  say  of  a  righteous  and  benevolent  judge,  that  he  never 
would  pronounce  sentence  of  death  against  any  man,  were  it  not 
necessary  to  the  cause  of  justice  and  to  the  order  of  the  com- 
munity. And  most  surely  a  judge  would  never  consent  that 
his  own  son  should  be  given  over  to  a  disgraceful  death,  unless 
he  was  convinced  that  reasons  of  great  weight  imperiously  de-, 
manded  it. 

But  there  is  no  case,  in  which  one  can  be  supposed  to  feel  so 
strong  a  reluctance  to  inflict  suffering  on  another,  as  God  must 
have  felt  to  inflict  suffering  on  Christ.  For  God  is  immeasurably 
more  benevolent,  than  any  other  being,  and  must  therefore  feel  a 
stronger  desire  for  the  complete  happiness  of  every  individual, 
and  a  stronger  aversion  to  the  infliction  of  pain.  But  as  his  only 
begotten  Son  is  infinitely  dearer  to  him  than  any  other  being  in 
the  universe,  he  must  have  felt  a  stronger  reluctance  to  inflict 
evil  upon  him,  than  upon  any  other.  And  it  is  far  less  unreason- 
able to  say,  that  God  destroyed  Sodom  by  fire,  and  the  world  by 
water,  without  any  necessity,  and  that  all  the  ends  of  moral  gov- 
ernment could  have  been  secured  without  the  infliction  of  such 
evil  as  well  as  with  it,  than  to  say,  that  the  death  of  Christ  was 
unnecessary,  and  that  sinners  could  have  been  saved  without  it  as 
well  as  with  it.  It  must  be  highl}^  dishonorable  to  him  to  suppose, 
that  he  would  pvit  his  dearly  beloved  Son  to  grief,  and  overwhelm 
him  with  suffering,  had  there  not  been  an  absolute  necessity  for  it 
in  order  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  momentous  ends  which  his 
benevolence  sought.  Had  not  these  ends  created  a  necessity  and 
a  very  strong  necessity  for  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  we  cannot  but 
think  that  God  would  have  been  infinitely  distant  from  inflicting 
them,  and  would  have  exerted  his  omnipotence  to  prevent  them. 
I  argue  here  from  the  mere  fact,  that  Christ,  according  to  the 
appointment  of  God,  did  suffer  and  die  to  make  an  atonement  for 
sin.  And  I  am  bold  to  say,  that  if  all  intelligent  beings  in  the 
universe  had  been  acquainted  with  the  character  of  Christ,  and 


ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY.  447 

the  perfect  love  which  God  felt  towards  him,  and  then,  without 
any  fartlicr  information,  had  been  spectators  of  the  sufferings 
which  Christ  endured  for  the  salvation  of  men,  there  could  have 
been  but  one  sentiment  among  them,  and  that  sentiment  must 
have  been,  that  there  was  some  mighty  reason,  some  most  urgent 
necessity  for  such  sufferings,  or  God  would  never  have  brought 
them  upon  the  head  of  his  beloved  Son.  So  Dr.  Wardlaw  ;  "  If 
he  whose  wisdom  is  infinite  has,  in  point  of  fact,  adopted  the 
plan  of  atonement,  who  will  tell  him  that  he  might  have  done 
otherwise  ?  Who  will  presume  to  affinn,  that  God  has  been 
expending  his  wisdom  in  a  useless  device,  and  executing  a 
scheme  of  stupendous  magnificence,  which  might  all  have  been 
spared  ?  *' 

My  second  argument  will  be  derived  from  passages  of  Scripture, 
which  imply  that  there  loas  a  necessity  for  the  sufferings  of  Christ. 
Matt.  26 :  54.  Jesus  signified  to  Peter,  in  reference  to  those 
who  came  with  the  traitor  to  apprehend  him,  that  if  he  chose,  he 
could  speedily  have  legions  of  angels  to  protect  him  from  their 
violence.  But  he  added  as  a  reason  for  not  doing  this  ;  "  How 
then  shall  the  Scriptures  be  fulfilled,  that  i\m^  it  must  he  f^''  or 
as  it  might  more  properly  be  translated,  that  it  is  necessary  so  to 
be;  lovra  M yevsa&ai.']  So  in  Mark  8:  31;  "He  began  to 
teach  them  that  the  Son  of  man  must  suffer  many  things,"  on  8sX 
Tov  vlov  70V  av&Q(onov  nnXla  na&eiv ;  that  it  was  necessary  the  Son 
of  man  should  suffer  many  things.  Luke  24  :  7  :  "  The  Son  of 
man  ynust  be  delivered  into  the  hands  of  sinful  men  ;"  it  is  neces- 
sary that  he  should  be  delivered.  Do  any  suppose,  that  this 
necessity  was  created  by  the  fact  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
were  predicted  or  predetermined  ?  But  if  there  had  been  no 
necessity  for  those  sufferings  in  order  to  the  salvation  of  sinners, 
why  did  God  predetermine  them  ?  And  why  did  he  predict 
them  ?  Besides  it  is  signified  in  the  passages  which  speak  of  the 
fulfilment  of  these  predictions,  that  the  Scriptures  did  not  merely 
foretell  the  fact  that  Jesus  should  suffer,  but  that  they  represent 
it  to  be  necessary.  This  necessity  is  brought  directly  to  view, 
John  3  :  14  ;  "As  Moses  lifted  up  the  serpent  in  the  wilderness, 


448  atonemej>tt    its   necessity. 

so  must  the  Son  of  man  be  lifted  up  Colrmq  viixoO-ijvai  8h  tov  vlov) 
—  even  so  it  is  necessary  the  Son  of  man  should  be  lifted  up,  that 
whosoever  beheveth  on  him  should  not  perish,  but  have  eternal 
life."  It  was  necessary  for  this  purpose,  that  those  who  believe  on 
him  might  be  saved.  The  salvation  of  men,  even  of  believers, 
depended  on  Christ's  death.  This  necessity  is  most  strikingly 
indicated  hj  the  prayer  of  Christ  in  the  garden  of  Gethsemane. 
Overwhelmed  with  sorrow  in  the  prospect  of  his  approachiug  death 
on  the  cross,  he  repeatedly  offered  up  this  earnest  prayer  ;  — "  0 
my  Father,  if  it  be  possible,  let  this  cup  pass  from  me."  The 
second  time,  he  prayed  and  said,  "  0  my  Father,  if  this  cup  may 
not  pass  from  me  except  I  drink  it,  —  d  ov  dvvarat.  if  it  cannot 
pass  away  from  me,  except  I  drink  it,  thy  will  be  done."  Now 
we  cannot  admit  the  thought,  that  the  Father  was  indifferent  to 
the  sufferings  of  his  beloved  Son,  much  less  that  he  took  pleasure 
in  them,  or  inflicted  them  needlessly.  The  prayer  of  Christ, 
with  what  follows,  clearly  implies  that  it  was  not  possible  that  the 
cup  should  pass  away  from  him  ;  that  there  was  a  necessity  for 
his  death.  It  is  evident  from  the  very  tei'ms  of  his  prayer,  that 
Christ  himself  apprehended  such  a  necessity.  Indeed  it  was  on 
the  ground  of  this  necessity  that  he  submitted  to  drink  the  cup. 
"  If  it  be  possible,  let  it  pass  from  me."  But  if  it  be  not  possible 
that  it  should  pass  from  me,  that  is,  if  there  is  a  necessity  that  I 
should  drink  it,  "  thy  will  be  done."  What  this  necessity  was, 
we  might  satisfactorily  infer  from  the  fact  that  Jesus  came  into  the 
world  to  save  sinners.  This  was  his  great  object.  When  there- 
fore it  appears,  that  in  the  view  of  his  Father  who  sent  him,  and 
in  his  own  view,  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to  be  freed  from  the 
sufferings  of  Calvary,  in  other  words,  that  it  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  he  should  die  on  the  cross,  the  natural  conclusion  is,  that 
it  was  thus  necessary  in  order  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  great 
object,  namely,  the  glory  of  God  in  the  salvation  of  sinners. 
Storr,  referring  to  the  prayer  in  the  garden,  says  ;  "  It  would 
have  been  altogether  inconsistent  with  the  character  of  the  only 
wise  God  to  expose  his  Son  to  such  sufferings,  if  the  object  for 
which  he  died  could  possibly  have  been  otherwise  obtained." 


ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY.  449 

Having  thus  argued  the  necessity  of  an  atonement  from  the  fact 
that  an  atonement  has  been  made,  and  from  several  texts  of  Scrip- 
ture which  clearly  imply  that  there  was  such  a  necessity,  I  shall 
now  argue  it, 

Tliirdly,  from  the  consideration  of  the  divine  attributes,  and 
the  well-known  principles  of  the  divine  government.  I  am  sensible 
that  if  we  should  pursue  this  argument  without  special  caution, 
we  should  be  exposed  to  the  danger  of  presumptuous  reasoning 
and  unwarrantable  conclusions.  Still  I  think  the  argument  may 
be  so  conducted,  as  to  be  entirely  satisfactory.  For  although  we 
cannot,  without  definite  information  from  God's  word  or  prov- 
idence, safely  conclude  in  what  precise  manner  any  one  of  his 
attributes  will  develop  itself,  or  how  the  general  principles  of  his 
government  will  operate  in  regard  to  particular  cases  in  future 
time  ;  yet  surely  we  may  reason  with  safety  on  these  subjects  in 
reference  to  cases  which  have  already  occurred,  and  concerning 
which  the  Scriptures  give  particular  instruction.  For  example, 
it  would  have  been  impossible  for  any  man,  living  before  the 
deluge  was  predicted,  to  know  that  the  wisdom  or  justice  of  God, 
or  any  principle  of  his  government,  would  require  the  destruction 
of  the  world  by  a  universal  deluge.  But  with  the  history  of  that 
dreadful  event  before  us  in  the  sacred  volume,  and  with  the  in- 
struction which  we  there  have  as  to  the  causes  and  circumstances 
of  it,  and  the  ends  which  were  to  be  accomplished  by  it,  we  have 
no  difficulty  in  adopting  the  conclusion,  that  the  justice  and  the 
wisdom  of  God  required  that  the  wicked  world  should  be  visited 
with  such  a  tremendous  judgment,  and  that  God  saw  such  a  signal 
punishment  to  be  necessary  to  support  the  principles  and  secure 
the  ends  of  his  moral  government. 

But  in  regard  to  the  atonement  by  the  death  of  Christ,  we  have 
more  clear  and  certain  principles  on  which  to  rest  our  conclusion, 
than  in  any  other  case  within  our  knowledge.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  we  know  the  character  of  God,  —  that  he  possesses  infinite 
holiness  and  justice,  wisdom  and  benevolence,  and  that  he  exer- 
cises these  attributes  as  Governor  of  the  world.  And  as  God  is 
holy  and  just,  he  will  manifest  his  holiness  and  justice  in  his  ad- 

38* 


450  ATONEMENT.       ITS    NECESSITY. 

ministration.  And  bow  can  he  do  this,  except  bj  executing  the 
penalty  of  the  law  in  the  punishment  of  sinners.  His  Avisdom 
must  evidently  lead  to  this,  because,  if  sin  exists,  we  can  conceive 
of  no  other  way  in  which  its  evil  consequences  can  be  prevented, 
and  the  order  and  happiness  of  his  kingdom  secured,  —  no  other 
fit  means  of  accomplishing  the  most  desirable  ends.  His  benevo- 
lence must  require  a  manifestation  of  his  displeasure  against  what- 
ever would  tend  to  injure  his  moral  kingdom.  And  how  can  he 
show  his  displeasure,  but  by  withholding  good,  or  inflicting  evil  ? 
The  bestowment  of  happiness  is  an  expression  of  love  and  appro- 
bation. Disapprobation  and  displeasure  cannot  be  shown  in  this 
wayo  If  sin  exists,  it  is  from  the  very  nature  of  things  impossible 
that  God  should  manifest  the  feelings  of  his  mind  respecting  it, 
except  by  the  infliction  of  sufibring. 

This  view  of  the  attributes  of  God,  and  of  their  operation  in  a 
moral  government,  agrees  perfectly  with  the  teachings  of  his  word. 
He  has  given  us  plain,  definite  commands,  and  has  encouraged  us 
to  obedience  by  the  promise  of  a  reward,  and  for  disobedience  has 
threatened  punishment.  This  law  expresses  the  mind  of  God  in 
regard  to  our  conduct,  and  develops  the  principles  of  his  moral 
government.  If  you  ask  then  why  God  has  annexed  such  a 
penalty  to  his  law,  and  why  he  will  inflict  such  punishment  upon 
transgressors,  I  answer,  because  he  has  a  benevolent  regard  to 
the  interests  of  his  kingdom,  and  must  frown  upon  whatever  aims 
to  injure  those  interests  ;  because  he  is  holy,  and  must  feel  a 
hatred  to  that  which  is  contrary  to  his  holiness ;  because  he  is 
just,  and  must  be  disposed  to  punish  those  who  disobey,  according 
to  the  degree  of  their  criminality  ;  and  because  he  is  wise,  and 
in  the  exercise  of  his  wisdom  must  adopt  the  most  suitable  means 
of  promoting  the  welfare  of  his  kingdom  ;  and  if  sin  occurs,  must 
vindicate  his  character,  and  guard  against  the  evil  consequences 
of  sin,  by  the  only  means  adapted  to  that  purpose,  that  is,  by  a 
righteous  punishment. 

We  see  then  what  is  the  design  of  the  penalty  of  the  law,  and, 
by  seeing  what  is  the  design  of  that  penalty,  we  see  what  is  the 
necessity  of  its  being  executed.     In  the  direct  and  regular  ad- 


ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY.  451 

ministration  of  God's  moral  government,  there  is  the  same  neces- 
sity of  his  executing  the  penalty  of  the  law,  as  there  is  of  his  acting 
according  to  his  own  perfections  and  accomplishing  the  great  end 
of  his  government.  The  punishment  of  sinners  is  necessary,  just 
as  it  is  necessary  that  God  should  exercise  hie  own  infinite  wisdom, 
and  justice,  and  goodness.  It  is  necessary,  just  as  it  is  necessary 
that  God  should  promote  order  and  happiness  in  his  moral  king- 
dom. In  other  words,  it  is  necessary,  just  as  it  is  necessary  that 
God  should  be  a  good  moral  Governor. 

On  the  same  grounds,  we  prove  the  necessity  of  an  atonement 
in  order  to  the  forgiveness  of  sin.  If  the  punishment  of  sin  is 
remitted,  and  nothing  comes  in  the  place  of  it  answering  the  same 
ends,  then  it  is  evident  God  ceases  to  act  according  to  his  own 
infinite  perfections.  He  ceases  to  be  a  good  moral  governor.  He 
ceases  to  pui-sue  the  order  and  happiness  of  his  kingdom'.  He 
gives  no  adequate  testimony  of  his  displeasure  against  sin,  and 
suffers  that  which  threatens  ruin  to  his  subjects,  to  pass  without 
any  effectual  check.  Supposing  then  that  sin  is  not  followed  with 
punishment  according  to  the  penalty  of  the  law,  how  can  God's 
character  as  a  moral  Governor  appear  in  an  honorable  light,  and 
the  highest  interests  of  his  kingdom  be  secured,  unless  he  substi- 
tutes something  in  the  place  of  the  punishment  of  sinners,  which 
shall  compass  the  same  ends ;  something  which  shall  equally 
manifest  his  holiness  and  justice,  and  his  regard  to  the  happiness 
of  his  kingdom  ;  something  which  shall  as  clearly  show  the  evil 
of  sin,  and  be  as  effectual  a  safeguard  against  its  prevalence.  I 
say  not  now  what  this  substitute  must  be  ;  but  I  say,  if  something 
does  not  come  in  the  place  of  the  threatened  punishment,  which 
shall  equally  answer  the  good  ends  of  punishment,  the  remission 
of  sin  will  occasion  real  injury  to  God's  moral  kingdom.  This  is 
perfectly  plain.  If  the  punishment  of  sin  is  a  fit  and  effectual 
means  of  promoting  the  welfare  of  God's  kingdom,  and  of  exhibit- 
ing his  character  in  an  honorable  fight,  and  if  this  punishment  is 
withheld,  and  nothing  else  take  the  place  of  it,  then  all  the  good 
which  would  have  been  secured  to  moral  beings  by  the  punish- 
ment of  sin,  is  lost,  and  the  glory  of  God's  holiness,  justice,  and 


452  ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY. 

goodness  as  moral  Governor,  which  would  have  been  displayed  by 
executing  the  penalty  of  the  law,  is  obscured. 

But  what  is  that  which,  by  divine  appointment,  is  substituted 
for  the  punishment  of  sinners,  and  which  secures  the  same  im- 
portant ends  ?  According  to  the  opinion  of  some,  it  is  the 
repentance  of  sinners.  But  does  repentance  answer  the  same 
ends  ?  Is  it  adapted  to  answer  them  ?  Does  the  fact  that  sin- 
ners repent,  show  God's  holiness  and  justice,  as  their  punishment 
shows  it  ?  Does  it  make  God's  hatred  of  sin  equally  apparent  ? 
Is  it  an  equally  powerful  check  to  the  commission  of  sin  ?  Is  it 
an  equally  effectual  means  of  promoting  obedience  and  happiness 
among  intelligent  beings  ?  If  so,  then  it  would  be  perfectly  safe 
and  proper,  and  what  eternal  truth  would  seem  to  dictate,  that 
every  divine  law,  and  every  human  law  too,  should  go  forth  with 
precisely  this  enforcement,  —  that  the  transgressor  must  either 
repent,  or  suffer  punishment.  It  would  be  wrong  to  omit  either 
one  part  or  the  other  of  this  alternative.  It  would  be  just  as 
proper  for  the  law  to  say  merely,  the  soul  that  sinneth  shall 
repent,  as  to  say  merely,  the  soul  that  sinneth  shall  die.  Neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  would,  on  this  supposition,  do  full  justice  to 
the  meaning  of  the  Lawgiver,  or  to  the  nature  of  the  case.  To 
be  consistent  with  truth,  the  law  must  stand  thus,  —  the  soul  that 
sinneth  shall  either  rep>ent  or  die.  Thus  too  the  most  important 
laws  of  civil  society  ought  to  stand.  The  man  who  commits 
murder  must  repent,  or  die.  The  thief,  the  highwayman,  must 
repent,  or  suffer  imprisonment.  For  who  can  show  any  reason 
why  repentance  may  not  answer  the  ends  of  punishment  in  civil 
society,  as  well  as  under  the  moral  government  of  God  ? 

It  is  indeed  evident  from  Scripture,  that  repentance  does 
secure  forgiveness.  But  it  is  equally  evident,  that  the  efficacy 
of  repentance  to  procure  forgiveness,  as  well  as  the  offer  of  for- 
giveness on  the  condition  of  repentance,  is  owing  altogether  to 
the  expiatory  sacrifice  of  Christ.  This  is  the  ground  of  every 
proposal  which  is  made,  and  of  every  measure  which  is  adopted, 
in  reference  to  the  salvation  of  sinners.  Repentance  would  not 
have  been  enjoined  nor  forgiveness  proffered,  except  in  virtue 
of  the  atonement  of  Christ. 


ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY.  459^ 

The  question  then  returns,  what  is  that  Avhich  by  divine 
appointment,  is  substituted  for  the  punishment  of  sinners,  and 
which  answers  the  same  important  ends  ?  The  true  Scripture 
answer  is,  the  expiatory  sacrifice  of  Christ.  He  redeemed  u8 
from  the  curse  of  the  law  by  being  made  a  curse  for  us.  And  a 
careful  examination  of  the  subject  and  of  the  representations  of 
Scripture  respecting  it,  will  clearly  show,  that  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  did  in  fact  secure  the  same  ends,  as  would  have  been 
secured  by  the  punishment  of  sinners.  The  death  of  Christ,  as 
an  expiatory  sacrifice,  made  known  the  ill  desert  of  sin  and  God's 
hatred  of  it,  —  it  showed  that  God  is  a  God  of  hohness  and  jus- 
tice and  goodness,  —  it  manifested  his  high  regard  to  the  principles 
of  a  moral  government,  and  to  the  permanent  order  and  happiness 
of  intelligent  beings.  And  I  am  sure  that  Christ's  sufferings  for 
our  sins,  connected  with  his  perfect  hohness  and  the  love  which 
the  Father  had  for  him,  must  make  an  appeal  to  the  moral  sensi- 
bilities of  men,  which  will  be,  to  say  the  least,  as  powerful  a  check 
to  the  commission  of  sin,  as  the  infliction  of  deserved  punishment 
on  transgressors  themselves  could  have  been. 

We  see  then  that  Christ's  death  was  appointed  by  God  as  a 
substitute  for  the  punishment  of  sinners  ;  that  it  answered  the 
same  purposes  ;  that  it  made  substantially  the  same  display  of 
God's  attributes  and  the  principles  of  his  government,  and  has 
the  same  efficacy,  though  far  superior  in  degree,  to  promote  the 
permanent  welfare  of  his  kingdom.  Now  on  supposition  that 
sinners  are  to  be  exempted  from  merited  punishment,  there  was 
evidently  the  same  necessity  for  an  atonement  by  the  death  of 
Christ,  as  there  would  have  been,  without  that  atonement,  for  the 
punishment  of  sinners.  If  you  know  what  necessity  there  origin- 
ally was  for  annexing  a  penalty  to  the  law,  and  for  inflicting 
punishment  upon  transgressors,  you  know  what  necessity  there 
was  for  the  .vicarious  sufferings  of  Christ,  on  supposition  that 
sinners  were  to  be  forgiven.  The  ends,  for  which  a  penalty  was 
annexed  to  the  law,  are  vastly  important,  and  must  be  accom- 
phshed  in  one  way  or  another.  If  they  are  not  accomplished 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  law,  by  the  merited  sufferings 


454  ATONEMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY. 

of  transgressors,  there  is  an  obvious  necessity  that  they  should,  be 
accomplished  in  another  way  ;  that  is,  according  to  the  provisions 
of  divine  grace,  by  the  substituted  sufferings  of  a  Redeemer. 
Should  not  these  ends  be  accomplished  either  by  the  punishment 
of  sinners,  or  by  the  death  of  a  substitute,  the  support  of  moral 
government  would  be  taken  away,  sin  would  be  licensed,  and  dis- 
order and  misery  w^ould  reign. 

My  reasoning,  you  perceive,  rests  on  those  attributes  of  God 
and  those  principles  of  moral  government,  which  are  made  known 
by  Scripture,  and  by  the  common  course  of  Divine  Providence. 
The  whole  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  God  being  what 
he  is,  a  holy,  just,  and  benevolent  Governor ;  his  subjects  being 
what  they  are,  rational  and  moral  agents  ;  and  the  settled  princi- 
ples of  his  administration  being  what  they  are  ;  there  is  an 
obvious  necessity  that  punishment  should  be  inflicted  on  sinners 
according  to  the  tenor  of  the  law^,  or,  if  not,  that  their  Redeemer, 
as  a  vicarious  sufferer,  should  endure  that  which  will  answer  the 
same  ends  as  would  have  been  answered  by  the  punishment  of 
sinners.  This  necessity  cannot  be  denied,  without  denying  that 
God  possesses  such  attributes,  or  that  he  has  established  such  a 
government  over  moral  beings,  or  that  moral  beings  are  possessed 
of  such  a  nature  and  are  influenced  in  such  a  manner,  as  the 
Scriptures  show.  When  therefore  we  assert  that  an  atonement 
was  absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  the  forgiveness  of  sin,  and 
that  God  could  not  forgive  sin  without  it,  we  assert  that  which  is 
in  the  highest  degree  honorable  to  God.  For  it  is  the  same  as  to 
say,  that  God  is  so  good  a  being  that  he  cannot  but  show  his 
displeasure  against  so  destructive  an  evil  as  sin,  and  cannot  but 
seek  the  welfare  of  his  intelligent  offspring.  If  we  had  lower 
conceptions  of  the  holiness  and  justice  and  universal  benevolence 
of  God  as  Governor  of  the  world,  we  might  think  he  could  very 
easily  and  safely  pardon  sin  without  taking  such  pains  to  prepare 
the  way  for  pardon  and  to  guard  against  the  evils  which  might 
otherwise  flow  from  it  to  his  moral  kingdom.  Or  if  we  had  lower 
conceptions  of  the  criminality  and  hurtful  tendency  of  sin,  we 
might  think  there  was  no  necessity  for  such  a  public  testimony 


ATONEiMENT.      ITS    NECESSITY.  455 

against  it  by  the  death  of  a  Mediator.  And  it  is  in  my  view  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  those  who  deny  the  necessity  of  an  atone- 
ment, do  entertain  low  conceptions  of  the  attributes  of  God,  par- 
ticularly of  his  holiness  and  justice  —  and  of  his  benevolence  too 
as  related  to  the  welfare  of  his  vast  moral  empire.  They  make 
much  of  God's  compassion  and  kindness  to  sinners,  considered  in 
their  private,  individual  capacity,  and  think  he  need  not  and 
cannot  be  so  severe,  as  to  doom  them  to  hopeless  misery.  But 
they  overlook  the  benevolent  regard  which  he  has  to  the  permar 
nent  order  and  happiness  of  his  universal  kingdom.  They  view 
God  in  the  light  of  a  judge  who  feels  more  for  a  criminal  at  the 
bar,  than  for  the  whole  community,  and  who  cannot  be  so  severe 
as  to  pronounce  a  sentence  of  death  upon  the  guilty  individual, 
though  such  sentence  is  required  by  a  wise  and  necessary  law. 
Those  who  reject  the  atonement  are,  I  think,  chargeable  with 
a  palpable  disregard  of  the  most  glorious  perfections  of  God,  with 
underrating  the  evil  of  sin,  and  with  a  manifest  indifference  to 
the  honor  of  God's  holy  law  and  the  welfare  of  his  kingdom. 
And  it  is  perfectly  plain,  that  while  they  retain  such  low  concep- 
tions on  these  subjects,  no  reasoning  whatever  is  likely  to  have 
any  effect  upon  them.  The  only  remedy  for  their  error  in  regard 
to  the  atonement  is,  that  through  the  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
they  should  be  brought  to  entertain  Scriptural  views  of  God,  of 
his  law,  and  of  the  evil  of  sin.  Let  them  be  brought  to  this,  and 
they  will  at  once  see  and  feel,  that  without  atoning  blood  there 
could  be  no  remission.  Their  error  is  at  bottom  a  practical  one, 
and  it  ought  to  be  treated  accordingly. 


LE  CTURE    LXXVIII 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    SUBSTITUTION    OR    VICARIOUS    SUFFERINGS 
MORE    PARTICULARLY    CONSIDERED. 

I  HAVE  frequently  spoken  of  Christ  as  sujQTering  in  our  stead, 
and  of  his  sufferings  as  vicarious.  These  and  other  phrases  of 
the  same  import  have  been  famiharlj  employed  by  the  most  learned 
and  pious  divines  in  Christendom,  for  the  simple  purpose  of  express- 
ing, in  a  convenient  form,  what  they  have  understood  the  Scrip- 
tures to  teach  as  to  the  sufferings  of  the  Redeemer.  These 
phrases  are  still  in  familiar  use.  They  are  interwoven  with  the 
relidous  discourse  and  associated  with  the  devout  feelinirs  of 
intelligent  Christians.  And  they  will  in  all  probability  continue 
to  be  employed  much  as  they  have  been.  And  why  sliould 
they  not  ?  There  are  no  forms  of  speech  which  seem  better 
suited  to  express  the  very  fact  which  the  Scriptures  plainly  set 
forth. 

It  is  not  my  present  design  to  give  a  particular  and  full  answer  to 
the  objections  urged  against  the  forms  of  speech  above  mentioned. 
I  propose,  however,  to  show  that  the  same  objections  lie  against 
the  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures,  and  against  the  language  by  which 
the  Scriptures  teach  the  doctrine.  It  is  said  by  those  who  object 
to  the  common  phraseology,  that  if  Christ  took  the  place  of  sin- 
ners and  suffered  in  their  stead,  neither  law  nor  justice  could 
demand  more  of  them.  And  how  could  the  wrath  of  God  abide 
on  them,  as  it  does  even  on  the  elect  before  they  believe,  after 


CHRIST'S    SUFFERINGS    VICARIOUS.  457 

Christ  had  endured  the  curse  of  the  law  as  their  substitute  ? 
Now  just  take  the  exjjression  of  Scripture,  "  that  Christ  died 
for  our  sins,"  — "  that  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the 
unjust."  The  objector  may  saj,  if  Chi-ist  has  died  for  our  sins, 
how  can  we  also  be  exposed  to  die  for  them  ?  After  our  Re- 
deemer has  suffered  for  us,  how  could  it  be  just  in  God  still  to 
punish  us  for  our  sins,  and  that  as  severely  as  though  Christ  had 
never  suffered  ?  Does  not  this  imply  either  that  all  which  Christ 
suffered  for  our  sins  stands  for  nothing,  or  that  God  considers  it 
right  to  require  a  double  punishment  for  the  same  sins,  first  of 
Christ,  and  then  of  us  ? 

The  objection,  you  see,  is  as  plausible  against  the  language  of 
Scripture,  as  against  the  phrases  above  mentioned.  And  it  is  so 
for  a  very  plain  reason,  namely,  that  these  phrases  and  the  lan- 
guage of  Scripture  evidently  mean  the  same  thing.  This  is  the 
answer  I  give  to  those  who  profess  to  hold  the  Scripture  doctrine 
of  atonement,  and  yet  object  to  the  common  method  of  designating 
the  sufferings  of  Christ,  as  substituted,  or  vicarious. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  substitution  never  implies,  that 
the  thing  substituted  is  exactly  like  that  for  which  it  is  substi- 
tuted. The  contrary  is  generally  imphed,  that  is,  one  thing  is 
substituted  in  place  of  another,  because  it  is  different,  and  is 
therefore  preferred.  For  example,  a  man  lays  aside  strong  drink, 
and  substitutes  water  in  its  place.  A  bank  note  is  a  substitute 
for  silver  and  gold. 

But  if  substitution  does  not  imply  that  the  thing  substituted  has 
an  exact  likeness  to  that  for  which  it  is  substituted,  what  does  it 
imply  ?  It  impUes,  that  it  answers,  or  is  intended  to  answer  the 
game  or  a  similar  purpose.  It  comes  in  the  place  of  the  other,  as 
to  its  use,  or  end.  Water  gives  refreshment  better  than  strong 
drink,  and  is  therefore  substituted  for  it.  A  bank  note  is  a  sub- 
stitute for  silver  and  gold,  because  in  pecuniary  transactions  it 
answers  the  same  purpose,  although  in  respect  to  the  other  uses 
of  silver  and  gold  it  cannot  be  a  substitute.  It  is  true  generally, 
that  one  thing  is  spoken  of  as  a  substitute  for  another  not  in  all 
respects,  but  only  in  the  particular  respect  intended.     The  design 

VOL.  n.  39 


458  Christ's    sufferings    vicarious. 

of  substitution,  and  its  necessary  limitations,  must  in  every  in- 
stance be  determined  from  Scripture  and  from  the  obvious  nature 
and  circumstances  of  the  case. 

The  substitution  in  the  case  before  us  relates  to  the  ends  of 
punishment  in  God's  moral  administration.  If  Christ's  suffer- 
ings answered  the  same  ends,  as  would  have  been  answered  by 
our  enduring  the  sufferings  which  are  deserved,  his  sufferings  are 
in  that  respect  vicarious.  The  language  is  here  used  in  the 
same  manner  as  it  is  commonly  used  in  reference  to  other  sub- 
jects. So  that  if  it  is  Uable  to  objections  when  used  in  relation 
to  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  it  is  equally  so  when  used  in  rela- 
tion to  all  other  subjects.  The  mistake  in  this,  as  in  other 
instances,  has  arisen  from  pressing  the  meaning  of  language  be- 
yond due  limits,  and  carrying  it  to  an  unreasonable  extreme. 

But  the  chief  object  I  now  have  in  view,  is  to  show,  that  unless 
Christ  was  our  substitute,  and  his  sufferings  vicarious,  his  death 
could  not  have  ansivered  the  ends  intended.  Suppose  then,  the 
holy  Saviour  had  died,  not  as  our  substitute,  not  in  our  place,  but, 
so  to  speak,  in  his  own  place,  or  for  himself.  What  display  could 
his  death  have  made  of  the  moral  perfections  of  God  ?  How 
could  it  have  shown  his  hatred  of  sin,  or  his  justice  in  punishing 
it  ?  And  how  could  it  have  given  support  to  his  law  ?  Let  a 
perfectly  holy  angel  be  exhibited  before  intelligent,  moral  beings 
as  an  example  of  extraordinary  suffering.  How  can  this  show 
God's  hatred  of  sin  —  seeing  the  angel  has  no  sin  which  God  can 
hate,  and  for  which  he  can  inflict  suffering  ?  How  can  it  show 
God's  justice  —  seeing  the  angel  has  done  nothing  for  which 
justice  can  inflict  evil  upon  him  ?  How  can  it  support  God's  law 
—  seeing  it  is  an  event  directly  in  the  face  of  that  law  —  an  in- 
stance of  great  suffering  without  any  thing  to  deserve  it,  and 
where  the  law  promised  unmingled  enjoyment  ?  Would  not  the 
impression  made  by  such  an  example  of  suffering,  considered  bj 
itself,  be  dishonorable  to  the  supreme  Lawgiver,  and  to  his  Law  ? 
Would  it  not  indicate,  that  he  was  displeased  with  holiness  ? 
Would  it  not  imply  that  he  was  wanting  in  that  principle  of  justice, 
which  would   lead   him  to   treat   his   subjects  according  to   their 


Christ's   sufferings  vicarious.  459 

character  ?  Would  it  not  detract  from  the  influence  of  law,  as  it 
would  evidently  be  a  frown  upon  obedience  ?  Such  clearly  would 
be  the  tendency  of  severe  suffering  in  a  holy  angel.  And  such,  but 
still  more  hazardous  and  dreadful,  would  be  the  tendency  of  suf- 
fering in  the  Son  of  God,  standing  by  himself,  and  suffering  on  his 
own  account.  It  would  produce  confusion  and  darkness  and  dis- 
tress in  the  kingdom  of  God.  It  would  subvert  his  moral  govern- 
ment. Now  what  possible  way  is  there,  in  which  the  sufferings 
of  Christ  could  manifest  the  righteousness  of  God  as  a  moral 
Governor,  or  give  support  to  his  law,  or  answer  any  good  end  what- 
ever, except  by  his  coming  into  a  real  and  very  near  relation  to 
sinners,  and  so  occupying  their  place,  that,  in  the  eye  of  God 
and  his  kingdom,  his  sufferings  shall  he  instead  of  theirs  ?  His 
relation  to  sinners  must  be  no  fiction,  no  illusion,  but  a  reaUty. 
As  a  sufferer,  he  must  be  substituted  for  them.  And  as  to  the 
ends  to  be  answered  by  the  penalty  of  the  law,  his  sufferings 
must  stand  in  the  place  of  theirs  ;  that  is,  he  must  suffer  and  die 
for  their  sins,  instead  of  their  suffering  for  their  own  sins.  I 
say,  there  must  be  this  substitution.  Christ  must  stand  in  the 
place  of  sinners,  and  his  sufferings  must  be  vicarious,  or  they 
could  not  in  any  conceivable  way  answer  the  ends  above  mention- 
ed. They  could  not  manifest  God's  hatred  of  sin,  for  on  that 
supposition  his  sufferings  would  not  in  any  sense  be  on  account 
of  sin.  They  certainly  would  not  be  for  his  own  sin ;  and  they 
would  not  be  for  our  sin,  as  that  would  be  making  his  sufferings 
stand  in  the  place  of  ours.  There  must  be  this  substitution,  or  his 
sufferings  could  not  manifest  God's  regard  to  his  law,  and  his  de- 
termination to  support  its  authority.  For  in  case  of  transgression, 
there  is  no  conceivable  way,  in  which  God  can  manifest  this  re- 
gard to  his  law,  but  by  the  infliction  of  evil  for  the  transgression. 
The  direct  way  of  doing  this  as  pointed  out  by  the  law,  is  to  in- 
flict the  merited  evil  upon  transgressors  themselves.  If  the 
penalty  of  the  law  is  not  executed  upon  them,  and  if  no  one  comes 
in  to  endure  it  in  their  place,  and  on  account  of  their  transgres- 
sion, then  what  does  God  do  to  show  a  regard  to  his  law,  or  to 
support   its   authority  ?     Nothing,   but   pardoning   sin ;   that  is, 


460  Christ's   sufferings  vicarious. 

nothing  but  not  executing  the  penalty.  Unless  Christ's  sufferings 
refer  to  this  penalty,  and  come  in  the  place  of  our  merited  punish- 
ment in  such  a  manner  that  they  shall  truly  be /or  our  sins,  they 
cannot  in  any  way  show  God's  regard  to  his  violated  law  and  his 
determination  to  support  its  authority.  The  law  was  violated  by 
us.  And  any  sufferings  which  can  answer  the  purpose  of  support- 
ing this  law,  thus  violated,  and  preventing  the  evil  consequences 
of  our  transgressions,  must  evidently  be  either  our  own  sufferings, 
or  the  sufferings  of  another  in  our  place,  and  on  our  account. 
Here  we  are  brought  back  to  the  Scripture  representation,  that 
"  Christ  suffered  for  our  sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust."  It  is  this 
vicariousness  of  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  which  gives  them  their 
significancy  and  their  efficacy.  As  his  sufferings  came  in  the 
place  of  the  just  sufferings  of  transgressors,  they  answered  the 
same  ends,  making  the  same  displays  of  the  attributes  of  God,  and 
giving  the    same  support  to  his  holy  law. 

Several  speculative  writers,  who  are  counted  on  the  side  of 
orthodoxy,  seem  to  have  made  it  their  business  to  show  what  the 
Scriptures  ought  to  teach  as  to  the  atonement,  not  what,  they  do 
teach.  And  some  of  these  writers  inquire,  whether  it  would  not 
be  expedient  to  lay  aside  the  use  of  those  phrases  which  represent 
Christ  as  suffering  in  our  stead,  and  whether  other  forms  of  speech 
might  not  be  introduced,  which  would  express  what  we  intend 
more  clearly.  To  this  I  reply,  first,  that  there  appears  to  be  no 
language  which  so  obviously  and  perfectly  agrees  with  the  true 
sense  of  the  Scriptures,  as  that  which  represents  Christ  as  our 
substitute,  and  his  sufferings  as  vicarious.  Secondly ;  suppose 
that  this  language  has  been  misapprehended,  and  that  it  may  in 
some  instances  occasion  erroneous  ideas ;  still  I  am  confident  that 
the  best  course  to  be  pursued  is,  not  to  lay  aside  the  language, 
but  clearly  to  explain  it,  and  to  use  it  in  a  proper  manner.  And 
as  the  language  is  so  well  suited  to  the  subject,  this  may  easily  be 
done.  And  in  regard  to  such  cases  generally,  it  seems  to  me 
altogether  expedient,  and  likely  to  pi-omote  the  cause  of  Christ, 
to  retain  the  words  and  phrases  which  are  in  good  use,  still  doing 
all  we  can  to  disentangle  them  from  false  and  ambiguous  signifi- 


Christ's   sufferings  vicarious.  461 

cations,  and  to  make  them  the  medium  of  conveying  the  truth 
clearly  and  exactly  to  the  minds  of  men. 

Attempts  have  often  been  made  to  give  a  correct  definition  of 
the  atonement.     On  this  subject  I  shall  offer  a  few  brief  remarks. 

Every  just  definition,  whether  longer  or  shorter,  must  clearly 
express  the  principal  properties  belonging  to  the  thing  defined, 
especially  those  which  distinguish  it  from  all  other  things.  That 
surely  cannot  be  a  just  and  adequate  definition,  which  will  apply 
to  other  things  as  well  as  the  thmg  defined. 

To  atone  for,  in  its  common  use,  signifies  to  make  amends  for 
an  injury,  or  to  give  satisfaction  for  an  offence.  But  our  present 
concern  is  with  the  word  in  the  theological  sense.  What  is  the 
atonement  which  the  gospel  reveals,  and  which  prepares  the  way 
for  our  salvation  ?  Suppose  it  should  be  defined  thus  :  the  atone- 
ment is  that  which  brings  about  a  reconciliation  between  God  and 
sinners,  or  that  which  prepares  the  way  for  our  salvation.  I  do 
not  regard  these  definitions  as  false  or  incorrect,  but  as  defective. 
We  could  never  learn  from  such  definitions  as  these,  whether  the 
atonement  which  brings  about  the  reconciliation,  or  prepares  the 
way  for  our  forgiveness,  was  made  by  ourselves,  or  by  an  angel, 
or  by  Christ ;  nor  could  we  learn  whether  it  was  made  by  per- 
forming some  useful  action,  or  by  enduruig  suffering,  or  by  some 
other  consideration.  These  definitions  fail  of  giving  a  full  and 
specific  description  of  the  thing  intended.  It  is  as  though  I 
should  ask,  what  a  thief,  now  in  prison,  owes  to  civil  government ; 
and  instead  of  pointing  out  the  exact  punishment  which  the  laAV 
threatens  for  stealing,  you  should  say  indefinitely,  he  owes  that 
which  will  answer  the  demands  of  justice,  and  which,  when  paid, 
will  restore  him  to  the  privileges  of  a  citizen.  Suppose  then  that 
any  one  should  define  the  atonement  to  be  that  which  displays  the 
hohness  and  justice  of  God  as  moral  Governor,  and  gives  support 
and  influence  to  his  law.  Such  a  definition  as  this,  besides  being 
too  general,  would  want  one  of  the  essential  qualities  of  a  good 
definition,  namely,  a  clear  distinction  between  the  thing  defined 
and  everything  else.     There  are  very  many  things  which  display 

39* 


462  Christ's   sufferings   vicarious. 

the  holiness  and  justice  of  God,  and  give  support  to  his  law.  The 
destruction  of  the  world  bj  a  deluge,  and  of  Sodom  by  fire,  and 
of  Jerusalem  by  the  Roman  army,  and  a  thousand  other  instances 
of  punishment,  have  displayed  in  an  eminent  degree  the  hohness 
and  justice  of  God  as  moral  Governor,  and  vindicated  and  sup- 
ported his  law.  Such  a  definition  would  make  no  distinction 
between  the  atonement  of  Christ  and  any  signal  punishment  of  the 
wicked.  And  surely  that  must  be  a  very  defective  definition, 
which  makes  no  distinction  between  the  suSerings  of  Christ  and 
the  punishment  of  transgressors,  and  which  will  apply  to  one  of 
them  just  as  well  as  to  the  other. 

But  it  may  be  said,  this  is  the  representation  which  is  made  of 
the  atonement  in  Rom.  3  :  25  ;  "  Whom  God  hath  set  forth  to  be 
a  propitiation  through  faith  in  his  blood,  to  declare  his  righteous- 
ness for  the  remission  of  sins/^  etc.  Here  the  Apostle  represents 
the  atonement  as  designed  to  declare  or  make  manifest  the  right- 
eousness of  God.  Be  it  so.  It  was  evidently  one  of  the  objects 
of  Christ's  death  to  declare  the  righteousness  of  God.  But  point- 
ing out  one  of  the  objects  of  Christ's  death  is  not  to  give  a  satis- 
factory definition  of  the  atonement.  We  know  it  is  the  object  of 
everything  which  exists  to  display  the  glory  of  God.  But  it  is  no 
proper  definition  of  any  one  particular  thing  to  say,  it  is  that 
which  displays  the  glory  of  God.  The  single  text  referred  to  does 
not  stop  with  saying,  that  the  propitiation  for  sin  was  designed  to 
declare  the  righteousness  of  God.  It  goes  further,  and  mforms 
us  voho  made  the  propitiation,  and  that  he  made  it  hy  his  blood,  and 
that  it  was  made  to  procure  the  forgiveness  of  our  sins.  So  that, 
if  we  would  give  a  definition  of  the  atonement  that  shall  cor- 
respond merely  with  this  single  passage,  we  must  do  more  than 
say,  it  is  that  which  displays  the  holiness  and  righteousness  of  God. 
We  are  here  taught  that  Jesus  Christ  made  propitiation  by  his 
blood  for  the  purpose  of  declaring  God's  righteousness,  so  that  he 
might  be  just  and  the  justifier  of  those  who  believe.  But  in 
making  out  a  definition  of  this  great  doctrine  of  Christianity,  we 
must  not  confine  ourselves  to  a  single  passage  of  Scripture,  but 
attend  to  all  the  passages  which  relate  to  the  subject.     And  then 


Christ's  sufferings  vicarious.  463 

we  must  frame  a  definition  that  shall  contain  a  plain  outline  of  the 
subject,  and  distinguish  it  from  everything  else.  Now  the  Scrip- 
tures teach  the  momentous  fact,  that  Ohrist  died  as  an  expiatory 
sacrifice.  A  definition  of  the  atonement  must  then  contain  this 
fact.  But  the  Scriptures  teach  also  that  Christ  suffered  and  died , 
not  on  account  of  any  sin  in  himself,  but  for  our  sins,  the  just 
for  the  unjust.  This  essential  point  must  be  contained  in  a  just 
definition,  especially  as  this  vicariousness  of  his  sufferings  is  th3 
circumstance  which  distinguishes  them  from  the  sufferings  which 
moral  agents  endure  on  account  of  their  own  sins.  The  Scrip- 
tures further  teach,  that  Christ  hy  his  death  manifested  God's 
righteousness,  and  they  teach  by  implication  that  his  death  an- 
swered the  same  ends  as  would  have  been  answered  by  our  suffer- 
ing for  ourselves  the  penalty  of  the  violated  law.  This  design  and 
effect  of  the  atonement,  in  respect  to  the  divine  character  and 
administration,  must  be  mentioned  in  the  definition,  as  also  its 
design  and  efiect  in  regard  to  us ;  that  is,  our  forgiveness  and 
complete  salvation.  These  I  think  are  the  main  points  in  the  Scrip- 
ture doctrine  of  atonement ;  and  these  are  sufficient  to  show  its  na- 
ture, and  to  distinguish  it  from  everything  else.  If  then  you  inquire 
in  what  did  the  atonement,  which  the  Scriptures  reveal,  primarily 
consist,  or  by  what  was  it  made  ?  I  reply,  by  Chrises  suffering  for 
our  sins,  in  our  stead,  that  is,  by  his  vicarious  sufferings.  If  you  in- 
quire what  ends  these  vicarious  sufferings  answered  ?  I  reply,  as  to 
God  and  his  law,  they  answered  substantially  the  same  ends  as 
would  have  been  answered  by  our  suffering  for  our  own  sins  ;  and 
their  end  as  to  us,  was  to  procure  our  forgiveness  and  eternal  life, 
includins:  sanctification  and  the  blessedness  of  heaven.  A  brief 
definition  of  the  atonement  then  might  be  given  in  some  such 
manner  as  this :  It  is  Christ* s  obedience  unto  death,  even  the  death 
of  the  cross,  in  the  place  of  sinners,  for  the  purpose  of  vindicating 
the  violated  law,  manifesting  the  righteousness  of  Cfod,  making 
expiation  for  sin,  and  procuring  forgiveness,  sanctification,  and 
eternal  life  for  all  believers.  1  do  not  give  this  as  the  only  proper 
definition  ;  for  it  may  be  varied,  and  made  more  or  less  particular 
and  full,  as  occasion  requires. 


464  Christ's  sufferings  vicarious. 

Rev.  George  Payne,  LL.  D.,  says ;  "  The  atonement  may  be 
defined  as  that  satisfaction  for  sin,  which  was  rendered  to  God  as 
the  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  by  the  perfect  obedience  unto 
death  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  —  a  satisfaction  which  has  re- 
moved every  obstacle,  resulting  from  the  divine  perfections  and 
government,  to  the  bestowment  of  mercy  upon  the  guilty."  But 
however  varied  and  however  short  the  definition  may  be,  it  should 
always  present  such  an  outhne  of  the  doctrine  as  will  show  what 
it  is  according  to  the  Scriptures,  and  will  clearly  distinguish  it 
from  everythuig  else. 


LECTURE    LXXIX. 


PROPITIATION.  SATISFACTION  OF  JUSTICE.  DID  CHRIST  ANSWER 
THE  DEMANDS  OF  THE  LAW  AND  ENDURE  ITS  PENALTY  ?  DID 
HE  PAY  THE  DEBT  OF  SINNERS  ?  DID  HE  CANCEL  THE 
CLAIMS   OF  THE   LAW  AGAINST   TRANSGRESSORS? 

It  is  my  earnest  and  devout  desire  to  treat  this  foundation 
doctrine  in  such  a  manner,  that  nothing  shall  be  left  doubtful 
or  obscure.  It  is  therefore  my  intention,  though  it  may  render 
some  repetition  unavoidable,  to  explain  several  phrases  and  answer 
several  inquiries  relating  to  the  subject  more  distinctly  and  fully, 
than  was  consistent  with  my  plan  in  the  preceding  Lectures. 

1.  Christ  is  said  to  have  made  a  propitiation  for  our  sins. 
What  is  the  precise  meaning  of  this  expression,  and  of  other 
similar  expressions  ? 

The  words  jn-opitiation,  atonement,  and  reconciliation,  have  the 
same  general  sense ;  that  is,  the  means  of  rendering  Crod  pro- 
pitious to  sinners,  —  the  means  of  averting  merited  punishment 
from  them,  bringing  about  a  reconciliation  between  them  and  God, 
and  procuring  his  special  favor.  The  change  produced  in  this 
case  is  not  in  the  character  or  any  of  the  attributes  of  God,  but 
in  his  administration  towards  sinners,  and  in  their  character  and 
state.  The  perfections  and  purposes  of  God  and  the  principles  of 
his  government,  are  absolutely  immutable.  But  this  very  im- 
mutability of  God  may,  under  a  change  of  circumstances,  lead  to 
a  change  in  his  conduct  towards  his  creatures,  and  this  may  be 


466  ATONEMENT. 

followed  by  a  change  in  them.  As  sinners,  we  deserve  punish- 
ment, and  God,  as  our  Lawgiver  and  Judge,  has  threatened  to 
inflict  it.  But  on  account  of  a  new  and  most  important  mea- 
sure in  the  moral  world,  that  is,  the  mediation  of  Christ,  he  for- 
gives our  sins,  and  treats  us  with  favor.  What  Christ  did  and 
suffered  in  our  behalf,  procured  this  favor,  and  this  is  the  same  as 
to  say,  it  rendered  Crod  propitious.  It  is  sometimes  said  the 
atonement  rendered  God  merciful.  And  this  is  true,  if  God's 
being  merciful  means,  his  actually  exercising  mercy  towards  us, 
or  bestowing  upon  us  the  blessings  of  his  mercy.  This  is  the 
meaning  of  the  word  in  many  instances,  and  always  when  we 
pray  that  God  would  be  merciful  to  us.  We  do  not  pray  that  God 
would  change  his  perfections,  but  that  he  would  bestow  upon  us 
the  fruits  of  his  compassion  and  love.  Unitarians  reject  the  doc- 
trine of  atonement  on  the  pretence  that  it  represents  God  as 
wanting  in  mercy,  and  as  needing  to  be  wrought  upon  by  some- 
thing from  without,  before  he  can  be  induced  to  show  us  any 
favor.  But  they  are  plainly  inconsistent  with  themselves  ;  for 
they  represent  repentance  as  the  means  of  procuring  divine  for- 
giveness and  favor.  And  with  reference  to  their  principles,  we 
might  very  properly  ask  them,  is  God  so  wanting  in  kindness  that 
he  must  be  wrought  upon  by  our  repentance,  before  he  can  be 
willing  to  bestow  favors  upon  us  ?  To  say  that  God  will  be  favor- 
able to  sinners  on  condition  of  their  repentance,  or  that  repent- 
ance is  the  appropriate  means  of  procuring  God's  favor,  implies 
just  as  much  want  of  goodness  in  God,  and  just  as  much  change- 
ableness,  as  to  say  that  the  death  of  Christ  is  the  means  of  pro- 
curing his  favor.  But  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these 
implies  that  God  is  changeable,  any  more  than  saying  that  the 
wickedness  of  men  brings  his  judgments  upon  them,  or  is  the 
reason  why  he  inflicts  evil.  The  fact  is,  that  if  God  is  infinitely 
and  immutably  wise  and  good,  he  must  conform  his  administration 
to  the  character  and  circumstances  of  his  subjects,  and  the  state 
of  things  in  his  kingdom.  His  varying  his  conduct  as  circum- 
stances vary,  results  from  his  unchangeable  perfection.  So  when 
we  assert  that  the  death  of  Christ  is  the  means  of  rendering  God 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  467 

propitious  to  sinners,  or  the  means  of  procuring  their  forgiveness, 
we  are  far  from  implying  that  God  is  not,  in  himself,  infinitely  and 
unchangeably  wise  and  good  ;  for  it  was  in  fact  God's  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness  which  fixed  upon  the  death  of  Christ  as  the 
means  of  procuring  salvation  for  sinners.  And  when  we  assert 
this,  we  are  far  from  implying  any  change  in  the  character  of 
God,  inasmuch  as  the  atonement  produces  its  effect,  not  upon  the 
perfections  of  his  nature,  hut  upon  the  acts  of  his  administration  ; 
that  is,  upon  his  treatment  of  sinners.  This  view  of  the  subject 
is  in  perfect  accordance  with  what  we  see  of  the  dispensations 
of  providence,  and  with  the  teachings  of  Scripture.  Many 
changes  occur  in  the  course  of  providence,  changes  from  mercy 
to  judgment,  and  from  judgment  to  mercy.  Scripture  teaches 
that  God  set  forth  Christ  to  be  a  propitiation  for  sin,  that  he  might 
be  just  and  the  justifier  of  them  who  beUeve  ;  implying  that, 
without  such  a  propitiation,  he  could  not  pardon  and  save  them 
consistently  with  his  justice.  Propitiation,  I  have  said,  is  that 
which  renders  God  propitious,  or  secures  his  favor.  But  this 
propitiation,  let  it  be  remembered,  does  not  take  away  or  diminish 
God's  opposition  to  the  sinful  character  of  transgressors.  Instead 
of  this,  it  makes  that  opposition  more  visible.  It  does  not  take 
away  or  diminish  God's  hatred  of  sin  ;  but  more  clearly  manifests 
it.  It  does  not  lower  the  demand  of  love  and  obedience  which  he 
makes  upon  us  in  his  law,  but  confirms  it.  It  does  not  alter  the 
penalty  of  the  law,  or  detract  from  its  severity,  but  establishes 
and  vindicates  it  as  perfectly  just.  It  is  evidently  in  these  and 
similar  ways,  that  the  death  of  Christ  becomes  a  propitiation  for 
sin,  and  thus  procures  salvation  for  sinners  on  the  conditions  pre- 
scribed in  the  gospel. 

2.  It  has  been  common  to  represent  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  or 
his  expiatory  sacrifice,  as  a  satisfactioti  to  divine  justice.  What 
does  this  representation  mean  ?     And  is  it  just  and  proper  f 

Reply.  The  original  and  exact  sense  of  the  word  satisfaction 
is,  doing  enough  —  doing  what  is  sufficient.  And  this  is  the 
meaning  which  the  word  commonly  conveys.  Satisfaction  in  any 
case  is,  doing  what  is  required  —  doing  enough  —  doing  what  is 


468  ATONEMENT. 

necessary.  Now  as  to  the  death  of  Christ  by  which  the  atone- 
ment was  made  ;  —  who  but  God  is  competent  to  judge  Avhether 
enough  was  done  —  whether  all  was  done  which  the  case  re- 
quired  ?  And  what  is  the  judgment  of  God  ?  Bj  appointing 
the  death  of  Christ  as  a  propitiation,  that  is,  as  a  means  of  pro- 
curing forgiveness  for  sinners,  fee  clearly  expressed  his  mind,  and 
showed  that  he  judged  it  to  be  suflBcient  —  to  be  all  that  the  case 
required.  He  showed  that  he  was  satisfied  with  it.  Had  he  not 
seen  it  to  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  him,  he  would  not  have  ap- 
pointed it. 

But  was  divine  justice  satisfied  ?  Answer.  When  we  say 
that  justice  as  an  attribute  of  God,  or  as  a  principle  of  his  gov- 
ernment, is  satisfied,  we  personify  justice  ;•  we  speak  of  it  as 
though  it  were  a  person.  This  figure  of  speech  is  very  common. 
I  have  no  objection  to  it.  But  we  shall  do  well  to  remember  that 
it  is  a  figure  of  speech.  We  come  then  to  the  question ;  is 
divine  justice  satisfied  with  Christ  crucified  as  a  propitiation  for 
sin  ?  To  determine  this,  consider  a  little  what  is  the  object  of 
divine  justice  —  what  it  aims  at  —  what  it  seeks  to  do.  Exer- 
cised according  to  the  common,  regular  course  of  a  moral  govern- 
ment, justice  seeks  the  punishment  of  offenders.  Tliis  is  its 
proximate  end.  But  what  is  its  idtimate  end  ?  What  does  jus- 
tice ultimately  aim  to  accomplish  by  punishment  ?  The  end 
aimed  at  in  punishment  is,  manifestly,  to  display  the  moral  char- 
acter of  God,  to  express  his  mind  as  to  the  goodness  of  his  law 
and  the  evil  of  sin,  to  support  his  government,  and  to  secure  the 
highest  welfare  of  his  kingdom.  We  know  this  is  the  end  aimed 
at,  because  it  is  the  end  actually  accomplished.  Now  all  think- 
ing men  who  hold  to  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  beheve  that  the 
vicarious  sufferings  of  Christ  answered  all  the  great,  ultimate 
ends  which  divine  justice  sought  in  the  merited  punishment  of 
transgressors  —  ail  the  ends  which  would  have  been  answered, 
had  that  punishment  been  fully  executed  upon  them.  If  then  all 
the  important  ends,  which  justice  sought  and  which  it  would 
have  accomplished  by  the  punishment  of  sinners,  are  accom- 
plished by  the  death  of  Christ ;  how  can  it  be  otherwise  than  that 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  469 

justice  is  satisfied  ?     It  seems  evident  that  divine  justice  must 
be  as  well  satisfied  with  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  as  with  the  pun- 
ishment of  sinners,  if  those  sufferings  perfectly  answered  the  ends 
which  it  aims  at.     If  Christ's  sufferings  manifest  the  righteous- 
ness of  God,  and  honor  his  character  as  much  as  the  punishment 
of  sinners  could  have  done  ;   if  they  do  as  much  to  discounte- 
nance sin,  to  give  influence  to  law,  and  to  promote  order  and  hap- 
piness among  intelligent  beings  ;    what  more    can  justice    ask  ? 
This  is  all  that  the   case  calls  for.     Justice,  seeing  the  good  it 
aimed  at  fully  accomplished,  says,  it   is   enough.      Intellifent 
moral  beings  cannot  regard  pain  or  suffering,  in  itself  considered, 
as  a  good,  as  an  object  of  desire.     Whenever  it  is  considered  as 
desirable,  it  is  on  account  of  the  relation  it  has  to  sin,  its  pro- 
curing cause,  and  to  the  ends  which  it  is  to  answer.     In  this,  I  think 
all  must  agree.     And  so  unquestionably  divine  justice  regards  it. 
For  divine  justice  is  not  a  blind   principle   aiming  at  no  end  ; 
much  less  is  it  a  malevolent  principle  aiming  at  a  bad  end,  and 
delighting  to  inflict  needless  pain.     Now  if  divine  justice  regards 
the  merited  punishment  of  sinners  as  desirable,  on  account  of  the 
ends  to  be  answered  by  it,  it  will  fix  the  degree  of  punishment  as 
the  ends  of  punishment  require.     If  the  ends  to  be  answered  by 
punishment  absolutely  require  that  sinners,  in  their  own  persons 
should  suffer  a  great  and  endless  misery  ;  justice  will  be  satisfied 
with  nothing  short  of  that.     If  the  important  ends  which  justice 
aims  at  can  be  accomplished  by  a  small  punishment,  it  is  satisfied 
with  a  small  punishment.     And  if  all  the  ends  of  punishment  are 
perfectly  and  safely  accomplished  in  another  way,  that  is,  by  the 
sufferings  of  a  substitute  ;   then  justice  is  satisfied  with  that,  and 
as  well  satisfied  as  it  could  be  by  the  merited  punishment  of  sin- 
ners themselves.     In  this  last  case,  it  is   satisfied,  not   by  the 
execution   of  the  penalty  of  the  law  upon  sinners,  but  by  some- 
thing else  of  as  much  value,  something  which  answers  all  the  ends 
aimed  at  as  well.     If  God  really  looks  upon  the  punishment  of 
sinners  as  desirable,  in  itself  considered,  why  has  he  taken  so  much 
pains  to  save  them  from  it  ?    And  if  he  looks  upon  the  happmess 
VOL.  II.  40 


470  ATONEMENT. 

of  sinners  as  in  itself  undesirable,  then  why  has  he  done  so  much 
to  secure  it  ? 

Should  3'ou  find  any  difficulty  remaining,  you  may  perhaps 
remove  it  by  varying  the  phraseology.  To  ask  whether  the  jus- 
tice of  God  is  satisfied,  is  the  same  in  regard  to  sense,  as  to  ask 
whether  a  just  God  is  satisfied,  or  whether  God  is  satisfied  in 
respect  to  his  justice?  For  surely  we  are  not  to  conceive  that 
God  and  his  justice  are  two  separate  beings.  The  question  is 
then,  whether  God,  as  a  just  moral  Governor,  is  satisfied  with  the 
sufferings  of  Christ,  instead  of  the  punishment  of  sinners  ?  Now 
if  he  is  not  satisfied  with  it,  then  why  did  he  appoint  it  ?  And 
why  has  he  in  so  many  ways  shown  his  approbation  of  it  ?  Why 
was  he  so  well  pleased  in  Christ,  who  came  for  the  very  purpose 
of  suffering  in  our  stead,  and  thus  procuring  our  salvation  ? 
Why  did  he  raise  Christ  from  the  dead,  thus  giving  testimony 
that  he  accepted  the  sacrifice  he  had  made  by  his  death,  and  con- 
firming him  in  the  character  of  a  Redeemer  ?  And  why  does  he 
offer  eternal  hfe  to  sinners,  and  actually  bestow  it  upon  believers, 
on  the  ground  of  Christ's  death  ?  The  whole  expression  which 
God  has  made  of  his  own  mind  in  regard  to  the  vicarious  death 
of  Christ,  is  an  expression  of  perfect  satisfaction. 

Farther.  If  the  justice  of  God  is  not  satisfied  with  the  expi- 
atory sacrifice  of  Christ,  then  where  is  the  harmony  of  the  divine 
attributes  ?  If  justice  is  not  satisfied,  then  justice  and  God's 
other  attributes  are  not  agreed.  Benevolence  or  goodness  is 
satisfied  ;  wisdom  is  satisfied  ;  but  justice  is  not  satisfied.  And 
so  God's  attributes  are  at  war  among  themselves.  Or  if  you 
speak  of  God  himself;  then  the  substituted  sufferings  satisfied 
him,  as  to  his  benevolence  and  mercy,  and  satisfied  him  as  to  his 
wisdom,  but  did  not  satisfy  him  as  to  his  justice.  As  to  his  jus- 
tice, the  death  of  Christ  is  not  enough.  Though  it  answered  all 
the  ends  of  punishment  as  to  the  character  and  government  of 
God,  the  honor  of  his  law,  and  the  order  and  happiness  of  his 
kingdom,  yet  justice  does  not  feel  this  to  be  sufficient.  It  is 
still  dissatisfied.  Why  ?  Because  sinners  themselves  are  not 
punished  as  they  deserve.     Divine  justice  will  never  be  at  ease 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  471 

■vrhile  any  are  saved.  It  will  always  feel  a  craving  desire,  which 
nothing  can  satisfy  but  the  endless  misery  of  all  pardoned  offen- 
ders ;  —  while  it  is  still  true  that  God's  holiness  and  righteousness 
and  the  evil  of  sinning  against  him  are  more  clearly  displayed, 
his  whole  character  more  honored,  his  law  better  supported,  and 
the  good  of  his  kingdom  more  effectually  secured  without  their 
misery,  than  with  it.  And  it  finally  comes  to  this,  that  God  has 
adopted  a  plan  of  conduct,  and  has  taken  immense  pains  to  carry 
it  into  execution,  and  yet  after  all  he  himself,  as  a  just  and  holy 
Sovereign,  is  not  fully  satisfied  with  it.  And  if  God  is  not  satis- 
fied with  it,  how  can  we  be  satisfied  ?  If  we  are  his  friends,  how 
can  we  help  sympathizing  with  his  feelings  in  regard  to  his  in- 
jured justice  ?  How  can  we  be  perfectly  satisfied  with  our  happy 
state,  when  we  see  it  has  occasioned  lasting  dissatisfaction  to  God, 
in  respect  to  one  of  the  essential  and  glorious  attributes  of  his 
character  ? 

S.  It  is  the  common  opinion  of  Christians,  that  Christ  hy  his 
death  satisfied  the  laiv,  that  he  fully  answered  the  demands  of  the 
lazv,  and  that  he  endured  its  penalty.  Are  these  rep-esentations 
Scriptural  P     And  hoiv  are  they  to  he  understood? 

Reply.  When  the  difficulty  attending  a  subject  arises  from  the 
ambiguity  of  the  language  employed,  it  may  generally  be  removed 
by  substituting  other  language,  more  clear  and  definite.  Perhaps 
we  shall  find  this  to  be  the  case  here.  For  it  is  not  always  easy 
to  determine  w^hat  writers  mean,  when  they  say  that  Christ  satis- 
fied the  law,  or  answered  its  demands.  The  law  requires  of  us, 
as  rational,  moral  beings,  that  we  should  love  God  with  all  the 
heart,  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  This  is  its  great  demand. 
The  demand  is  made  upon  us  personally.  The  obedience  of 
Christ  was  not  hterally  our  obedience.  It  might  stand  for  it.  It 
might  answer  the  same  ends.  But  it  is  not  true,  that  when  Christ 
obeyed  the  law,  you  and  I,  in  our  own  persons,  actually  obeyed. 
For  truly  we  could  not  literally  act  in  obeying  the  law,  before  we 
existed.  And  whatever  language  may  have  been  used,  no  sober 
man  ever  entertained  or  could  entertain  such  a  thought  as  this. 
The  same  as  to  the  demand  which  the  violated  law  makes  upon  us 


472  ATONEMENT. 

as  transgressors.  It  requires  that  we  should  die.  Its  penalty 
respects  us,  and  rests  upon  us  personallj.  The  law  does  not  say, 
if  we  sin,  Christ  shall  die  ;  but  the  soul  that  sinneth  it  shall  die. 
And  who  ever  entertained  the  thought,  that  Christ's  dying  was 
literally  the  sinner's  dying  ? 

But  there  is  no  occasion  to  dwell  longer  on  this  point.  And 
what  I  have  advanced  is  intended  not  so  much  to  refute  the 
notion  referred  to,  as  to  show  that  no  man  ever  did  or  ever  can 
beheve  it.  What  the  current  language  of  Scripture  is,  we  have 
already  seen.  Christ  suffered  and  died  for  our  sins ;  that  is,  on 
their  account.  He  suffered  for  us ;  that  is,  in  our  stead,  —  in 
order  that  we,  who  otherwise  must  have  suffered  the  penalty  of 
the  law,  might  be  exempt  from  it.  The  Bible  does  indeed 
declare  that  Christ  saved  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being 
made  a  curse  for  us.  But  it  does  not  say  that  he  endured  liter- 
ally  the  very  curse  denounced  by  the  law  against  sinners,  the  very 
curse  from  which  believers  are  saved  ;  but  it  says,  "  he  was  made 
a  curse  for  us.  As  it  is  written,  cursed  is  every  one  that  hang- 
eth  on  a  tree."  The  particular  curse  spoken  of  was  crucifixion, 
■which  was  a  very  painful,  ignominious  death.  But  crucifixion 
does  not  constitute  the  exact  curse  denounced  by  the  law  against 
transgressors  ;  and  very  few  who  have  fallen  under  that  curse, 
have  suffered  crucifixion.  The  language  of  the  Bible  on  this 
subject,  and  the  corresponding  language  of  Christians,  is  per- 
fectly just  and  proper.  But  it  must  have  a  reasonable  con- 
struction, and  must  be  explained  and  Hmited  by  other  expres- 
sions relating  to  the  same  subject.  The  law  of  God  was  indeed 
satisfied  by  the  death  of  Christ  in  this  sense,  that  all  the  good 
ends  which  it  sought,  and  which  would  have  been  accomplished 
by  our  perfect  obedience  or  by  our  merited  punishment,  were 
accomplished  by  the  obedience  and  death  of  Christ.  In  his  vica- 
rious sufferings  the  law  fully  compassed  the  ends  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  compassed  by  the  punishment  of  sinners  ; 
that  is,  it  completely  answered,  in  another  way,  the  ends  which 
would  have  been  answered  by  a  direct  and  full  execution  of  the 
penalty  of  the  law,  —  which  penalty  was  a  very  different  thing 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  473 

from  crucifixion.  Or  to  express  the  same  thing  differently  ;  the 
law  was  satisfied  by  the  substitution  of  Christ's  death  for  the 
punishment  of  transgressors.  But  if  we  would  speak  with  strict 
propriety,   we   must   say,    the    Supreme  Laivgiver   is  satisfied ; 

—  for  satisfaction  really  pertains  to  a  person.  If  what  the  Law- 
giver aims  at  is  done  by  the  vicarious  death  of  Christ,  as  fully  as 
would  have  been  done  by  the  punishment  of  sinners  ;  why  should 
he  not  be  satisfied  ?  And  if  his  great  object  as  Lawgiver  could 
not  have  been  accomplished  by  the  death  of  Christ,  then  why  did 
he  appoint  that  death  as  a  substitute  for  the  punishment  of  sin- 
ners ?  It  would  really  seem  that  God  had  a  preference  for  the 
former.  And  we  should  naturally  think  that  the  reason  of  that 
preference  was,  that  on  the  whole  more  good  would  result  from 
the  sufierings  of  Christ,  than  from  the  execution  of  the  penalty 
upon  sinners. 

As  to  the  demands  of  the  law  ;  Christ  undertook  to  do  all  that 
was  necessary  in  order  that  those  who  believe,  might  be  forgiven. 
Whatever  demands  the  law  or  the  Lawgiver  made  upon  Christ,  as 
our  Redeemer,  as  our  substitute,  or  surety,  those  demands  he  fully 
answered.  And  thus  he  virtually  answered  the  demands  which 
the  law  had  against  us.  The  same  in  regard  to  the  penalty. 
Christ  sufiered  it  virtually.  He  suffered  that  which  had  a  Hke 
efiect,  or  which  had  a  like  value  in  God's  moral  government.  As 
to  the  ends  of  government,  it  was  as  though  the  curse  of  the  law 
had  been  endured  literally.  So  that  it  is  sufficiently  correct  for 
common  purposes,  especially  for  the  purpose  of  impression,  to  say, 
as  Storr  and  Flatt  and  a  thousand  others  have  said,  that  Christ 
endured  the  penalty  of  the  law,  that  he  suffered  the  punishment 
due  to  us.  And  this  mode  of  representation  is  perfectly  justified 
by  Scripture  example.  For  when  the  prophet  says,  "  he  bare 
the  sin  of  many  —  the  Lord  laid  on  him  the  iniquity  of,  us  all," 

—  and  when  the  Apostle  says,  "  he  bare  our  sins  in  his  own  body, 
on  the  tree,"  the  obvious  meaning  is,  that  the  punishment  of  our 
iniquities  was  laid  upon  him,  or  that  he  endured  the  suffering 
which  our  sins  deserved.  And  whenever  phraseology  like  this  is 
used,  it  is  only  necessary  to  keep  in  mind,  that  it  is  used  for  the 

40* 


474  A  T  0  X  E  JI E  N  T  . 

purpose  of  brevity  and  impression,  and  is  to  be  construed  -with  a 
reasonable  latitude,  not  Avith  an  over-rigid  exactness ;  just  as  we 
construe  other  expressions  used  in  Scripture  and  in  free  conver- 
sation. If  we  were  to  lay  aside  all  the  language  which  will  not 
bear  to  be  construed  literally  and  strictly,  we  should  lay  aside 
what  is  most  impassioned  and  moving  in  the  Scriptures  and  in 
common  discourse.  That  language  is  good  which  is  suited  to 
the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  which,  with  a  reasonable  and  candid 
construction,  is  adapted  to  impress  the  truth  upon  the  understand- 
ing and  the  heart. 

4.  Did  Christ  pay  the  debt  of  sinners  ?  In  the  Scriptures, 
and  in  common  discourse,  the  punishment  which  sinners  deserve 
is  figuratively  represented  as  a  debt.  "  Forgive  us  our  debts  ;" 
that  is,  remit  the  punishment  of  our  oJBFences.  The  figure  is  in- 
telligible and  striking.  As  those  who  are  in  debt  are  held  to 
pay  a  sum  of  money  to  their  creditor ;  so  sinners  are  held  to  suf- 
fer the  penalty  of  the  law  which  they  have  violated.  As  the 
creditor  can  demand  payment  of  his  debtors ;  so  the  Lawgiver 
and  Judge  can  require  sinners  to  suffer  merited  punishment. 
Accordingly,  when  they  suffer  that  punishment,  they  are  repre- 
sented as  paying  their  debt  to  God,  or  to  divine  justice.  But  the 
punishment  of  penitent  sinners  is  remitted.  That  is,  the  same 
figure  of  speech  being  retained,  their  debt  is  forgiven.  And  it 
is  forgiven  through  the  vicarious  sufferings  of  Christ.  He  paid 
what  God  accepted,  in  Ueu  of  the  debt  which  they  owed.  From 
a  regard  to  what  he  paid,  God  forgives  their  debt.  Thus  he 
virtually  paid  their  debt.  He  did  that  which  was  accepted  in  the 
place  of  it,  that  which  answered  the  same  purposes,  and  which 
secured  their  forgiveness. 

But  in  regard  to  this  kind  of  language,  which  is  so  frequent  in 
the  Scriptures  and  in  rehgious  discourse,  we  must  remember  that 
the  language  is  more  or  less  figurative  ;  and  then  we  must  deter- 
mine the  sense  of  the  figure,  and  the  extent  of  the  analogy  impli- 
ed, by  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  by  all  the  instructions  which 
the  Scriptures  give  concerning  it.  Proceeding  in  this  manner, 
as  we  do  in  all  other  instances  of  figurative  language,  we  shall 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  475 

easily  avoid  the  difficulties  and  mistakes  which  have  been  occa- 
sioned hy  carrying  the  analogy  im})lied  in  the  metaphor  to  an 
unwarrantable  length.  ISTany  of  the  circumstances  which  belong 
to  a  literal  debt  or  an  obligation  to  pay  money,  do  not  belong  to 
a  sinner's  obligation  to  suffer  punishment.  This  obligation  is  of  a 
moral  nature  ;  it  arises  fix)m  the  moral  conduct  of  him  who  is  to 
suffer ;  it  pertains  to  a  moral  law  and  administration,  and  is 
directed  to  moral  ends.  Wlio  can  suppose  that  a  debt  of  this 
kind,  that  is,  an  obligation  to  suffer  punishment  for  the  violation 
of  a  moral  law,  is  attended  throughout  with  the  same  circumstan- 
ces with  a  pecuniary  debt  ?  When  a  man's  pecuniary  debt  is 
paid,  or  when  that  is  done  which  his  creditor  accepts  in  liew  of  it, 
he  is  no  longer  liable  to  be  called  upon  for  payment,  and  it  would 
be  unjust  and  oppressive  in  his  creditor  to  require  payment.  But 
this  is  not  true  in  regard  to  the  atonement,  which  does,  in  a  cer- 
tain sense,  pay  the  debt  of  sinners.  Their  ill  desert  is  neither 
taken  away  nor  diminished.  Nor  would  it  be  any  injustice  to 
them,  if  God  should  inflict  punishment.  This  all  beUevers  ac- 
knowledge and  feel.  The  atonement  gives  them  no  personal 
claim  to  salvation.  They  cannot  demand  it  as  what  is  due  to 
them  on  the  ground  of  justice.  They  cannot  say,  they  should  be 
treated  unjustly,  or  as  they  do  not  deserve,  if  they  should  not  be 
saved.  The  atonement  was  never  designed  to  put  sinners  in  this 
condition,  and  to  make  salvation  a  matter  of  debt  to  them.  God 
provided  the  propitiation  —  that  he  might  be  just  while  he  justi- 
fies believers ;  not  that  he  might  be  obliged  in  justice  to  save 
them,  but  that  he  might  graciously  save  them,  might  save  them 
contrary  to  their  personal  desert,  and  yet  do  it  consistently  with 
the  honor  of  his  justice.  The  death  of  Christ  prepared  the  way 
for  believing  sinners  to  be  pardoned  and  saved  by  grace.  It  was 
never  intended  to  prepare  the  way  for  any  to  be  saved  without 
faith,  nor  even  for  believers  to  be  saved  in  any  other  way  than 
by  the  abounding  of  divine  grace. 

Thus  while  I  maintain  the  propriety  of  freely  using  the  Scrip- 
ture phraseology  which  represents  our  exposure  to  punishment  as 
a  debt,  and  the  propriety  also  of  speaking  of  Christ  as  paying  or 


476  ATONEMENT. 

discharging  this  debt  by  suffering  in  our  stead,  and  thus  procuring 
our  forgiveness ;  I  maintain  that  both  these  representations  are 
metaphorical,  and  are  to  be  understood  with  such  quahfications  as 
the  nature  of  the  subject  requires,  and  that  the  neglect  of  these 
necessary  qualifications  would  lead  us,  as  it  has  led  others,  into 
very  pernicious  errors. 

5.  Did  Christ  cancel  the  claims  of  the  law  against  transgres- 
sors ? 

Although  this  question  is  not  essentially  different  from  some  of 
those  to  which  we  have  already  attended,  it  may  be  of  use  to 
consider  it  a  little,  as  a  phraseology  of  this  kind  is  often  found  in 
inspired  as  well  as  uninspired  writings. 

Did  Christ  cancel  the  claims  of  the  law  against  transgressors  ? 
I  answer,  yes,  if  they  repent  and  believe  ?  To  cancel,  taken  lit- 
erally, is  to  draw  cross  lines  over  a  writing,  such  as  an  account  of 
a  merchant  against  a  debtor ;  to  obliterate  it,  or  blot  it  out.  It 
denotes  that  the  account,  or  the  claim  of  the  merchant  is  given 
up,  or  that  the  debtor  is  freed  from  the  obhgation  to  pay  what  is 
due.  Apply  this  to  our  subject.  To  cancel  the  claims  of  the 
violated  law  against  us,  is  to  forgive  our  sins.  Forgiveness  is 
often  represented  in  Scripture  under  the  same  figure.  "  I  am  he 
that  blotteth  out  thy  transgressions.  Now  this  blotting  out,  or 
cancelling  of  the  penal  demands  of  the  law,  that  is,  our  forgive- 
ness, comes  to  us  through  the  mediation  of  Christ.  He  died  to 
procure  our  forgiveness,  — r  to  procure  the  cancelling  of  the  penal- 
ty of  the  law  for  all  sinners  who  believe. 

Language  of  this  kind,  understood  literally  and  with  an  ex- 
treme strictness,  is  open  to  various  objections,  such  as  have  been 
urged  by  Unitarians.  But  such  a  hteral  and  extreme  construc- 
tion is  altogether  unreasonable,  and  frequently  betrays  a  carping, 
fault-finding  disposition.  The  sense  intended  by  the  language 
before  us,  is  obvious.  Christ  died  to  exempt  us  from  the  penalty 
of  the  law,  or  from  the  punishment  which  we  deserve  for  sin. 
But  this  statement  of  the  design  of  Christ's  death,  instead  of 
being  taken  in  the  largest  possible  sense,  is  to  be  qualified  and 
guarded  by  all  the  teachings  of  Scripture.     Christ  procures  de- 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  477 

liverance  from  the  condemnation  of  the  law,  not  indiscriminately 
and  absolutely  for  all  transgressors,  but  for  each  and  all  who  ex- 
ercise a  true  faith  in  him.  For  those  who  comply  with  the  propo- 
sal of  mercy  in  the  gospel  and  cordially  receive  Christ  by  faith,  a 
complete  forgiveness  is  procured.  The  curse  of  the  law,  or  its 
penal  demand  against  them,  is  cancelled.  God  pardons  them  — 
he  casts  their  sins  into  the  depths  of  the  sea  —  nothing  is  charged 
against  them  in  the  book  of  his  remembrance.  "  Who  shall  lay 
any  thing  to  the  charge  of  God's  elect  ?  It  is  God  that  justifi- 
eth  ;  who  is  he  that  condemneth  ?"  This  full  forgiveness  is  se- 
cured to  believers  by  the  blood  of  the  cross. 

If  you  inquire,  whether  it  is  expedient  for  us  to  use  such  meta- 
phorical language  ;  I  answer  as  before,  that  the  inspired  writers 
are  our  patterns,  and  that  no  valid  objection  can  lie  against  us  for 
using  such  language  as  they  employ,  if  we  use  it  with  the  same 
meaning  and  design  with  them.  An  attempt  to  restrict  ourselves 
in  our  religious  discourse  to  such  language  as  has  a  literal  and 
rigidly  logical  exactness,  would  probably  prove  unsuccessful ;  or 
if  it  should  succeed,  would  be  fraught  with  injury  to  the  interests 
of  evangelical  truth. 


LECTURE   LXXX. 


WAS  THE  DEATH  OF  CHRIST  A  FULL  EQUIVALENT  AND  LEGAL 
SUBSTITUTE  FOR  THE  PUNISHMENT  OF  SINNERS  ?  WAS  CHRIST 
OUR  REPRESENTATIVE  ?  WERE  OUR  SINS  IMPUTED  TO  HIM  ? 
WAS  HIS  ACTIVE  OBEDIENCE  AN  ESSENTIAL  PART  OF  THE 
ATONEMENT  ? 

6.    Was  the  death  of  Christ  a  full  equivalent  for  the  punish- 
ment of  sinners  ?  and  was  it  a  legal  substitute  9 

The  exact  meaning  of  equivalent  is,  equal  in  value  or  worth,  of 
equal  avail,  or  of  equal  influence.  The  question  then  is,  whether 
the  death  of  Christ  is  in  a  moral  view  of  equal  avail,  or  equal  in 
value,  with  the  punishment  of  sinners.  To  this  we  have  already 
attended.  Christ's  death  answered  the  ends  of  punishment,  so 
that  the  honor  of  the  Lawgiver,  the  authority  of  the  law  and  the 
welfare  of  the  moral  world  are  as  well  secured,  as  they  could 
have  been  by  the  merited  punishment  of  transgressors.  And  this 
is  the  same  as  to  say,  the  death  of  Christ  is,  in  a  moral  view,  of 
equal  value  with  their  punishment,  or  is  an  equivalent  for  it.  And 
it  is  a  full  equivalent,  because  it  fully  answers  the  ends  of  punish- 
ment, answers  them  as  perfectly  as  they  could  have  been  answered 
by  the  infliction  of  punishment  according  to  the  threat  of  the  law. 
It  might  be  shown,  that  the  death  of  Christ  is  ynore  than  an  equiv-. 
alent  for  the  punishment  of  sinners,  as  it  doubtless  answers  the 
ends  of  a  just  punishment  in  a  higher  degree  than  could  have 
been  answered  by  the  punishment  itself,  besides  accomplishing 
Qther  objects  of  everlasting  importance,  which  the  punishment  of 


ATONEMENT.  479 

sinners  could  never  have  accomplished  ;  so  that,  in  the  final  re- 
sult, the  vicarious  death  of  Christ  will  be  the  cause  of  vast  gain 
to  the  universe. 

But  is  the  death  of  Christ  a  legal  substitute,  and  a  legal  equiv- 
alent? The  answer  to  this  must  vary  according  to  the  sense  we 
affix  to  the  word  legal.  If  by  a  legal  substitute  or  equivalent,  be 
meant  that  which  is  provided  by  law,  or  that  which  is  exactly  con- 
formed to  the  letter  of  the  law  ;  then  the  death  of  Christ  is  not 
legal.  For  the  law  itself  provides  for  nothing  in  case  of  trans- 
gression, but  the  punishment  of  transgressors.  Its  precepts  and 
its  sanctions,  taken  literally,  relate  only  to  those  who  are  the 
proper  subjects  of  law.  But  if  by  a  legal  substitute  is  meant  a 
substitute  which  supports  the  principles  and  answers  the  ends  of 
law ;  then  the  death  of  Christ  is  a  legal  substitute,  and  a  legal 
equivalent.  In  its  efficacy  to  accomplish  the  great  purposes  of  a 
moral  government,  it  is  fully  equal,  not  to  say  superior,  to  the  di- 
rect execution  of  the  penalty  of  the  law. 

7.  Did  Christ  take  the  law-place  of  sinners  ?  Answer.  The 
law-place  of  sinners,  that  is,  the  place  or  condition  pointed  out  for 
them  by  the  law,  is  a  place  of  sufferiyig.  Christ  took  this  place 
for  them,  or  suffered  in  their  stead,  so  far  and  in  such  a  manner 
as  the  ends  of  suffering  required.  He  took  their  law-place,  not 
by  enduring  an  evil  of  the  same  kind  and  duration  with  what  the 
law  threatened  to  them,  but  by  suffering  what  was  sufficient  to  ac- 
complish the  objects  contemplated  in  the  penal  sanction  of  the 
law,  and  what  the  righteous  Lawgiver  accepted  in  Ueu  of  the  pun- 
ishment threatened  against  transgressors. 

8.  Was  Christ,  when  he  suffered,  our  representative  ?  Answer. 
A  representative,  as  the  word  is  commonly  used,  is  one  who  is  au- 
thorized to  act  for  others,  one  who  conducts  the  affairs  of  others 
fur  them.  A  representative  then,  is  one  who  transacts  business 
vicariously,  or  as  a  substitute  for  others.  What  he  does  he  does 
in  their  place,  and  they  enjoy  the  benefit  of  it  as  though  they  did 
it  themselves.  In  the  affairs  of  civil  government  and  the  common 
business  of  life,  our  representative  is  generally  one  whom  we  our- 
selves choose  or  appoint  to   act  for  us.     In  this  respect,  Christ 


480  ATONEMENT. 

was  not  our  representative.  He  was  not  chosen  or  authorized  by 
any  act  of  ours,  to  do  and  suffer  in  our  stead.  But  he  was  cho- 
sen and  authorized  by  God.  It  comes  then  to  the  same  thing  as 
before.  Christ  was  the  representative  of  his  people  in  such  a 
sense,  that  the  benefits  of  what  he  did  and  suffered  accrue  to 
them.  When  we  believe  in  him,  we  receive  him  as  one  appoint- 
ed by  God  to  act  as  our  representative,  and,  in  our  stead,  to  bear 
the  burden  of  our  guilt,  so  that  we  might  be  forgiven  and  saved. 

I  have  never  been  accustomed  to  speak  very  frequently  of 
Christ  as  our  representative  or  our  surety.  Nor  do  I  think  it 
desirable  that  this  phraseology  should  so  abound  in  religious  dis- 
course, as  in  any  manner  to  set  aside  the  language  of  Scripture. 
But  it  has  been  freely  used  by  writers  of  the  highest  excellence ; 
and  when  candidly  construed,  it  conveys  plain  Bible-truth.  I 
would  not  reject  it ;  still  I  would  guard  with  all  possible  care 
against  any  misconceptions  which  it  may  have  occasioned.  If  the 
cause  of  truth  required,  I  would  omit  the  word  altogether.  But 
I  am  far  from  thinking  this  to  be  the  case.  Let  us  however  avoid 
logomachy,  and  exercise  becoming  candor  in  ascertaining  the  ex- 
act sense,  which  the  word  under  consideration  and  other  similar 
terms  are  intended  to  communicate. 

In  regard  to  several  of  the  phrases  which  have  been  mentioned, 
permit  me  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  gross  misconceptions,  erro- 
neous reasonings  and  whimsical  speculations  have  arisen  in  the 
minds  of  men  from  the  practice  of  carrying  the  sense  of  these 
phrases,  and  also  of  Scripture  metaphors,  to  an  unwarrantable 
length.  And  though  it  appears  from  fact,  that  Christianity  may 
exist  and  exert  a  saving  efficacy  in  a  state  of  alliance  with  various 
misconceptions,  and  various  whimsical  and  erratic  speculations, 
it  can  certainly  exist  and  exert  its  saving  efficacy  much  better 
without  them. 

9.  Were  our  sins  imputed  to  Christ  ?  or  was  our  guilt  trans- 
ferred to  1dm  ? 

The  literal  and  primary  sense  of  the  word  impute,  is,  to  charge 
to  any  person  Ms  oivn  actions  or  qualities.  "  Blessed  is  the  man 
to  whom  the  Lord  impute th  not  iniquity,"  that  is  his  own  iniquity. 


VARIOUS     QUESTIONS     CONSIDERED.  481 

Not  to  impute  sin  to  any  one  who  is  a  sinner,  is  not  to  cnarge  his 
own  sin  to  him,  and  not  to  punish  him  for  it ;  that  is,  to  forgive 
him.  And  to  impute  sin  to  any  one,  is  to  charge  it  to  him,  and 
to  inflict  the  punishment  due.  Now  as  our  sins  are  our  own  per- 
sonal attributes  or  actions,  it  is  impossible  they  should  become  the 
personal  attributes  or  actions  of  Christ.  To  say  that  our  sin,  as 
a  personal  attribute  or  act,  is  so  imputed  to  Christ,  or  that  our 
sinful  character  or  ill  desert  is  so  transferred  to  him,  that  he  him- 
self becomes  personally  sinful  or  ill  deserving,  is  what  no  man 
can  believe.  It  is  an  absurdity.  And  those  who  have  used  lan- 
guage which  seems  to  imply  this,  have  evidently  affixed  a  secon- 
dary or  figurative  sense  to  the  language  ;  for  notwithstanding  this 
imputation  or  transfer  of  our  sins  to  Christ,  they  consider  him  to 
be  perfectly  innocent  and  holy. 

But  the  word  impute  is  used  sometimes  in  the  Bible,  and  often 
in  theological  works,  in  a  secondary  sense.  The  Apostle,  Rom. 
4:6,  speaks  of  God's  imputing  righteousness  to  a  man  who  is  not 
personally  righteous.  The  connection  shows  perfectly  what  the 
word  means.  He  says  "  David  describeth  the  blessedness  of  the 
man  unto  whom  God  imputeth  righteousness  without  works  ;"  and 
he  immediately  tells  us  Iwio  David  describes  it.  "  Blessed  is  the 
man  whose  iniquities  are  forgiven,  and  whose  sin  is  covered." 
For  God  to  impute  righteousness  to  us,  in  the  sense  here  intended, 
is  to  treat  us  as  though  we  were  righteous,  to  forgive  our  sins,  to 
withhold  punishment,  and  to  bestow  upon  us  the  benefits  of  right- 
eousness, while  we  have  not  the  righteousness  itself.  Now  if  we 
speak  of  the  imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ  in  this  sense  of  im- 
putation, it  is  the  same  as  to  speak  of  his  suffering  on  account  of 
our  sins,  or  of  his  enduring  evil  as  though  he  were  an  offender. 
In  this  sense  of  the  phrase,  we  may  very  properly  say,  that  God 
imputed  our  sins  to  Christ,  or  transferred  our  guilt  to  him,  or  as 
the  Scriptures  speak,  that  he  laid  our  sins  upon  Christ.  The 
meaning  of  all  the  expressions  is  the  same,  namely,  that  God  in- 
flicted sufferings  on  Christ  for  our  sin,  and  so  transferred  our  sin, 
that  is,  the  punishment  of  it,  from  us  to  him.  It  will  be  found 
universally  true,  that  when  the  Scriptures  use  this  kind  of  phrase- 

VOL  II.  41 


482  ATONEMENT. 

ologj,  find  speak  of  one's  bearing  sin,  of  laying  sin  upon  one,  of 
imputing  sin,  even  one's  own  sin,  they  refer  to  the  punishment  of 
sin,  to  the  suffering  of  evil  on  account  of  sin.  Now  if  men  will 
only  agree  to  use  this  Scripture  language  in  this  obvious  sense, 
there  will  be  no  farther  difficulty.  We  may  with  perfect  propriety 
retain  the  phraseology  which  is  in  common  use,  and  which  is  either 
exactly  conformed,  or  at  least  very  similar,  to  what  we  find  in  the 
word  of  God,  only  taking  care  to  affix  to  it  the  meaning  which  a 
vaa,n  of  common  sense  and  candor  and  piety  would  naturally  de- 
rive from  the  current  representations  of  Scripture,  and  from  the 
nature  of  the  subject.  Say,  if  you  please,  that  God  imputed  our 
sins  to  Christ,  meaning  that  he  inflicted  sufferings  upon  him  on 
account  of  our  sins.  Say,  if  you  please,  that  our  guilt  was  trans- 
ferred to  him,  or  was  laid  upon  him,  only  remembering  that  this  is 
a  common  and  very  impressive  figure  of  speech,  which  puts  the 
cause  for  the  effect,  and  that  the  meaning  is,  he  transferred  suf- 
fering, the  effect  or  consequence  of  guilt,  from  us  who  deserved 
it,  to  Christ  our  holy  Saviour.  And  in  all  your  contemplations 
and  reasonings  on  the  subject,  keep  in  mind,  that  moral  evil  never 
became  the  personal  attribute  of  Christ ;  that  he  Avas  never  in 
any  respect,  either  in  outward  action  or  in  heart,  a  transgressor  of 
God's  law ;  that  he  was  perfectly  holy,  harmless,  undefiled,  and 
that  in  reality  what  he  had  to  do  with  sin  as  our  substitute,  was  to 
suffer  on  account  of  it,  and  so  to  procure  our  forgiveness. 

10.  The  next  question  is,  tvhether  the  active  obedience  of  Christ 
was  an  essential  part  of  the  atonement,  or  heljyed  to  constitute  its 
value  and  efficacy. 

In  order  to  reach  a  proper  answer,  I  shall  consider  the  follow- 
ing points,  namely,  1.  What  is  meant  by  Christ's  active  obedi- 
ence ?  2.  In  his  work  as  our  Redeemer  and  High  Priest,  was  his 
active  obedience  connected  with  his  sufferings  ?  or  were  they  or 
could  they  be  separated  ?  and  if  they  had  been  separated,  could 
either  of  them,  taken  without  the  other,  have  had  any  efficacy  to 
secure  our  salvation  ?  3.  What  is  meant  by  atonement ;  and 
could  it  be  effected  either  by  living  obediently  without  suffermg 
death,  or  by  dying  without  an  obedient  life  ?     And  4.  As  to  the 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  483 

blessings  involved  in  justification,  namely  forgiveness  and  eternal 
life  ;  are  they  separate  or  separable  from  each  other,  and  could 
either  Christ's  active  obedience  or  his  death,  taken  by  itself  with- 
out the  other,  have  had  any  influence  to  secure  either  our  forgive- 
ness, or  our  eternal  life  ? 

1.  What  is  meant  by  Christ's  active  obedience  ?  The  Apostle 
says,  Rom.  5 :  19,  "  As  by  one  man's  disobedience  many  were 
made  sinners  ;  so  by  the  obedience  of  one  shall  many  be  made 
righteous."  The  work  of  Christ  by  which  believers  are  made 
righteous^  or  are  justified^  is  here  called  "  obedience."  His 
death,  in  which  he  exercised  his  obedience,  was  doubtless  meant 
to  be  included.  But  if  that  which  procured  our  justification  con- 
sisted in  his  death  alone,  it  would  certainly  appear  strange  that 
the  Apostle  should  give  to  it  the  expressive  and  comprehensive 
name  of  "  obedience."  He  may  refer  specially  to  his  obedience 
unto  death.  But  how  can  we  suppose  that  he  refers  to  that  oyily, 
unless  we  first  adopt  the  opinion  that  nothing  but  Christ's  death 
was  concerned  in  procuring  our  justification  ?  In  v.  18,  the 
Apostle  expresses  the  same  sentiment  in  another  form.  Justi- 
fication, he  says,  comes  by  "  the  righteousness  of  one.  Accord- 
ing to  this,  "  righteousness  "  procures  the  same  blessing  as  "  obe- 
dience," that  blessing  being  called  justification  in  one  place,  and 
being  made  righteous  or  just  in  another  place.  Now  who  can 
suppose  that  the  Apostle  would  call  the  great  work  which  pro- 
cures our  justification,  "  the  obedience  "  and  "  the  righteousness" 
of  Christ,  if  he  had  nothing  in  view  but  his  death.  Every  can- 
did person  must,  I  think,  be  satisfied,  that  the  Apostle  meant  to 
refer  to  Christ's  obedience  in  the  large,  comprehensive  sense,  that 
is,  to  his  obedient  life,  as  well  as  to  his  obedient  death.  His  doing 
the  tvill  of  God,  whether  in  life  or  in  death,  is  evidently  intended. 
This  is  expressly  spoken  of  as  the  object  of  Christ's  advent,  Psalm 
40 :  8  ;  "  Lo  I  come,  I  delight  to  do  thy  will,  0  my  God  ;  thy 
law  is  within  my  heart. ''^  John  4  :  34  ;  "  My  meat  is  to  do  the 
will  of  him  that  sent  me,  and  to  finish  his  work."  His  doing  the 
will  of  God,  and  his  righteousness,  must  be  understood  to  include 
both  his  obedient,  holy  life,  and  his  obedient  death  ;  and  these  are 
what  we  mean  by  his  active  and  passive  obedience. 


484  ATONEMENT. 

But  the  question  to  be  considered  relates  to  Christ's  active 
obedience,  that  is,  his  obedient  life,  in  distinction  from  his  passive 
obedience,  or  his  obedient  sufferings.  The  distinction  is  the  one 
commonly  made,  and  I  shall  admit  it  without  objection.  Christ's 
active  obedience  was,  then,  his  perfect  conformity  ivith  the  moral 
law,  and,  as  he  was  a  Jew,  tvith  the  ritual  laio  also ;  which  law, 
whether  moral  or  ritual,  required  no  suffering  except  for  trans- 
gression. 

2.  We  are  to  consider  the  connection  of  Christ's  active  obe- 
dience with  his  death.  This  connection  was  a  matter  of  fact. 
Both  obedience  and  death  belonged  to  the  Son  of  God,  and  thej 
belonged  to  him  as  Redeemer.  They  were  necessarily  joined 
together.  For  the  same  disposition  which  led  the  Saviour  to  obey 
God  as  the  Author  of  the  moral  and  the  ceremonial  law,  must 
have  led  him  freely  to  obey  God  as  the  Author  of  the  dispen- 
sation of  grace,  which  required  an  atoning  sacrifice ;  the  same 
inward  principle  ^thich  led  liim  to  comply  with  the  command  of 
God  requiring  him  to  be  holy,  could  not  have  failed  to  lead  him 
voluntarily  to  comply  with  the  command  which  required  him  to 
lay  down  his  life  for  his  people. 

And  while  it  is  true  that  obedience  and  death  were  both  united 
in  the  person  of  Christ  in  fact,  and  from  the  necessary  operation 
of  moral  causes ;  it  is  also  true,  that  if  either  of  them  had  been 
found  in  Christ  without  the  other,  it  could  have  had  no  efficacy  to 
secure  our  salvation.  Had  he  lived  obediently  without  dying,  he 
would  indeed  have  been  excellent  and  praise-worthy  in  the  sight 
of  God ;  but  how  could  his  obedient  life  have  redeemed  sinners, 
any  more  than  the  obedient  life  of  an  angel  ?  If  God  had  seen 
that  obedience  ivithout  suffering  could  secure  our  salvation,  who 
can  believe  that  he  would  have  required  him  to  endure  suffering, 
and  that  of  such  terrible  severity  ?  Jesus  prayed,  that  if  it  were 
possible,  he  might  be  exempt  from  the  agonies  of  the  cross.  If  it 
had  been  ^^  possible,''^  —  if  it  had  been  consistent  with  the  object 
for  which  he  became  incarnate,  who  can  doubt  that  his  prayer 
would  have  been  answered  ?  For  who  can  suppose  that  God 
would  inflict  unnecessary  pain  upon  any  one,  especially  upon  his 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  485 

onlj-begotten  Son,  Avhom  he  loved  more  than  all  the  creation  ? 
The  all-wise  God  knew  that  obedience  alone  could  have  no  saving 
eflScacy.  Though  perfect  obedience  in  us  would  have  been  suf- 
ficient to  prevent  our  death,  and  the  necessity  of  a  Redeemer  ; 
yet  obedience  in  our  Redeemer  was  not  sufficient  to  save  us  as 
miners.  Without  the  shedding  of  blood,  there  could  have  been 
no  remission  ;  and  if  no  remission,  certainly  no  salvation. 

On  the  other  hand,  suffering  could  have  had  no  saving  efficacy 
without  obedience.  Had  Christ  been  disobedient^  the  justice  of 
God  would  have  had  demands  against  him,  and  he  must  have 
suffered  death  on  his  own  account ;  and  how  could  his  death,  in 
that  case,  have  availed  to  our  benefit,  any  more  than  the  death  of 
any  other  offender  ?  It  may  be  said  that  it  was  God's  appoint- 
ment which  gave  the  death  of  Christ  power  to  procure  our  for- 
giveness. Be  it  so.  But  remember,  that  the  vicarious  death 
which  he  appointed,  was  the  death  of  a  holy  Mediator.  The 
appointment  of  Christ  was  not  one  which  would  stain  the  purity 
of  God's  character  by  bringing  him  into  alliance  with  unrighteous- 
ness. He  whom  God  anointed  as  our  Great  High  Priest,  "  waa 
holy^  harmless,  imdejiled^'' — like  the  sacrificial  Iamb,  '■'■  without 
blemish.''''  A  holy  God  could  have  appointed  no  other,  could  have 
had  complacency  in  no  other,  and  could  have  admitted  no  other 
to  approach  him  as  Mediator.  The  idea  that  God  would  have 
accepted  the  merited  death  of  a  sinner,  how  exalted  soever  his 
natural  endowments,  as  a  substitute  for  the  punishment  which 
other  sinners  deserve,  and  as  the  medium  through  which  their 
salvation  should  come,  is  abhorrent  to  every  principle  of  piety  in 
us,  and  utterly  contrary  to  all  the  perfections  of  God  ;  for  all  his 
perfections  are  totally  and  unchangeably  opposed  to  sin  ;  and  his 
spotless,  holy  character,  comes  out  clearly  to  view  in  every  part 
of  the  plan  he  has  adopted  for  the  redemption  of  the  world,  and 
particularly  in  the  character  of  the  anointed  Saviour. 

3.  The  nature  of  the  atonement.  Definite  ideas  on  this  point 
are  necessary  to  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  question,  whether 
Christ's  active  obedience  was  a  part  of  the  atonement.  Look  now 
at  the  New  Testament  use  of  the  word.     The  English  word, 

41* 


486  ATONEMENT. 

atonement,  is  found  in  relation  to  the  present  subject,  in  only  one 
place,  Rom.  5  :  11  ;  "  By  whom  we  have  received  the  atonement^'' 
KaruXXayriv,  reconciliation.  See  Schleusner  and  Robinson  on  the 
word,  and  on  KaraXlaaGa.  The  word  refers  to  a  previous  state 
of  alienation  and  enmity,  and  implies  a  change  from  that  to  a  state 
of  friendship.  By  or  through  Christ  we,  believers,  have  received  the 
atonement.  The  state  of  enmity  has  been  removed,  and  the  favor 
of  God  restored  to  us.  In  common  theological  use,  atonement 
signifies  the  grand  expedient  or  means,  by  or  through  which  this 
reconciliation  is  effected.  And  it  seems  to  have  exactly  this  sense 
in  Rom.  11 :  15.  The  casting  away  of  the  Jews  was  the  recon- 
ciling, that  is,  the  means  of  reconciling  the  world.  Was  then  the 
active  obedience  of  Christ  a  part,  and  a  necessary  part  of  that  work 
of  Christ  by  which  our  forgiveness  and  our  restoration  to  the 
divine  favor  was  effected  ?  In  every  point  of  view,  the  answer 
must  be  affirmative.  Without  perfect  obedience  to  the  divine  law, 
Jesus  could  have  made  no  atonement,  could  have  done  nothing  to 
deliver  us  from  punishment,  and  restore  us  to  the  favor  of  God. 
If  he  had  been  wanting  in  obedience,  he  would  have  been  a  trans- 
gressor, and  could  have  suffered  no  more  than  justice  required  of 
him  on  his  own  account.  And  in  that  case,  how  could  his  suffer- 
ings have  procured  salvation  for  other  sinners,  or  even  for  hhn- 
selff  Would  not  he  have  needed  a  Saviour  as  really  as  any  other 
sinner  ?  If  a  messenger  of  God  that  was  disobedient,  had  en- 
dured the  severest  punishment,  if  he  had  suffered  and  should  con- 
tinue to  suffer  ever  so  long,  his  sufferings,  according  to  the  views 
of  evangehcal  Christians,  would  not  have  exceeded  his  own  de- 
serts, and  could  in  no  way  have  availed  to  the  salvation  of  others. 
4.  Our  final  inquiry  respects  forgiveness,  or  exemption  from 
positive  punishment,  and  eternal  blessedness  in  heaven.  Aj'c  these 
two  leading  benefits,  which  are  involved  in  justification,  separate 
or  separable  from  each  other  ?  And  could  either  ChrisVs  active 
obedience,  or  his  death,  taken  separately,  secure  for  us  either  the 
one  or  the  other  of  these  benefits  ?  Now  while  Christ's  active  obe- 
dience and  his  death  have  each  a  real  and  prominent  influence  in 
securing  the  two  parts  of  justification  above-named ;  still  could 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  487 

either  of  them  have  that  hifluence  without  the  other  ?  That  is, 
could  the  death  of  Christ,  which  some  consider  as  constituting  the 
"whole  of  the  atonement,  procure  forgiveness,  without  an  obedient 
life  ?  Or  could  his  obedience  procure  the  blessedness  of  heaven, 
without  his  death  ?  I  think  not.  In'  Rom.  5  :  19,  the  Apostle 
does  indeed  make  justification  the  result  of  Christ's  obedience. 
But  justification,  as  he  uses  it,  certainly  includes  forgiveness,  as 
well  as  acceptance  Avith  God  and  etemal  blessedness  ;  and  the 
obedience  of  Christ  which  he  speaks  of,  must  be  substantially  the 
same  as  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  mentioned  just  before,  and 
must  include  what  he  in  another  place  calls  "  obedience  unto 
death;'''  that  is,  it  must  include  the  suifering  of  death,  as  really 
as  conformity  with  the  divine  law.  We  cannot  then  ascribe  the 
influence  which  Christ  had  in  procuring  the  one  or  the  other  of 
the  benefits  of  justification,  to  either  part  of  his  work  separate 
from  the  other.  His  obedience  could  have  procured  no  good  for 
us  without  his  death,  and  his  death  could  have  procured  no  good 
without  his  obedience.  They  were  joined  together  in  the  work 
of  the  Redeemer,  and  both  were  necessary  to  each  and  all  of  the 
benefits  he  confers. 

And  as  the  two  parts  of  Christ's  work  above  mentioned  are 
inseparably  joined  together,  so  also  are  the  two  parts  of  justi- 
fication. They  always  go  together  in  fact.  No  sinner  ever  par- 
takes of  forgiveness  without  acceptance  and  eternal  life.  And  no 
one  obtains  acceptance  with  God  and  eternal  life  without  being 
forgiven.  And  these  two  are  not  only  joined  together  in  fact,  but 
from  the  nature  of  the  case  must  be.  To  be  accepted  as  right- 
eous, and  to  enjoy  eternal  life,  necessarily  implies  forgiveness. 
And  does  not  forgiveness,  taken  in  the  large  sense,  involve  eternal 
life  ?  The  penalty  of  the  law  implies  etei-nal  death.  And  can 
any  one  be  freed  from  eternal  death  without  having  eternal  life  ? 
The  penalty  of  the  law  implies  the  wrath  of  God.  And  can  any 
one  be  delivered  from  God's  wrath  without  being  restored  to  his 
favor  ?  The  penalty  implies  banishment  from  God  and  the  loss 
of  heaven.  And  can  any  one  who  is  condemned  to  be  banished 
from  God,  be  delivered  from  that  evil  without  being  restored  to 


ATONEMENT. 

the  presence  of  God  ?  And  can  any  one  be  freed  from  the  loss 
of  heavenly  blessedness  without  coming  to  enjoy  that  blessedness  ? 
And,  I  add,  can  any  one  enjoy  a  holy  blessedness  without  being 
sanctified,  or  made  holy  ? 

This,  I  think,  is  the  teaching  of  revelation.  Whenever  the 
word  of  God  speaks  of  either  the  obedience  or  the  death  of  Christ 
as  having  a  saving  influence,  it  clearly  implies  the  other.  Christ's 
sufferings  were  the  sufferings  of  a  holy,  obedient  Saviour,  and 
were  holy,  obedient  sufferings.  Both  suffering  and  obedience  were 
essential.  Both  had  a  saving  efficacy,  not  separately,  but  jointly. 
It  would  be  an  utter  mistake  to  suppose  that  one  of  them  exerts  a 
redemptive  influence,  or  secures  any  good  for  us,  without  the 
other.  They  are  parts  of  a  whole,  incapable  of  separation.  And 
the  same  is  true  of  the  benefits  involved  in  justification,  namely, 
forgiveness  in  the  restricted  seiise,  and  the  favor  of  God  and  eter- 
nal life.  They  are  parts  of  a  unity.  They  constitute  salvation. 
We  often  have  occasion  to  speak  of  them  distinctly.  But  they  do 
not  and  cannot  exist  separately. 

Dr.  Emmons  thought  that  the  death  of  Christ,  and  that  alone, 
made  the  atonement ;  and  then,  from  the  texts  which  teach  us 
that  Christ's  death  procured  forgiveness  of  sin,  he  infers  that  for- 
giveness is  the  only  blessing  procured  by  the  atonement.  The 
texts  to  which  he  refers  do  indeed  declare  that  the  death  of 
Christ  procured  forgiveness  ;  but  they  do  not  declare  that  it  pro- 
cured this  blessing  and  no  other.  Nor  do  these  texts  nor  any 
others  teach,  that  Christ's  death  made  atonement  without  his  obe- 
dience. His  death  had  clearly  a  special  influence  in  saving  us 
from  the  curse  of  the  law.  But  had  it  this  influence  disconnected 
from  his  obedience  and  holiness  ?  Does  the  Apostle  teach,  Rom. 
6  :  18,  that  his  righteousness,  by  which  our  justification  was  pro- 
cured, consisted  of  his  death,  and  that  only  ?  Or  does  he  teach 
that  justification  consists  of  mere  exemption  from  punishment,  exr- 
clusive  of  eternal  life  ? 

Dr.  John  Taylor  is  chargeable  with  a  similar  mistake  on  the 
other  side.  He  takes  the  texts  which  teach  that  Christ  died  to 
deUver  us  from  sin  and  make  us  holy,  and  from  these  he  concludes 


VARIOUS    QUESTIONS    CONSIDERED.  489 

that  tJds  was  the  sole  object  of  his  death  ;  just  as  Socinians  fix  upon 
the  texts  which  declare  Christ  to  be  a  man,  and  hence  conclude 
that  he  was  nothing  more  than  a  man.  Why  should  writers  over- 
look the  principle,  that  our  faith  is  to  be  derived,  not  from  parti- 
cular parts  of  Scripture,  but  from  a  connected  view  of  the  whole  ? 
Instead  then  of  attempting  to  push  our  theories  beyond  the 
plain  import  of  Scripture  on  this  great  doctrine  of  the  gospel,  let 
us  rejoice  and  glory  in  the  one  perfect  Mediator,  and  in  the  one 
all-sufficient  work  of  grace  which  he  undertook  and  finished  ;  and 
let  us  render  him  hearty  thanks  for  that  complete  salvation  which 
we  owe  to  his  obedient,  holy,  and  infinitely  meritorious  life  and 
death. 


LECTURE    LXXXI. 


IS   THE    ATONEMENT    GENERAL,  OR   PARTICULAR  ? 

11.  Was  the  atonement  general^  or  particular;  universal,  or 
limited  ?  In  other  words  ;  was  the  atonement  provided  for  all 
men,  or  only  for  a  part  ?  Did  Christ  die  for  the  whole  world,  or 
only  for  the  elect  ? 

This  question,  as  generally  stated  and  discussed,  has  the  attri- 
bute of  remarkable  indefiniteness  and  ambiguity  ;  and  hence  it  is 
adapted  to  create  a  warm  and  fruitless  controversy  —  a  contro- 
versy which  may  very  easily  be  continued,  as  long  as  men  can  be 
found  who  take  pleasure  in  strife.  But  the  controversy  may,  I 
think,  be  quickly  brought  to  a  conclusion,  if  men  will  cherish  a 
real  desire  to  be  agreed,  and  will  take  pains  to  understand  one 
another,  and  especially  if  they  will  be  content  to  make  the  Scrip- 
tures their  guide. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  we  should  do  all  we  can  to 
exclude  logomachy,  to  prevent  a  needless  expense  of  time,  and  to 
bring  ourselves  in  the  shortest  way  to  the  most  satisfactory  result. 
In  order  to  this,  let  us  see  how  many  things  we  can  lay  out  of  the 
question,  and  so  reduce  the  discussion  to  the  most  simple  and 
intelligible  form,  and  to  the  narrowest  compass. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  let  me  say  that  the  point  at  issue  is 
not,  whether  the  atonement  was  so  provided  for  all  men,  that 
all  will  actually  be  saved.  As  the  controversy,  so  long  agitated 
among  evangelical  Christians  respecting  the  extent  of  the  atone- 


ATONEMENT.       ETC.  491 

ment,  does  not  relate  to  the  question  of  universal  salvation,  this 
point  is  to  be  wholly  excluded  from  the  discussion.  Those  who 
are  enlisted  in  this  controversy,  are  united  in  the  belief,  that  sal- 
vation will  not  be  actually  experienced  by  all  men.  So  that  the 
question  whether  Christ  died  for  all  men  is  to  be  understood  as 
entirely  distinct  from  the  question  whether  he  will  actually  save 
all. 

Again.  The  pomt  at  issue  is  not,  whether  God  actually  inr 
tended  or  determined  to  save  all  men.  Those  who  manage  this 
controversy  are  united  in  the  belief,  that  it  is  the  purpose  or 
determination  of  God  to  save  only  a  part  of  the  human  race. 
The  parties  then  agree  that  Christ  did  not  die  for  all  men  in  such 
a  sense,  that  they  will  all  actually  obtain  forgiveness  through  his 
blood  ;  and  they  agree  too  that  he  did  not  die  for  all  men  with  a 
purpose  or  determination  actually  to  save  all. 

There  are  other  points  also,  which  we  shall  find  it  easy  to  dis- 
pose of  satisfactorily,  if  we  take  pains  to  avoid  obscurity  in  our 
thoughts  and  in  our  language,  and  to  place  the  subject  in  a  clear 
and  distinct  light. 

One  of  these  points  is  whether  Christ  died  for  his  chosen  people 
absolutely  or  unconditionally  ? 

It  is  difficult  to  give  a  direct  answer  to  this  question,  merely 
because  it  is  difficult  to  know  exactly  w^hat  is  meant  by  it.  If  the 
meaning  is,  whether  Christ  by  his  death  so  purchased  or  procured 
salvation  for  his  chosen  people,  that  nothing  else  is  necessary  and 
nothing  ever  to  be  admitted,  as  a  meritorious  cause  or  ground 
of  their  forgiveness  ;  the  answer  is  easy.  Christ's  death  is  a  per- 
fect cause  or  ground  of  our  forgiveness.  So  far  as  merit  is  con- 
cerned, our  righteousness,  our  good  works  are  not  needed,  nay, 
they  are  expressly  excluded  from  having  any  influence.  Those 
who  are  saved  do  nothing  which  renders  them  deserving  of  the 
divine  favor,  or  gives  them  any  claim  to  it  on  the  ground  of  jus- 
tice. They  are  saved  wholly  through  the  blood  of  Christ.  His 
obedience  unto  death  laid  a  complete  foundation  for  our  forgive- 
ness, and  we  can  add  nothing  to  it.  If  this  is  what  is  meant  by 
Christ's  dying  for  his  people  absolutely  or  unconditionally,  then 


4S2  ATONEMENT. 

undoubtedly  he  did  this.  And  if  the  meaning  is  that  he  died  for 
them  "with  an  unalterable  purpose  actually  to  save  them,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  this  was  the  case.  But  if  the  meaning  of  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  he  so  died  for  them,  and  so  purchased  and  so 
designed  to  purchase  salvation  for  them,  that  nothing  is  required 
of  them  in  order  to  their  actually  possessing  eternal  hfe  ;  then  the 
answer  must  be  negative.  For  the  word  of  God  everywhere 
requires  a  duty  of  sinners,  and  represents  it  as  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  they  should  repent  and  believe  in  order  to  their  obtain- 
ing salvation ;  and  that  which  is  required  of  them  in  order  to 
their  obtaining  salvation,  may  very  properly,  and  in  accordance 
with  good  usage,  be  called  a  condition  of  salvation.  A  condition^ 
in  this  use  of  the  word,  is  that  which  is  to  be  done  as  requisite  to 
some  other  thing  ;  that  which  must  exist  as  a  necessary  adjunct 
of  something  else.  The  word  terms  is  often  used  in  a  similar 
sense.  When  the  Scriptures  require  repentance  of  sinners  in 
order  to  their  forgiveness,  and  declare  that  except  they  repent 
they  shall  perish,  the  exact  sense  of  condition,  as  here  employed, 
is  clearly  suggested.  All  idea  of  merit  is  excluded.  A  condition 
may  be  meritorious  in  some  cases,  but  not  here.  In  this  sense, 
then,  Christ  did  not  die  for  the  elect  or  procure  salvation  for  them 
absolutely  and  unconditionally ;  that  is,  he  did  not  do  it  so 
as  to  supersede  the  necessity  of  repentance  and  faith  on  their 
part,  as  requisite  to  their  enjoying  eternal  life. 

Another  point  of  inquiry  is,  whether  there  is  any  important 
sense,  in  which  Christ  died  for  his  chosen  people  in  distinction 
from  others.  The  parties  in  the  controversy  generally  agree  that 
there  is.  He  died  for  his  pecuhar  people  with  a  gracious  and 
unalterable  design  actually  to  save  them  ;  —  not  however  to  save 
them  unconditionally^  that  is,  whether  they  repent  and  believe  or 
not,  but  to  save  them  in  the  manner,  or  on  the  conditions  or  terms 
stated  in  the  gospel  —  their  compliance  with  those  terms  being 
secured  by  his  purpose,  as  a  part  of  the  free  and  full  salvation 
which  he  gives.  In  this  respect  then  there  is  a  marked  distinction. 
He  died  for  those  who  were  given  him  of  the  Father  —  he  laid 
down  his  life  for  the  sheep,  with  an  ultimate  design  or  destination 
which  related  to  no  others. 


IS    IT    GENERAL,    OR    PARTICULAR?  493 

We  come  then  to  the  question  which  is  of  so  much  special  in- 
terest, whether  Christ  died  for  the  world  at  large,  or  for  human 
beings  indiscriminately,  in  any  sense  ?  And  if  so  in  what  sense  ? 
This  is  the  main  question,  and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  only  im- 
portant question,  upon  which  there  can  be  any  diiference  of  opin- 
ion among  those  who  have  any  proper  behef  of  the  Scripture 
doctrine  of  atonement.  They  are  agreed  that  Christ  died  for  the 
elect,  and  that  he  died  for  them  in  a  peculiar  sense.  They 
are  agreed  that  notwithstanding  this  peculiar  sense  in  which  he 
died  for  them,  repentance  and  faith  are  required  of  them  in  order 
to  their  obtaining  forgiveness  and  eternal  life.  They  are  agreed, 
too,  that  he  did  not  so  die  for  all  men  that  they  will  all  be  finally 
saved,  and  that  he  did  not  die  with  a  determination  actually  to 
save  all.  What  point  of  any  consequence  then  remains,  except 
the  one  just  stated,  namely,  whether  Christ  in  any  sense  ivhatever 
died  for  the  whole  ivorld. 

For  the  sake  of  making  the  point  now  under  consideration  as 
plain  as  possible,  I  shall,  for  the  present,  lay  aside  the  word 
atonement,  which  has  become  ambiguous,  its  common  use  being 
somewhat  different  from  its  use  in  Scripture  ;  and  I  shall  state 
the  d[uestion  thus  :  Had  the  death  of  Christ  any  respect  whatever 
to  the  human  race  generally  ?  Had  it  any  influence  —  did  it 
produce  any  effect,  and  if  so,  what  effect,  upon  the  condition  of 
mankind  at  large  —  upon  those  who  will  not  be  saved,  as  well  as 
upon  those  who  will  be  saved  ?  This,  I  think,  frees  the  question 
from  needless  obscurity,  and  presents  it  in  the  clearest  light  possible. 
Accordingly,  if  it  appears  from  the  word  of  God,  that  the  state 
or  condition  of  the  world  at  large  is  in  any  respect  different  from 
what  it  would  have  been,  had  not  Christ  died,  —  if  it  appears 
that  his  death  has  had  any  influence  upon  the  condition  of  all 
men ;  then  his  death  had  a  real  and  manifest  relation  to  all  men, 
and,  in  this  respect,  he  died  for  all.  Is  then  the  condition  of  the 
whole  world  —  are  the  circumstances  of  human  beings  univer- 
sally different  in  any  respect  from  what  they  would  have  been, 
had  there  been  no  death  of  a  Mediator  ?  Has  Christ's  deathi 
had  any  influence  upon  the  state  of  the  world  at  large  ?     Those- 

VOL.  n.  42 


494  ATONEMENT. 

•who  will  submit  to  be  guided  by  the  word  of  God,  and  will  take 
pains  to  think  and  judge  candidly  on  this  subject,  will,  I  appre- 
hend, find  no  difficulty  in  admitting  the  following  positions. 

1.  The  death  of  Christ  had  such  an  influence,  that  forgive- 
ness and  eternal  life  may  he  truly  and  consistently  offered  to  all 
men.  This  offer  of  salvation  is  actually  made  to  all  by  the  in- 
spired writers,  and  is  made  in  a  variety  of  the  most  explicit 
declarations.  This  is  fully  admitted  by  those  who  hold  most 
strictly  to  a  limited  atonement,  and  say  that  Christ  died  only  for 
the  elect.*  Nor  do  the  sacred  writers  merely  offer  salvation. 
They  invite  and  beseech  all  to  whom  the  gospel  comes,  to  receive 
the  gift  of  eternal  hfe.  Now  had  there  been  no  Saviour  provided, 
and  had  the  divine  administration  proceeded  directly  and  only 
according  to  the  principles  of  law,  there  would  have  been  no  such 
proposal  of  mercy  to  offenders  —  no  offer  of  forgiveness  and  no 
gracious  invitation  and  entreaty  to  accept  it.  We  hear  of  no 
offer  or  invitation  of  this  kind  to  the  angels  who  fell.  And  no 
man  who  soundly  believes  the  general  principles  of  revelation, 
can  suppose  that  such  an  offer  would  ever  have  been  made  to 
fallen  men,  had  it  not  been  for  the  intervention  of  a  Saviour. 
Now  surely  the  condition  of  those  transgressors  who  have  this 
free  offer  of  salvation  presented  to  them,  and  who  are  thus  invited 
and  entreated  to  accept  it,  is  widely  different  from  those  to  whom 
no  such  overture  is  or  can  be  made.  And  this  difference  is 
caused  by  the  mediation  of  Christ ;  it  is  the  effect  of  his  expiatory 
death.     Thus  far  then  it  is  clear,  that  the  death  of  Christ  has 

*  I  am  happy  to  quote  here  a  passage  from  the  Rev.  R.  S.  Candlish,  D.  D.  of 
Edinburgh,  who  earnestly  maintains  the  doctrine  of  a  limited  atonement.  In 
his  recent  work  on  the  Atonement  he  says :  "  That  the  death  of  Christ  has  a 
certain  reference  to  all  men  universally  —  that  it  has  a  certain  bearing  even  upon 
the  lost  —  we  must  hold  and  maintain;  because  we  maintain  that  it  lays  the 
foundation  for  the  offer  of  the  gospel  to  all  men  universally,  and  lays  the  founda- 
tion for  that  offer  being  honest  and  free  on  the  part  of  God.  This  could  not  be, 
without  some  sort  of  relation  existing  between  the  death  of  Christ  and  every 
impenitent  and  unbelieving  man  who  is  called  to  receive  the  gospel."  He  does 
not  undertake  to  explain  that  relation,  only  that  it  is  such  as  to  lay  a  foundation 
for  the  gospel  offer.  See  his  work  on  the  Atonement,  p.  137,  2d  edit.  Edinburgh, 
1845. 


IS    IT    GENERAL,     OR     PARTICULAR?  495 

had  an  influence  upon  the  condition  of  all  men.  And  in  this 
sense  he  died  for  all  —  that  is,  he  so  died  for  all,  that  in  conse- 
quence of  his  death,  the  gracious  ofier  of  salvation  may  be  and  is 
made  to  all. 

2.  In  consequence  of  Chnsfs  death,  any  sinners,  all  sinners, 
may  have  eternal  life  if  they  ivill  believe,  consistently  with  the 
perfections  of  God  and  the  principles  of  his  government.  This 
is  implied  in  the  fact  above  stated,  that  salvation  is  offered  to  all, 
and  that  all  are  invited  to  receive  it.  Who  can  think  it  consistent 
for  any  king  or  ruler  to  make  a  public  offer  of  forgiveness  to 
offenders,  and  to  send  forth  a  messenger  to  urge  them  to  accept 
it,  when,  after  all,  that  king  knows  it  would  be  incompatible  with 
his  justice  and  honor,  and  the  good  of  his  kingdom,  actually 
to  forgive  those  to  whom  the  offer  is  made  ?  Who  especially  can 
think  such  a  procedure  consistent  with  the  character  of  God  ? 
The  free  offer  he  makes  of  forgiveness  to  sinners  in  general  most 
certainly  implies,  that  they  may  safely  and  properly  have  forgive- 
ness, if  they  will  accept  it.  But  how  could  they  be  safely  and 
properly  forgiven,  and  how  could  anything  be  said  or  done 
implying  that  they  may  be  forgiven,  tvithout  the  shedding  of 
blood  ?  Whatever  they  might  do,  they  could  have  no  exemption 
from  punishment,  if  Christ  had  not  died.  Here,  then,  is  an  effect 
of  the  death  of  Christ,  which  is  as  extensive  as  the  human  race. 
In  consequence  of  that  momentous  event,  salvation  may  be  offered 
to  sinners  indiscriminately ;  and  any  sinners  who  will  comply 
with  the  terms  proposed,  may  consistently  be  saved.  Those  who 
do  comply  are  saved.  Others  might,  on  the  same  terms,  be  saved 
as  consistently  as  they.  The  offer  is  the  same  to  all.  The  con- 
ditions of  salvation  required  of  all,  are  also  the  same.  !From  this 
we  conclude,  that  the  principles  of  the  divine  government  would 
admit  of  the  salvation  of  all,  on  the  same  conditions.  The  death  of 
Christ,  then,  must  have  had  a  general  influence,  an  influence  which 
respected  mankind  at  large,  and  which  opened  the  door  of  mercy 
for  the  whole  fallen  race,  and  which  rendered  it  as  consistent  for 
one  sinner  to  be  actually  saved,  as  another,  for  all  as  for  any,  on 
the  same  terms.     In  this  respect,  the  death  of  Christ  evidently 


496  ATONEMENT. 

affected  all  alike  ;  that  is,  it  put  all  into  a  state  iii  which  they 
may  obtain  salvation,  on  the  terms  and  in  the  manner  prescribed. 

If  I  rightly  understand  the  teachings  of  revelation,  the  death 
of  Christ  did  then,  in  the  respect  above  mentioned,  relate  to  all 
men  alike.  It  prepared  the  way  for  all,  on  the  same  terms,  to  be 
forgiven  consistently  with  the  honor  of  God's  law.  It  procured 
the  free  offer  of  salvation  for  all  —  an  offer  stamped  ivith  divine 
sincerity  and  truth ;  an  offer  which  might  consistently  and  pro- 
perly, be  carried  into  effect  on  the  terms  prescribed.  And  it  ren- 
dered it  proper,  that  the  messengers  of  Christ  shoidd  make  the 
proclamation  of  mercy  to  human  beings  in  every  place,  without 
distinction,  and  should  invite  and  entreat  them,  one  as  well  as 
another,  to  receive  it. 

But  this  general  design  of  the  atonement,  and  the  equal  respect, 
above  stated,  Avhich  it  had  to  the  case  of  sinners  universallyj 
does  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  will  be  treated  alike  by  the 
providence  of  God,  or  that  all  will  share  alike  in  the  influence  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  It  does  not  imply,  that  the  purpose  of  God 
respecting  the  actual  bestowment  of  spiritual  blessings,  was  the 
same  as  to  all  men.  The  general  provision  is  one  thing ;  the 
divine  influence  which  disposes  men  to  avail  themselves  of  that 
provision,  is  another  thing.  The  first  has  such  an  effect  upon  the 
condition  of  men  in  relation  to  the  violated  law  and  its  penalty, 
that  any  of  them  may,  in  the  way  pointed  out,  be  consistently 
pardoned  and  saved.  The  other  has  an  effect  upon  their  personal 
character.  It  rencAvs  their  heart,  and  unites  them  to  Christ  by 
faith.  The  one,  therefore,  may  be  general ;  the  other  must  be 
limited  and  particular,  — just  as  much  so  as  actual  salvation  is. 
What  I  would  say  on  this  subject  may  be  summarily  expressed 
thus :  The  death  of  Christ,  as  to  its  direct  influence  in  vindica- 
ting the  law  and  justice  of  God,  so  far  as  to  open  the  door  of 
mercy  and  to  procure  the  offer  of  forgiveness  and  eternal  life, 
affects  all  ahke.  As  to  its  application,  or  its  actual  results,  and 
as  to  the  design  of  God  in  regard  to  its  ultimate  efficacy,  it  has  an 
essentially  different  respect  to  those  who  are  given  to  Christ,  and 
who  will  be  saved,  from  what  it  has  to  others. 


IS     IT     GENERAL,    OR    PARTICULAR?  497 

Thus  far  I  have  discussed  the  subject  on  the  ground  of  general 
principles  derived  from  the  word  of  God.  But  I  much  prefer  a 
method  which  is  more  directly  and  more  obviously  Scriptural. 

Let  us  then  examine  the  Bible,  and  see  how  this  subject  is 
treated  there. 

First.  There  are  many  passages  which  represent,  that  a 
merciful  provision  is  made  by  Christ  for  the  salvation  of  onen  in 
general.  — fo?'  men  indiscriminately,  and  without  any  limitation^ 
except  in  the  terms  on  which  its  blessings  are  to  be  enjoyed. 
John  3 :  16  ;  "  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only 
begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  on  him  should  not  perish, 
but  have  eternal  life."  No  words  could  more  clearly  and  une- 
quivocally set  forth  a  general  measure  of  divine  mercy  —  an  act 
of  God's  love  towards  the  human  race  at  large.  If  the  expression 
that  "  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten 
Son,"  leaves  any  doubt  as  to  the  general  bearing  of  the  gift,  that 
doubt  is  removed  by  the  expression  which  immediately  follows, 
and  which  teaches  the  wide  reach  of  the  merciful  provision.  God 
—  "  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him 
should  not  perish,  but  have  eternal  life."  It  is  as  much  as  to 
say  ;  if  any  sinner,  whoever  he  may  be,  will  believe  in  Christ,  he 
shall  be  saved.  This  general  act  of  God's  love  towards  mankind 
is  expressed  in  various  ways  in  other  texts.  John  1 :  29  ;  "  Be- 
hold the  Lamb  of  God  which  taketh  away  the  sin  of  the  world." 
It  might,  as  I  have  before  signified,  be  more  properly  rendered ; 
Beliold  the  Lamb  of  God  which  maketh  expiation  for  the  sin  of 
the  world.  The  expiation  in  one  respect  is  general  —  it  has  a 
relation  to  the  world  at  large,  to  sinners  indiscriminately.  The 
declaration  of  Christ,  John  6  :  51,  is  of  the  same  import ;  "  I  am 
the  living  bread  which  came  down  from  heaven  ;  if  any  man  eat 
of  this  bread  he  shall  live  forever.  And  the  bread  which  I  will 
give  him  is  my  flesh,  which  I  will  give  for  the  life  of  the  world.'^ 
2  Cor.  5 :  19  ;  "  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  unto 
himself.  1  John  2  :  2  ;  "  And  he  is  the  propitiation  for  our  sins, 
and  not  for  ours  only,  but  for  the  sins  of  the.whole  woi-ld.*'  He 
is  the  propitiation  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world  in  such  a  sense, 

42* 


498  ATONEMENT. 

that  to  any  sinners  and  to  all  sinners  forgiveness  may  be  freely 
offered,  "with  the  assurance,  that  they  shall  actually  enjoy  the 
blessings  of  eternal  life,  if  they  will  comply  with  the  necessary 
conditions.  1  John  4 :  14  ;  "  God  sent  his  Son  to  be  the  Saviour 
of  the,  ivorldy 

Secondly.  Tlie  inspired  writers  speak  familiarly  of  this  work 
of  divine  mercy,  as  actually  relating  to  those  who  perish,  or  who 
may  be  supposed  to  perish.  Rom.  14 :  15  ;  "  Destroy  not  him 
with  thy  meat  for  lohom  Christ  died.''''  1  Cor.  8 :  11 ;  "  And 
through  thy  knowledge  shall  thy  weak  brother  perish,  for  whom 
Christ  died.'''  Peter  speaks  of  false  teachers,  who  deny  the  Lord 
that  bought  them,  and  bring  upon  themselves  swift  destruction.  2 
Pet.  2:1.  They  are  false  teachers  and  bring  destruction  upon 
themselves,  and  a  very  aggravated  destruction,  because  they 
denied  the  Lord  that  bought  or  redeemed  them.  Is  it  conceivable 
that  the  inspu'ed  writers  would  speak  in  this  manner,  if  the 
death  of  the  Redeemer  had  no  relation  whatever  to  those  who 
will  finally  perish,  and  produced  no  effect  upon  their  circum- 
stances ? 

Thirdly.  It  appears  irreconcilable  with  sincerity,  for  Grod  to 
offer  salvation  to  perishing  siyiners,  and  to  invite  and  command 
the?n  to  accept  it,  unless  Christ  so  died  for  them,  and  so  expiated 
their  sins,  that  they  may  consistently  be  saved :  to  offer  them  Avhat 
was  never,  in  any  sense,  provided  for  them  —  to  invite  them  to 
receive  a  gift,  which  he  could  not  consistently  bestoiv,  though  they 
should  comply  mth  the  conditions  proposed  —  to  command  his 
servants  to  go  into  all  the  world  and  proclaim  glad  tidings  to 
every  creature,  when  there  could  be  no  glad  tidings  except  to  a 
part. 

Thus  far  as  to  the  provision  which  God  has  made  by  the 
appointment  of  a  Mediator  for  the  benefit  of  the  world  —  the 
human  race  in  a  general  view.  This  provision  is  stated  in  the 
Scriptures  in  various  forms,  and  in  language  very  definite  and 
emphatical.  And  the  inspired  writers  treat  it  as  a  practical 
truth,  that  is,  they  make  it  the  ground  of  a  free  offer  of  forgive- 
ness and  eternal  life  to  all  men  without  distinction ;  which  offer 


IS    IT    GENERAL,    OR    PARTICULAR?  499 

they  could  never  have  made,  had  not  Christ  by  his  death  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  free  exercise  of  divine  mercy.  On  this 
same  ground,  ministers  of  the  gospel,  make  a  proclamation  of 
peace  on  earth  and  good  will  to  all  men.  Wlierever  they  find 
human  beings,  they  tell  them  that  Christ  has  died  for  sin,  the  just 
for  the  unjust,  and  endeavor  to  persuade  them  to  come  and 
partake  of  the  blessings  which  he  has  procured  and  offered. 
They  lift  up  their  voice  in  the  name  of  God  and  proclaim  the 
glad  tidings  to  men.  "  Whosoever  will,  let  him  take  of  the 
water  of  life."  "  Turn  ye,  for  why  will  ye  die  ?  "  Wherever 
we  find  human  beings,  we  are  authorized  to  make  these  overtures 
to  them,  without  knowing  or  inquiring  whether  they  are  elected 
to  salvation  or  not.  And  God,  who  knows  who  are  elected,  and 
who  are  not,  makes  these  overtures  equally  to  all.  "  Come,  for 
all  things  are  ready."  Such  is  the  general  provision  —  such  the 
influence  which  Christ's  death  has  upon  the  circumstances  and 
prospects  of  this  apostate  world. 

But  every  general  provision  is  subject  to  be  qualified  by  spe- 
cific conditions,  or  to  be  otherwise  limited.  And  both  the  gen- 
eral provision  and  the  qualifying  conditions  and  other  limitations, 
are  expressive  and  equally  expressive  of  the  mind  of  God  — 
the  general  provision  in  one  point  of  view,  the  qualifying  condi- 
tions and  limitations  in  another  point  of  \dew.  As  to  the  present 
case,  some  texts  state  the  general  provision  made  by  Christ's 
death,  and  also  the  particular  conditions  on  which  that  provision 
will  turn  to  our  benefit.  Such  is  the  passage  John  3  :  16 ;  "  God  so 
loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever 
believeth  on  him.  should  not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life." 
The  provision  was  general^  for  the  tvorlcl ;  but  the  enjoyment  of 
its  blessings  is  hmited  in  the  manner  specified.  There  are  some 
texts  which  represent  the  general  provision  only.  But  all  such 
texts  are  to  be  qualified  by  other  texts,  which  point  out  the  parti- 
cular limitations.  For  example.  Some  texts  affirm  that  Christ 
gave  himself  a  ransom  for  all  —  that  he  is  the  propitiation  for  the 
sins  of  the  whole  world.  But  these  texts  must  not  be  taken  in 
the  most  extensive,  absolute  sense,  as  though  the  Scriptures  said 


500  ATONEMENT. 

nothing  else  on  the  subject,  but  are  to  be  qualified  by  those  which 
bring  into  view  the  particular  limitations,  such  as  these  :  "  He 
that  believeth  shall  be  saved."  "  Let  the  wicked  turn  to  the 
Lord,  and  he  will  have  mercy  upon  him."  "  Repent  and  be 
converted,  that  your  sins  may  be  blotted  out."  You  observe  that 
in  these  texts  the  particular  terms  of  salvation  on  man's  part  are 
mentioned,  without  any  express  reference  to  the  death  of  Christ, 
or  the  provision  he  made  for  our  salvation.  But  if  we  would 
interpret  the  Bible  justly,  we  must  not  derive  our  opinion  from 
texts  of  one  particular  character,  to  the  neglect  of  other  texts 
relating  to  the  subject,  but  from  all  the  texts  taken  together. 
This  connected  view  of  diflferent  texts  is  required  by  a  due  rever- 
ence for  the  authority  of  God's  word  ;  and  it  cannot  be  neglected 
by  any  sincere  inquirers  after  the  truth.  It  is  obvious  that  any 
other  way  of  handling  the  subject  must  expose  us  to  palpable 
error  on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 

While  then  we  admit  the  propitiation  for  sin  to  be,  in  one 
respect,  general ;  while  we  admit  that  the  atonement  is  all-suffi- 
cient, and  without  any  limitations  arising  from  its  own  nature  ;  we 
must  still  remember,  that  the  actual  benefits  of  that  provision  are 
necessarily  connected  with  conditions,  and  of  course  limited  to 
those  by  whom  the  conditions  are  performed.  If"  the  conditions 
are  neglected,  it  is  certain  that  the  blessings  of  redemption  cannot 
be  enjoyed.  It  is  utterly  impossible  for  sinners  to  partake  of  a 
holy  salvation,  without  holiness  of  heart ;  and  hohness  of  heart  in 
this  case  will  operate  in  the  way  of  repentance  and  faith.  What- 
ever may  be  the  case,  therefore,  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  atone- 
ment, and  the  extent  of  the  propitiation  by  which  salvation  was 
procured  and  profiered  ;  the  actual  salvation  of  any  of  the  human 
race,  even  of  those  who  are  in  the  divine  counsels  destined  to 
enjoy  it,  must  be  conditional.  They  must  forsake  sin  and  beheve 
in  Christ,  or  they  cannot  enjoy  happiness  in  the  presence  of  God. 
These  conditions  are  not  arbitrarily  imposed.  The  nature  and 
circumstances  of  the  case  render  them  indispensably  necessary. 
Requiring  men  to  perform  these  conditions  is  in  truth  only  requir- 
ing them  to  he  saved  —  it  is  only  requiring  them  to  receive  salvar 
tion  and  to  enjoy  eternal  life. 


IS     IT     GENERAL,     OR    PARTICULAR?  501 

I  have  referred  to  other  limitations  besides  those  which  are  in- 
dicated bj  the  express  conditions  connected  with  the  general 
proffer  of  salvation.  The  limitations  intended  are  set  forth  in  va- 
rious passages  of  Scripture,  which  plainly  teach,  that  the  mission 
and  death  of  the  Mediator  had  a  special  reference  to  the  chosen 
people  of  God  ;  that  Christ  died  for  them  in  particular  —  died  for 
them  with  a  gracious  and  unalterable  design  to  save  them  —  died 
for  them,  I  may  say,  efficaeiously.  The  following  are  some  of  the 
texts  which  express  this  hmited  and  definite  designation  of  the  atone- 
ment, or,  more  exactly,  of  Chrisfs  death.  Isa.  53  :  8  and  11 ; 
"  For  the  transgression  of  mi/  people  was  he  stricken."  "  By  his 
knowledge  shall  my  righteous  servant  justify  many ;  for  he  shall 
bear  their  miquities."  Matt.  1 :  21 ;  "He  shall  save  his  people 
from  then-  sins."  Acts  20  :  28  ;  "  To  feed  the  church  of  God, 
which  he  purchased  with  his  own  blood."  Ephes.  5  :  25  ;  "  Christ 
also  loved  the  church,  and  gave  himself  for  it,  that  he  might  sanc- 
tify and  cleanse  it."  John  10  :  11,  15  ;  "  I  am  the  good  shep- 
herd.—  The  good  shepherd  giveth  his  life  for  the  sheep,"  —  "  I 
lay  down  my  life  for  the  sheep."  Tit.  2  :  14  ;  "  Who  gave  him- 
self for  us,  that  he  might  redeem  us  from  all  iniquity,  and  purify 
unto  himself  a  peculiar  people,  zealous  of  good  works."  Rom. 
5:8;  "  But  God  commendeth  his  love  towards  ms,  in  that,  while 
we  were  yet  smners,  Christ  died  for  ms."  Rom.  8  :  32  ;  "  He 
that  spared  not  his  own  Son,  but  dehvered  him  up  for  us  all,  how 
shall  he  not  with  him  also  freely  give  us  all  things."  1  John  4 : 
10  ;  "  Herein  is  love,  not  that  we  loved  God,  but  that  he  loved  w«, 
and  sent  his  Son  to  be  the  propitiation  for  our  sins."  The  words 
we,  us  and  our  in  these  passages  are  very  evidently  used  not  with 
reference  to  mankind  at  large,  but  with  a  special  and  restricted 
reference  to  those  who  are  saved.  The  writer  is  speaking  to  and 
of  believers. 

Now  it  seems  to  me  evident,  that  this  special  and  restricted  re- 
ference or  designation  of  Christ's  death  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
the  general  design  and  influence  of  it,  as  above  explained.  Nor 
is  there  anything  singular  in  such  a  two-fold  sense  of  the  same 
word  or  phrase.     Take  for  example  the  expression,  Grod  loves  the 


502  ATONEMENT. 

world.  There  is  abundant  evidence  that  he  does  love  all  and 
every  one  of  the  human  race ;  that  he  has  true  benevolence  to- 
wards them  ;  that  he  takes  pleasure  not  in  their  misery,  but  in 
their  happiness ;  and  that  when  we  have  a  hearty  love  and  kind- 
ness towards  all  men,  we  do  but  imitate,  in  a  humble  measure,  the 
unbounded  goodness  of  our  heavenly  Father.  He  truly  loves  all 
men.  But  he  loves  the  elect,  those  whom  "  he  has  chosen  to  sal- 
vation," in  a  special  manner.  His  love  towards  them  has  in  it  a 
purpose  to  give  them  eternal  life.  He  loves  them  efficaciously  and 
mvingly.  Now  surely  this  love  of  God  to  those  whom  he  has 
given  to  Christ  as  his  peculiar  people,  is  none  the  less  special  and 
discriminating,  and  none  the  less  precious,  and  none  the  less  cer- 
tainly productive  of  saving  good  to  their  souls,  because  he  truly 
loves  the  whole  human  race,  though  not  with  the  same  special 
and  gracious  purpose.  In  hke  manner,  Christ's  dying  or  making 
atonement  for  his  chosen  people  specially^  and  with  a  gracious 
purpose  to  save  them,  does  not  interfere  in  the  least  with  his  dying 
in  a  general  sense  for  the  whole  world,  and  thus  laying  a  founda- 
tion for  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all,  and  opening  wide  the  door  of 
mercy,  so  that  whosoever  will  may  enter  in  and  be  saved. 

The  views  which  have  been  taken  of  this  subject,  will  help  us  at 
once  to  see  the  utter  fallacy  of  the  argument,  by  which  men  some- 
times attempt  to  prove  universal  salvation.  One  class  of  Univer- 
salists  urge  in  defence  of  their  scheme  that  Christ  died  for  all  — 
was  a  ransom  for  all,  etc.,  and  that  this  design  and  extent  of  the 
atonement  imply  that  all  men  will  actually  be  saved. 

To  expose  the  inconclusiveness  of  this  argument,  it  is  only  ne- 
cessary to  consider  the  Scripture  representations  which  have  al- 
ready been  noticed.  The  substance  of  what  they  reveal  is,  that 
God  has  given  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  on 
him  might  be  saved  ;  that  Christ  so  died  for  all,  that  all  may  have 
the  offer  of  salvation,  and  may  actually  be  saved,  if  they  will  re- 
pent and  beheve.  These  conditions  are  as  real  as  the  general 
provision,  and  are  always  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  it.  Of 
course  the  general  provision  can  avail  nothing  as  to  individuals, 
except  where  the   conditions  are,  through  divine  grace,  actually 


IS     IT     GENERAL,     OR     PARTICULAR?  503 

fulfilled.  If  then  we  would  determine  whether  all  men  are  to  be 
saved,  Ave  must  determine  whether  all  men  repent  and  believe. 
For,  according  to  the  word  of  God,  it  is  as  true,  as  it  would  be  if 
there  had  been  no  atonement,  that  the  impenitent  and  unholy 
shall  perish.  Just  as  it  is  in  the  natural  world.  Although  God 
has  provided  the  sun  to  enlighten  the  world  ;  if  any  man  should 
choose  to  live  in  a  dark  dungeon,  he  would  fail  to  enjoy  the  advan- 
tages of  the  light.  And  although  God  has  provided  an  abundance 
of  water,  if  any  man  should  refuse  to  drink,  he  would  die  of  thirst. 
The  Scripture  representations  imply  the  same  thing,  as  to  the 
general  provision  which  God  has  made  for  the  spiritual  welfare  of 
men,  and  as  to  the  way,  and  the  only  way,  in  which  we  are  to  se- 
cure the  benefits  of  that  provision  to  ourselves.  A  rich  man  pro- 
vides a  great  supper,  and  invites  many  to  come  and  partake.  But 
those  who  refuse  to  comply  with  the  invitation,  lose  the  benefits  of 
the  general  provision  and  the  general  invitation.  A  man  entrusts 
his  servants  with  various  talents  ;  but  none  can  enjoy  his  approba- 
tion, except  those  who  make  a  right  use  of  the  talents.  In  other 
places,  the  Scriptures  lay  aside  metaphors  and  allegories,  and 
teach  plainly,  that  although  Christ  has,  in  an  important  sense,  died 
for  all,  and  made  propitiation  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  sinners 
cannot  be  saved  unless  they  repent  —  that  they  cannot  escape,  if 
they  neglect  so  great  salvation.  It  is  perfectly  clear  then,  from 
the  word  of  God,  that  the  salvation  of  all  men  cannot  by  any 
means  be  inferred  from  the  extent  and  all-sufficiency  of  the  pro- 
vision made  by  the  death  of  Chnsb,  or  from  the  unlimited  offers  of 
the  Gospel,  and  that  it  can  be  proved  in  no  other  way,  than  by 
proving  that  all  men  do  actually  repent  and  believe.  Just  so  far 
as  there  is  a  want  of  evidence  that  all  men  are  penitent  and  holy, 
there  is  want  of  evidence  that  all  will  be  saved.  And  if  we  have 
reason,  either  from  the  Bible  or  from  a  knowledge  of  facts,  to  con- 
clude that  any  of  the  human  race  live  and  die  impenitent,  we 
have  just  so  much  reason  to  conclude,  that  they  will  fail  to  enjoy 
the  benefits  of  Christ's  death.  For  Christ  died  for  all  in  such  a 
sense  only,  that  whosoever  believeth  on  him  shall  have  eternal 
life.     There  is  no  evidence  from  the  Scriptures,  taken  as  a  whole, 


504  ATONEMENT. 

that  Christ  died  with  a  purpose  or  expectation  actually  to  save  all. 
But  there  is  abundant  evidence  to  the  contrary.  The  fault  of 
TIniversalists  is,  that  they  infer  from  a  few  passages,  pressed  to  an 
extreme  construction,  a  doctrine  which  is  plainly  contradictory  to 
the  general  current  of  Scripture,  and  which  is  by  no  means  war- 
ranted even  by  the  passages  on  which  they  rely.  Their  opinion 
is  nothing  but  conjecture,  and  it  is  a  conjecture  totally  irreconcila- 
ble with  facts,  and  with  the  obvious,  practical  teachings  of  revela- 
tion. 


LECTURE    LXXXII. 


REMARKS     ON     THE     CONTROVERSY    RESPECTING    THE     EXTENT   OF 
THE   ATONEMENT,   AS   CONDUCTED    BY   THE   TWO   PARTIES. 

From  the  remarks  which  I  shall  now  oflfer,  it  will,  I  hope,  be 
made  to  appear,  that,  notwithstanding  the  difference  in  phraseolo- 
gy and  the  manner  of  reasoning,  there  is  in  fact  a  substantial 
agreement  among  evangelical  Christians  as  to  all  points  of  conse- 
quence respecting  the  atonement ;  that,  if  the  parties  are  to  con- 
tinue the  dispute,  they  ought  to  take  pains  to  determine  before- 
hand, what  they  are  to  dispute  about ;  and  that,  if  both  parties 
will  endeavor  to  promote  union  among  the  followers  of  Christ  by 
exerting  that  measure  of  pacific  influence  which  they  may  do  con- 
sistently with  Christian  fidelity,  the  way  will  soon  be  prepared  to 
drop  the  controversy  altogether,  and  thus  to  save  for  other  and 
more  important  objects,  the  time  and  strength  which  would  other- 
wise be  spent  in  strife. 

There  are  two  recent  and  well-known  writers,  Symington  and 
Jenkyn,  who  may  properly  enough  be  taken  as  representatives  of 
the  two  parties  that  have  been  engaged  in  this  controversy.  These 
authors  are  highly  respectable,  and  they  lay  before  us  very  clearly 
the  amount  of  what  has  been  said  on  both  sides  of  the  question  at 
issue. 

Symington  thinks  proper,  as  many  others  do,  to  use  the  phrase, 
Christ  died  for  us,  as  including  not  only  the  general  provision  of 
divine  blessings,  but  the  design  of  Christ  actually  to  bestow  them ;  as 

VOL.  II.  43 


506  ATONEMENT. 

not  only  opening  the  door  of  mercy,  but  designing  to  bring  those  for 
whom  he  died,  actually  to  come  in  at  that  door.     Thus  the  author 
holds  that  Christ  died  for  those  only,  who  are  chosen  to  salvation, 
and  who  will  actually  be  saved.     And  he  uses  the  word  atonement 
in  the  same  limited  sense.     He  carries  along  with  him  the  literal 
meaning  of  the  original  word,  translated  atonement,  in  Rom.  5 :  11 ; 
"  By  whom  we  have  now  received  reconciliation.^^     So  the  trans- 
lators render  the  word  in  the  preceding  verse  :  "  For  if  while  we 
were  enemies  we  were  reconciled  to  God,  QtarrjXldyrjuEv')  by  the 
death  of  his  Son,  much  more  being  reconciled  (^xaTaXXays'vzsg')  we 
shall  be  saved  through  him."     This  reconciliation  is  by  the  death 
of  Christ.     It  is  a  reconciliation  which  believers  have   actually 
received.     A  derivative  of  the  word  is  used  in  the  same  sense,  2 
Cor.  5  :  18,  19  ;  "  All  things  are  of  God,  who  hath  reconciled  us 
to  himself  (^xazaXXdhavrog^ ,  and  hath  given  to  us  the  ministry  of 
reconciliation  (^xaraXXayijg^  ;  to  wit,  that  God  was  in  Christ  re- 
conciling the  world  unto   himself,  not  imputing  their  trespasses 
unto  them."     This  primary   sense   of   the  word  is  regarded  by 
Symington  as  a  conclusive  argument  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of  a 
limited  atonement,  the  doctrine  that  Christ  died  only  for  the  elect. 
Now  what  I  have  to  remark,  is  this ;    that  if  the  word  atone- 
ment is  understood  exactly  in  the  sense   in  which  it  is  used  in 
Rom.  5  :  11,  and  in  the  sense  in  which  the  same  word  in  the  orig- 
inal is  used  in  other  places,  where  it  means  actual  reconciliation, 
such  as  believers  have  experienced  ;  then,  of  course,  it  is  limited 
to  those  who  are   thus  reconciled.     And  it  is  evident  that  Sym- 
ington understands  other  expressions,  such  as,  Christ  died  for  our 
sins  —  died  for  us — is  the  propitiation  for  our  sins,  etc.,  as  de- 
noting that  influence  of  his  death,  which  is  effectual  to  salvation. 
The  sense  in  which  he  employs  the  words  makes  a  limitation  neces- 
sary.    But  it  is  nothing  uncommon  that  a  word,  which  ordinarily 
denotes  a  particular  thing  which  is  accomplished,  is  used  to  denote 
the  means  of  its  accomplishment.     So  the  word  nazaXXay^^  recon- 
ciling, is  used  in  Rom.  11 :  15.     The  casting  away  of  the  Jews 
is  said  to  be  the  reconciling  of  the  world,  —  that  is,  the  means  of 
reconciling  the  worH.     And  why  may  we  not  use  the  word  atone- 


EVANGELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  507 

ment  in  theological  discourse,  in  the  same  way,  that  is  to  signify 
the  means  of  reconcihng  us  to  God,  namely,  the  death  of  Christ? 
And  why  may  we  not  consider  his  death  as  having  a  relation  to 
all  those,  whose  condition  was  in  any  important  respect  favorably 
affected  by  his  death  'i  And  why  may  we  not  properly  say,  in 
that  respect  he  died  for  all  men,  leaving  it  to  other  texts  to  deter- 
mine how  far  the  saving  eflScacy  of  his  death  extended  ?  And 
why  may  we  not  hence  come  to  this  conclusion,  that  Christ  in  a 
more  general  though  very  important  respect,  died  for  the  whole 
family  of  man,  but  that  he  died  for  his  chosen  people  in  a  definite 
and  peculiar  sense  ?  This  manner  of  speaking  would  convey 
the  idea  intended  in  a  manner  which  is  just  and  iutelligibie,  and 
"which  is  frequent  in  other  matters.  The  use  of  terms  in  different 
senses  is  rendered  necessary  by  the  poverty  of  language.  You 
will  find  it  impossible  to  discourse  freely  on  any  important  subject, 
without  giving  different  meanings,  or  different  shades  of  meaning, 
to  the  same  words  and  expressions.  And  if  it  is  asked  how  we 
can  on  this  principle  be  sure  of  rightly  understanding  the  sacred 
writers,  the  answer  is,  that  intelligent,  candid  men  will  easily  dis- 
cover their  meaning  from  the  general  current  of  their  thoughts, 
and  the  drift  of  their  discourse  ;  from  the  nature  of  the  subject, 
and  from  Avhat  they  say  of  it  in  other  ways.  Accordingly,  when 
they  declare  at  one  time,  that  Christ  died  for  the  whole  world,  or 
made  propitiation  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  and  at  another  time, 
that  he  laid  down  his  life  for  his  sheep,  that  is,  his  chosen  people, 
we  are  under  no  necessity  of  making  out,  that  the  Avorld  means 
only  his  chosen  people  in  every  part  of  the  world,  and  that  the 
two  expressions  are  not  only  to  be  applied  to  the  same  subject, 
but  that  they  mean  precisely  the  same  thing.  So  far  as  the  lan- 
guage and  the  consistency  of  the  writers  are  concerned,  we  may 
just  as  well  consider  the  first  expression  as  relating  to  all  human 
beings  without  distinction,  and  the  last,  as  relating  to  those  who 
will  be  saved  ;  the  first  implying,  that  he  died  for  all  men  in  one 
respect,  the  latter,  that  he  died  for  those  who  will  be  saved  in 
another  and  special  respect.  No  reason  can  arise  against  such 
an  interpretation  of  the  language  used  in  the  first  case,  from  the 


508  ATONEMENT. 

doctrine  of  election,  or  the  doctrine  that  Christ  died  for  his  own 
people  in  a  special  sense.  Nor  is  this  interpretation  any  depar- 
ture from  good  usage.  The  general  principles  of  philology  will 
fairly  admit  of  it.  I  say  then,  that  Symington  and  those  who 
agree  with  him,  have  in  reaUty  no  occasion  to  object  to  the  posi- 
tion, that  Christ,  in  a  certain  sense,  died  for  all  men.  For  they 
may  hold  just  what  they  mean  by  a  definite  or  limited  atonement, 
and  yet  may  consistently  admit,  that  he  died  for  all  men  in  anoth- 
er and  more  general  sense.  They  may  hold  that  the  death  of 
Christ  had  that  peculiar  relation  to  the  elect  which  their  doctrine 
implies,  and  yet  may  consistently  admit,  that  it  had  a  relation  of 
another  kind  to  the  whole  world.  And  is  not  this  the  view,  and 
the  only  vicAV,  which  fairly  agrees  with  the  various  representations 
of  the  Bible  taken  together?  If  those  who  believe  the  doctrine 
of  a  limited  or  definite  atonement  should  come  into  this  view  of 
the  subject,  as  I  apprehend  they  may  consistently,  they  would  not 
feel  it  necessary  to  put  an  unnatural  and  forced  sense  upon  the 
various  texts  which  teach  that  Christ  died  for  all  men.  Their 
doctrine,  maintained  with  Christian  candor,  would  perfectly  har- 
monize with  the  doctrine  for  which  I  have  contended,  as  to  the 
bearing  of  Christ's  death  upon  the  whole  human  race.  I  am  thus 
led  to  think  that  there  is  no  need  of  any  controversy  on  this  sub- 
ject among  those  who  embrace  the  great  doctrines  of  the  gospel 
on  other  subjects. 

But  I  must  further  and  very  particularly  remark,  that  Syming- 
ton himself  really  admits  all  that  we  mean  by  the  doctrine,  that 
Christ,  in  an  important  sense,  died  for  all  men,  —  commonly  called 
the  doctrine  of  a  general  atonement. 

Our  doctrine  is  precisel3'  this,  that  Christ's  death  had  such  a 
relation  to  the  whole  human  race,  that  eterftal  life  may  be  offered 
to  all ;  that  the  door  of  mercy  is  opened  to  all ;  that  all  may  be 
invited  to  believe  in  Christ ;  and  that  whosoever  beheveth  in  him 
shall,  on  the  ground  of  his  expiatory  sacrifice,  be  pardoned  and 
saved.  We  mean  that  Christ's  death  had  this  most  important 
influence  upon  the  human  race  at  large,  —  upon  the  non-elect  as 
well  as  the  elect.     The  day  of  salvation  is  given  to  all  who  hear 


EVANGELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  509 

the  gospel.  Pardon  is  offered  to  all  alike.  Opportunity  to  be 
saved  is,  under  the  gospel  dispensation,  afforded  to  all  alike  ;  so 
that  now,  where  revelation  is  enjoyed,  those  who  perish  will 
perish  not  merely  because  they  have  transgressed  the  moral  law, 
but  because  they  refuse  the  salvation  provided  and  offered. 

Now  Symington,  and  others  who  embrace  his  opinions,  do  really 
admit  and  maintain  all  this.  Symington  says  ;  "  We  hold  that 
the  sacrifice  of  the  Lord  Jesus  possessed  an  intrinsic  value  suf- 
ficient for  the  salvation  of  the  whole  world.  In  this  sense,  it  was 
adequate  to  the  redemption  of  every  human  being."  "  The  worth 
of  Christ's  atonement,"  he  says,  "  we  hold  to  be,  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  the  term,  infinite,  absolute,  all-sufficient."  "  We  regard 
the  atonement  of  Christ  as  sufficient  for  all.  This  all-sufficiency 
is  what  lays  the  foundation  for  the  unrestricted  universality  of 
the  gospel  call.  And  from  every  such  view  of  the  atonement,  as 
would  imply  that  it  was  not  sufficient  for  all,  or  that  there  was  not 
an  ample  warrant  in  the  invitations  of  the  gospel  for  all  to  look  to 
it  for  salvation,  we  utterly  dissent."  Symington  adopts  the  fol- 
lowing language  of  Wardlaw :  "  Such  is  my  impression  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  atonement,  that  were  all  the  guilt  of  all  mankind 
concentrated  in  my  own  person,  I  should  see  no  reason,  relying  on 
that  blood  which  cleanseth  from  all  sin,  to  indulge  despair." 

The  following  expressions  of  Symington  show  still  more  clearly 
what  his  views  are.  "  It  is  not  said  in  the  gospel  that  Christ 
died  with  the  intention  that  all  should  be  saved,  but  that  his 
atonement  is  a  sufficient  ground  of  salvation  to  all,  and  that  all 
who  rest  on  this  groimd  by  faith  shall  be  saved."  "  The  atone- 
ment of  Christ  being  sufficient  for  all,  is  with  propriety  made 
known  and  offered  to  the  acceptance  of  all."  "J.  sufficient  ground 
of  salvation  exists  ;  the  appropriate  means  of  salvation  are  pro- 
vided." And  the  reason  why  men  perish  in  their  sins  is  not,  in 
any  sense,  because  Christ  did  not  die  for  them,  but  because  they 
would  not  avail  themselves  of  the  merits  of  his  death."  He  says, 
too,  that  "  the  free,  full,  unhampered  proclamation  of  mercy  to  all 
men  proceeds  on  this  ground,  —  that  it  derives  all  its  consistency 
and  power  from  the  perfect,  all-sufficient  atonement  of  Christ." 

43* 


510  ATONEMENT. 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  these  and  other  passages,  Symington 
asserts  the  very  thing  intended  by  those  who  hold  to  the  doctrine 
that  Christ  died  for  all  men.  And  it  will  be  difficult  to  find  in 
their  writings  any  stronger  or  more  unequivocal  expressions  than 
what  are  found  in  the  work  of  this  excellent  author,  of  the  suf- 
ficiency of  the  atonement  for  the  salvation  of  all  men,  the  abun- 
dant provision  which  was  made  by  the  death  of  Christ  for  the 
eternal  hfe  of  all  who  will  accept  it,  and  the  obligation  of  all  who 
hear  the  gospel  to  receive  Christ  as  their  Saviour.  Nor  do  those 
who  advocate  an  unlimited  atonement  declare  more  explicitly  than 
Symington,  that  unbelievers  will  perish,  not  because  Christ  did  not 
die  for  them,  but  because  they  reject  Christ  and  refuse  his  offered 
salvation.  In  short,  the  practical  treatment  which  both  parties 
give  to  this  part  of  the  subject  is,  in  all  important  points,  the  same. 
Both  parties  tell  sinners  in  the  same  language,  that  by  the  death 
of  Christ  the  door  of  mercy  is  open  for  them  ;  that  salvation  is 
freely  and  sincerely  offered ;  that  whosoever  will  may  come  and 
take  of  the  w^ater  of  life  ;  that  the  merit  of  Christ's  death  is  infinite 
and  all-sufficient ;  that  they  all  have  a  full  warrant  to  believe  in 
him  ;  and  that  if  any  of  them,  even  the  chief  of  sinners,  perish,  it 
will  be  because  they  would  not  beheve.  The  advocates  of  a  de- 
finite or  limited  atonement  are,  in  their  feelings  and  in  their 
preaching,  as  far  as  any  others  from  circumscribing  the  value 
or  sufficiency  of  the  atonement,  and  from  denying  or  concealing 
tthe  fact,  that  Christ's  death  had  this  real  and  momentous  effect 
upon  all  men,  namely,  that  it  secured  to  them  the  offer  of  a  free 
and  full  salvation,  and  made  it  proper  that  we  should  invite  and 
beseech  all  alike,  the  non-elect  as  well  as  the  elect,  to  come  to 
'him  that  they  may  have  life. 

This  being  the  case,  an  important  question  arises,  namely,  what 
is  still  wanting  in  order  to  the  salvation  of  all  sinners  now  living, 
if  they  should  repent  ?  As  the  atonement  is  of  infinite  worth, 
and  is  allowed  to  be  sufficient  for  the  salvation  of  the  whole  world, 
can  anything  more  be  necessary  in  the  way  of  atonement  ?  Sup- 
pose it  were  the  design  of  God,  (I  make  the  supposition  for  the 
sake  of  illueytrating  the  principle  concerned,  as  Paul  did,  Gal. 


EVANQELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  511 

1 :  8,)  suppose  it  to  be  God's  gracious  design  to  save  all  the  non- 
elect  population  of  the  earth,  would  a  new  atoning  sacrifice  be 
required  on  their  account  ?  Would  it  be  necessary  that  the  Son 
of  God  should  again  suflfer  and  die  for  their  sins,  in  their  stead, 
and  that  in  a  manner  essentially  different  from  the  manner  in 
which  he  died  before  ?  And  if  so,  then  how  can  it  be  said  that 
the  atonement  already  made  is  sufficient  for  all  ?  As  God  has 
given  the  free  offer  of  salvation  to  all  on  the  ground  of  the  atone- 
ment which  Christ  has  made,  might  he  not  also  give  his  Spirit  to 
work  repentance  and  faith  in  them  on  the  same  ground  ?  Might 
not  the  blood  of  the  cross  operate  in  this  way,  as  well  as  in  the 
other  ?  In  a  word,  would  not  the  atonement,  just  as  it  is,  be  all 
that  would  be  called  for  in  order  to  the  salvation  of  any  sinners  on 
earth,  if  they  should  repent  and  believe  ?  Or  would  it,  after  all, 
be  indispensable  that  atoning  blood  should  be  again  shed,  and  shed 
for  them  in  a  new  and  special  sense,  before  they  could  be  saved  ? 
Is  it  indeed  true,  notwithstanding  the  free  offer  of  mercy  to  them, 
that,  if  they  should  believe  in  Christ,  as  they  are  commanded  to 
do,  the  want  of  a  sufficient  atonement  would  still  stand  in  the  way 
of  their  eternal  life  ?  And  if  so,  tljen  would  not  honesty  and 
truth  require  that  this  important  circumstance  should  be  plainly 
announced,  and  that,  in  the  universal  offer  of  salvation  which  we 
make  to  sinners,  we  should  distinctly  declare  that,  although  we 
present  to  them  the  gracious  proposals  of  the  gospel,  and  tell  them, 
without  distinction,  that  if  they  will  accept  those  proposals,  they 
shall  have  everlasting  life,  it  is  still  true  of  all  the  non-elect,  that 
if  they  should  accept  they  could  not  be  saved,  inasmuch  as  Christ 
had  not  died  for  their  sins,  and  had  made  no  atonement  for  them  ? 
But  if  this  principle  should  be  proclaimed  by  the  ambassadors  of 
Christ,  it  would  tend  directly  to  neutralize  their  message ;  and 
sinners,  unless  they  could  somehow  think  themselves  of  the  num- 
ber of  the  elect,  would  feel  that  they  were  mocked  by  the  offers 
of  mercy,  seeing  they  could  not  be  saved  even  if  they  should  ac- 
cept those  offers. 

To  accomplish  my  object,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show  that  the 
advocates  of  a  general  atonement  hold  to  the  very  limitations, 


612  ATONEMENT. 

which  are  asserted  by  the  advocates  of  a  pai  t'x'uuxr  or  limited 
atonement.  While  they  maintain  that  Christ  died  for  all  men, 
they  also  maintain  that  it  was  the  divine  purpose  to  bestow  the 
blessings  procured  by  his  death  on  a  part  only.  Symington  ex- 
pressly mentions  this  as  the  main  point  of  the  controversy.  He 
says  the  question  between  the  two  parties  "  hinges  solely  on  ilie 
divine  intention  respectirig  the  subjects  of  the  atonement,  or  what  is 
called  the  destination  of  Chrisfs  deathJ^  And  then  he  proceeds 
to  support  his  views  respecting  the  atonement  by  the  special  and 
immutable  purpose  of  God  respecting  the  subjects  of  salvation. 
He  says  "  if  God  in  the  matter  of  salvation  acts  according  to 
design,  and  it  so  happens  that  salvation  is  limited  in  its  apphcation 
to  some,  does  it  not  follow  that  it  was  the  design  of  God  that  it 
should  be  hmited  ?"  Again  he  says,  "  As  God  cannot  fail  in  any 
of  his  designs,  the  actual  eflfect  shows  us  the  extent  of  the  designed 
effect."  "  And  as  the  effects  of  atonement,  namely,  redemption, 
reconciliatioyi,  and  glory  extend  only  to  some,  we  are  hound  to 
apply  to  the  atonement  itself  a  similar  restriction  in  the  designed 
extent  of  its  subjects. ^^  The  ablest  advocates  of  a  general  atone- 
ment hold  strongly  to  the  ^ame  restriction  in  the  designed  apph- 
cation of  it.  So  that  it  is  with  very  good  reason  that  Symington 
suggests,  that  the  difference  is  more  in  words  than  in  opinion.  I 
mio"ht  name  to  you  a  great  number  of  divines  of  high  reputation, 
both  here  and  abroad,  who  hold  to  the  doctrine  that  Christ  died 
fbr  all  men,  and  yet  maintain  that  it  is  the  divine  purpose  to 
make  his  death  effectual  to  the  salvation  of  only  a  part ;  that  the 
atonement,  as  to  sufficiency,  is  without  limits,  that  it  opened  the 
door  for  the  salvation  of  all  men  ;  but  as  to  the  design  of  God  in 
regard  to  its  saving  application,  it  is  limited. 

This  limitation  is  much  insisted  on  by  Jenkyn,  the  other  writer 
whom  I  mentioned  above ;  an  author  of  great  ingenuity  and 
force,  not  at  all  biassed  in  favor  of  a  rigid  orthodoxy,  and  quite 
enough  inclined  to  maintain  high  notions  of  man's  freedom,  agency 
and  ability.  In  his  book  on  the  Atonement,  he  contends  very 
earnestly  for  the  doctrine  that  Christ  died  for  all  men.  But  as  to 
the  designed  application  of  the  atonement  in  the  salvation  of  the 


EVANGELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  513 

people  of  God,  he  expresses  himself  with  as  much  decision  as 
Symington,  or  any  other  Calvinist.  "  It  is,"  he  says,  "  an  awful 
fact,  that  unless  God  will  sovereignly  exercise  his  gracious  influ- 
ence on  the  hearts  of  men,  not  one  —  will  ever  avail  himself  of 
the  benefits  of  the  atonement,  and  consequently  no  flesh  can  be 
saved."  Again  he  says  ;  "  All  mankind  are  of  themselves  so 
opposed  to  the  designs  of  the  mediation  of  Christ,  and  so  inclined 
to  persevere  in  sin,  that  unless  God,  in  his  sovereign  will,  exer- 
cise his  influence  in  special  and  personal  cases,  no  one  of  all  the 
human  race  will  ever  be  saved."  "  For  it  is  in  the  physical  and 
moral  constitution  of  the  nature  of  man,  that  what  he  is  unwilling 
to  do,  he  never  will  do.  Hence  the  Scriptures  speak  of  that,  of 
which  a  man  is  unwilling  to  do,  as  a  thing  impossible  to  come  to 
pass.  When  Christ  charges  the  Jews  with  this  unwillingness,  he 
represents  their  coming  to  him  as  impossible."  "  Ye  will  not  come 
unto  me  ;  "  —  and  "  no  man  can  come  unto  me  unless  the  Father 
draw  him."  He  says,  past  ages  ''  do  not  furnish  one  instance  of 
a  man,  who  has  ascribed  his  conversion  to  his  own  agency  and 
goodness  of  heart."  "  The  cases  are  innumerable,  in  which  the 
best  means  have  been  used  in  vain.  *  *  Yet  among  men  of  the 
same  character,  means,  apparently  less  likely  to  succeed,  have 
prospered  mightily."  He  proceeds  to  say  ;  "  On  any  other  prin- 
ciple than  the  sovereign  application  of  divine  influences,  it  is 
impossible  to  account  for  the  conversion  of  man.  The  theory  of 
"common  grace  '  will  not  account  for  it ;  for  it  leaves  the  question 
behind  —  how  comes  one  man  more  than  another,  to  make  a  right 
use  of  this  common  grace  ?  The  self-determining  power  of  the 
will  will  not  account  for  it,  for  there  is  no  such  thing.  A  wUl, 
not  determined  by  motives,  is  not  the  will  of  an  intelligent,  ac- 
countable being."  "  God  alone  changes  the  heart.  And  he 
has  a  sovereign,  independent  right  to  impart  divine  influences  in 
what  degree  and  on  whomsoever  he  pleases,  according  to  the  coun- 
sel of  his  own  will."  Jenkyn  says,  the  total  failure  of  the  atone- 
ment "  would  not  have  been  efiectually  prevented  by  leaving  it 
entirely  to  the  liberty  of  free  agents  ;  for  in  such  hands  the 
failure  would  have  been  entire  and  total."     "  Nothing  can  pre- 


514  ATONEMENT. 

vent  this  failure,  but  the  determination  of  God  to  impart  sove- 
reign influences  to  make  some  differ  from  others,  and  to  give 
unto  them,  for  the  sake  of  Christ,  to  believe  in  him."  "  The 
Lord  Jesus  was  deeply  interested  in  the  subject.  It  was  bj  the 
exercise  of  this  sovereignty  that  he  was  to  see  of  the  travail  of 
his  soul.  He  never  thought  that  his  harvest  Avould  have  been 
larger,  if  it  had  been  left  to  the  self-determining  sovereignty  of 
the  human  will.  He  regarded  it  as  more  sure  in  the  hands  of 
his  Father.  Divine  sovereignty  settles  every  jewel  in  the  media- 
torial diadem."  I  give  one  more  quotation.  The  instances  of 
the  actual  success  of  the  atonement  "  are  not,"  he  says,  "  mat- 
ters of  chance,  —  they  are  the  result  of  a  definite  purpose,  and 
of  an  adjusted  plan  settled  in  eternity.  God  will  direct  that  — 
the  atonement  shall  infallibly  issue  in  the  personal  salvation  of  a 
multitude  which  no  man  can  number."     "  Jesus  Christ  knew 

THESE  DEFINITELY  AND  PERSONALLY,  AND  HAD  A  DIRECT  AND  SPE- 
CIAL REFERENCE  TO  THEM  IN  HIS  SUFFERINGS  AND  DEATH." 

The  quotations  which  I  made  from  Symington  are  sufficient  to 
show,  that  although  he  strenuously  maintains  the  doctrine  of  a  de- 
finite and  limited  atonement,  hemaintains  also  that  Christ  by  his 
death  actually  made  a  general  provision  for  the  exercise  of  mercy 
to  the  human  race  on  specified  conditions,  and  prepared  the  way 
for  an  unlimited  offer  of  pardon  to  sinners  in  every  part  of  the 
earth,  whether  elect  or  non-elect.  He  asserts  this  general,  un- 
limited provision  as  explicitly  and  emphatically,  as  any  advocates 
of  a  general  atonement.  And  the  quotations  from  Jenkyn  show, 
that  he  decidedly  maintains  the  doctrine  of  election,  that  is,  that 
it  was  the  sovereign  purpose  of  God  to  render  the  death  of  Christ 
effectual  to  the  salvation  of  only  a  limited  number  ;  —  or,  to 
express  it  in  another  manner,  that  the  death  of  Christ,  or  the 
atonement  he  made,  as  to  its  designed  and  saving  efficacy^ 
was  limited  and  definite.  Jenkyn  and  the  most  respectable 
advocates  of  a  general  atonement  maintain  all  this  as  fully,  as 
the  advocates  of  a  particular  atonement. 

You  may  now  ask  what  difference  there  can  be  between  the 
two  parties,  if  both  really  hold  to  the  same  doctrines.     To  this  I 


EVANGELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  515 

reply,  that,  notwithstanding  the  substantial  agreement  which  ap- 
pears, there  is  a  real  and  not  unimportant  difference  between  them 
in  the  following  respects. 

First ;  as  to  the  use  of  terms.  The  advocates  of  a  general 
atonement  make  use  of  the  phrase,  Christ  died  for  sinners,  or 
made  atonement  for  the  world,  to  denote  that  general  work  of 
Christ  and  that  offer  of  salvation,  respecting  which  the  parties 
agree.  But  the  advocates  of  a  definite  and  limited  atonement 
use  the  same  phrase  to  point  out  not  only  the  atoning  merit  of 
Christ's  death,  which  they  allow  to  be  sufficient  for  all,  but  his 
purpose  to  bestow  the  benefits  of  it  upon  the  elect.  Accordingly 
if  you  propose  the  question,  whether  Christ  died  for  all ;  one 
party  answers  it  in  the  affirmative,  the  other  in  the  negative. 
Ask  whether  Christ  made  atonement  for  all,  or  only  for  a  part ; 
one  party  answers,  for  all,  the  other,  only  for  a  part.  And  they 
answer  thus  differently,  merely  because  they  attach  different 
meanings  to  the  same  words  and  phrases,  and  not,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  because  they  differ  materially  in  the  ideas  they  entertain. 
For  if  you  lay  aside  the  particular  words  and  phrases,  which  they 
use  in  different  senses,  and  make  use  of  others  which  they  cannot 
but  understand  alike,  you  will  find  that  no  substantial  difference 
remains.  The  difference  then  is  in  words,  rather  than  in  behef ; 
or  to  say  the  least,  the  difference  is  in  words  far  more  than  in 
behef. 

If  you  inquire,  which  party  uses  the  words  and  phrases  re- 
ferred to  most  correctly;  my  answer  is,  that  one  party  adopts 
what  appears  to  me  to  be  the  Scriptural  and  correct  usage  in 
some  instances,  and  the  other  party,  in  other  instances.  The 
sacred  writers  seem  often  to  speak  of  Christ's  dying  for  all  in 
order  to  denote  the  general  j^rovision  he  made.  And  in  regard 
to  such  cases,  the  advocates  of  a  general  atonement  do,  as  I 
think,  conform  to  Scripture  usage.  But  in  other  cases,  the 
Scriptures  speak  of  Christ's  dying  in  a  special  sense  for  those  who 
will  actually  he  saved;  that  is,  they  use  the  expression  with  a 
particular  and  limited  meaning,  implying  the  designed  applicar- 
tion   of  the   atonement,  or   the    designation   of  Christ's  death  j 


516  ATONEMENT. 

and  in  regard  to  such  cases,  the  advocates  of  a  definite  and  lim- 
ited atonement  conform  to  Scripture  usage.  In  this,  as  in  many 
other  instances.  Scripture  usage  evidently  varies.  The  sacred 
writers  sometimes  use  the  expression,  Christ  died,  or  made  expia- 
tion, in  the  larger  sense,  and  sometimes  in  the  definite,  limited 
sense.  It  follows,  then,  that  we  shall  most  perfectly  follow  the 
free  and  artless  manner  of  the  sacred  writers,  if  Ave  speak  of 
Christ's  dying  for  men,  sometimes  in  the  large  and  general 
sense,  and  sometimes  in  the  special  and  restricted  sense,  while  our 
exact  meaning  in  each  case  is  to  be  made  evident  by  circum- 
stances, or,  if  necessary,  by  particular  explanations. 

I  have  already  noticed,  that  the  word  atonement  is  used  in 
our  version  only  twice  in  the  New  Testament.  First,  in  Rom.  5 : 
11,  by  whom  we  have  received  the  atonement  (xaT«nay^»'),  re- 
conciliation, that  is,  restoration  to  the  divine  favor.  Here  atone- 
ment evidently  means  the  special  blessings,  which  believers 
actually  receive,  through  the  death  of  the  Mediator.  Of  course 
the  atonement  as  here  spoken  of,  must  be  definite  and  limited. 
And  when  Symington  and  others  speak  of  the  atonement  as 
limited,  their  language  is  plainly  conformed  to  the  example  of  the 
Apostle  in  this  passage.  And  this  is  the  only  place  in  the  New 
Testament  where  the  word  atonement  is  used  in  relation  to  this 
subject.  The  verb,  xaTaXXaaaca,  is  generally  used  in  the  New 
Testament  in  a  sense  equally  special  and  restricted.  Those, 
therefore,  who  speak  of  the  atonement  as  general  and  unhmited, 
use  the  word  atonement  in  a  sense  obviously  different  from  the 
sense  of  the  original  in  the  passages  referred  to. 

In  regard  to  the  other  words  employed  in  the  New  Testament, 
or  in  common  religious  discourse,  in  relation  to  the  work  of 
Christ,  as  that  he  died  for  the  sins  of  men,  made  propitiation, 
expiation,  etc.,  they  evidently  admit  of  being  used  both  in  a  more 
general  and  in  a  more  definite  sense.  And  if  men  would  exercise 
the  same  intelligence  and  candor  here,  as  they  do  in  cases  where 
there  is  no  controversy,  this  variety  of  meanings  would  occasion 
no  great  difficulty.  But  if  one  party  insist  upon  it,  that  the 
words  and  phrases  above  mentioned  shall  be  used  invariably  and 


EVANGELICAL    CHRISTIANS    AGREED.  517 

exclusively  in  one  sense,  and  the  other  party  insist  that  they  shall 
be  used  exclusively  in  another  sense  ;  then  controversy  ensues  ; 
and  the  controversy,  which  at  the  outset  is  a  war  of  words,  will  in 
its  progress  produce  real  differences  of  opinion.  Or  if  the  opin- 
ions of  the  two  parties  continue  to  be  substantially  the  same,  still 
the  appearance  of  a  difference,  occasioned  by  such  a  different  use 
of  words,  will  be  followed  by  many  of  the  unhappy  consequences 
of  a  real  difference. 

But  secondly  ;  there  is  a  disagreement  between  the  two  parties^ 
as  to  the  comparative  importance  of  the  differeyit  portions  of  truth 
which  appertain  to  the  subject. 

Men  of  one  part}"-  give  great  prominence  to  the  special  design 
of  Christ's  death  in  regard  to  those  who  are  chosen  to  salvation. 
They  delight  to  dwell  upon  the  eternal  love  of  God,  and  his  pur- 
pose actually  to  save  sinners  ;  upon  his  grace  in  renewing  and 
justifying  them  ;  upon  the  special  influence  of  his  Spirit  in  giving 
them  repentance  and  faith  ;  upon  his  faithfulness  towards  them, 
and  his  unchangeable  determination  to  restore  them  to  his  image, 
and  to  train  them  up  for  heaven  ;  and  upon  their  dependence  on 
his  sovereign  grace  for  the  whole  of  salvation.  They  neither 
deny  nor  overlook  the  goodness  of  God  in  providing  a  Saviour 
for  the  world,  and  offering  him  to  all  sinners,  and  inviting 
them  to  believe  in  him.  They  do  not  overlook  the  opportunity 
which  sinners  have  to  obtain  eternal  life,  nor  the  powerful  mo- 
tives which  urge  them  to  accept  offered  mercy,  nor  their  high 
obHgations  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  eternal  life,  nor  their 
utter  inexcusableness  if  they  neglect  the  great  salvation  and 
perish  in  unbelief.  I  say  they  do  not  either  deny  or  overlook 
these  gospel  truths.  They  acknowledge  and  exhibit  them.  But 
in  general  they  do  not  make  them  prominent.  They  do  not 
declare  them  in  all  their  fulness.  They  do  not  take  pains  to 
present  them  in  a  clear  and  strong  light,  lest  they  should  su- 
persede or  overshadow  tJwse  doctrines  which  they  regard  as  pre^ 
eminently  important.  These  remarks  are  specially  applicable  to 
the  preaching  and  the  writings  of  those  who  lean  towards  Antino- 
mian  sentiments. 

VOL.  n.  44 


gtS  ATONEMENT. 

The  other  party  take  ground  which  is  in  some  respects  the 
reverse  of  this.  They  give  the  greatest  prominence  to  those 
parts  of  divine  truth,  which  others  comparatively  disregard. 
They  insist  often  and  earnestly  upon  man's  endowments  as  a  free 
moral,  accountable  agent,  and  a  proper  subject  of  divine  law,  and 
upon  his  perfect  obligation  to  obey ;  upon  the  expansive  benevo- 
lence of  God,  and  the  general  and  full  provision  he  has  made,  by 
the  death  of  Christ,  for  the  salvation  of  the  whole  world  ;  upon 
the  free  and  sincere  offer  of  pardon,  the  power  and  willingness  of 
Christ  to  save,  the  all-sufficiency  of  his  atonement,  and  the  guilt 
and  inexcusableness  of  those  who  continue  in  unbelief.  But  as  to 
those  particular  truths,  which  the  other  party  regard  as  preemi- 
nently important,  —  they  generally  keep  them  in  the  back  ground, 
and  often  make  the  impression  that  they  do  not  believe  them. 
You  will  seldom  hear  them  speak,  in  a  truly  Scriptural  manner,  of 
the  doctrine  of  election,  of  God's  having  mercy  on  whom  he  will 
have  mercy,  of  his  having  given  a  people  to  Christ  to  be  saved 
through  his  death,  of  the  deep  depravity  of  our  moral  nature,  of 
the  utter  ruin  and  helplessness  of  sinners,  and  their  dependence  on 
divine  grace  for  the  beginning  and  continuance  of  holiness.  They 
do  not  reject  these  doctrines  ;  but  they  generally  keep  them  out 
of  sight.  And  when  they  mention  them,  they  do  it,  not  directly 
to  establish  and  inculcate  them,  but  rather  in  the  way  of  con- 
cession. They  appear  to  be  reluctant  to  bring  them  clearly  into 
view,  lest  they  should  interfere  with  that  class  of  truths,  to  which 
they  attach  so  much  more  importance.  In  short,  they  make 
Christianity  consist  chiefly  of  their  favorite  doctrines.  When  they 
allow  the  other  truths  some  place  in  their  system,  it  is  a  very 
subordinate  place.  And  they  appear  sometimes  to  do  even  that, 
rather  to  vindicate  their  claim  to  orthodoxy,  than  from  any  strong 
impulse  of  the  heart. 

The  foregoing  remarks  do,  I  think,  truly  exhibit  the  general 
features  of  the  two  parties  described  ;  though  they  are  applicable 
to  individuals  belonging  to  the  parties  in  very  different  degrees. 
Accordingly  one  of  these  parties  generally  and  very  naturally 
adopt    Symington    and   others   agreeing   with   him,   as  favorite 


EVANGELICAL     CHRISTIANS     AGREED.         519 

authors  ;  while  the  other  party  adopt  Jenkyn.  And  these  two 
authors  show  you  the  general  forms  and  aspects  of  the  two  sys- 
tems in  regard  to  the  atonement  and  other  related  subjects. 

I  cannot  quit  the  subject  without  suggesting  a  few  things  in  the 
way  of  free  and  aflfectionate  counsel  to  those  who  are  candidates 
for  the  sacred  office. 

Guard  then  against  overrating  the  comparative  importance  of 
particular  portions  of  divine  truth,  and  underrating  the  impor- 
tance of  others.  We  are  not  in  danger  of  overrating  the  real, 
intrinsic  importance  of  any  of  the  truths  of  religion,  as  they  are 
in  themselves.  But  we  may  overrate  their  importance  compara- 
tively ;  and  we  may  really  as  well  as  comparatively,  undervalue 
other  truths.  Now  a  wrong  judgment  as  to  the  value  of  diflferent 
divine  ti-uths,  is  error,  and,  if  acted  out,  will  have  the  influence 
of  error.  It  is  like  a  portraiture  of  a  man's  face  which  is  false 
because  it  makes  some  of  the  features  too  large  and  prominent, 
and  others  too  small.  If  you  would  avoid  this  error,  you  must 
learn  the  truths  of  religion  chiefly  from  the  w^ord  of  God.  Neg- 
lect not  other  means  of  knowledge,  but  rely  principally  on  that 
book  which  is  infallible.  When  you  speak  of  any  portion  of  divine 
truth,  do  as  the  sacred  writers  do  —  declare  it  freely  and  earn- 
estly, maintain  it  and  enforce  it  with  all  your  heart,  and  show  that 
you  decidedly  hold  it,  as  a  part  of  the  counsel  of  God.  For 
example ;  hold  forth  the  depraved  and  lost  state  of  man  by  nar 
ture,  as  the  inspired  writers  do, — not  hesitatingly,  or  circuitous- 
ly,  and  with  a  studied  smoothness  or  reserve,  but  seriously,  freely 
and  earnestly ;  and  let  it  appear,  that  your  own  heart  has  been 
penetrated  with  it.  Hold  forth  God's  eternal  purpose  to  save  a 
part  of  our  race  and  his  sovereign  mercy  in  their  effectual  calling, 
as  the  Scriptures  do.  Repeat  freely  those  passages  of  the  Bible, 
which  most  plainly  teach  the  doctrine.  Speak  unreservedly  of  the 
eternal  purpose  of  God,  of  election,  of  those  Avhom  the  Father 
has  given  to  Christ,  of  his  having  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have 
mercy,  of  salvation  by  grace,  etc.  And  have  no  more  fear  than 
the  apostles  had,  that  this  portion  of  truth  will  interfere  with  our 
moral,  accountable  agency,  or  with  Christ's  willingness  to  save,  or 


620  ATONEMENT. 

with  any  other  truth.  And  when  you  come  to  the  other  part  of 
evangehcal  truth,  still  copy  the  inspired  writers.  Declare  unhes- 
itatingly and  earnestly,  that  God  sent  his  Son  to  die  for  mankind, 
to  make  propitiation  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world,  that  there  is 
in  Christ  an  abounding  of  grace,  an  all-sufficiency  for  the  salvation 
of  a  fallen  world ;  and  that  whosoever  will,  may  come  and  take 
of  the  water  of  life  freely.  And  never  fear  that  a  full  declara- 
tion of  these  truths  will  displace  the  doctrine  of  election,  or  the 
special  design  of  the  atonement  in  regard  to  the  elect.  And 
when  you  call  upon  sinners  to  repent  and  accept  of  salvation,  do 
it  heartily  and  zealously  ;  urge  it  as  a  most  neceSsary  and  reason- 
able duty,  —  the  duty  which  a  holy  God  requires  sinners  to 
perform,  and  on  which  their  eternal  salvation  depends.  And 
never  be  troubled  with  any  fear,  that,  by  thus  earnestly  inculcat- 
ing upon  simiers  the  work  which  God  commands  them  to  perform, 
yoTi  will  interfere  with  the  doctrine  of  the  special  and  sovereign 
influence  of  the  Spirit  in  the  renewal  of  the  heart.  And  learn 
from  the  example  of  Christ  and  the  apostles,  that  no  particular 
labor  of  yours  is  called  for  to  reconcile  these  different  portions  of 
divine  truth  with  one  another.  Christ  and  the  apostles  never 
labored  for  this  ;  and  there  was  no  occasion  for  their  doing  it. 
God  has  so  formed  the  mind,  that,  when  it  is  in  any  good  measure 
in  a  right  state,  it  will  of  itself  work  out  a  reconcihation  among 
the  different  truths  of  revelation.  Though  in  speculative  reason- 
ing there  may  be  difficulties  and  apparent  inconsistencies ;  there 
will  be  none  in  right  moral  feeling.  The  effect  which  a  good  man 
will  experience  in  his  own  mind  from  each  divine  truth,  will  harmo- 
nize with  the  effect  of  every  other  truth.  All  the  truths  of  the 
gospel,  received  into  the  heart,  will  work  there  consistently,  and 
produce  a  united  result  in  the  sanctification  of  the  whole  man. 
Our  intelligent  and  moral  nature  really  demands  every  part  of 
divine  truth,  and  we  suffer  loss  if  any  part  is  withheld.  The 
neglect  of  any  important  truths  will  be  likely  to  produce  a  real 
interference  and  jargon,  which  might  be  effectually  prevented  by 
the  appropriate  influence  of  the  whole  system  of  truth  rightly 
apprehended.     And  your   experience  will  show,  that  the  more 


EVANGELICAL     CHRISTIANS     AGREED.  521 

fully  all  parts  of  divine  truth  are  held  forth  and  received,  the 
more  consistency  will  there  be  in  the  effect  produced  in  the  sanc- 
tij&ed  mind.  A  partial,  defective  exhibition  of  the  various  doc- 
trines of  revelation  tends  to  an  unharmonious  result.  Inconsist- 
encies spring  up  from  the  very  fact,  that  some  of  the  truths  of 
the  gospel  are  kept  back,  while  other  truths,  being  left  alone, 
act  upon  us  with  difficulty  and  irregularity.  The  very  circum- 
stance, which  may  be  intended  to  prevent  inconsistency,  occasions 
it.  We  do  most  for  the  glory  of  God,  the  harmony  of  divine 
truth,  and  the  sanctification  of  believers,  when  we  faithfully  and 
fully  declare  all  the  doctrines  of  God's  word,  and  leave  it  to  the 
Holy  Spirit  and  the  illuminated  heart  to  show  their  consistency 
with  each  other. 

44* 


LECTURE    LXXXIII. 


EEMAEKS    ON   THE    VIEWS    OF    COLERIDGE   RESPECTING  THE  DEATH 

OF    CHRIST.* 

Coleridge  objects  to  the  doctrine  of  redemption  as  held  by 
the  orthodox,  that  it  gives  a  hteral  sense  to  the  language  employed 
on  the  subject  of  the  sacred  writers.  He  mentions  four  prin- 
cipal metaphors,  by  which  the  Apostle  Paul  illustrates  the  subject. 

1.  Those  derived  from  sin-offerings  under  the  former  dispensation. 

2.  Those  which  speak  of  reconciliation  or  atonement.  3.  Those 
which  speak  of  ransom.  4.  Those  which  speak  of  the  payment 
of  a  debt. 

Coleridge  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  orthodox  divines  gen- 
erally have  understood  the  language  of  the  Apostle  in  these 
instances  in  a  strictly  literal  sense.  There  are  indeed  some  dis- 
tinguished writers,  who  seem  to  have  a  leaning  to  the  literal 
sense,  and  who  ground  their  arguments  and  conclusions  more  or 
less  upon  the  assumption,  that  such  is  the  true  sense.  Now  so  far 
as  writers  have  committed  any  mistake  in  this  way,  I  would  join 
with  Coleridge  in  opposing  it,  and  in  discarding  the  consequences 
which  flow  from  it.  He  rightly  represents  the  work  of  redemp- 
tion and  the  blessings  resulting  from  it,  as  spiritual  things,  which 
are  to  be  spiritually  discerned.  But  he  says,  "  such  being  the 
means  and  effects  of  our  redemption,  well  might  the  Apostle 
associate  it  with  whatever  was  eminently  dear  and  precious  to 

*  See  Aids  to  Reflection.  Burlington  Edit.  1840.  pp.  286  —  316,  and  else- 
where. 


ATONEMENT.      VIEWS     OF    COLERIDGE.  523 

erring  mortals."  And  he  proceeds  to  illustrate  the  benefits  of 
the  redemptive  act,  hy  the  benefits  secured  to  the  Israelites 
bj  tlieir  sacrifices  of  atonement ;  by  the  ransom  of  a  slave 
from  captivity ;  by  the  reconciliation  of  a  friend  who  had 
been  offended  ;  and  by  the  payment  of  a  debt.  To  this  no  one 
can  object.  What  then  is  there  exceptionable  in  the  views  which 
this  author  has  taken  of  the  subject  ?  So  far  as  I  can  gather  his 
meaning  from  Avhat  he  has  written  on  the  subject,  he  is  faulty 
chiefly  in  two  respects  ;  first,  in  regard  to  that  which  is  the 
cause,  means  or  ground  of  our  redemption.  Here  he  fails  of 
bringing  out  clearly  to  view  that  which  the  Scriptures  represent 
as  the  grand  expedient,  the  ground  work  of  human  salvation. 
Secondly,  in  regard  to  the  eflfects  produced  or  the  blessings  se- 
cured by  the  Redeemer.  Here  he  covers  over  a  part  of  that  which 
the  Scriptures  make  very  prominent.  "While  the  sacred  writers 
set  forth  two  great  and  comprehensive  blessings,  that  is,  forgive- 
ness and  sanctification,  he  has  his  eye  upon  one  only,  that  is, 
sanctification. 

In  his  synopsis  of  the  constituent  points  in  the  doctrine  of 
redemption,  he  presents  four  questions,  with  correspondent  an- 
swers. 

"  1.  Who  is  the  agens  causator,  the  agent  who  is  the  personal 
cause  or  author  of  redemption  ? 

2.  What  is  the  actus  causativus,  the  causative  act  ? 

3.  What  is  the  efiectum  causatum,  the  effect  caused  ? 

4.  What  are  the  consequentia  ab  effecto,  the  consequences 
arising  from  the  effect  ?  " 

The  personal  agent,  who  is  the  cause  or  author  of  redemption, 
he  holds,  in  common  with  all  evangelical  Christians,  to  be  "  the 
eternal  word,  the  Son  of  God,  incarnate,  tempted,  agonizing, 
crucified,  submittmg  to  death,  rising  from  the  dead,  ascending, 
and  obtaining  for  his  people  the  descent  and  communion  of  the 
Holy  Spirit." 

"  The  causative  act,"  he  says,  "  is  a  spiritual  mystery  that 
passeth  all  understanding." 

"  The   effect   caused,"   he   says,   "  is   being  bom  anew —  as 


524-  ATONEMENT.      VIEWS     OF    COLERIDGE. 

before  in  the  flesh  to  the  world,  so  now  born  in  the  spirit  to 
Christ." 

"  The  consequences  arising  from  the  effect,"  he  says,  "  are 
sanctification  from  sin,  and  hberation  from  the  inherent  and  penal 
consequences  of  sin  in  the  world  to  come,  with  all  the  means 
and  processes  of  sanctification  by  the  word  and  the  Spirit." 

As  the  author  expressly  designs  his  discussion  of  the  subject 
for  learned  readers  and  professional  students  of  theology,  his  an- 
swers to  these  four  questions  should  have  an  exact  logical  correct- 
ness. But  is  this  the  case  ?  Under  the  first  head,  the  personal 
cause,  he  includes  not  only  a  description  of  Christ's  personal 
character  as  the  Son  of  God,  the  incarnate  word,  but  also  his 
suffering  and  dying,  his  rising  again,  and  giving  his  Spirit.  But 
these  last  evidently  belong  to  the  second  head,  the  causative  act. 
For  where  will  you  find  the  act,  which  is  preeminently  the  cause 
or  ground  of  redemption,  except  in  the  death  and  resurrection  of 
Christ,  and  in  the  communication  of  his  Spirit  ?  In  an  argument 
which  professes  to  be  so  exact  and  scientific,  who  would  expect  to 
find  two  distinct  topics  thus  confounded  ?  The  two  topics  are  the 
agent,  or  personal  cause,  and  the  causative  act.  These  he  first 
states  as  distinct  topics,  the  first,  and  the  second.  But  in  de- 
scribing the  first,  he  includes  the  act  or  acts  which  are  specially 
and  preeminently  causative  in  the  work  of  redemption. 

But  what  does  he  give  under  the  second  head,  as  the  causative 
act  ?  Just  this,  —  "a  spiritual  and  transcendent  mystery,  that 
passe th  all  understanding."  But  how  does  this  describe  the 
causative  act  ?  And  how  does  this  distinguish  the  second  topic 
from  the  first  ?  Is  not  the  co-eternal  word  a  transcendent  mys- 
tery ?  Is  not  the  incarnation,  and  death,  and  resurrection  of 
Christ  a  spiritual  and  transcendent  mystery  ?  This  is  the  very 
thing  the  Apostle  describes  as  the  great  mystery  of  godliness. 
And  are  there  not  many  other  mysteries  ?  Is  not  the  eternal 
existence  of  God  a  mystery  ?  Are  not  all  his  perfections  mys- 
teries ?  What  advance  then  does  our  author  make  under  the 
second  head,  where  he  professedly  undertakes  to  answer  the  ques- 
■.tion,  what  is  the  "  actus  causativus  ?"     He  says  it  is  a  mystery. 


ATONEMENT.      VIEWS    OP    COLERIDGE.  525 

So  is  "  the  personal  cause  "  which  constitutes  the  first  head.  So 
in  truth  is  the  third  point,  the  effect  caused.  So  also  are  the  con- 
sequences from  the  effect,  under  the  fourth  head.  The  four 
points  are  all  mysteries.  IIow  then,  I  ask,  does  he  say  anything 
to  distinguish  the  second  head  from  any  of  the  others  ?  In  an- 
swering the  first  question,  who  or  what  is  the  personal  cause,  he 
might  just  as  well  say,  it  is  a  transcendent  mystery,  and  stop 
there.  And  the  same  in  answering  the  third  and  fourth.  And 
thus,  on  the  principle  of  the  second  answer,  all  the  four  answers 
might  have  stood  thus  : 

1.  Who  or  what  is  the  agens  causator  ?  Answer  ;  a  trans- 
cendent mystery.  2.  What  is  the  actus  causativus  ?  Answer, 
just  as  he  gives  it ;  a  transcendent  mystery.  3.  What  is  the 
affectum  causatum  ?  Answer ;  a  transcendent  mystery.  4. 
What  are  the  consequentia  ab  effecto  ?  Answer ;  a  transcendent 
mystery. 

But  we  must  examine  these  points  farther.  The  third  point, 
"  the  effect  caused,"  he  says,  is  "  being  bom  anew,"  which  is 
commonly  called  regeneration.  Here  we  come  to  the  peculiar 
opinion  of  Coleridge,  in  which  he  seems  to  agree  substantially 
with  John  Taylor  and  the  Unitarians,  who  regard  the  principal 
and  specific  design  of  Christ's  death  to  be  man's  repentance  and 
reformation.  This  view  of  the  subject  conflicts  with  all  the  creeds 
of  evangelical  churches,  and  not  less  with  the  teachings  of  the 
inspired  writers.  If  any  one  point  can  be  clearly  and  emphat- 
ically made  out  to  be  a  doctrine  of  revelation,  it  is,  that  Christ 
died  as  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  to  procure  the  forgiveness  of  sin. 
A  mvdtitude  of  passages  cited  in  previous  Lectures  show,  that  our 
forgiveness  stands  in  the  closest  connection  with  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ,  or  the  blood  he  shed  on  the  cross  ;  that  Christ's  dying  for 
us  was  preeminently  the  ground  of  our  pardon  and  justification ; 
that  he  was  set  forth  as  a  propitiation,  for  the  forgiveness  of  sin ; 
not  indeed  exclusively,  but  specially,  for  this  purpose.  No  bless- 
ing is  represented  as  having  so  near  a  relation  to  the  sufferings  of 
Christ,  as  this.  The  Apostle  says  he  delivered  us  from  the  curse 
of  the  law,  that  is,  its  penalty.     How  ?     He   does  not  say  by 


626  ATONEMENT.       VIEAVS     OF    COLERIDGE. 

bringing  us  to  repentance,  or  by  making  us  holy,  but  by  being 
made  a  curse  for  us.     But  I  shall  touch  upon  this  point  again. 

Our  author  says,  the  effect  of  the  causative  axjt  in  redemption 
is,  being  born  anew.  This  is  his  third  point.  Then  in  the  fourth 
place,  he  says,  the  consequences  from  this  effect  are,  "  sanctifi- 
cation  from  sin  and  liberation  from  the  inherent  and  penal  con- 
sequences of  sin."  The  consequence  of  being  born  anew  is 
"  sanctification  from  sin."  But  what  is  being  bom  anew,  but 
sanctification  begun  ?  Is  not  the  man  who  is  born  anew,  sancti- 
fied, that  is,  made  holy  ?  It  would,  I  think,  be  more  exact  to 
say,  the  consequence  of  being  born  anew,  or  that  which  follows 
the  new  birth,  which  is  the  commencement  of  sanctification,  is  the 
continuance,  and  increase,  and  final  completion  of  sanctification. 
This  is  what  is  taught  in  Scripture,  and  confiniied  by  experience. 
And  it  is  probable  he  had  some  such  idea,  as  may  be  gathered 
from  other  remarks  of  his  on  this  subject.  But  a  logical  dis- 
cussion, designed  for  learned  men  and  professional  students  in 
theology,  should  be  arranged  in  a  logical  order,  and  expressed 
definitely  and  exactly. 

But  that  which  I  regard  as  most  worthy  of  notice  is,  that  our 
author  considers  the  blessings  of  redemption,  which  are  repre- 
sented by  the  payment  of  a  debt,  by  the  sacrificial  atonement,  and 
by  the  ransom  of  a  slave  or  captive,  as  the  consequences  of  being 
born  aiiew,  this  new  birth  being  the  grand  and  only  effect  of  what 
he  calls  the  causative  act,  meaning  doubtless  the  great  redemptive 
act. 

On  this  view  of  the  subject  I  have  several  remarks  to  make. 

The  first  is,  that  the  new  birth  is  directly  and  specifically 
ascribed  to  the  Soli/  Spirit.  It  is  set  forth  in  Scripture  as  the 
appropriate  work  of  the  third  person  of  the  Trinity.  And  if  the 
new  birth  is  the  primary  and  chief  effect  of  the  redemptive  act, 
why  should  not  the  Holy  Spirit  be  called  the  Redeemer  ?  Instead 
of  calling  Christ  the  agens  causator  in  the  new  birth,  why  does  he 
not  give  this  title  to  the  Holy  Ghost,  which  the  Scriptures  so  ex- 
pressly represent  as  the  causative  agent  in  that  great  work  ? 

Secondly.     Our  author  holds  that  we  are  saved  from  the  penal 


ATONEMENT.      VIEWS    OF    COLERIDGE.  527 

consequences  of  sin,  in  other  words,  from  the  evils  involved  in  the 
penalty  of  the  law,  in  consequence  of  the  new  birth  ;  ■whereas  it  is 
the  current  representation  of  the  Bible,  that  we  are  saved  from  these 
penal  evils  in  consequence  of  the  sufferings  of  Christ ;  that  our  libe- 
ration from  them  is  procured  bj  his  expiatory  death.  Christ  shed 
his  blood  for  the  remission  of  sin  ;  he  died  to  deliver  us  from  the 
curse  of  the  law,  that  is,  to  procure  our  forgiveness.  Now  if  for- 
giveness, or  liberation  from  the  penal  consequences  of  sin,  has  not 
an  intimate  relation  to  the  death  of  Christ ;  if  his  death  is  not  in  a 
special  sense  the  meritorious  cause  or  ground  of  it ;  wh}^  is  it  so 
represented  by  Christ  and  his  apostles  ?  Why  does  not  Christ 
say,  this  is  my  blood  which  is  shed  for  many,  for  their  new  birth  ? 
Why  does  not  Paul  say,  in  whom  we  have  redemption  through  his 
blood,  even  the  renewal  of  the  heart?  Why  does  he  not  say, 
Christ  was  set  forth  to  be  a  propitiation  for  sin,  that  God  might  be 
just  and  the  sanctifier  of  him  that  believeth  ?  The  scheme  of 
Coleridge  overlooks  the  peculiar  sense  of  all  the  passages  which 
teach  that  Christ  died  for  our  sins,  that  is,  on  account  of  our  sins, 
and  that  he  died  for  us,  that  is,  in  our  stead.  He  rejects  that 
which  has  been  regarded  by  orthodox  Christians  universally,  as  the 
foundation  doctrine  of  Christianity,  the  doctrine  of  the  vicarious 
suflFerings  of  Christ. 

Thirdly.  On  the  principle  of  our  author,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
what  necessity  there  was  for  the  death  of  Christ,  or  to  understand 
what  influence  it  has  in  our  salvation.  Had  not  God  power  to 
create  us  anew  without  the  death  of  Christ  ?  Could  he  not,  on 
the  scheme  of  Coleridge,  send  the  Spirit  to  make  us  holy  without 
the  shedding  of  blood  ?  If  it  should  be  said  that  there  was  some 
hinderance  in  the  way,  which  rendered  it  inconsistent  with  the 
character  of  God,  or  with  the  principles  of  his  moral  government, 
to  do  this  without  the  death  of  his  Son  ;  I  ask  what  that  hinderance 
was  ?  If  he  says  it  was  our  sinfulness ;  I  ask  how  that  was  a 
hinderance,  and  how  it  was  removed  by  Christ's  death  ?  If  our 
sinfulness  is  regarded  merely  as  discjualifying  us  for  the  enjoy- 
ments of  heaven,  can  it  not  be  removed  by  the  sanctifying  influ- 
ence of  the  Spirit  ?     How  could  Christ's  death,  taken  by  itself. 


628  ATONEMENT.      VIEWS    OF    COLERIDGE. 

accomplish  our  renewal  ?  If  Christ's  death  had  a  direct  efficacy 
to  regenerate  sinners,  we  should  suppose  that  all  sinners  would  at 
once  be  regenerated.  But  where  are  sinners  said  to  be  born 
again  of  the  death  of  Christ  ?  The  new  birth  is  an  effect  result- 
ing from  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  its  immediate  cause.  What  then  was 
the  necessity  of  the  sufferings  of  Christ  ?  On  the  common  prin- 
ciple, this  question  is  easily  answered.  Sinners  had  incurred  the 
curse  of  the  law.  Divine  justice  demanded  that  they  should  en- 
dure it.  They  could  not  be  delivered  from  it,  unless  something 
was  done  which  would  meet  the  demands  of  his  justice,  and 
remove  the  hinderance  to  their  receiving  spiritual  blessings  from 
his  hand.  In  this  deplorable  state  of  things,  Christ  dies  for  their 
sins,  and  dies  in  their  place.  In  consequence  of  this,  forgiveness 
of  sin,  and  the  renewal  of  the  heart  by  the  Spirit,  and  all  the 
blessings  of  salvation  can  be  granted.  Sin  had  shut  the  door  of 
mercy  against  us.  Christ's  death  opened  the  door,  and  we  may 
now  be  delivered  from  evil,  and  receive  the  blessings  of  salvation. 
And  as  a  renewal  to  holiness  by  the  Spirit  is  an  important  part  of 
salvation,  and  is  indispensable  to  our  enjoying  other  parts,  this,  as 
really  as  forgiveness,  is  granted  on  account  of  Christ's  death. 
According  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  the  necessity  of  Christ's 
death,  and  the  influence  it  has  on  our  salvation,  become  very 
obvious.  The  cross  of  Christ  is  thus  surrounded  with  a  clear 
light.  We  fix  our  eyes  upon  it.  It  shoAvs  us  that  we  were  under 
a  sentence  of  condemnation,  utterly  helpless  and  hopeless  in  our- 
selves. It  shows  the  love  of  God  in  providing  a  Saviour.  It 
vindicates  his  justice.  It  honors  his  law,  and  invests  it  with  new 
authority.  It  gives  a  new  exhibition  of  the  evil  of  sin.  It  pre- 
sents new  and  more  powerful  motives  to  obedience.  It  does  all 
that  a  righteous  God  saw  to  be  necessary.  He  can  now  be  just 
and  the  justifier  of  those  who  believe. 

But  on  the  scheme  of  Coleridge,  which  makes  the  new  birth 
or  renewal  to  holiness  the  great  and  only  thing  to  be  accomplished 
in  redemption,  who  can  see  any  necessity  for  the  death  of  Christ  ? 
And  who  can  understand  what  is  the  real  influence  of  it  in  the 
work  of  redemption  ?     He  often  discards  the  Unitarian  scheme 


ATONEMENT.       VIEWS     OF     COLERIDGE.  529 

in  respect  to  this  subject.  But  what  better  does  he  substitute  ? 
Under  the  second  head,  where  he  undertakes  to  answer  the 
question,  what  is  the  causative  act  in  redemption,  and  where  we 
should  have  mentioned  Christ's  obedience  unto  death,  he  gives  no 
definite  answer,  saying  only  that  it  is  a  transcendent  mystery. 
The  question  is,  what  is  the  causative  act  ?  Suppose  it  is  a 
transcendent  mystery,  still  what  is  the  act  which  is  a  mystery  ? 
Does  he  mean  to  say,  I  cannot  7iame  the  act,  but  it  is  something 
transcendently  mysterious  ?  I  would  then  ask  him,  is  it  any  act 
at  all  ?  And  do  you  know  whose  act  it  is,  and  what  it  is  ?  If 
80,  tell  us.  If  you  do  not  know  what  it  is,  then  why  pretend  to 
tell  us  ?  Why  ask  the  question,  unless  you  mean  to  answer  it  ? 
Or  if  you  ask  the  question  to  show  that  you  cannot  answer  it, 
then  say  so  ;  and  think  not  to  impose  upon  your  readers  by  giving 
an  answer  which  is  no  answer. 

Fourthly.  Coleridge  seems  to  be  apprehensive  that  the  opinion 
which  the  orthodox  have  usually  entertained  on  the  subject  of 
redemption,  sets  aside  the  importance  of  the  new  spiritual  birth, 
or  at  least  that  it  gives  such  prominence  to  the  idea  of  Christ's 
dying  to  discharge  us  from  our  debt  to  the  divine  justice,  that  we 
shall  forget  that  he  died  to  deliver  us  from  the  dominion  of  sin, 
and  to  bring  us  back  to  a  spiritual  life.  But  any  one  who  can- 
didly examines  the  matter  will  see,  that  those  who  hold  the  com- 
mon doctrine,  make  the  new  spiritual  birth  as  important  as  he 
does,  and  that  they  believe  it  to  be  as  truly  an  object  of  Christ's 
death  and  intercession.  We  maintain  that  the  death  of  Christ 
not  only  removed  the  curse  of  the  law,  and  laid  the  foundation  for 
our  forgiveness,  but  procured  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  renew 
and  sanctify  us,  and  to  prepare  us  for  heaven.  The  renewal  of 
the  heart  is  ever  to  be  regarded  as  a  blessing  of  unspeakable  im- 
portance, without  which  no  one  can  enjoy  the  blessings  of  for- 
giveness. 

As  to  the  particular  order,  in  which  the  two  leading  blessings 
of  salvation  are  related  to  the  death  of  Christ,  and  to  one  another, 
we  must  take  care  not  to  adopt  any  opinions  which  would  coli- 
travene    the  obvious   meaning  of  any  part   of   Scripture.     The 

VOL.  n.  45 


580  ATONEMENT.       VIEWS     OF    COLERIDGE. 

sacred  writers  teach,  that  both  forgiveness  and  sanctification  have 
a  real  and  inseparable  connection  with  the  death  of  Christ,  and 
flow  from  it ;  that  these  two  blessings  always  go  together ;  that 
no  sinner  is  actually  pardoned  who  has  not  been  renewed,  and 
that  no  one  is  renewed  who  is  not  pardoned.  They  are  both 
owing  to  the  grace  of  God,  and  to  the  blood  of  atonement.  But 
I  would  not  willingly  take  upon  me  to  determine  which  of  the  two 
is  the  more  important.  I  would  rather  do  all  in  my  power  to  show 
the  great  importance  of  both.  It  is  clear  from  the  word  of  God, 
that  repentance  and  faith  are  in  an  important  sense  conditions,  on 
our  part,  of  divine  forgiveness.  We  must  repent  and  believe  in 
Christ  that  we  may  be  pardoned.  We  cannot  realize  the  blessings 
of  forgiveness,  before  we  turn  from  sin  and  believe  in  Christ. 
This  is  the  order  in  which  we  become  the  subjects  of  these  two 
distinct  parts  of  salvation.  I  say  distinct  parts,  but  not  separate 
parts.  They  are  always  joined  together,  and  they  really  imply 
each  other. 

Suppose  now  a  case  like  this.  A  preacher,  who  undertakes  to 
show  what  is  the  eflBcacy  of  Christ's  death,  or  to  describe  the 
great  salvation  which  flows  from  it,  confines  himself  to  sanctifica- 
tion^ or  the  restoration  of  the  soul  to  the  holy  image  of  God.  He 
goes  through  with  his  account  of  redemption  without  any  particu- 
lar notice  of  that  remission  of  sin,  which  comes  from  the  blood  of 
atonement.  In  short,  he  makes  redemption  consist  merely  in  the 
work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  gives  Christ's  death  no  concern  in 
it,  except  as  it  conduces  to  spiritual  purification.  I  ask  whether 
such  a  preacher  follows  the  guidance  of  revelation,  and  teaches 
as  Christ  and  his  apostles  taught.  Here  I  think  is  the  radical 
fault  of  those  preachers,  who  derive  their  theology  from  the  writ- 
ings of  Coleridge,  rather  than  from  the  word  of  God. 

In  previous  lectures,  I  have  taken  pains  to  show,  that  many  of 
the  expressions  which  are  found  in  the  Bible  on  the  subject  of 
atonement,  are  figurative ;  that  when  the  sacred  writers  speak 
of  Christ  as  a  sacrificial  lamb,  a  ransom,  a  propitiation,  a  Re- 
deemer, etc.,  they  have  their  eye  upon  those  spiritual  benefits, 
which  have  a  resemblance  to  the  benefits  that  resulted  from  the 


ATONEMENT.      VIEWS    OF    COLERIDGE.  5ol 

offering  of  the  sacrifice  of  atonement  under  the  j\Iosaic  econom}', 
or  that  result  from  a  literal  ransom  of  captives,  or  from  proj)itiating 
one  who  has  been  angry,  or  from  the  discharge  of  a  pecuniary 
obligation  for  a  poor  debtor  by  the  charity  of  a  friend.  And 
this  would  seem  to  be  the  main  pohit  which  Coleridge  aims  at. 
But  in  his  account  of  the  matter  there  are  several  things  which  I 
must  regard  as  exceptionable. 

1.  He  introduces  his  ideas  respecting  the  figurative  import  of 
Scriptural  expressions  on  this  subject,  as  though  they  were  pecu- 
liar to  himself,  and  as  though  they  originated  with  him  ;  whereas 
learned  and  discreet  divines  have  generally  maintained,  that  the 
language  referred  to  is  more  or  less  metaphorical,  and  is  intended 
to  set  forth  the  spiritual  benefits  which  flow  from  the  death  of 
Christ  under  the  image  of  redemption  of  captives  by  a  ransom, 
the  payment  of  a  poor  man's  debt,  etc.  So  far  as  respects  the 
general  question,  whether  the  language  has  a  literal  or  meta- 
phorical sense,  I  see  no  reason  why  Coleridge  should  put  on 
the  appearance  of  differing  so  widely  from  the  best  theologi- 
cal writers.  But  it  is  the  frequent  fault  of  such  a  man  as 
he,  to  think  that  ideas  which  have  been  entertained  for  ages  by 
other  men,  originate  with  himself.  This  fault  in  Coleridge  may 
result  from  the  fact,  that  he  was  not  very  familiar  with  the  writings 
of  the  best  protestant  divines,  or  from  the  fact  that  there  is  some- 
thing peculiar  to  him  in  the  very  opinions  which  he  holds  in  com- 
mon with  others,  those  opinions  not  shaping  themselves  in  his 
mind,  just  as  they  do  in  the  minds  of  others,  and  acquiring  a  pecu- 
liar cast  from  his  singular  intellectual  habits,  and  his  singular  style. 

2.  In  his  interpretation  of  tropical  words  and  phrases,  Cole- 
ridge mars  the  sense  which  was  evidently  meant  to  be  conveyed 
by  the  sacred  writers.  Figurative  language  has  a  meaning,  an  ob- 
vious meaning,  as  well  as  that  which  is  literal.  Metaphors  are  not 
designed  to  obscure  or  weaken  the  ideas  intended,  but  to  express 
them  with  greater  clearness  and  strength.  When  the  Scriptures 
declare  that  Christ  gave  himself  a  ransom  for  sinners,  they  indeed 
use  a  figure  of  speech.  But  the  figure  makes  the  idea  of  the 
spiritual  blessing  which  Christ  procures  by  his  death,  more  vivid. 


532  ATONEMENT.       VIEWS     OF    COLERIDGE. 

And  as  to  those  spiritual  blessings  themselves,  —  they  are  not 
metaphors.  Forgiveness  of  sin  is  not  a  figure  of  speech.  End- 
less raiser  J  is  not  a  metaphor,  and  deliverance  from  it  is  not  a 
metaphor.  Deliverance  from  punishment  is  no  more  a  metahpor, 
than  deliverance  from  sin  itself.  The  death  of  Christ  is  no  figure 
of  speech.  He  was  literally  crucified.  He  hterallj  suffered  and 
died.  And  he  literally  died  for  our  sins.  There  is  no  meta- 
phor in  this.  If  you  say  his  death  is  a  ransom,  or  the  payment  of 
our  debt,  you  use  a  figure  of  speech.  You  represent  the  benefits 
of  Christs  death  under  the  idea  of  paying  a  price  for  the  deliver- 
ance of  captives,  or  of  paying  the  debt  of  a  poor  man  to  procure 
his  release  from  prison.  But  the  figure  has  an  obvious,  substantial 
sense.  The  only  question  is,  what  are  those  moral,  sj^iritual  bene- 
fits, which  Christ'c  death  procures  ?  Now  these  benefits  may  be 
summed  up  in  forgiveness,  or  deliverance  from  punishment,  sanc- 
tification  by  the  Spirit,  and  the  endless  enjoyment  of  God.  These 
benefits  are  realities,  though  they  may  be  set  forth  by  figurative 
language.  And  one  of  them  is  as  much  a  reality  as  the  other. 
Coleridge  makes  the  new,  spiritual  birth  a  reaUty,  and  seems  to 
regard  the  Scripture  phrase,  being  horn  again,  as  literal.  But  it  is 
no  more  a  reality  than  forgiveness,  and  the  language  of  Scripture 
which  sets  it  forth,  is  quite  as  figurative,  as  any  of  the  language 
of  Scripture  which  sets  forth  the  blessing  of  forgiveness.  Cole- 
ridge represents  being  horn  and  sanctified  of  the  Spirit,  as  the 
great  blessing  which  redemption  procures,  and  makes  this  com- 
prehend all  other  blessings.  But  spiritual  renovation  no  more 
comprehends  forgiveness,  than  forgiveness  comprehends  renova- 
tion. And  you  may  just  as  well  say  that  forgiveness  is  the  whole 
of  salvation,  as  that  sanctification  is  so.  In  the  gospel  plan  they 
are  inseparably  connected.  As  God  has  settled  it,  each  comes  with 
the  other,  and  each  involves  the  other.  Still  they  are  in  their 
nature  distinct,  and  they  often  require  a  distinct  consideration. 
I  have  frequently  been  inclined  to  ask  how  Coleridge  was  led 
to  think  so  little  of  Christ's  death  as  the  ground  or  procuring 
cause  of  our  forgiveness,  and  to  regard  the  renewal  of  the  heart 
as  the  Avhole  of  salvation ;   and  why  he  was  so  exceedingly  fearful 


ATONEMENT.       VIEWS    OF    COLERIDGE.         533 

of  carrying  to  a  dangerous  extreme  the  analogy  implied  in  the 
metaphors  which  set  forth  forgiveness  through  the  blood  of  Christ, 
when  he  showed  no  such  fear  respecting  the  other  part  of  the 
subject,  and  seemed  to  consider  the  language  of  Christ,  "  ye  must 
he  horn  again'^  as  not  being  metaphorical  at  all.  The  probability 
is,  that  in  his  own  experience  he  had  never  been  so  particularly 
impressed  with  his  guilt,  that  is,  his  exposure  to  the  penalty  of  the 
law,  as  he  had  with  his  inward  alienation  from  the  spiritual  re- 
quirements of  the  law ;  that  he  had  thought  more  of  the  holiness 
and  purity  of  God,  than  of  his  justice,  and  more  of  the  evil  nature 
of  sin,  than  of  the  dreadfulness  of  its  punishment ;  and,  of  course, 
made  it  his  inquiry,  not  so  much  how  he  should  escape  the  penalty 
of  the  law,  as  how  he  should  obtain  a  conformity  with  its  precepts. 
Now  I  really  think  it  safer  to  err  on  this  side,  than  on  the  other. 
But  it  is  safest  of  all,  not  to  err  on  either  side.  It  is  impor- 
tant that  the  experience  of  Christians  should  correspond  with  all 
parts  of  divine  truth,  and  with  all  the  principles  of  divine 
goveniment.  And  I  am  sure  that  any  transgressor,  whose  con- 
science is  thoroughly  awakened,  and  who  considers  what  it  is  to 
be  under  the  wrath  of  God,  and  to  dwell  with  everlasting  burnings, 
will  be  exceedingly  solicitous  to  know,  how  he  can  obtain  dehv- 
erance,  and  in  what  way  God  can  be  just  and  yet  forgive  his 
oflFences.  And  we  should  think  that  such  a  person  would  wel- 
come the  assurance,  that  Jesus  by  his  death  delivers  believers 
from  the  curse  of  the  law.  And  this  deliverance  from  the  penalty 
of  the  law  by  the  death  of  Christ,  we  should  think  would  always 
be  regarded  as  a  fundamental  blessing  of  the  Christian  religion. 
I  hardly  know  how  to  account  for  it,  that  any  one  who  believes  the 
Scriptures  to  be  divinely  inspired,  should  not  regard  it  in  this 
Ught,  and  that  he  should  suppress  or  pass  over  the  prominent  fact, 
that  Jesus  died  for  our  sins,  and  make  the  whole  of  redemption  to 
consist  in  spiritual  renovation. 

Coleridge  notices  with  a  just  severity  the  opinion  of  some,  —  an 
opinion  as  distant  from  the  belief  of  judicious  Calvinists,  as  the 
east  is  from  the  west,  —  that  the  varied  expressions  of  Paul  on 
this  subject  are  to  be  literally  interpreted,  namely,  that  sin  is  or  in^ 

45* 


534  ATONEMENT.       VIEWS     OF     COLERIDGE. 

volves  an  infinite  debt  in  the  proper  and  law-court  sense  of  the 
term,  —  a  debt  to  the  vindictive  justice  of  God  the  Father,  which 
can  be  hquidated  by  nothing  but  the  everlasting  misery  of  Adam 
and  all  his  posterity,  or  by  a  sum  of  suffering  equal  to  this  ;  and 
that  the  Son  of  God  paid  the  debt  and  satisfied  divine  justice  by 
suffering  agonies  which  were  equal  in  amount  to  what  would  have 
been  the  sum  total  of  the  torments  of  all  mankind  here  and  here- 
after. Now  I  say,  that  the  great  body  of  orthodox  divines  are 
80  far  from  holding  this  opinion,  that  they  regard  it  as  a  monstrous 
error. 

Our  author  shows  clearly  his  habit  of  thinking,  by  introducing 
the  case  of  a  worthy  mother,  whose  son  had  been  guilty  of  in- 
gratitude and  vice.  His  object  is  to  show  that  divine  justice  is 
satisfied,  not  by  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  but  by  the  repentance 
and  thorough  reformation  of  sinners.  He  says,  suppose  some 
other  person  should  step  in,  and  perform  all  the  duties  of  an  af- 
fectionate son,  and  then  should  say  to  her,  —  I  hope  you  will  now 
be  satisfied  with  my  faithful  conduct  in  the  place  of  your  son's,  and 
"will  henceforth  regard  him  with  the  same  complacency  as  if  he 
had  always  been  a  dutiful  child.  He  justly  concludes  that  the 
mother  would  think  it  a  cruel  insult  to  her  wounded  feelings,  and 
that  nothing  but  the  return  of  her  son  to  gratitude  and  duty 
could  satisfy  the  mother. 

You  are  aware,  how  easy  it  is  for  an  objector  to  cavil,  and  by 
caricatures  to  expose  any  doctrine  of  revelation  or  of  natural  re- 
ligion to  ridicule.  The  representation  here  made  is  inappropriate 
and  unjust  in  more  than  one  respect.  In  the  first  place,  the 
'mother  stands  merely  in  a  private  relation  to  her  son,  and  all  her 
feelings  are  confined  to  that  relation.  Of  course  all  she  would 
ask  for  in  order  to  her  forgiving  her  son,  would  be  his  repentance 
and  return  to  duty.  But  the  case  is  very  different  with  one  who 
sustains  the  office  of  a  civil  magistrate,  and  who  acts  for  the  good 
of  the  community,  and  especially  with  God,  the  Ruler  of  the 
world,  who  is  the  guardian  of  the  highest  interests  of  a  great 
moral  empire.  Here  satisfaction  becomes  quite  a  different  thing 
from  the  satisfaction  of  one  who  stands  merely  in  a  private  relation, 


ATONEMENT.      VIEWS     OF     COLERIDGE.  535 

and  is  governed  altogether  bj  the  feelings  which  belong  to  that  re- 
lation. The  representation  is  faulty  too,  as  it  implies  that  satisfac- 
tion is  given  bj  the  death  of  Christ,  without  involving  the  refor- 
mation of  sinners ;  that  thej  may  be  pardoned  and  restored  to 
favor,  while  impenitent.  But  we  are  far  from  holding  any  such 
thing.  The  death  of  Christ  does  give  complete  satisfaction  to  the 
Governor  of  the  world,  so  far  as  his  justice  is  concerned  in  exe- 
cuting the  penalty  of  the  law.  In  other  words,  it  removes  the 
necessity  of  punishment,  arising  from  the  threat  of  the  law  and 
the  righteousness  of  the  lawgiver,  —  which,  aside  from  the  death 
of  Christ,  would  have  imperiously  demanded  that  punishment. 
But  no  one  can  ever  reap  the  benefits  of  this  satisfaction  to  divine 
justice,  without  a  spiritual  renovation,  showing  itself  in  repent- 
ance and  faith.  This  is  indispensably  necessary,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  satisfying  divine  justice,  not  to  accompHsh  the  end  which 
was  primarily  and  directly  aimed  at  in  the  death  of  Christ,  but 
for  another  purpose,  that  is,  to  prepare  sinners  actually  to  enjoy 
the  blessings  of  a  free  and  full  salvation. 


LE  CTURE    LXXXIV 


REGENERATION.      ITS    SPECIAL   NATURE. 

We  pass  now  from  one  of  the  chief  doctrines  of  Christianity 
to  another  ;  from  the  work  of  our  great  High  Priest  in  making 
expiation  for  sin  and  procuring  the  blessings  of  salvation,  to  the 
work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  renewing  men  to  holiness,  and  bringing 
them  actually  to  partake  of  the  blessings  procured  by  the  death 
of  Christ. 

The  subject,  now  proposed  for  consideration,  is  of  the  highest 
conceivable  importance  to  every  human  being.  For  it  is  the  de- 
claration of  him  whose  word  is  truth,  that  no  one  can  enter  into 
the  kingdom  of  heaven,  except  he  be  horn  again.  Without  holi- 
ness no  man  can  see  the  Lord.  And  as  holiness  does  not  result 
from  our  natural  birth,  there  must  be  a  new  birth,  a  spiritual  ren- 
ovation, a  restoration  to  the  moral  image  of  God.  This  being  the 
case,  it  becomes  every  one  who  enjoys  the  benefit  of  revelation, 
to  be  awake  to  the  importance  of  this  spiritual  change,  and  to  re- 
gard it  as  the  one  thing  needful.  I  indulge  the  hope,  that  in 
your  present  studies,  and  in  your  future  labors  in  the  ministry, 
you  will  regard  it  in  this  light,  and  will  never  overlook  its  momen- 
tous bearing  upon  the  present  and  eternal  well-being  of  yourselves 
and  your  fellow-men. 

In  these  Lectures,  I  shall  use  the  word,  regeneration,  in  the 
sense  commonly  given  to  it  by  the  most  respectable  writers,  that 
is,  to  denote  the  change  which  is  necessary  to  prepare  men  for 


REGENERATION.      ITS     NATURE.  537 

heaven,  and  which  is  wrought  in  them  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  Our 
Saviour  speaks  of  this  change  as  a  being  horn  again  —  horn  of 
the  Spirit.  It  is  indeed  evident,  that  when  the  sacred  writers 
speak  of  men's  being  renetced,  they  frequently  refer  not  only  to 
the  commencement  of  sanctification,  but  to  its  progress.  But  I 
shall  use  the  word  with  a  particular  reference  to  the  commence- 
ment of  this  work  of  the  Spirit,  though  not  exclusively  of  its  con- 
tinuance. 

The  first  point  to  which  I  would  invite  your  attention  is,  that 
man  himself —  man  as  an  intelligent,  moral,  but  depraved  being, 
man  as  a  sinner,  is  the  subject  of  regeneration.  "  Ye  must  be 
born  again."  "  Except  a  man  (except  any  one)  be  born  again, 
he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven."  If  man  were  free  from 
sin,  he  would  not  need  regeneration. 

It  is  sometimes  said,  that  regeneration  consists  merely  in  right 
exercises,  such  as  loving  and  obeying  God.  It  is  true,  that  the 
change  is  closely  connected  with  man's  inward  exercises  and  out- 
ward actions.  If  a  man  is  regenerated,  he  will  love  and  obey 
God.  A  holy  being  will  have  holy  exercises  and  perform  holy 
actions.  "  A  good  tree  will  bring  forth  good  fruit."  And  again, 
"  Either  make  the  tree  good  and  its  fruit  good,  or  else  make  the 
tree  corrupt  and  its  fruit  corrupt."  A  moral  agent  that  is  unho- 
ly, will  put  forth  unholy  exercises.  Holiness  or  unholiness  be- 
longs primarily  and  essentially  to  man  himself,  as  an  intelligent, 
moral  being,  and  to  his  actions  secondarily  and  consequentially. 
You  may  ask,  whether  there  is  any  thing  hack  of  right  moral 
action,  that  is,  prior  to  it.  I  answer,  yes  ;  there  is  an  agent,  en- 
dued Avith  all  necessary  moral  powers  and  faculties.  And  there 
is  something  more  than  an  agent,  and  something  more  than  a 
maral  agent.  If  the  actions  are  holy,  there  is  a  holg  moral  agent. 
And  if  the  actions  are  unholy,  there  is  an  unholy  agent.  It  is  in 
reference  to  this  subject  that  Christ  says,  "  The  tree  is  known  by 
its  fruit."  It  is  known  by  the  fruit,  whether  the  tree  is  good  or 
bad.  The  goodness  or  badness  of  the  tree  is  hack  of  the  fruit. 
The  fruit  does  not  constitute  the  goodness  or  badness  of  the  tree, 
but  is  derived  from  it,  and  makes  it  known.     In  like  manner  holy 


538  REGENERATION.       ITS     NATURE. 

actions  result  from  the  holiness  of  the  agent,  and  show  that  he  is 
holy;  and  unholy  actions  show  that  he  is  unholy.  So  far  as  we 
know  the  quality  of  the  exercises  or  acts,  we  know  the  quality  of 
the  agent.  The  connection  between  the  character  of  the  actions 
and  the  character  of  the  agent  is  invariable.  Take  an  unrenewed 
sinner,  who,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  is  an  enemy  to  God. 
What  now  is  necessary  in  order  that  he  may  love  God  ?  It  is 
necessary  that  he  should  be  born  again.  He^  the  man,  must  be 
created  anew  ;  and  if  he  is  created  anew,  it  will  be  unto  good 
works:  —  not  that  good  works  must  be  created,  he  himself  re- 
maining unchanged  ;  but  that  he  must  be  created  anew,  and  then, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  good  works  will  be  performed.  If  a  man 
is  regenerated,  or  made  holy,  holy  afiFections  and  acts  will  follow — 
he  will  love  and  obey  God.  How  can  he  love  and  obey,  while  he 
is  an  unrenewed  sinner  ?     How  can  a  bad  tree  bear  good  fruit  ? 

To  say  that  regeneration  consists  in  good  moral  exercises,  that 
is,  in  loving  God  and  obeying  his  commands,  seems  to  me  to  be  an 
abuse  of  language.  It  is  as  unphilosophical  and  strange,  as  to 
say,  that  the  birth  of  a  child  consists  in  his  breathing,  or  that  the 
creation  of  the  sun  consists  in  his  shining.  3Ian  himself  is  born 
again,  and  is  born  of  God.  Regeneration  is  a  change  wrought  in 
fallen,  sinful  man  by  the  Holy  Spirit ;  and  this  change  is  devel- 
oped and  acted  out  in  holy  aifections  and  a  holy  life.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  Scripture  and  of  the  Christian  church. 

Do  you  ask,  whether  regeneration  is  a  j^hysieal  change  ?  I 
cannot  answer  this  without  knowing  what  is  meant  by  the  word 
physical.  If  it  means,  as  it  commonly  does,  that  which  is  not  of 
a  moral  nature  ;  then  I  say,  regeneration  is  not  a  physical  change. 
If  it  is  used  to  point  out  what  may  be  called  the  essence  of  the 
mind,  or  that,  without  which  the  mind  cannot  exist ;  if  it  is  used 
to  signify  reason,  memory,  conscience,  or  any  of  those  faculties, 
capacities  or  susceptibilities,  which  necessarily  belong  to  man  as 
an  accountable  being,  a  subject  of  divine  law ;  my  answer  must 
still  be,  that  regeneration  is  not  a  physical  change.  The  Holy 
Spirit  in  renewing  the  sinner,  does  not  take  away  any  of  these 
natural  faculties  or  susceptibilities,  nor  does  it  impart  any  new 


REGENERATION.      ITS    NATURE.  539 

ones.  Paul,  when  regenerated,  possessed  the  same  faculty  of 
reason,  the  same  faculty  of  conscience,  the  same  po^Yer  of  mem- 
ory, the  same  natural  passions  and  appetites,  as  he  did  before  he 
was  regenerated.  He  was  not  changed  in  regard  to  these  any 
more  than  he  was  in  regard  to  his  body.  More  properly  speak- 
ing, his  body  was  his  physical  part.  But  the  essential  faculties 
and  capacities  of  a  rational  and  accountable  agent  are  sometimes, 
though,  I  think,  improperly,  called  physical,  —  it  being  intended 
thus  to  distinguish  them  from  that  which  is  strictly  moral. 

But  when  I  say  that  the  natural  faculties  of  the  mind,  as  well 
as  the  members  of  the  body,  are  essentially  the  same  after  regen- 
eration, as  before,  I  do  not  mean  that  they  undergo  no  change 
whatsoever.  In  regard  to  their  direction  and  use  they  are 
changed.  "  All  thirigs  are  new."  Whereas  they  were  once  the 
instruments  of  sin,  they  are  now  the  instruments  of  righteousness. 
In  this  sense  regeneration  implies  an  important  change  in  all  the 
faculties  of  the  mind,  and  in  all  the  bodily  members  and  senses. 
And  if  any  one  pleases,  he  may  call  this  a  physical  change.  It 
is  really  a  change  in  the  use  of  what  is  physical.  And  this  change 
extends  to  a  man's  property,  and  time,  and  to  all  that  comes  under 
his  influence.  But  this  new  use  of  what  he  possesses,  this  new 
aim  and  purpose,  and  this  new  life  result  from  a  change  which  is 
more  inward,  a  renewal  in  the  spirit  of  the  mind.  This  renewal, 
like  other  works  of  God,  is  in  itself  imperceptible.  But  it  is 
made  known  by  its  results,  or  fruits,  which  are  love,  joy,  peace, 
etc.  From  the  unrenewed  spirit  of  the  mind,  the  depraved  heart, 
"  proceed  evil  thoughts,  adulteries,  —  murders,  —  covetousness, 
—  pride."  All  these,  Christ  says,  come  "  from  within,  out  of 
the  heart,"  that  is,  the  unrenewed  heart.  The  heart,  in  its  nat- 
ural state,  is  the  fountain,  from  which  proceed  all  evil  affections 
and  actions.  The  heart,  in  its  regenerate  state,  is  the  fountain 
from  which  proceed  all  holy  affections  and  actions. 

If  I  should  undertake  to  describe  more  specifically  what  change 
is  effected  by  the  renewing  the  Holy  Ghost,  I  sliould  say,  it  is 
a  change  in  man's  moral  disposition,  in  his  governing  inclination 
or  p'opensitg  ;  or  as  it  is  otherwise  expressed,  in  his  moral  taste, 


540  REGENERATION.      ITS   NATURE. 

or  relish^  or  his  principle  of  action.  All  this  phraseology  is  in 
familiar  use,  and  is  well  understood  both  by  the  learned  and  the 
unlearned.  The  disposition  or  principle  of  action  is  regarded  by 
all  as  constituting  a  man's  character.  If  a  man's  predominant  dis- 
position is  covetousness,  or  ambition,  or  malice,  we  say,  he  —  the 
man,  is  covetous,  ambitious,  or  malevolent.  If  his  disposition  is 
to  do  good,  we  say,  he  is  benevolent.  This  is  his  character.  If 
he  has  a  disposition  to  love  and  obey  God,  a  taste  for  spiritual 
objects,  a  relish  for  the  pleasures  of  religion  ;  we  say,  he  is  a 
good  man,  a  pious  man,  a  Christian.  This  is  a  kind  of  language 
which  all  men  use,  and  to  which  all  give  the  same  meaning. 
Nor  does  it  occasion  any  difficulty,  except  with  those  who  carry 
their  philosophical  speculations  too  far. 

No  one  can  reasonably  deny  the  existence  of  such  a  disposition, 
taste,  or  principle  of  action  in  man  because  it  is  in  itself  concealed 
from  our  view,  and  is  known  only  by  its  effects  or  operations. 
For  the  same  is  true  of  the  ooul  of  man,  and  of  all  its  faculties, 
and  of  all  the  powers  existing  in  the  natural  world.  And  the 
same  is  true  of  the  Supreme  Being,  of  whom  are  all  things.  All 
these  are  incapable  of  being  perceived  or  known  by  us,  except  in 
and  by  their  operations  and  effects.  The  existence  of  God  and 
of  other  spiritual  beings,  and  even  of  our  own  souls,  can  be 
understood  or  perceived  by  us  in  no  other  way.  To  deny  then 
the  existence  of  a  disposition,  or  taste,  or  principle,  which  is  an- 
tecedent to  moral  action,  and  is  the  ground  or  cause  of  it,  because 
in  itself  it  is  not  a  subject  of  direct  consciousness,  and  is  manifested 
to  us  only  by  its  operations  and  results,  would  be  in  effect,  to 
deny  the  most  important  doctrines  of  human  belief. 

What  then  is  regeneration  ?  It  is  a  change  wrought  in  de- 
praved man  by  the  divine  Spirit  —  a  change  from  a  state  of  sin 
to  a  state  of  holiness  ;  from  a  disposition  to  hate  the  true  char- 
acter of  God  to  a  disposition  to  love  God ;  from  a  disposition  to 
seek  one's  own  interest  as  his  supreme  object,  to  a  disposition  to 
seek  the  good  of  others.  The  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost  gives 
this  new  disposition  or  inclination,  this  new  taste  or  principle  of 
action.     And  it  shows  itself  in  the  following  way.    When  holy 


REGENERATION.      ITS   NATURE.  541 

objects  are  presented  to  the  mind  of  a  regenerate  man,  a  corres- 
pondent affection  is  waked  up  in  his  soul.  He  is  pleased  with 
holy  objects  ;  whereas  he  was  before  displeased.  He  has  a  taste 
for  spiritual  employments  and  pleasures,  for  which  in  his  unregen- 
erate  state  he  had  no  taste.  This  is  what  Ave  mean  by  a  new  dis- 
position, a  new  principle  of  action.  The  renewing  of  the  Spirit 
does  not  consist  in  creating  holy  exercises  in  the  unchanged  mind 
of  the  sinner  ;  not  in  loving  and  obeying  God  without  any  disposition 
to  love  and  obey  ;  not  in  the  actings  of  benevolence  and  faith  spring- 
ing from  no  principle  of  benevolence  and  faith.  But  it  consists 
primarily  and  essentially  in  giving  a  new  and  holy  disposition,  a 
principle  of  love  and  obedience.  The  regenerated  soul  is  so 
changed,  that  it  will  habitually  and  permanently  love  God  and 
man,  and  obey  the  moral  law  ;  in  other  words,  it  has  permanently  a 
new  disposition.  It  is  a  holy  soul.  It  is  a  pure  fountain,  and 
will  send  forth  pure  waters. 

Scripture  speaks  of  a  "  new  heart,  and  a  new  spirit "  —  of 
"  a  heart  to  love  God  and  keep  his  commandments  ;  "  which  is 
surely  very  different  from  a  heart  or  spirit  which  acts  in  the  way 
of  enmity  and  disobedience.  Not  only  the  affections  and  actions 
are  different,  but  the  heart,  the  spirit  is  different.  The  sinner 
himself  is  changed  —  the  agent,  the  person  is  sanctified.  Com- 
mon sense  and  philosophy  have  always  taught  and  always  will 
teach,  that  the  current  of  a  man's  affections,  desires  and  volitions 
proceed  from  an  inward  principle,  called  disposition,  or  state  of 
mind,  and  that  this  governing  disposition  essentially  constitutes 
character.  It  seems  to  me  absurd  to  suppose,  that  a  moral  agent 
who  is  totally  depraved,  will  ever  love  and  obey  God,  without 
being  changed  in  his  moral  disposition,  or  principle  of  action. 
Riglit  exercises  presuppose  a  right  disposition,  and  proceed  from 
it.  If  any  one  loves  God,  it  is  because  he  is  renewed  —  be- 
cause, in  the  disposition  or  temper  of  his  mind,  he  is  changed. 

What  I  have  here  advanced  is  in  accordance  with  the  views  of 
the  most  respectable  Calvinistic  divines.  Charnock  speaks  of  the 
new  creation  as  consisting  in  gracious  qualities  and  habits  of  the 
soul,  lohieh  dispose  it  to  holy  acts.     Owen  calls  it  "  an  habitual 

VOL.  II.  46 


542  REGENERATION.      ITS     NATURE. 

holy  principle  wrought  in  us  bj  God  —  a  supernatural  principle 
of  holy  actions."  Edwards  strenuously  maintains  that  a  moral 
principle  must  exist  in  the  soul,  prior  (in  the  order  of  nature)  to 
moral  action.  And  he  considers  regeneration  as  essentially  con- 
sisting in  imparting  to  the  soul  a  new  moral  sense,  taste,  or  prin- 
ciple, adapted  to  the  perception  and  love  of  moral  excellence. 
"  This  new  sense,  and  the  new  dispositions  that  attend  it,"  he 
says,  "  are  not  new  faculties,  but  new  principles  of  nature.  By 
a  principle  of  nature,  in  this  place,  I  mean  that  foundation  which 
is  laid  in  nature,  either  old  or  new,  for  any  particular  kind  of 
exercise  —  or  a  natural  habit,  giving  a  person  ability  and  disposi- 
tion to  exert  the  faculties  in  exercises  of  such  a  certain  kind,"  so 
that  such  exertion  of  his  faculties  may  be  said  to  be  his  nature. 
Bellamy  refers  with  approbation  to  the  views  of  Edwards,  and 
says  ;  "  In  regeneration  there  is  a  new,  divine  and  holy  taste 
begotten  in  the  heart  by  the  immediate  influence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit." 

Dwight  discusses  this  subject  extensively.  I  shall  quote  a  few 
sentences.  He  says,  "  Without  a  relish  for  spiritual  objects,  I 
cannot  see  that  any  discoveries  concerning  them,  however  clear 
and  bright,  can  render  them  pleasing  to  the  soul."  "  The  nature 
of  the  object  perceived  is  disrehshed.  The  more,  then,  it  is  per- 
ceived, the  more  it  is  disrelished  of  course,  so  long  as  the  present 
taste  continues.  It  seems  therefore  indispensable,  that  its  relish 
with  respect  to  spiritual  objects  should  first  be  changed."  "  A 
relish  for  all  spiritual  objects,  never  before  existing  in  him,  is 
communicated  to  every  man,  who  is  the  subject  of  regeneration, 
by  the  Spirit  of  God."  "  This  relish,"  he  says  "  has  been  com- 
monly styled  disposition,  temper,  inclination,  heart,  etc.  He  calls 
it  disposition."  He  says,  "  This  disposition  in  Adam,  (i.  e.  when 
first  created)  was  the  cause  whence  his  virtuous  voHtions  pro- 
ceeded ;  the  reason  why  they  were  virtuous  and  not  sinful." 
"  Plain  men,  with  truth  as  well  as  with  good  sense,  ascribe  all  the 
vohtions  of  mankind  to  disposition.''^  "  The  soul  of  every  man 
who  becomes  a  Christian,  is  renewed  by  the  communication  of  a 
relish  for  spiritual  objects." 


REGENERATION.      ITS    NATURE.  543 

The  Rev.  George  Payne,  LL.  D.,  of  Exeter,  England,  says : 
"  I  think  Dr.  Dwight  might  also  have  referred  to  the  case  of 
infants  regenerated  by  the  Spirit  of  Grace.  The  change  pro- 
duced in  their  minds  does  not  consist  in  just  views  of  divine 
things,  or  in  holy  aflfections  towards  them.  For  they  are  physi- 
cally incapable  of  either.  But  the  germ  of  holiness  is  implanted  ; 
some  eflfect  is  produced,  which  will  lead,  if  the  life  of  the  child  is 
spared,  to  just  apprehensions  and  holy  affections." 

Dr.  Hopkins  says  :  "  As  depravity  is  wholly  in  the  will,  or 
heart,  the  source  and  seat  of  all  moral  actions,  the  divine  opera- 
tion directly  respects  the  heart,  and  consists  in  changing  that"  — 
that  is,  in  changing  not  only  moral  actions,  but  that  which  is  the 
source  and  seat  of  moral  actions,  namely,  the  will  or  heart.  "  The 
renovation  of  the  will,  or  giving  a  new  heart,  sets  the  whole  soul 
right  in  all  its  powers  and  faculties." 

It  is  sometimes  objected,  that,  if  the  renewing  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  imparts  a  new  disposition  or  taste,  prior,  in  the  order  of 
nature,  to  holy  exercises  ;  then  regeneration  is  a  ijhyslcal  change. 
But  we  regard  this  objection  as  without  force,  inasmuch  as  this 
disposition  or  taste  is  not  of  a  physical,  but  altogether  of  a  moral 
nature.  It  is,  in  my  view,  an  unphilosophical  and  groundless 
assumption,  that  nothing  but  exercise  is  of  a  moral  nature.  Of 
course,  any  argument  founded  on  that  assumption,  appears  to  me 
totally  inconclusive.  The  opinion  has  been  so  common,  and  is  so 
obviously  true  as  to  need  no  arguments  to  support  it,  that  man  has 
a  7noral  nature,  and  moral  as  well  as  intellectual  faculties,  antece- 
dentli/  to  moral  action,  and  that  it  is  this  moral  nature  which  quali- 
fies him  for  moral  action.  And  it  is  also  the  common  opinion,  that 
it  is  a  virtuous  disposition  that  leads  to  virtuous  action,  and  a 
vicious  disposition  that  leads  to  vicious  action.  To  assert  that 
there  is  moral  exercise  in  man  without  an  antecedent  moral 
nature  and  moral  disposition  or  propensity,  is  as  unreasonable  as 
to  assert  that  man  has  intellectual  action  without  an  intellectual 
nature. 

There  are  some  who  hold,  that  every  human  being,  from  the 
beginning  of  his  existence,  has  a  disposition,  propensity,  or  bias, 


544  REGENERATION.   ITS  NATURE. 

which  certainly  leads  to  sin,  and  that,  while  this  disposition  or 
bias  remains,  sin  and  onlj  sin  will  be  the  result ;  but  that  this 
original  disposition  or  bias  is  not  of  a  moral  nature.  Of  course, 
they  consider  it  as  i:>liy8ical.  And  as  this  disposition  or  bias 
must  be  changed  in  order  to  right  exercise  and  action,  they  who 
say,  the  disposition  is  not  of  a  moral  nature,  are  really  chargeable 
with  holding  to  a  physical  change  in  regeneration,  though  they 
profess  to  deny  it.  They  must  unavoidably  hold  to  this,  so  long 
as  they  assert  that  the  disposition  or  propensity  to  love  and  obey 
God,  which  is  given  in  regeneration,  is  of  a  physical  and  not  of  a 
moral  nature. 

A  somewhat  plausible  objection,  which  has  been  urged  against 
the  views  above  stated,  deserves  some  attention  in  this  place.  If 
a  disposition  or  propensity  to  holy  acts  is  necessary  to  account 
for  such  acts,  and  if  a  disposition  to  commit  sin  is  necessary  to 
account  for  sinful  acts  ;  then  how  was  it  with  the  first  sin  ?  Was 
there  in  Adam,  before  he  fell,  a  disposition  or  propensity  to  sin  ? 
In  reference  to  this,  I  remark,  first ;  to  transgress  the  divine 
law  under  the  influence  of  any  kind  or  degree  of  temptation,  is 
sin.  Secondly.  When  Adam  was  tempted  to  sin,  it  is  inconceiv- 
able that  he  should  have  complied  with  the  temptation,  without  a 
state  of  mind  which  may  properly  be  called  a  disposition  or  apti- 
tude to  comply.  The  temptation  may  have  been  the  means  of 
producing  such  a  disposition  ;  but  such  a  disposition  or  aptitude 
must  have  existed  in  him  prior,  in  the  order  of  nature,  to  the 
determination  or  choice  of  his  will  to  transgress.  When  he  sin- 
ned, he  manifested  a  state  of  mind,  a  disposition,  or  propensity, 
diflFerent  from  what  had  governed  him  before.  And  who  can 
doubt  that  this  state  of  mind  was  prior,  in  the  order  of  nature,  to 
his  sinful  act  ?  Who  can  suppose  that  with  a  heart  perfectly  dis- 
posed and  inclined  to  obey,  and  while  it  continued  perfectly 
inclined  to  obey,  he  did  actually  disobey  ?  There  was,  then,  a 
change  in  his  disposition  or  state  of  mind,  prior  to  the  change  in 
his  vohtions  and  actions.  And  how  is  this  change  to  be  accounted 
for  ?  You  may  ask  this  question  ;  but  it  may  be,  that  the  subject 
lies  out  of  the  province  of  the  human  intellect,  and  that  no  man 


REGENERATION.   ITS  NATURE.         545 

can  give  a  satisfactory  answer.  That  which  seems  to  approach 
nearest  to  an  answer  is,  that  God,  in  a  sovereign  manner,  withheld 
that  influence  of  his  Spirit  which  was  necessary  to  shield  him  from 
the  influence  of  temptation  and  to  preserve  him  in  a  state  of 
holiness,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  this  withdrawment,  Adam 
was  left  under  the  mere  influence  of  those  affections  which  neces- 
sarily belonged  to  him  as  a  human  being  —  was  left  a  rational, 
moral  agent,  without  holiness.  Of  course,  he  was  disposed  to 
gratify  himself  rather  than  to  obey  God.  That  is,  he  came  to 
have  an  aptitude  to  the  indulgence  of  selfish,  worldly  affections, 
and  a  propensity  to  violate  the  divine  commands.  This  account 
of  the  matter  seems  to  have  been  satisfactory  to  some  of  the 
greatest  and  best  of  men.  But  suppose  there  are  insolvable  diffi- 
culties attending  this  subject,  and  obscurities  which  we  cannot 
clear  up  ;  is  this  a  reason  for  denying  what  is  plain  ?  And  is  it 
not  a  plain  truth,  that  the  tree  is  known  by  its  fruit  —  that  a 
man's  inward  character,  his  disposition,  the  state  of  his  heart,  is 
known  by  his  conduct  ?  And  why  should  we  depart  from  this 
principle  in  regard  to  moral  agents  who  fell  from  a  state  of  hoh- 
ness  ?  A  moral  agent  cannot  commit  the  first  sin,  any  more  than 
any  subsequent  sin,  without  a  disposition  to  sin.  It  is  unaccount- 
able, you  say,  how  Adam's  disposition  or  principle  of  action  was 
changed.  I  admit  that  we  cannot  explain  Itow  it  was  changed. 
But  the  fact  that  it  was  changed  —  that  from  being  right  it 
became  wrong,  is  incontrovertible.  The  only  question  now  to  be 
considered  is,  whether  it  was  changed  prior  to  his  actual  trans- 
gression, or  afterwards  ?  If  you  say  it  was  not  changed  prior  to 
his  actual  disobedience  ;  then  you  have  the  singular  fact  of  a 
man's  committing  an  act  of  transgression,  by  which  he  lost  the 
favor  of  God  and  was  expelled  from  Paradise,  tmthout  any  dispo- 
sition to  transgress  —  certainly  without  any  culpable  disposition  ; 
that  while  his  state  of  mind,  his  inclination,  his  inward  principle 
of  action,  was  perfectly  faultless  and  right,  he  voluntarily  commit- 
ted that  sin  against  God,  which  brought  ruin  upon  himself  and  all 
his  posterity.  And  if  he  could  begin  to  sin  without  any  disposi- 
tion to  sin,  why  could  he  not  continue  to  sin  without  any  such  dis- 

46* 


546  REGENERATION.   ITS  NATURE. 

position  ?  How  Adam's  disposition  ■was  changed  from  holj  to 
unholj  cannot,  I  admit,  be  satisfactorily  explained.  But  shall  we, 
I  ask,  —  shall  we  on  this  account  deny  what  is  evident,  that  is, 
that  his  disposition  was  changed,  and  that  when  he  sinned  he 
acted  according  to  the  disposition  he  then  had  ?  I  contend  only 
for  the  common  truth,  that  man's  affections  and  voluntary  acts  are 
according  to  his  disposition,  or  the  state  of  his  heart,  and  that 
under  the  influence  of  external  motives,  they  proceed  from  it. 
But  whatever  diflSculties  may  arise  in  regard  to  the  case  of  Adam, 
it  is  evident  that  all  human  beings  from  the  first,  are  now  inclined 
to  sin.  This  is  admitted  by  every  man  who  regards  either  Scrip- 
ture or  facts,  although  the  subject  is  involved  in  such  mystery. 
And  this  native  inclination  or  bias,  called  the  corruption  of  their 
nature,  is  admitted  to  be  the  ground  of  their  actual  transgressions. 
In  other  words,  it  is  admitted  that  their  having  this  corrupt  incli- 
nation or  bias  accounts  for  it,  that  they  commit  actual  sin.  I  say, 
accounts  for  it,  or  is  the  reason  of  it.  For  if  they  were  free  from 
a  corrupt  bias,  and  continued  to  have  a  disposition  or  state  of 
mind  perfectly  pm-e  and  holy,  as  Jesus  had ;  they  would  resist 
temptation,  and  be,  as  he  was,  without  sin. 

But  I  am  treating  of  regeneration.  And  the  position  which  I 
maintain  is,  that  the  Divine  Spirit  does  not  change  a  man's  exer- 
cises and  actions  while  his  disposition  or  the  state  of  his  heart 
remains  as  it  was  ;  but  that  it  gives  him  a  new  disposition,  or 
■changes  his  heart,  and  that,  being  thus  renewed,  he  puts  forth 
new  exercises  and  performs  new  actions.  He  himself  is  made 
holy,  and  then,  in  consequence,  his  acts  are  holy.  His  heart  is 
new,  and  from  this  proceed  new  exercises.  The  tree  is  made 
good,  and  then  bears  good  fruit.  "The  fruit  of  the  Spirit"  — 
the  Spirit  which  regenerates  the  heart,  — "  is  love,  joy,  peace, 
•etc."  These  affections  and  habits  of  the  regenerate  heart  show 
themselves  in  correspondent  outward  practice.  Here  we  have  the 
habitual,  permanent  character  of  the  converted  man,  the  renewed 
moral  agent.  He  is  holy.  He  is  a  saint.  He  is  pious,  benevolent, 
obedient.  So  we  say,  Jesus  was  "  meek  and  lowly  in  heart.^* 
The  language  is  plain.     We  know  exactly  what  it  means.     There 


REGENERATION.   ITS  NATURE.         547 

is  no  obscurity  in  it,  unless  we  make  it  obscure  by  false  philos- 
ophy. 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind,  that  the  change  which  takes  place  in 
the  disposition  or  state  of  the  heart,  gives  a  new  direction  to  all 
the  faculties  of  the  mind,  and  to  all  the  members  of  the  body. 
In  this  sense,  "  all  things  are  new."  All  things  are  turned  to  a 
higher  and  nobler  use!  Whereas  they  were  instruments  of  sin, 
they  have  now  become  instruments  of  righteousness.  All  this  is 
the  fruit  of  the  new  disposition  or  principle  of  action,  which  is 
imparted  to  the  soul  by  the  Holy  Ghost.  A  holy  heart  comes 
from  the  Holy  Spirit.  Holy  love  comes  from  a  holy  heart,  and 
holy  actions  come  from  holy  love.  This  is  the  order.  There  can 
be  no  acts  of  obedience  where  there  is  no  love.  And  there  can 
be  no  love  without  a  regenerated,  holy  heart.  A  holy  heart, 
or,  more  exactly,  a  holy  man,  loves  divine  things  as  soon  as  they 
are  presented  to  view.  And  the  actions  will  be  according  to  this 
love.  The  state  of  the  heart,  the  affections,  and  the  voluntary 
actions  all  harmonize. 

It  is  sometimes  made  a  question,  whether  repentance  or  con- 
version is  the  same  as  regeneration,  or  the  new  birth.  The  an- 
swer'is  ob^^ous.  Regeneration  is  the  change  of  the  heart  by  the 
Holy  Spirit.  Conversion,  that  is,  actual  turning  from  sin,  or 
repentance,  is  the  consequence  of  regeneration.  So  is  holy  love  ; 
so  is  every  Christian  grace.  The  spiritual  principle,  the  seed, 
which  grace  has  planted,  develops  itself  in  obedience,  and  finally 
in  universal  and  complete  obedience  to  the  divine  law.  From 
some  passages  of  Scripture,  taken  by  themselves,  we  might  sup- 
pose, that  the  change  wrought  in  regeneration  is  in  all  respects 
complete  at  once.  If  one,  who  is  dead  in  sin,  is  raised  from  the 
dead,  we  might  naturally  think  that  death  is  entirely  removed ; 
that,  if  he  is  really  turned  from  sin  and  sanctified,  he  is  complete- 
ly turned  dia^  perfectly  sanctified.  And  if  we  Avere  to  form  our 
judgment  on  this  matter  from  our  own  reason  merely,  we  should 
probably  think  that  it  must  be  so,  —  that  no  one  who  sees  the 
evil  of  sin,  and  repents,  and  tastes  the  joys  of  salvation,  will  ever 
sin  again.     But  the  current  languaiiie  of  revelation  and  the  ex- 


548  REGENERATION.      ITS    NATURE. 

perience  of  the  best  of  men  clearly  show,  that  Avhile  the  change 
in  the  renewed  is  real,  it  is  far  from  being  at  once  complete  ;  that 
while  there  is  a  commencement  of  holiness,  there  is  much  remain- 
ing sin ;  that  through  the  whole  life  of  believers  on  earth,  there  is 
a  warfare  against  the  sin  which  dwells  in  them.  Bv  this  remark- 
able fact  the  deep-rooted  depravity  of  the  heart  is  made  very 
clear.  As  God  is  able  to  sanctify  his  people  perfectly  at  the 
beginning  of  their  Christian  life,  we  are  compelled  to  beheve,  that 
there  are  reasons,  founded  in  the  unsearchable  wisdom  of  God, 
for  another  mode  of  proceeding  in  the  dispensation  of  his  grace. 
And  it  cannot  be  doubted,  that  the  plan  which  God  actually 
pursues  will,  in  the  end,  most  fully  manifest  to  the  saints  their 
own  exceeding  wickedness  and  ill-desert,  and  the  glory  of  that 
grace  to  which  they  are  indebted  for  their  salvation. 

If  these  things  be  so,  it  may  be  asked,  what  we  are  to  under- 
stand by  those  passages  of  Scripture  Avhich  teach  that  believers 
are  delivered  from  sin  and  are  complete  in  Christ  —  that  old  things 
are  passed  away,  and  all  things  become  new.  The  best  answer 
I  am  able  to  give  is,  that  in  all  such  passages  the  work  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  spoken  of  as  a  whole;  that  the  sacred  writers 
represent  the  character  of  the  regenerate  not  only  as  it  is,  but  as 
it  will  finally  be  ;  that  they  speak  of  that  saving  change  which 
though  at  present  only  begun,  is  destined  to  be  carried  on  to 
perfection.  Just  as  a  little  child  is  spoken  of  as  a  man.  A 
man,  we  say,  is  born ;  that  is,  one  who,  according  to  the  estab- 
lished course  of  nature,  is  to  he  a  man.  So  it  is  said,  Rom.  4 : 
17,  that  God  "  calleth  those  things  which  be  not,  as  though  they 
were."  This  principle  lies  at  the  bottom  of  many  representations 
of  Scripture.  What  God  determines  to  do  may  be  spoken  of  as 
though  it  was  actually  done. 

So  far  as  the  mode  of  preaching  on  this  subject  is  concerned, 
there  is  no  practical  difficulty.  We  are  to  copy  the  example  of 
those  who  were  inspired.  They  recognized  the  duty  —  the  prop- 
er work  of  depraved  moral  agents,  and  required  them  to  do  it. 
They  called  upon  sinners  to  repent,  to  turn  from  their  evil  ways, 
to  believe,  to  confess  their  sins,  to  pray,  to  love  God,  and  to  obej 


REGENERATION.      ITS    NATURE.  549 

his  word.  This  is  the  part  Avhich  sinners,  however  guilty  and  de- 
praved, are  required  to  perform.  This  is  the  appropriate  sphere 
of  their  agency,  their  own  distinct  agency.  It  is  the  converted 
sinner,  and  not  God,  that  repents,  and  makes  confession  of  sin, 
and  prays,  and  bcheves,  and  obeys.  It  is,  I  say,  he  that  does 
this  and  no  one  else. 

NoAv  what  can  be  more  proper  for  the  ministers  of  Christ,  than 
to  do  as  he  and  his  apostles  did,  that  is,  to  exhort  men  to  do 
their  duty  —  their  own  proper  work  —  the  work  which  is  essen- 
tial to  their  salvation,  to  urge  and  persuade  them  to  do  this 
reasonable  and  necessary  work,  by  the  most  moving  and  solemn 
considerations  drawn  from  the  word  of  God.  Thus  far  all  is  plain. 
—  Then  we  must  recognize  the  other  agency  concerned  —  the 
agency  of  God's  Spirit ;  must  set  forth  its  importance  and  neces- 
sity ;  must  show,  that  no  being  but  God,  ever  did  or  can  exercise 
the  proper,  efficient  agency  which  regenerates  sinners.  We  must 
represent  this  renewing,  sanctifying  agency  as  the  appropriate  and 
exclusive  work  of  God,  —  as  a  work  to  be  desired  and  sought  in 
earnest  prayer,  and  as  a  work  which,  whenever  accomplished, 
must  be  ascribed  to  the  glory  of  his  grace.  Here  all  is  plain,  if 
we  only  follow  the  teachings  of  revelation.  We  are  to  hold 
forth  the  two  agencies  above  mentioned  as  perfectly  distinct,  but 
not  as  disjoined  —  the  sanctifying  work  of  the  Spirit  being  the 
cause  of  all  holy  affections  and  acts  in  man,  and  holy  affections 
and  acts  in  man  being  the  effect  and  the  evidence  of  the  sanctify- 
ing work  of  the  Spirit.  But  this  subject  will  be  more  particularly 
considered  in  the  following  Lectures. 


LECTURE    LXXXV 


REGENERATION.  ITS  CAUSE  OR  AUTHOR.  THE  WORK  MANIFESTS 
GREAT  POWER  ;  IS  SOVEREIGN  ;  AND  IS  SPECIAL  AND  SUPER- 
NATURAL. 

The  errors  which  prevail  respecting  regeneration,  arise  more  or 
less  from  men's  inattention  to  the  subject,  or  from  unprofitable 
speculations  and  controversies,  or  from  the  objections  which  have 
been  urged  against  the  truth  by  learned  and  subtle  opposers.  But 
the  principal  source  of  these  errors  is  that  very  blindness  of  mind 
and  depravity  of  heart,  which  nothing  but  the  renewing  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  can  efiectually  remove.  The  only  way,  therefore,  in 
which  men  can  be  brought  truly  to  understand  the  reality  and 
excellence  of  the  work  of  God  in  the  renewal  of  sinners,  is  to  ex- 
perience it  themselves.  And  however  it  may  be  with  some  Chri&- 
tians,  whose  religious  exercises  are  wanting  in  clearness  and 
power,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  those  who  have  a  deep  and 
thorough  experience  of  the  gracious  work  of  the  Spirit,  will 
entertain  just  and  Scriptural  views  of  it.  The  eyes  of  their 
imderstanding  are  enlightened,  so  that  they  discern  spiritual 
things. 

The  nature  of  regeneration  having  been  considered,  the  next 
inquiry  will  be,  to  what  cause  is  this  change  to  be  ascribed? 
And  the  position  which  I  shall  endeavor  to  maintain  is,  that  rege- 
neration is  to  be  ascribed  to  a  special  act  of  divine  power ;  that  it 
is  the  work  of  the  Spirit  of  God. 

Power  denotes  that  which  produces  or  is  competent  to  produce 


THE    CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION.  551 

effects,  -whatever  maj  be  their  nature.  In  other  words,  it  denotes 
that  which  is  or  may  be  a  cause. 

This  holds  as  to  the  power  of  God.  Count  up  the  effects  which 
God  has  produced,  the  things  which  he  has  done  or  will  do,  and 
ascribe  them  to  him  as  the  cause,  and  you  will  attain  to  the  proper 
idea  of  his  power.  The  particular  denominations  we  give  to 
power,  are  generally  derived  from  the  different  classes  of  effects 
contemplated.  If  the  work  of  creation  is  referred  to,  we  say,  God 
has  creative  power ;  if  the  work  of  continuing  existence  to  things 
before  created,  we  say,  he  has  a  preserving  or  sustaining  power. 
With  reference  to  miracles,  we  say,  he  has  miraculous  power. 
But  if  we  speak  of  what  are  properly  called  physical  effects,  that 
is,  effects  taking  place  in  material  substances  and  of  a  material 
nature,  we  cannot  ascribe  them  to  a  proper  physical  power  in 
God,  because  he  is  not  a  physical  or  material  being.  But  though 
a  spiritual,  and  not  a  physical  Being,  he  creates  physical  sub- 
stances, and  endues  them  with  physical  properties  ;  that  is,  he 
produces  physical  effects.  For  example  ;  it  would  be  improper  to 
say  that  God  has  a  magnetic  power  ;  but  we  say,  he  creates  the 
magnet,  and  endues  it  with  its  appropriate  power. 

But  we  must  carefully  guard  against  concei^ing  of  God's 
power,  as  made  up  of  different  parts  corresponding  to  the  different 
effects  produced  —  one  part  accomplishing  this  work,  and  another 
that.  The  right  position  is,  that  God  is  one  and  the  same,  a  pure 
Spirit,  uncompounded  and  infinite.  But  this  one  Being  performs 
an  endless  variety  of  works  —  produces  an  endless  variety  of 
effects.  Of  course,  he  has  power  to  do  so.  And  this  is  only 
saying,  God  acts,  or  puts  forth  his  power  in  such  a  variety  of 
ways.  In  every  case,  the  operation  of  God's  power  is  perfectly 
suited  to  the  end  in  view  ;  and  when  it  relates  to  things  already 
existing,  its  operation  is  suited  to  the  nature  of  those  things  in 
which  the  effect  is  produced. 

The  doctrine  which  I  maintain  is,  that  regeneration  is  the  spe- 
cial work  of  God;  in  other  words,  that  it  is  accomplished  by  the 
power  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  evidence  which  supports  this  position  is  abundant.     The 


552  THE    CAUSE    OF    R    GENERATION. 

word  of  God,  which  is  our  onlj  infallible  guide,  teaches  us  that 
believers  have  experienced  the  mightj  power  of  God  —  the  power 
which  raised  Christ  from  the  dead ;  that  they  are  his  workman- 
ship ;  that  they  are  born  of  the  Spirit ;  that  he  creates  in  them  a 
new  heart,  turns  them  from  sin,  and  makes  them  holy ;  that  he 
gives  them  repentance  and  faith,  enlightens  them,  purifies  them, 
and  works  in  them  to  will  and  to  do.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  Scrip- 
ture, that  hohness,  in  all  its  branches,  is,  from  first  to  last,  pro- 
duced in  Christians  by  the  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  It  is  all 
attributed  to  him  as  the  efficient  cause.  There  is  no  intimation 
that  the  power  which  renews  the  heart  or  causes  hohness,  is 
partly  God's  and  partly  man's.  Every  cause  but  one  is  ex- 
pressly excluded.  It  is  "  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the  will  of  the 
flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God.''''  Paul  and  other  in- 
spired writers  take  special  care  to  impress  it  upon  our  minds  as  a 
matter  of  great  consequence,  that  every  part  of  sanctification, 
while  it  takes  place  in  man  as  an  intelligent,  moral,  active,  and 
accountable  being,  is  strictly  of  Crod. 

This  is  a  very  plain  and  simple  view  of  regeneration.  We  con- 
template holiness  at  its  commencement  in  the  heart  of  man  — 
hohness  as  an  active  jjj'inciple,  an  affection,  and  a  life.  Of  this 
God  is  the  cause.  The  divine  agency  in  this  new  spiritual  cre- 
ation is  as  obvious  and  as  easy  to  be  understood,  as  in  the  creation 
of  the  world.  We  look  upon  the  heavens  and  the  earth,  which 
once  were  not,  but  now  are,  and  we  ascribe  their  existence  to 
God.  He  made  them.  He  caused  them  to  be.  In  this  case, 
the  things  done  are  material  and  unintelligent  ;  in  the  other, 
moral  or  spiritual.  But  they  are  equally  from  God.  Holiness  in 
fallen  man,  both  in  principle  and  in  action,  results  as  really  and 
as  entirel}^  from  the  effectual  operation  of  God,  as  any  object  in 
the  natural  world.  Hence  the  manifest  propriety  of  the  language 
of  Scripture,  which  sets  forth  the  renewal  of  sinners  by  the  Spirit 
as  a  creation,  a  causing  of  the  light  to  shine,  and  a  resurrection  of 
the  dead.  Hence  too  we  see  that  the  honor  of  renewing  sinners 
is  due  to  God,  as  really  as  the  honor  of  creating  the  universe. 
This  is  acknowledged  by  all  Christians  in  their  prayers,  and  is 


THE    CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION.  553 

impressed  more  and  more  deeply  on  their  hearts  in  proportion  as 
they  grow  in  grace  and  in  the  knowledge  of  divine  things. 

To  any  who  doubt  whether  the  renewal  of  sinners  is  owing  to 
the  agency  of  God,  I  have  one  additional  remark  to  make.  Tell 
me  then  how  the  word  of  God  could  more  clearly  teach  this  doc- 
trine ?  By  what  forms  of  speech  could  it  more  fully  satisfy  you, 
that  the  doctrine  is  true  ?  You  will  find  that  Scripture  teaches  the 
doctrine  in  all  the  ways  most  adapted  to  convince  us  of  its  truth. 
Our  conclusion  then  must  be,  that  the  sacred  writers  could  not 
have  taught  it  more  clearly,  or  affirmed  it  more  strongly,  if  they 
had  really  intended  to  set  it  before  us  as  a  primary  and  essential 
article  of  our  faith. 

In  regard  to  the  work  of  God  in  the  regeneration  of  sinners, 
there  are  several  points  which  I  would  particularly  impress  upon 
your  minds. 

1.  This  work  of  God  manifests  great  power.  Thus  it  is  repre- 
sented by  the  Apostle  Paul.  He  speaks  of  the  exceeding  great- 
ness of  God's  power  towards  believers.  But  why  is  this  repre- 
sented as  an  instance  of  great  power  ?  I  answer  ;  on  account  of 
the  greatness  of  the  effect  produced.  On  this  principle  we  form 
our  apprehensions  of  divine  power  in  other  cases.  If  we  think  of 
God  as  creating  the  mountains,  the  ocean,  the  world,  and  the 
heavenly  bodies,  we  are  impressed  with  the  greatness  of  his 
power.  We  judge  of  the  degree  of  the  power  exercised,  by  its 
efiects,  whether  those  effects  are  of  one  kind  or  another.  Con- 
sider then  the  renovation  of  fallen  man.  To  make  one  sinner 
holy  —  to  give  spiritual  life  to  one  who  is  dead  in  sin  —  to  pre- 
pare for  heaven  one  who  is  fitted  for  destruction,  is  a  remarkable 
work.  Extend  your  thoughts  then  to  a  large  number  of  con- 
versions. Contemplate  those  who  constituted  the  Corinthian 
church.  They  were  deUvered  from  the  base  and  abominable 
passions  which  once  held  them  in  bondage,  and  were  filled  with 
the  fruits  of  the  Spirit.  Then  go  further,  and  think  of  the  mul- 
titude which  no  man  can  number,  out  of  every  nation  and  people 
under  heaven,  saved  from  sin  and  eternal  ruin,  and  made  holy 
and  happy  for  ever  in  the  kingdom  of  Christ.     How  vast  the 

VOL  II.  47 


554  THE     CAUSE     OF    REGENERATION. 

power  of  God  which  accomplishes  this  work !     What  a  display  of 
omnipotence  ! 

We  also  judge  of  the  greatness  of  the  power  exercised  in  any 
case,  by  the  greatness  of  the  obstacles  which  are  overcome.  The 
conversion  of  sinners  is  opposed  by  all  that  is  perverse  in  their 
passions  and  habits  ;  by  their  entire  alienation  from  God,  and 
their  settled  enmity  against  his  character  and  government ;  by 
the  lust  of  the  flesh,  the  lust  of  the  eye,  and  the  pride  of  life ; 
by  a  stubborn  will ;  by  an  unyielding  obstinacy  of  heart ;  in  a 
word,  by  all  the  active  and  powerful  principles  of  their  depraved 
nature,  excited  and  strengthened  by  the  influence  of  the  wicked 
one.  These  obstacles  are  such  that  no  convictions  of  conscience, 
no  fears  of  misery  or  desires  of  happiness,  no  persuasions  of 
God's  ministers,  no  warnings  of  liis  word  and  providence  can 
overcome  them.  They  bid  defiance  to  the  powers  of  men  and  an- 
gels. To  remove  all  these  difficulties,  and  rise  above  all  these 
obstacles  so  opposed  to  the  conversion  of  sinners ;  to  break  the 
chains  which  bind  them,  and  deliver  them  from  the  iron  despotism 
•which  oppresses  them  ;  to  bring  them  into  the  glorious  liberty  of  the 
sons  of  God,  and  make  them  obedient  and  happy  subjects  of  his 
spiritual  reign  —  to  do  all  this  manifests  a  greatness  of  divine 
power,  as  well  as  divine  mercy,  which  will  be  celebrated  forever 
in  God's  holy  kingdom. 

2.  In  the  renewal  of  sinners,  the  power  of  God  is  exercised  in 
a  sovereign  manner.  By  this  I  mean,  that  those  who  are  regen- 
erated, are  no  more  worthy  of  the  divine  favor,  and  are,  of  them- 
selves, no  more  inclined  to  turn  from  sin,  than  those  who  are 
never  regenerated.  The  reason,  therefore,  the  ultimate  reason 
why  they  are  regenerated  rather  than  others,  cannot  be  found  in 
any  attribute  of  character  which  they  possess  or  any  actions 
which  they  perform  in  their  unregenerate  state.  Their  conver- 
sion may  be  connected  with  favorable  circumstances  of  birth  and 
education,  with  the  faithful  labors,  prayers  and  examples  of  pa- 
rents and  ministers,  and  with  other  means  of  divine  appointment. 
But  God  does  not  give  them  a  new  heart  on  account  of  these 
privileges,  nor  on  account  of  any  works  they  have  done,  or  any 


THE     CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION.  555 

worthiness  they  possess  ;  nor  does  he  do  it,  because  they  are  less 
ill-deserving  than  others.  God,  who  is  infinitely  wise,  unques- 
tionably has  a  reason  for  all  that  he  does.  But  in  this  case,  as 
in  many  others,  the  reason  of  his  conduct  lies  concealed  in  his 
own  mind.  He  acts  according  to  his  own  pleasure ;  agreeably 
to  the  declaration  of  God  to  Moses,  which  the  Apostle  Paul 
applies  to  this  very  subject  :  "  I  will  have  mercy  on  whom  I 
will  have  mercy ;"  and  agreeably  to  the  representation  of  the 
same  Apostle,  that  God  calls  and  saves  men,  not  according  to  their 
works,  but  according  to  his  own  purpose  and  grace.  Now  this 
doctrine  of  divine  sovereignty,  instead  of  being  the  subject  of 
complaint,  is  suited  to  exert  a  most  important  influence,  particu- 
larly to  humble  the  pride  of  man,  and  lay  him  low  in  self-abase- 
ment, to  secure  to  God  all  the  glory  of  salvation,  and  also  to  show 
sinners  that,  how  great  soever  their  guilt,  they  have  no  occasion  to 
despair  of  divine  mercy. 

3.  In  the  renewal  of  sinners  there  is  a  special  and  supeiinatural 
operation  of  divine  power. 

That  is  special  which  is  uncommon  —  which  is  something  more 
than  what  is  ordinary.  The  effect  produced  by  the  Holy  Spirit  in 
regeneration,  is  hoHness  of  heart,  and,  as  the  result  of  this,  holy 
exercises  and  actions.  Now  holiness  is  not  common  to  mankind. 
To  be  born  again  —  to  love  and  serve  God,  is  not  what  generally 
takes  place.  And  if  it  should  take  place  generally,  as  we  expect 
it  will  in  a  coming  age,  it  would  still  deserve  to  be  called  special, 
because  it  would  be  entirely  different  from  what  men  would  ever 
possess,  if  left  without  this  divine  influence.  The  exercise  of  God's 
power  in  producing  it  would  in  that  case  be  special,  as  it  would 
be  different  from  any  exercise  of  his  power  in  the  unregenerate. 
It  would  imply,  as  it  does  at  present,  a  new  moral  creation  in 
every  true  convert.  From  this  view  of  the  subject  it  would  seem, 
that  a  sp>ecial  operation  and  a  supernatural  operation  are  expres- 
sions of  nearly  the  same  import.  The  objections  of  Dr.  Emmons 
to  this  use  of  the  word  supernatural  in  relation  to  this  subject, 
arose  from  his  giving  it  a  meaning  different  from  its  usual  meaning. 
And  I  think  the  objections  which  he  urges  against  the  supposition 


566  THE     CAUSE     OF    REGENERATION. 

of  a  siqjernatural  influence  of  the  Spirit  in  regeneration  lie 
equally  against  his  doctrine  of  a  special  influence. 

The  exact  meaning  of  supernatural  is,  above  u'hat  is  natural. 
To  inquire  then,  whether  the  operation  of  the  Spirit  in  regenera- 
tion is  su2?ernat}iral,  is  to  inquire  whether  it  is  above  what  takes 
place  in  those  who  remain  in  their  natural  state,  or  whether  it 
produces  a  disposition  or  character  of  mind  above  what  men 
naturally  possess.  It  is  the  same  as  to  inquire  whether  holiness 
is  natural  to  men,  or  whether  they  are  holy  by  nature ;  that  is, 
■whether  they  are  born  holy. 

But  we  cannot  have  a  just  and  adequate  idea  of  what  is  super- 
natural without  a  more  particular  and  definite  conception  of  what 
is  natural. 

Now  that  event  is  natural  which  takes  place  according  to  the 
established  laws  of  nature,  and  merely  in  consequence  of  those 
laws,  Thus  men  acquire  the  knowledge  of  different  languages, 
by  the  use  of  suitable  means,  and  the  diligent  exercise  of  their 
faculties.  Here,  all  is  natural.  Knowledge  comes  to  them  as 
the  result  of  the  laws  of  their  physical  and  intellectual  being. 
But  if  they  understood  diflerent  languages  and  sciences  at  once, 
without  study,  their  knowledge  would  be  supernatural.  But  here, 
I  observe,  that  such  an  event  as  the  one  just  mentioned,  and  all 
events  which  transcend  our  physical  and  mental  faculties  and  our 
obligations, — actions  done,  or  events  brought  about  above  the  laws 
of  nature,  as  the  turning  of  a  river  of  water  into  blood,  or  the 
knowledge  of  future  events  by  the  prophets  —  such  actions  and 
events  are  generally  styled  miraculous.  They  are  indeed  super- 
natural. But  this  word,  rather  than  the  other,  is  usually  applied 
in  theological  writings,  and  in  religious  discourse,  to  the  saving 
work  of  the  Spirit  in  renewing  and  sanctifying  sinful  men,  while 
the  other  is  appUed  to  those  visible  eflects  which  transcend  the 
powers  of  nature.  Supernatural  has  a  more  extensive  applica- 
tion, being  used  to  designate  both  classes  of  events  above  named, 
while  miraculous  commonly  designates  only  the  last. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give,  or  to  attempt  to  give,  a  full  enumerar 
tion  of  the  natural  faculties,  afiections  and  actions  of  man.     But  it 


TUE    CAUSE    OF    KEGENERATION.  557 

will  be  of  use  to  mention  a  few,  such  as  conscience,  or  a  power 
of  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong  ;  reason,  memory,  self- 
love  ;  and  the  various  affections  which  belong  to  the  social  and 
domestic  relations.  These  are  instances  of  what  is  natural  to  us. 
They  are  the  common  attributes  of  human  nature. 

I  might  mention  also  various  changes  in  the  feehngs,  habits,  and 
characters  of  men,  which  take  place  according  to  the  laws  of  our 
nature.  An  intemperate  man  may  become  sober,  and  a  sober  man 
intemperate  ;  a  spendthi-ift  may  become  penurious,  and  a  penu- 
rious man  a  spendthrift  by  natural  means,  and  in  a  natural  man- 
ner. Whatever  results  from  any  faculty,  disposition  or  principle 
which  properly  belongs  to  man,  or  from  the  exercise,  improvement, 
or  abuse  of  such  faculty,  disposition  or  principle,  may  justly  be 
considered  as  natural. 

If  you  ask,  whether  those  things  which  are  natural  exist  or  are 
produced  independently  of  God  ;  I  answer,  by  no  means.  His 
agency  is  universal.  He  worketh  all  in  all.  But  in  regard  to 
those  things  which  we  call  natural,  God  operates  in  an  uniform 
manner.  His  agency  is  conformed  to  the  established  laws  of  na- 
ture. It  shows  itself  in  those  laws.  In  this  way  he  moves  the 
planets,  and  causes  the  grass  and  the  trees  to  grow,  and  ordinarily 
governs  the  minds  of  men.  Whatever  God  does  in  the  physi- 
cal, the  intellectual,  or  the  moral  world  in  conformity  with  the 
constitution  and  uniform  order  which  he  has  established,  is  to  be 
regaided  as  natural.  The  effect  produced  and  the  operation  of 
the  divine  cause  are  both  natural. 

The  question  then  to  be  considered  is,  whether  regeneration  is 
a  natural  event ;  whether  the  effect  produced,  and  the  operation 
of  the  cause  producing  it,  are  conformed  to  the  common  laws  of 
the  intellectual  and  moral  world.  Is  holiness  a  natural  attribute 
of  man  ?  Or  if  not,  is  it  acquired  merely  by  natural  means  ? 
Can  its  existence  in  the  posterity  of  Adam  be  accounted  for  by 
the  exercise  and  improvement  of  any  of  the  powers  or  principles 
of  action  which  they  possess,  or  by  the  use  they  make,  while  un- 
regenerate,  of  the  means  which  God  is  pleased  to  grant  them  ? 

A  satisfactory  answer  to  this  question  is  very  obvious.      The 

47* 


558  THE     CAUSE     OF    REGENERATION. 

Scriptures  teach  that  by  nature  all  men  are  children  of  wrath. 
As  they  are  bom  into  the  world,  thej  possess  only  those  princi- 
ples which  our  Savioui'  calls  "  flesh,"  so  that  they  "  must  be  bom 
again  "  — must  "  be  born  of  God,"  in  order  to  be  admitted  into 
the  kingdom  of  heaven.  The  account  which  the  inspired  writers 
give  of  the  natural  character  and  state  of  man,  implies,  that  he 
has  within  himself  no  holiness,  and  no  spring  of  holiness  —  that 
all  his  moral  affections  are  depraved.  When  the  objects  of  re- 
ligion are  distinctly  contemplated  by  unregenerate  man,  feelings 
of  dislike  will  be  excited.  "  The  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against 
God,  and  is  not  subject  to  his  law,  neither  indeed  can  be.  So 
then  they  that  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please  God."  The  divine 
character  and  the  various  truths  of  religion,  presented  as  clearly 
and  impressively  as  possible  to  the  view  of  the  natural  man,  will 
call  forth  no  right  affections.  Let  his  reason  be  so  cultivated  that 
he  will  "  understand  all  mysteries  and  all  knowledge ;  "  let  his 
conscience  be  roused  from  its  slumbers,  and  speak  to  him  faithfully 
of  the  evils  of  his  heart  and  life,  and  of  the  judgment  to  come. 
All  this  will  fail  of  subduing  his  stubborn  will,  and  inducing  him 
to  hate  sin  and  love  holiness.  His  natural  kindness,  sympathy, 
generosity  and  gratitude,  how  much  soever  they  may  be  strength- 
ened and  refined,  will  not  partake  in  any  degree  of  the  nature  of 
holiness.  They  may  be  perfect  in  their  kmd,  and  lovely  in  out- 
ward manifestation  ;  but  they  will  make  no  approximation  to  real, 
.spiritual  excellence. 

But  you  may  not  be  satisfied  with  these  brief  and  peremptory 
statements,  and  may  call  for  arguments  to  support  them.  WTiy, 
you  may  ask,  why  may  not  a  change  from  sin  to  holiness  be 
brought  about  by  the  active  principles  of  the  mind,  particularly  by 
conscience,  I'eason,  and  self-love  ?  Surely,  it  may  be  thought,  a 
rational  being  may  be  influenced  by  the  clear  convictions  of  his 
reason  and  conscience  to  abandon  his  sins  and  walk  in  the  way  of 
God's  commands,  when  he  is  moreover  urged  to  do  so  by  his  re- 
gard to  his  own  eternal  well-being.  Why  is  not  this  a  just  and 
satisfactory  view  of  the  subject  ? 

When  we  enter  on  a  serious  consideration  of  this  subject,  we 


THE    CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION.  559 

are  met  with  the  appaUing  fact,  that  the  feeUngs  and  conduct  of 
unconverted  men  are  by  no  means  governed  either  by  the  convic- 
tions of  reason  and  conscience,  or  by  a  regard  to  their  own  high- 
est interest.  If  it  were  the  case,  that  as  soon  as  men  are  con- 
vinced by  their  own  reason  and  conscience,  that  it  is  their  duty  to 
love  and  obey  God,  and  that  their  present  and  future  happiness 
requires  them  to  do  tliis,  —  if  as  soon  as  they  come  to  have  this 
conviction  of  duty,  tliey  would  actually  love  and  obey  God,  it 
would  show  that  their  hearts  arc  right.  It  would  make  it  mani- 
fest that  they  are  what  they  ought  to  be  —  sincerely  inclmed  to 
perform  their  duty,  waiting  only  to  know  the  will  of  God,  and 
ready  to  do  it  as  soon  as  known,  —  disposed  to  pursue  the  course 
which  will  secure  their  own  eternal  happiness.  What  higher 
praise  than  this  can  any  rational  beings  deserve  ?  To  bring  men 
to  this  desirable  state,  that  is,  to  uifluence  them  to  conform  in 
their  affections,  purposes  and  conduct  to  the  dictates  of  enhghtened 
reason  and  conscience,  and  to  do  habitually  what  will  contribute 
to  their  highest  good  through  the  whole  of  their  existence,  is  the 
very  thing  which  the  Holy  Spirit  accomplishes  by  his  regenerating 
and  sanctifying  influence.  To  suppose  that  men,  while  unre- 
newed, possess  an  obedient  disposition,  or  that  they  are  ever  per- 
suaded by  their  desire  for  happiness  to  conform  to  God's  spiritual 
law,  is  contrary  to  the  teachings  of  Scripture  and  experience. 
What  is  the  testimony  of  those  who  have  been  born  of  God  after 
arriving  at  adult  years  ?  Look  back  to  the  time  of  your  first  se- 
rious consideration.  Did  not  conscience  admonish  you  of  the 
wickedness  of  living  without  God  ?  Had  you  not  a  clear  and 
painful  conviction,  that  endless  ruin  would  be  the  consequence  of 
neglecting  your  duty,  and  that  repentance,  faith  and  obedience  was 
the  only  way  to  secure  the  happiness  of  your  souls  ?  But  did  any 
admonitions  of  conscience,  any  persuasions  of  reason,  or  any  excite- 
ment of  desire  or  fear  ever  influence  you  to  repent  and  obey  the  gos- 
pel ?  Did  you  not  often  feel  this  very  thing  to  be  your  condemnation, 
that  while  you  knew  the  will  of  God,  you  did  it  not  ?  —  that  your 
heart  was  so  perverse  and  obstinate  that  it  would  not  give  up  the  love 
of  sin  and  submit  to  the  authority  of  God,  though  urged  to  it  by  the 


660  THE      CAUSE     OF    REGENERATION. 

strongest  conceivable  motives  ?  And  were  you  not  compelled  to 
acknowledge,  that  your  spiritual  disease  was  so  deep  and  invete- 
rate, that  no  arguments  of  reason,  no  convictions  of  conscience,  no 
cravings  of  self-love,  no  hopes  or  fears,  no  means  or  efforts  would 
afford  a  remedy,  and  that  there  was  no  help  for  you  but  in  the 
sovereign  mercy  of  God  ?  And  when  you  reflect  upon  what  you 
consider  to  have  been  your  regeneration,  do  you  admit  the  idea, 
that  it  resulted  from  the  natural  influence  of  motives  acting  on 
your  unregenerate  hearts,  or  from  any  efforts  you  were  excited  to 
make  ?  On  the  contrary,  are  you  not  satisfied  that  the  saving 
change,  if  produced  at  all,  was  produced  by  the  special  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  tiiat  the  good  effect  which  rational  motives 
at  length  exerted  upon  you,  was  owing  altogether  to  the  inward 
operation  of  divine  grace  ? 

And  what  does  your  present  experience  teach  ?  Do  you  find 
your  convictions  of  conscience  and  your  desires  of  happiness 
and  of  holiness  sufiicieAt,  even  now,  to  overcome  the  law  of  sin  in 
your  affections,  and  to  keep  you  steadily  in  the  way  of  life  ? 
Have  you  not  been  taught  the  humbling  truth,  that  youi-  heart  is 
still  deceitful,  earthly  and  selfish,  and  that,  without  the  constant 
work  of  the  sanctifying  spirit,  it  will  yield  no  obedience  to  the  will 
of  God  ?  Is  it  not  more  and  more  your  practical  conviction,  that 
you  are  not  sufficient  of  yourselves  to  do  any  thing  as  of  your- 
selves, and  that  all  your  sufficiency  is  of  God  ?  —  that  instead  of 
relying  upon  your  resolutions,  or  upon  the  dictates  of  reason  and 
conscience,  or  upon  the  impulses  of  self-love,  or  upon  the  power  of 
free  agency,  your  reUance  must  be  upon  the  all-sufficient  grace  of 
Christ,  and  that  unless  you  are  continually  sanctified  and 
strengthened  by  that  grace,  you  will  go  astray  from  the  path  of 
duty,  and  relapse  into  the  pollution  and  wickedness  of  your  nat- 
ural state  ?  Is  it  not  then  evident,  that  neither  means,  nor  mo- 
tives, nor  any  of  the  powers  of  man  have  any  efficacy  to  restrain 
you  from  sin,  or  to  secure  your  continuance  in  the  way  of  hoh- 
ness  ?  And  if  they  have  no  efficacy  with  those  who  are  already 
sanctified  in  part,  how  much  less  can  they  be  supposed  to  have 
efficacy  with  those,  who  are  wholly  under  the  dominion  of  sin !    If 


THE    CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION.  561 

any  unrcgenerate  man  supposes  that  the  power  of  reason,  con- 
science and  self-love  is  suflScient  to  take  away  the  heart  of  stone 
and  give  a  heart  of  flesh,  and  to  produce  cordial  obedience  to  the 
law  of  God  ;  let  him  make  the  trial,  either  upon  his  fellow  crea- 
tures, or  upon  himself,  and  see  whether  the  results  of  the  trial  will 
not  correspond  with  the  doctrine  of  Scripture. 

Most  of  the  prevalent  mistakes  in  regard  to  the  subject  before 
us,  manifestly  arise  from  an  incoiTCct  or  inadequate  notion  of  hu- 
man depravity.  Wishing  to  obviate  these  mistakes,  I  shall  just 
call  your  attention  to  the  following  positions,  which  it  would  be  no 
difficult  matter  to  support. 

Our  depravity  does  not  primarily  and  essentially  consist  in  any 
disorder  of  the  faculty  of  reason  or  conscience,  or  in  any  inactiv- 
ity or  weakness  of  self-love.  These  things  may  flow  as  conse- 
quences of  moral  depravity,  but  they  do  not  constitute  depravity. 
Our  dep-avity  essentially  consists  in  the  disorder  of  our  moral 
nature  —  in  a  wrong  disposition  —  in  a  desperately  wicked  heart, 
from  which  sinful  feelings,  purposes  and  actions  proceed. 

3.  There  is  no  established  connection  between  any  supposable 
exercises  of  our  natural  reason,  conscience  or  self-love,  and  the 
removal  of  this  moral  disorder.  Reason  and  conscience  may  be 
convinced  of  the  excellence  of  holiness,  and  strongly  approve  of 
it ;  but  they  cannot  cause  its  existence.  They  may  condemn  a 
proud,  rebellions  heai*t ;  but  they  cannot  sanctify  it.  Self-love 
may  aspire  after  happiness  —  a  happiness  suited  to  the  inclina- 
tions of  the  unrenewed  heart ;  but  it  does  not  seek  a  pure  and 
holy  happiness,  and  it  cannot  prepare  the  sinner  to  enjoy  it. 

I  have  mentioned  reason,  conscience  and  self-love  as  the  chief 
principles  which  can  be  supposed  to  bear  upon  the  present  subject. 
The  result  of  the  whole  investigation  is,  that  man  has  a  moral 
disorder  which  cannot  be  remedied  by  any  active  principle  in  his 
mind,  or  by  any  exertions  he  can  make  in  his  unrenewed  state  ; 
that  in  order  to  his  loving  and  enjoying  God,  he  must  be  born 
again.  This  new  birth  is  not  necessary  to  any  change  which  may 
spring  from  principles  natural  to  the  human  mind.  A  man  need 
not  be  born  again  in  order  to  change  from  intemperance  to  sobrie- 


THE     CAUSE    OF    REGENERATION. 

ty,  or  from  ignorance  to  knowledge,  or  from  indolence  to  industry. 
These  and  other  like  changes  imply  no  new  moral  principle,  and 
may  be  brought  about  by  the  exercise  and  improvement  of  man's 
natural  powers  and  dispositions.  But  holiness  is  a  new  principle, 
and  cannot  be  traced  to  any  thing  in  man  as  its  proper  source.  It 
must  come  from  the  new-creating  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  following  quotations  from  Edwards'  Treatise  on  the  Affec- 
tions are  perfectly  coincident  with  what  I  have  advanced  on  the 
nature  and  necessity  of  a  supernatural  influence  in  regeneration. 
*'  It  is  evident,"  he  says,  "  that  those  gracious  influences  which  the 
saints  are  subjects  of,  and  the  effects  of  God's  Spirit  which  they 
experience,  are  entirely  above  nature,  altogether  of  a  different 
kind  from  any  thing  that  men  find  within  themselves  by  nature, 
or  only  in  the  exercise  of  natural  principles  ;  and  are  things  which 
no  improvement  of  those  qualifications  or  principles  that  are  natu- 
ral —  no  advancing  or  exalting  of  them  to  higher  degrees,  and  no 
kind  of  composition  of  them,  will  ever  bring  men  to  ;  because 
they  differ  from  what  is  natural  and  from  every  thing  that  natural 
men  experience,  not  only  in  degree  and  circumstances,  but  also  in 
hind ;  and  are  of  a  nature  vastly  more  excellent.  And  this  is 
■what  I  mean  by  supernatural." 

"  Fi'om  hence  it  follows  that  in  those  gracious  exercises  and  af- 
fections which  are  wrought  in  the  minds  of  the  saints  through  the 
saving  influences  of  the  Spirit,  there  is  a  new  inward  perception 
or  sensation,  entirely  different  in  its  nature  and  kind  from  any 
thing  they  were  ever  the  subjects  of  before  they  were  sanctified." 
"  And  if  there  be  in  the  soul  a  new  sort  of  exercises  —  which  the 
soul  knew  nothing  of  before,  and  which  no  improvement,  composi- 
tion or  management  of  what  it  was  before  conscious  of,  could 
produce,  —  then  it  follows  that  the  mind  has  an  entirely  new  kind 
of  perception  or  sensation  ;  and  here  is,  as  it  were,  a  new  spiritual 
sense,  and  something  is  perceived  by  a  true  saint  in  the  exercise 
of  this  new  sense  —  in  spiritual  things,  as  entirely  diverse  from 
any  thing  that  is  perceived  in  them  by  natural  men,  as  the  sweet 
taste  of  honey  is  diverse  from  the  ideas  men  have  of  honey  by 
only  looking  on  it.  —  And  because  this  new  spiritual  sense  is  im- 


THE     CAUSE     OF     REGENERATION.  563 

mansely  the  most  noble  and  excellent,  and  without  which  all  other 
principles  of  perception  and  all  our  faculties  are  useless  and  vain ; 
therefore  the  giving  of  this  new  sense,  with  the  blessed  fruits  and 
effects  of  it  in  the  soul,  is  compared  to  raising  the  dead,  and  to  a 
new  creation." 

"  The  Spirit  of  God,  in  all  his  operations  upon  the  minds  of 
natural  men,  only  moves,  impresses,  assists,  improves,  or  in  some 
way  acts  upon  natural  principles  ;  but  gives  no  new  spiritual  prin- 
ciple. —  Here  is  nothing  supernatural  and  divine.  But  the  Spirit 
of  God  in  his  spiritual  influences  on  the  hearts  of  his  saints,  ope- 
rates by  mfusing  or  exercising  new,  divine,  and  supernatural  prin- 
ciples." 


LECTURE  LXXXVI. 


REGENERATION  NOT  OWING  TO  ANY  THING  IN  FALLEN  MAN. 

After  all  that  has  been  said  to  show  that  holiness  cannot  spring 
from  the  operation  of  man's  natural  principles,  some  one  may  say, 
I  am  not  yet  satisfied.  The  arguments  presented  on  the  subject 
may  be  plausible  ;  but  they  do  not  appear  to  me  conclusive,  —  ea- 
pecially  in  regard  to  self-love.  I  admit  that  man  is  naturally  de- 
praved —  that  he  is  worldly,  selfish,  and  alienated  from  God. 
But  if  he  is  convinced  that  a  sinful,  ungodly  life  will  end  in  dis- 
appointment and  ruin,  and  that  repentance  and  obedience  are 
essential  to  true  and  permanent  happiness  ;  why  may  not  his  nat- 
ural desire  for  happiness,  by  its  own  proper  influence,  lead  him  to 
relinquish  his  sinful  pursuits,  and  to  devote  himself  to  the  service 
of  God  ?  Why  may  he  not  be  persuaded  to  give  up  his  mistaken 
way  of  seeking  happiness,  and  henceforth  seek  it  by  a  life  of  obe- 
dience to  the  gospel  ?  — just  as  a  man  who  is  supremely  desirous 
of  honor,  and  has  been  seeking  it  by  flattering  the  vices  of  his 
fellow-creatuies,  may  be  convinced  of  his  mistake,  and  may  deter- 
mine to  seek  it  by  more  just  and  more  successful  means.  Why 
may  not  a  man  be  induced  to  forsake  sin,  though  he  loves  it,  for 
the  sake  of  that  happiness  which  he  supremely  loves  ?  Why  may 
not  a  serious  regard  to  his  own  eternal  welfare  be  sufficient  to  in- 
duce him  to  become  a  follower  of  Christ  ? 

In  reply  to  these  inquiries  I  offer  the  following  remarks. 

1.  The  desire  of  happiness  in  the  minds  of  different  men  is  not 
one  and  the  same  thing,  but  exists  in  a  great  variety  of  forms. 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF     GOD.  565 

In  the  sensualist,  it  is  the  desire  of  sensual  indulgence  ;  in  the 
ambitious  man,  it  is  the  desire  of  honor  and  promotion  ;  in  the 
covetous  man,  the  desire  of  money  ;  in  the  benevolent  and  sanc- 
tified man,  it  is  a  desire  for  perfect  hoUness,  for  the  enjoyment  of 
God,  and  for  the  happiness  of  his  fellow-creatures.  These  are 
some  of  the  forms  in  which  the  love  of  happiness  shows  itself 
among  men.  And  when  it  is  said,  mankind  have  a  natural  love 
of  pleasure,  or  desire  for  happiness,  no  one  can  determine  merely 
from  the  language  employed,  whether  the  desire  spoken  of  is  of 
one  kind  or  another.  The  happiness  desired  is  the  gratification 
of  some  inclination,  and  varies  as  the  inclination  varies.  There 
are  many  cases  in  which  the  pleasures  desired  by  different  indi- 
viduals stand  in  direct  opposition  to  each  other.  They  who  hearti- 
ly love  their  neighbor,  will  enjoy  pleasure  in  his  prosperity ; 
whereas  to  others,  who  entertain  malevolent  feelings  towards  him, 
his  prosperity  would  occasion  pain.  Hence  the  particular  kind 
of  enjoyment  which  any  one  desires  is  a  sure  index  to  his  charac- 
ter. 

2.  It  is  often  the  case,  that  a  desire  for  pleasure  of  one  kind 
has  no  connection  with  a  desire  for  pleasure  of  another  kind.  In 
some  cases,  such  a  connection  evidently  exists.  Thus  a  man's 
love  of  riches  may  be  closely  connected  with  his  love  of  honor  or 
sensual  indulgence,  as  the  possession  of  riches  may  contribute  to 
his  honor  or  sensual  pleasure.  Other  instances  of  a  similar  con- 
nection among  the  objects  of  desire  might  be  mentioned.  But 
there  are  cases  where  no  such  connection  is  supposable,  and  where 
the  objects  of  desire  are  not  only  unlike,  but  opposite  in  their  nar- 
ture,  and  are  consequently  incapable  of  coalescing  with  each  oth- 
er, or  of  being  in  any  way  subservient  to  each  other.  For  exam- 
ple, the  welfare  of  others,  which  is  the  object  of  benevolence,  is 
directly  opposite  to  their  degradation  and  sufiering,  which  is  the 
object  of  malevolence.  A  desire  for  one  of  these  objects  is  ex- 
clusive of  a  desire  for  the  other.  And  the  gratification  of  one 
of  these  desires  excludes  the  gratification  of  the  other. 

Now  apply  this  principle  to  the  case  under  consideration.  The 
self-love  of  unrenewed  sinners,  or  their  desire  of  happiness  is  not 

VOL.  ir.  48 


566  THE    REGENERATE     BORN    OF     GOD. 

a  holy  desire.  As  it  actually  exists  in  those  who  are  destitute  of 
love  to  God,  it  is  selfishness,  which  is  always  considered  as  sinful. 
The  pleasure  which  they  desire  is  a  selfish  pleasure.  The  good 
which  they  crave  is  a  selfish  good.  Their  desire  is  not  a  general, 
indefinite  desire,  which  seeks  pleasure  of  any  kind,  not  caring 
what  sort  of  pleasure  it  is.  Their  desire  is  definite,  reaching 
after  a  particular  kind  of  gratification,  a  gratification  which  is 
correspondent  Avith  the  predominant  inclination  of  a  depraved  heart. 
The  real  question  to  be  solved  is  then  the  following  :  —  Can  the 
desire  of  selfish,  sinful  pleasure,  —  which  is  the  only  desire  of 
pleasure  which  a  man  has  in  his  natural  state,  —  produce  a  desire 
of  an  opposite  character  —  a  desire  for  benevolent,  holy  enjoy- 
ment ?  Or  let  it  be  stated  thus  :  Can  any  excitement  or  modifi- 
cation of  a  selfish  desire  transmute  it  into  a  benevolent  desire ; 
or  can  any  excitement  or  modification  of  a  sinful  desire  transmute 
it  into  a  pure  and  holy  desire  ? 

It  may  be  said,  that  the  self-love,  or  desire  of  happiness,  which 
belongs  to  man  in  his  natural  state,  and  which  is  supposed  to  be 
the  means  of  his  renovation,  is  not  a  selfish,  sinful  desire  ;  that  it 
necessarily  belongs  to  every  intelligent  being,  and  is  neither  mor- 
ally good  nor  evil ;  and  that  this  self-love,  which  is  in  itself  inno- 
cent, may  be  so  enlightened  and  directed,  that  the  sinner,  under 
its  salutary  influence,  will  forsake  his  wicked  ways  and  choose  a 
life  of  obedience. 

I  grant  that  man  in  his  natural  state,  has  appetites  and  desires, 
which,  in  themselves  considered,  are  both  innocent  and  useful ; 
and  that  a  simple  desire  for  gratification,  being  common  to  all  in- 
telligent beings,  is  no  part  of  man's  depravity.  But  self-love,  as 
it  actually  exists  in  unrenewed  man,  is  not  the  same  affection  as 
would  exist  in  him  if  he  were  holy.  If  he  were  holy,  his  self-love 
would  be  under  the  guidance  and  control  of  a  higher  principle, 
and  so  would  be  just  and  impartial,  and  in  all  its  actings  would 
be  subservient  to  the  love  of  God.  Thus  regulated,  and  thus 
combined  with  a  higher  affection,  love  to  one's  self  and  to  one's 
own  enjoyiTient,  would  be  sanctified ;  it  would  be  a  consecrated 
thing  ;  and  all  its  oj  orations  would  be  to  the  glory  of  God.     But 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD.  567 

there  is  nothing  Hke  this  in  the  mind  of  the  unrenewed  sinner. 
Being  without  the  high  and  controlling  influence  of  love  to  God, 
his  self-love  becomes  supreme.  And  supreme  self-love  is  selfish- 
ness. And  if  any  thing  in  the  human  mind  is  sinful,  supreme  love 
of  self  is  sinful ;  and  it  is  also  the  fruitful  source  of  many  other 
forms  of  iniquity.  Supreme  self-love  is  directly  opposed  to  the 
authority  of  God,  and  is  a  transgression  of  both  the  precepts 
•which  Christ  lays  down  as  comprehending  the  whole  moral  law. 
Those  precepts  require  us  to  love  God  Avith  all  the  heart,  and  to 
love  our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  The  unregenerate  man  does 
neither.  He  neither  loves  his  Creator,  nor  his  fellow-creatures, 
but  sets  up  himself  and  his  own  personal  interest  as  the  supreme 
object  of  his  affection.  Even  if  it  were  otherwise  —  if  his  self-love 
were  indifferent  in  its  nature  ;  still  it  could  no  more  be  the  means 
of  changing  the  heart,  than  the  appetite  of  hunger  or  thirst. 
That  which  is  destitute  of  hohness  cannot  be  the  source  of  holi- 
ness. But  we  have  seen  that  self-love  in  the  unrenewed  is  not 
neutral  —  is  not  free  from  sin.  Existing  where  the  love  of  God 
is  wanting,  it  is  supreme  love  of  self;  and  supreme  love  of  self  is 
self-idolatry.     And  if  this  is  not  sin,  what  is  ? 

The  question  then  returns  ;  ivhether  supreme  self-love,  or  self- 
ishness, can  he  an  effectual  motive  to  holiness,  or  a  means  of  excit- 
ing supreme  love  to  God  ?  Or  it  may  be  expressed  thus :  Whether 
self-love,  or  such  a  desire  of  happiness  as  exists  in  the  unregene- 
rate sinner,  mag  have  an  influence  to  produce  a  saving  conversion, 
without  the  special  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit  ? 

Here  then  consider  self-love  simply  as  a  motive  —  a  motive 
■within  the  mind.  And  who  knows  not  that  an  action  is  according 
to  the  inward  motive  which  prompts  it  ?  If  the  motive  is  right, 
the  action  to  which  it  leads  is  right.  If  the  motive  is  wrong,  so 
is  the  action  resulting  from  it.  If  the  motive  is  of  an  indifferent 
kind,  neither  good  nor  bad,  and  no  motive  of  a  moral  nature  is 
combined  with  it,  then  the  act  resulting;  from  it  must  be  indifferent 
too.  The  great  motive  operating  in  the  unrenewed  sinner  is  self- 
love,  or  a  desire  of  his  own  personal  enjoyment.  This  self-love, 
as  it  exists  in  him,  is  exclusive  of  love  to  God,  and  so  is  supreme 


568  THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD. 

self-love  ;  and  this  is  manifestly  an  affection  in  direct  opposition  to 
both  the  first  and  the  second  precepts  of  the  law.  And  whatever 
such  a  motive  may  prompt  —  whatever  may  result  from  it,  must 
be  regarded  in  the  same  light.  This  principle  is  universally 
admitted.  AVhatever  a  man's  outward  actions,  his  volitions,  or 
determinations  may  be,  they  must  be  considered  as  corresponding 
■with  his  motive. 

Suppose  the  strength  of  this  motive  increased.  Suppose  the 
sinner's  dread  of  misery  and  desire  of  happiness  to  become  very 
intense.  What  will  be  the  consequence  ?  I  reply.  This  increase 
of  strength  alters  not  the  nature  of  the  affection.  It  is  still 
supreme  self-love,  and  will  exert  its  increased  power  to  maintain 
its  supremacy  in  the  soul.  Surely  it  will  not  be  more  ready  to 
resign  its  throne  because  its  strength  is  augmented. 

Suppose  then  its  strength  is  diminished.     What  will  be  the 

consequence  of  this  ?     Will   self-love,  will  a  sinner's  desire  of 

happiness,  have  more  influence  to  turn  him  from  his  wicked  ways, 

because  it  has  lost  a  part  of  its  power,  and  acts  feebly  ?     Will  a 

sinner  who  cares  but  little  for  his  own  eternal  happiness,  be  more 

likely  to  repent  and  enter  on  a  life  of  obedience,  than  one  whose 

regard  to  his  own  personal  good  is  awakened  to  a  high  degree  of 

eOimestness  ? 

I        Some   seem  to  think    that  the   selfish  principle   in  the  unre- 

generate    sinner   may  at   times   be    suspended,    and   that    other 

principles,  particularly  natural  or  constitutional  self-love,  may  take 

advantage  of  such  suspension,  and  induce  the  sinner,  for  the  sake 

\  of  his  own  good,  to  turn  from  sin  and  embrace  the  gospel  oflFer. 

By  the  suspension  of  the  selfish  principle  must,  I   suppose,  be 

intended  its  ceasing  for  a  time  to  act ;  as  the  affection  of  a  parent 

ceases  to  put  forth  any  sensible  actings  when  its  object  is  not 

present  to  his  view.     In  this  sense,  the  most  selfish  person  may 

sometimes  have  his  thoughts  so  completely  occupied  with  other 

things,  that  the  particular  objects  of  selfish  regard  will  be  absent 

from  his  mind,  and  of  course  will  excite  no  selfish  feelings.     Now 

^  suppose  this  to  be  the  case.     It  does  not  imply  that  the  selfish 

principle  is  eradicated,  or  even  weakened.     After  its  temporary 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OP    GOD.  569 

sleep,  it  may  awake  with  new  power,  and  in  pursuit  of  its  appro- 
priate interests  may  be  more  active  than  ever  before.  If  a  selfish 
person  should  suppose  that  he  has  ceased  to  be  selfish,  because 
his  selfishness  does  not  now  manifest  itself  by  any  visible  actions  ; 
he  would  discover  his  mistake  as  soon  as  any  object  suited  to 
awaken  his  latent  disposition,  should  be  presented  before  him; 
and  he  would  find  that  any  better  principle  which  had  gained,  or 
seemed  to  gain  a  temporary  ascendancy,  would  soon  yield  to  the 
dominant  principle.  How  groundless,  then,  how  utterly  falla- 
cious is  the  supposition,  that  a  man's  reason,  or  conscience,  or  a 
reo-ard  to  his  own  well-being,  can  take  advantage  of  the  suspen- 
sion of  selfishness  to  turn  his  heart  to  the  love  of  God  !  Surely 
the  heart  is  not  to  be  regenerated  by  any  such  stratagem  as 

this. 

Take  then  the  good  which  self-love  seeks,  as  an  objective  mo- 
tive. Can  this  influence  an  enemy  of  God  to  become  his  friend  ? 
I  do  not  ask  whether  it  can  influence  him  to  perform  external 
actions  which  have  an  appearance  of  piety,  but  whether  it  can 
gain  the  love  of  the  heart  ?  And  this  resolves  itself  into  the 
question,  whether  a  sinful  object  of  love  can  influence  him  to 
love  a  lioly  object ;  whether  a  selfish  interest  or  pleasure  can  be 
so  contemplated  by  an  unrenewed  sinner,  as  to  be  the  means 
of  brin<iing  him  to  love  a  benevolent  interest  and  to  desire  a  pure 
and  spiritual  pleasure. 

In  regard  to  all  such  subjects  as  have  been  touched  upon, 
there  is  a  common  principle,  well  known  and  generally  acknow- 
ledged, namely,  that  every  disposition  or  afiection  of  the  mind, 
instead  of  doing  anything  to  destroy  its  own  influence,  will,  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinary  laws  of  the  mind,  continually  acquire  new 
strength  by  exercise.  This  will  always  be  the  case,  unless  a 
superior  power  interposes  to  control  the  natural  principles  of  our 
intelligent  and  moral  nature.  Accordingly  any  direction  which 
can  be  given  to  self-love,  or  any  use  which  can  be  made  of  it, 
either  taken  by  itself,  or  combined  with  reason  and  conscience,  in 
the  mind  of  a  totally  depraved  sinner,  will  have  no  tendency  to 
dehver  him  from  the  dominion  of  sin.     And  is  it  not  exceedingly 

48* 


570  THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF     GOD. 

strange,  that  any  man  who  enjoys  the  light  of  revelation,  and 
feels  any  serious  regard  to  its  instructions,  should  labor  to  evade 
or  obscure  our  entire  dependence  on  God,  and  to  account  for  the 
change  of  a  sinner's  heart  by  the  operation  of  his  natural  powers 
and  inclinations,  and  that  instead  of  ascribing  the  work  of  spiritual 
renovation  wholly  to  the  Divine  Spirit,  he  should  give  the  honor  of 
it  primarily,  or  at  least  partly,  to  the  sinner  himself ! 

I  have  thus  endeavored  to  show,  that  the  renewal  of  the  heart 
in  man  cannot  result  from  the  exercise  of  any  of  his  natural  facul- 
ties or  dispositions,  nor  from  the  influence  of  rational  considera- 
tions, nor  from  the  inci^ease  of  intellectual  light  or  speculative 
knowledge,  nor  from  any  means  used  or  any  efforts  made  in  a 
state  of  unregeneracy ;  that  it  does  not  result  from  any  influence 
within  the  compass  of  those  laws  which  belong  to  our  intellectual 
or  moral  nature  in  its  present  degenerate  state  ;  that  we  have  no 
resource  within  ourselves  from  which  the  renovation  of  the  heart 
can  proceed  ;  and  consequently  that  it  must  be  traced  to  a  super- 
natural cause. 

But  whether  this  can  be  made  certain  by  any  reasoning  of 
ours,  or  not,  it  is  taught  with  great  clearness  by  the  word  of  God. 
And  the  course  of  thought  which  we  have  pursued  will  at  least 
prepare  us  to  understand  more  fully  the  various  texts  which  relate 
to  the  subject,  and  to  receive  their  meaning  more  readily. 

The  doctrine  is  evidently  implied  in  the  representations  which 
the  Scriptures  make  of  the  natural  character  and  condition  of 
man.  Man  has  destroyed  himself.  His  heart  is  desperately 
wicked.  He  cannot  even  apply  to  the  Saviour,  unless  he  is  drawn 
of  the  Father.  Representations  of  this  kind  abound  in  the  Scrip- 
tures ;  and  they  all  show,  that  the  remedy  for  man's  spiritual  dis- 
ease cannot  be  found  in  himself. 

The  same  doctrine  is  implied  in  those  texts  which  set  forth  the 
provision  made  for  our  renovation.  Divine  grace  has  introduced 
a  new  dispensation,  an  essential  part  of  which  is  the  mission  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  to  recover  alienated  man  to  the  worship  of  God ; 
to  give  him  a  new  heart,  and  to  work  in  him  repentance,  faith, 
and  obedience.     Now  why  has  God  sent  the  Holy  Spirit  to  accom- 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD.  571 

plish  this  work,  if  man  is  able  to  accomplish  it  himself?  "VVhy 
this  gracious  provision  for  our  moral  renovation,  if  we  have  within 
ourselves  what  is  necessary  to  bring  it  about  ? 

That  the  power  which  regenerates  man  must  be  supernatural, 
appears  also  from  the  account  which  the  Scriptures  give  of  the 
change  itself.  They  teach  that  Christians  are  bom  again  — 
created  anew  —  raised  from  the  dead  ;  —  that  whereas  they  were 
blind,  now  they  see  ;  —  that  all  things  are  become  new.  It  is, 
indeed,  true,  that  these  representations  are  mostly  metaphorical. 
But  what  is  the  design  of  metaphors,  but  to  convey  the  sentiment 
intended  more  clearly  and  forcibly  than  could  be  done  by  any 
other  language  ?  The  metaphors  referred  to  came  from  those 
who  were  awake  to  the  importance  and  greatness  of  the  change 
which  is  necessary  to  salvation,  and  who  wished  to  convey  to 
others  the  vivid  impression  they  had  in  their  own  minds.  The 
inspired  writers  must  have  employed  language  adapted  to  make 
known  the  exact  truth  ;  and  of  course  the  change  produced  in 
regeneration  must  answer  to  the  obvious  design  of  the  metaphors 
by  which  it  is  set  forth.  For  example,  the  metaphorical  repre- 
sentation, that  believers  are  born  again,  and  raised  from  the  dead, 
must  imply,  that  they  have  a  new  moral  existence  ;  that  they 
have  entered  on  a  new  mode  of  being  ;  that  they  are  the  subjects" 
of  a  spiritual  hfe,  of  which  they  were  wholly  destitute  before ; 
that  they  are  really  and  permanently  alive  unto  God.  It  may 
be  inferred  from  these  representations,  that  the  change  cannot  ori- 
ginate from  anything  in  man.  But  other  texts  settle  the  matter 
at  once,  by  expressly  ascribing  the  change  to  a  supernatural 
cause.  They  teach  that  believers  "  are  born,  not  of  blood,  nor 
of  the  will  of  the  flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God,"  — 
of  God  exclusively  of  all  other  causes.  "  God,  who  is  rich  in 
mercy,  for  his  great  love  wherewith  he  loved  us,  even  when  we 
were  dead  in  sins,  hath  quickened  us,"  i.  e.  made  us  alive.  "  Ye 
are  his  workmanship,  created  in  Christ  Jesus  unto  good  works." 
Accordingly,  if  any  man  is  renewed,  he  is  renewed  by  the  Spirit 
of  God.  If  any  man  is  turned  from  sin,  it  is  God  who  hath 
turned  him.     If  any  one  differs  from  the  unconverted  world,  it  is 


672  THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD. 

God  that  maketh  him  to  differ.     Holiness  in  man  springs  from  the 
divine  influence. 

In  the  whole  course  of  my  reasoning  on  this  subject,  I  aim  at 
one  result.  I  wish  to  produce  in  your  minds  a  deep  conviction, 
that  hoUness  will  never  result  from  any  disposition,  principle,  or 
effort  of  unregenerate  man  ;  that  there  is  no  prospect  of  the  con- 
version of  any  human  being  from  the  mere  operation  of  his  reason, 
conscience,  or  self-love,  or  from  the  mere  influence  of  any  rational 
motives ;  that  salvation  is  wholly  of  God  ;  and  that  in  respect  to 
the  accomphshment  of  this  great  work,  our  reliance  must  be, 
"  not  pn  him  that  willeth  nor  on  him  that  runneth,  but  on  God 
that  showeth  mercy." 

The  truth  of  the  doctrine  I  have  endeavored  to  defend,  is  con- 
firmed by  the  history  of  the  Church.  Look  at  the  time  when  our 
Saviour  appeared  on  earth.  Jesus  taught  the  truths  of  religion 
in  the  best  possible  manner,  and  estabhshed  his  authority  as  the 
Messiah  by  the  most  striking  miracles.  But  what  was  the  effect 
of  his  ministry  ?  Why  was  it  that  such  instructions,  and  the  ex- 
hibition of  such  benevolence,  wisdom,  and  power,  did  not  win  the 
hearts  of  the  Jews  ?  There  was  the  best  system  of  means.  There 
was  "  God  manifest  in  the  flesh."  There  was  a  person  who  could 
'  say,  "  He  that  hath  seen  me,  hath  seen  the  Father  also."  But 
what  was  the  effect  of  his  ministry  ?  In  regard  to  those  who 
remained  \mre generate,  it  was  this,  —  that  in  proportion  as  they 
became  acquainted  with  his  character  and  the  nature  of  his  king- 
dom, their  enmity  increased.  He  expressed  this  dreadful  fact 
when  he  said,  "  Ye  have  both  seen  and  hated  both  me  and  my 
Father."  As  to  the  few  who  became  his  disciples,  they  had  been 
given  him  and  drawn  to  him  of  the  Father.  The  unbelieving 
Jews  showed  the  fruits  of  unrenewed  nature,  and  the  effect  pro- 
duced upon  it  by  the  best  external  means.  True  believers  showed 
the  fruits  of  the  gracious  influence  of  the  Spirit. 

The  same  was  true  as  to  the  ministry  of  the  apostles.  Wherever 
they  went,  and  however  faithfully  they  preached  the  gospel, 
nothing  effectual  was  done  towards  the  renewal  of  sinners,  except 
by  that  divine  power  which  raised  Christ  from  the  dead. 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD.  573 

The  truth  of  this  doctrine  is  supported  not  only  bj  the  general 
history  of  past  ages,  but  by  the  consciousness  and  recollections  of 
the  most  eminent  Christians.  I  shall  refer  to  a  few  individuals 
of  this  class. 

The  account  which  Augustine  gives  of  his  own  conversion  shows 
that  the  renewal  of  the  heart  is  effected  by  the  supernatural 
agency  of  the  Spirit.  He  had  long  and  distressing  convictions  of 
sin  ;  and  under  the  influence  of  natural  conscience,  fear  of  punish- 
ment, and  desire  of  happiness,  he  was  roused  to  various  and  earnest 
efforts  to  repent  and  turn  to  God ;  but  found  himself  disappointed 
and  baffled  by  the  invincible  corruptions  of  his  heart,  and  was  at 
last  brought  to  despair  of  relief  from  any  resources  of  his  own. 

Halyburton  was  an  eminent  minister  of  Scotland,  and  Professor 
of  Dignity  in  the  University  of  St.  Andrews  near  the  beginning 
of  the  last  century.  Besides  several  works  of  distinguished  abi- 
lity and  usefulness,  he  left  a  particular  and  most  interesting 
account  of  his  own  religious  experience,  which  Dr.  Watts  ear- 
nestly recommends.  "  Here,"  he  says,  "  you  may  see  the 
crooked  and  perverse  workings  of  a  carnal  heart  in  a  state  of 
nature ;  the  subtle  turnings  of  the  old  serpent  to  keep  the  soul 
from  God,  and  all  the  counter  workings  of  sovereign  grace,  which 
in  the  end  appears  victorious."  "  Here  Halyburton  describes  the 
utter  insufficiency  of  all  convictions,  and  awakening  words  and 
providences,  all  tears  and  repentances,  all  religious  duties,  all 
vows  and  promises,  covenants  and  bonds  ;  and  how  sin  triumphed 
over  them  all.  All  these  left  liim  still  under  guilt,  under  the 
power  of  sin,  and  near  to  despair,  till  it  pleased  God  to  open  his 
eyes  to  behold  the  mercy  of  the  gospel,  as  a  way  of  hohness  and 
peace  ;  till  divine  grace  brought  him,  as  a  dying  sinner,  empty  of 
all  good,  and  helpless,  to  a  full  salvation  that  is  in  Christ,  and 
sweetly  constrained  him  to  receive  peace  and  holiness  together." 
Watts  then  adds :  "  Though  I  dare  not  confine  the  workings  of 
the  blessed  Spirit,  who  is  infinitely  free  and  various  in  his  ope- 
rations, 3^et  it  is  my  judgment  that  such  a  conversion  as  this  author 
experienced,  is  always  more  frequent  where  the  gospel,^is  made 
known  in  its  purest  light  and  its  divinest  glory,  and  seems  to  be 
more  akin  to  the  spirit  of  Christianity." 


574  THE    KEGENERATE    BORN    OF    GOD. 

Haljburton  says  of  himself:  "  "VVoful  experience  obliges  me  to 
acknowledge,  to  my  shame,  that  I  never  looked  towards  the 
Lord's  way,  except  when  he  drew  me.  Though  the  work  of  my 
own  conversion  was  congruous  to  reason,  it  was  far  above  the 
power  of  nature.  I  cannot  ascribe  its  rise  or  progress  to  myself; 
for  it  was  what  I  sought  not.  I  cannot  ascribe  it  to  any  outward 
means.  There  are  many  parts  of  it  which  they  did  not  reach. 
The  strongest  failed  ;  the  Aveakest  wrought  the  effect.  But  the 
work  was  carried  on  by  the  secret,  indiscernible  power  of  him  who 
is  like  the  wind  blowing  where  it  listeth.  The  voice  that  awakened 
me  was  the  voice  of  him  who  maketh  the  dead  to  ,hear.  The 
work  was  uniform,  though  variously  carried  on  through  many 
interruptions,  over  many  oppositions,  for  a  long  time,  by  means 
seemingly  weak  —  yea  seemingly  improper  and  contrary,  and 
suitable  for  him  only,  whose  way  is  in  the  sea,  and  whose  foot- 
steps are  not  known." 

There  is  scarcely  any  case  among  Christians  which  shows  more 
clearly  the  nature  and  the  cause  of  the  change  which  takes  place 
in  regeneration,  than  that  of  David  Brainerd.  It  is  specially 
evident  that  the  change  in  him  was  supernatural.  The  exertions 
which  he  made  to  obtain  the  spirit  of  piety  were  probably  as 
earnest  and  persevering  as  were  ever  made  by  any  unregenerate 
man.  What  those  exertions  were,  and  what  effect  they  produced, 
may  be  learned  from  his  published  Diary.  His  manner  of  life 
was  regular  and  full  of  rehgion,  such  as  it  was.  He  read  the 
Scriptures,  spent  much  time  in  prayer  and  other  secret  duties, 
and  endeavored  to  the  utmost  to  bring  himself  to  love  and  obey 
God.  But  his  efforts  ended  in  disappointment.  And  he  was 
fully  convinced  that  there  could  be  no  way  prescribed,  whereby  a 
natural  man  could,  by  his  own  strength,  obtain  that  which  is  super- 
natural. He  at  length  saw  that  all  contrivances  to  procure  sal- 
vation for  himself  were  in  vain,  and  that  he  was  utterly  lost.  "  I 
saw,"  he  says,  "  that  it  was  for  ever  impossible  for  me  to  do  any- 
thing towards  helping  myself;  that  let  me  have  done  what  I 
would,"  (that  is,  while  unregenerate,)  "  it  would  have  had  no 
better  tendency  than  what  I  did ;  that  my  state  was  for  ever 


THE    REGENERATE    BORN     OF    GOD.  587 

miserable  for  all  that  I  could  do,  and  I  wondered  I  had  never 
been  sensible  of  it  before."  It  was  in  this  state  of  self-despair, 
that  God  was  pleased  to  interpose,  and  by  his  effectual  grace  to 
renew  his  heart,  to  open  the  eyes  of  his  understanding  to  see  the 
beauty  and  glory  of  the  divine  character  and  the  way  of  salvation, 
and  to  trust  in  Christ  as  an  all-sufficient  Saviour. 

Now  if  the  word  of  God  is  true,  and  if  Brainerd's  own  convic- 
tions were  true,  the  change  which  he  experienced  did  not  spring 
from  any  power  or  disposition  in  his  own  mind,  or  from  any  efforts 
which  he  made.  He  was  bom  again  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the  will 
of  the  flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God.  It  was  a  work 
above  the  powers  of  nature,  and  was  wrought  by  the  power  that 
raised  Christ  from  the  dead. 

The  subject  of  regeneration  will  be  pursued  in  the  next  volimie. 


